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ANZSA STATEMENT ON UKRAINE

The Committee of the Australia and New Zealand Slavists' Association condemns the unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. We express our support for the people of Ukraine and deplore the destruction of life, property and cultural capital caused by the war. As scholars of eastern and central Europe we declare our commitment to the values of collaboration and the honest exchange of information in the region which is currently under grave threat.

TATYANA SMYKOVSKAYA

**Личность и творчество Максима Горького на страницах
прессы Гулага 1930-х годов**

Abstract: Maxim Gorky's visit to the Gulag camps remains one of the more ambiguous factors of the last decade of the writer's life (and of his complicated biography in general). His visit to Solovki, his authorial contribution to a collective book on Belomorkanal and some of Gorky's other deeds arouse a multitude of emotional and contradictory opinions. These opinions tend to create an 'external' and rather negative view of Gorky and the above-mentioned events of his life. However, the whole spectrum of scholarly conceptions on Gorky does not shed light on the 'internal' perception of his personality on the pages of Gulag newspapers and magazines ('The Builder of BAM', 'Literature and Art of the BAMLAG', 'The Remoulding of Volga Constructions', 'On the Storm of the Rail Track', and others). In these camp periodicals, Gorky's personality and his artistic endeavours were ideologically coded. Such codes were aimed at an approval of the Gulag system and the consolidation of official tendencies in Soviet literature.

Аннотация: Посещение М. Горьким исправительно-трудовых лагерей советского государства до сих пор остаётся одним из неоднозначных фактов (и без того непростой биографической канвы) последнего десятилетия жизни писателя. Визит на Соловки, авторское участие в коллективной книге о Беломорканале и многое другое вызывает множество самых противоречивых и эмоциональных оценок, формирующих внешний, часто негативный, взгляд на данные события. Однако при многочисленности разного рода позиций в литературоведении до

настоящего дня «белым пятном» является внутренняя рецепция, вылившаяся на страницы гулаговских газет и журналов («Строитель БАМа», «Литература и искусство БАМлага», «Перековка на Волгострое», «На штурм трассы» и др.). В них личность и творчество классика соцреализма подвергались идеологическому кодированию, нацеленному не только на обеление гулаговской системы, но и на закрепление официозных тенденций советской литературы.

Keywords: GULAG, M. Gorky, ‘remoulding’ of prisoners, Socialist Realism

Ключевые слова: ГУЛАГ, М. Горький, «перековка», соцреализм

После смерти Горького в июне 1936 года в течение нескольких месяцев литературно-художественные журналы и газеты ГУЛАГа (как и «вольные», представляющие официальную прессу СССР) открывались траурными строчками, посвящёнными великому советскому писателю:

Глаза горячи, тяжелеют веки,
Утрату попробуй – смерть:
Сердце прекрасного человека
Остановила смерть. [...]

Словами бодрыми и живыми
Ему столетья мерцать.
Мы будем хранить великое имя
Мастера и борца.

GORKY AND THE GULAG PRESS

Ярче, прекрасней молнии мига
В рассветную даль веков
В его великих и мудрых книгах
Пылает сердце Данко (Мольков 1936, 8)!

Непростая история под названием «Горький/ГУЛАГ» официально началась за семь лет до кончины писателя. Посещение в 1929 году Максимом Горьким СЛОНа (Соловецкого лагеря особого назначения) положило начало взаимоотношениям зачинателя соцреализма с ГУЛАГом. Власть активно использовала авторитетное амплуа пролетарского писателя, который и в 1930-е годы становился почётным гостем ряда гулаговскихстроек (Белтбалтлаг, Дмитлаг и др.). Очевидно, что природа данных контактов очень сложна и неоднозначна, поэтому противоречивость и диаметральность их оценок не удивляет. Так, А. Солженицын в опыте художественного исследования *Архипелаг ГУЛАГ* (1964-1968) открыто осуждает Горького:

Это было 20 июня 1929 года. Знаменитый писатель сошёл на пристань в Бухте Благоденствия. Рядом с ним была его невестка, вся в коже [...], – живой символ ОГПУ плечо о плечо с русской литературой. [...] / Толкуют, что там, наверху, глава литературы отнекивался, не хотел публиковать похвал УСЛОНу. Но как же так, Алексей Максимович?.. Но перед буржуазной Европой! Но *именно сейчас, именно в этот момент*, такой опасный и сложный!.. А режим? – мы сменим, мы сменим режим. / И напечаталось, и перепечаталось в большой вольной прессе, нашей и западной, от имени Сокола-Буревестника, что зря Соловками пугают, что живут здесь заключённые замечательно и

исправляются замечательно. [...] / Жалкое поведение Горького после возвращения из Италии и до смерти я приписывал его заблуждениям и неуму. Но недавно опубликованная переписка двадцатых годов даёт толчок объяснить это ниже того: корыстью. Оказавшись в Сорренто, Горький с удивлением не обнаружил вокруг себя мировой славы, а затем – и денег (был же у него целый двор обслуги). Стало ясно, что за деньгами и оживлением славы надо возвращаться в Союз и принять все условия. Тут стал он добровольным пленником Ягоды. И Сталин убивал его зря, из перестраховки: он воспел бы и 37-й год (*Архипелаг ГУЛАГ* 2010, 51; 53).

Академик Д.С. Лихачёв, бывший заключённым на Соловках во время приезда Горького, не одобряя действий писателя, замечал: «Горькому дали понять, что если он отведёт все обвинения от лагеря, то режим будет смягчён. Наверное, так оно и было... Горький сдержал слово, палачи – нет» (*Максим Горький [Алексей Пешков] на Соловках: визит писателя в Соловецкий лагерь особого назначения*). О мотивах поведения Горького поэт Е. Евтушенко, стремясь понять и даже оправдать, высказывался так:

У меня есть гипотеза, что Горький в конце концов понял всю глубину происходящей в России трагедии и даже на Соловки ездил только затем, чтобы впоследствии уехать и рассказать всему миру о сталинской тирании. Но тиран догадался звериным чутьём о намерениях писателя и прикончил его в сужавшемся кольце облавы – то ли ядом чекистской атмосферы, то ли просто ядом (*Максим Горький [Алексей Пешков] на Соловках: визит писателя в Соловецкий лагерь особого назначения*).

GORKY AND THE GULAG PRESS

Контрастность мнений во многом вытекает из отношения самого Горького к большевикам. Оно, как известно, не было однородным:

В тот период своей жизни Горький был вернувшимся «блудным сыном» большевиков, которые превозносили его на все лады. Убеждённый социалист, в прошлом близкий к Ленину, Горький тем не менее не одобрил большевистский переворот 1917 года. В последующих статьях и выступлениях он страстно осуждал переворот и «красный террор», называл политику Ленина «авантюрной», а послереволюционный Петроград – «трясиной». В 1921-м он эмигрировал в Сорренто, откуда поначалу продолжал отправлять на родину гневные послания. / Со временем, однако, его настроение изменилось, и в 1928 году он решил вернуться. [...] Причины его возвращения не вполне ясны. [...] Каковы бы ни были его мотивы, он приехал обратно с твёрдым намерением всеми силами помогать советскому режиму. Почти сразу же он предпринял целый ряд триумфальных поездок по Советскому Союзу и осознанно включил в маршрут Соловки (Эпплбаум 2006, 71-72).

Попытки проникнуть в причины, толкнувшие Горького к сотрудничеству с гулаговской властью, не прекращаются (*Максим Горький [Алексей Пешков] на Соловках: визит писателя в Соловецкий лагерь особого назначения*). Исследователи (Бородкин 2005; Плотникова 2023; Умнягин 2022; Эпплбаум 2006; Allan 2023; Gullotta 2018) сходятся во мнении, что это был комплекс факторов (синтез личной выгоды, веры в социальный прогресс, желания участвовать в формировании исторического процесса, сложная международная обстановка), ключевым из них называют идейные взгляды писателя:

Они стали плодом многолетних [...] исканий и сформировались задолго до 1917 года, почему их нельзя считать прямым заигрыванием с пришедшими к власти большевиками. Опыт СЛОНа и других мест «перековки», к которым после возвращения в СССР проявлял интерес М. Горький, был должен служить доказательством его убеждений. А именно того, что «нормальные условия быта, существование в коллективе, перед которым поставлена цель самостоятельно создать эти условия, приведут к нравственному выздоровлению тех, кого прежний режим превращал в преступников (Умнягин 2022, 30).

Внутренний дискурс, выраженный на страницах лагерных газет и журналов, не становился предметом литературоведческого изучения и, следовательно, не влиял на формирование позиции, стремящейся к целостности и объективной презентации тех или иных фактов. Цель настоящего исследования – выявить специфику отражения личности и творчества М. Горького в официальном культурном топосе ГУЛАГа и определить, как она сопутствовала возникновению и закреплению одного из устойчивых мнений о позднем Горьком, восхвалявшем ГУЛАГ. Анализ выполнен на основе художественно-публицистических источников, ранее не являвшихся объектом литературоведческого изучения и открывающим перспективы для рассмотрения моделей функционирования гулаговской литературы.¹

¹ Под *гулаговской литературой* подразумевается комплекс произведений, созданный в ГУЛАГе заключёнными во время отбывания тюремного срока. Это понятие следует отличать от уже укоренившегося в литературоведении термина *лагерная литература*, которая создавалась после освобождения, осмысливая историю и опыт личной судьбы.

В первую очередь в гулаговской прессе актуализировалась пролетарская сущность писателя. Делалось это нередко без обращения к биографии или творчеству Горького. Например, в газете Дмитлага «Перековка тридцатипятника»² сообщалось, что «члены коллектива малолеток-тридцатипятников [...], 2 участка Центрального района, послали в подарок к празднику 1 мая А.М. Горькому изготовленный своими силами комплект слесарных инструментов» (Суханов 1935, 1). В литературных произведениях это происходило прежде всего через обращение к одному из неоценимых суждений первого пролетарского автора. Так, в очерке *Монтаж жизни* (1935), опубликованном в журнале Байкало-Амурского исправительно-трудового лагеря (БАМлаг) «Путеармеец»,³ появляется заветное имя Горького:

Строительство вторых путей – это звучит знаменито. И если представить себе, голова закружится: три тысячи километров. А если вдуматься: второй, новый путь к жизни, путь в будущее. Почему же я, Медведев Александр Александрович, не этот прямой путь строю, а какие-то водопроводы протягиваю и склёпываю разные машины? Как это вообразить? Канализация будущего? [...] / Такие печальные размышления оказались вздором. Был возле меня неглупый человек. Я ему пожаловался, он ругнул меня: «А ты что думаешь? – сказал он. – Машину монтируешь?» / Он мне Горького читать приносил. Горький тоже кого-то приблизительно так ругает в статье: «Труд сапожника не

² *Тридцатипятники* – заключённые, осуждённые по уголовной 35-ой статье.

³ *Путеармейцами* в БАМлаге называли строителей «вторых путей», так в 1930-е годы именовали Байкало-Амурскую магистраль. БАМлаг находился на Дальнем Востоке, территория современной Амурской области России.

хуже труда лётчика. И тот и другой – нужны, полезны. Кто этого не понимает, то вообще ничего не понимает. Надо любить и уважать любой труд, если он полезен» (*Монтаж жизни* 1935, 15).

Акцентирование производственной темы, образа пролетариата связывалось с главной целью создания и существования ГУЛАГа – быстро поднять индустриальные показатели страны за счёт подневольного труда заключённых. Для её осуществления прибегали к самым разнообразным суггестивным средствам, в том числе к весомым воззрениям первого «рабочего» писателя.

Однако особенно веским было мнение Горького в культурно-идеологической области. Об этом на страницах гулаговской прессы, например, свидетельствовала большая статья *О Пушкине* (1909),⁴ опубликованная в 1937 году в литературно-публицистическом журнале Дмитлага «На штурм трассы». Материал оказался востребован в контексте официального процесса канонизации отдельных классиков отечественной словесности. В гулаговском издании он был приурочен к столетней годовщине гибели «солнца русской поэзии».

Определяющим было мнение Горького в области соцреализма. Направление к 1936 году оказалось внедрено в гулаговскую официальную литературу, приобрело в ней содержательно-поэтическое своеобразие, во многом встав в авангард ключевых тенденций советского художественного дискурса:

В ответ на вечно живые призывы великого пролетарского писателя путеармейцы нашего строительства должны ответить

⁴ Данная статья представляет черновой вариант лекции, которую М. Горький читал русским рабочим на острове Капри.

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высоко художественными, выражающими пламенную любовь к нашей социалистической родине произведениями, ответить подъёмом на новую ступень культуры [...]. Метод социалистического реализма – магистраль советской литературы, – должен найти своё применение и на строительстве великой железнодорожной магистрали вторых путей, верного залога обороны социалистической родины, могучего рычага нашего хозяйственного и культурного роста и славной кузницы человеческой перековки (*Конкурс творчества* 1936, 1).

Механизм идеологической работы демонстрирует материал из газеты «Литература и искусство БАМлага», получивший заголовок *Осуществить решения творческого слёта* (1936). На воспитательном мероприятии постановили провести конкурс «под знаком творческих рапортов Максиму Горькому от культуры БАМлага». Ключевая цель – овладение авторскими коллективами лагеря «метода соцреалистического реализма в упорной борьбе с натурализмом, формализмом и вульгаризаторством». Темы, которым должны строго следовать бамлаговские писатели, озвучивались с опорой на постулаты Горького, обозначенные на Первом всесоюзном съезде советских писателей (1934):

Широк и значителен круг тем, поставленный перед нашей литературой. Учитель и друг трудящегося человечества А.М. Горький указывает на эти основные темы, стоящие перед нами: социалистический труд – воспитатель нового человека,

пролетарский гуманизм, «перековка»⁵ потомков и наследников
мещанства в героев труда, женщина – организатор труда
(*Осуществить решение творческого слёта* 1936, 1).

Усвоение литературных инициатив Горького могло происходить тоньше, на идейно-тематическом и образном уровне произведения. Так, в 1939-ом году в газете «Строитель БАМа»⁶ В. Ажаев (Лахузен 1994; Lahusen 1997) опубликует рассказ *Медведь*, где, изображая идеологическое перерождение старухи Степаниды Ковальской и её сына Андрюши, явит стремление к осмыслению образцов соцреалистической словесности, а именно признанному в 1930-е эталонным роману Горького *Мать* (1909) (Смыковская 2023, 163-164).

Горький был инициатором не только «вольных» («Библиотека поэта», «Жизнь замечательных людей»), но и гулаговских художественных серий. Так, в Дмитлаге по его задумке начали выпускать «Библиотеку ‘Перековки’»: «Сегодня, когда наша ‘Библиотека’ уже подходит к шестому десятку своих изданий, многое кажется не столь сложным и трудным, как вначале. Тогда это представлялось более чем смелой затеей» (Фирин 1936, 51). По-видимому, в иных подразделениях ГУЛАГа по аналогии с «Библиотекой ‘Перековки’» стали создаваться свои книжные серии. Например, в БАМлаге такой сделалась «Библиотека ‘Строителя БАМа’», где публиковались заключённые-путеармейцы. В Дмитлаге Горький явился зачинателем ещё одного литературно-публицистического цикла книг:

⁵ *Перековкой* в ГУЛАГе именовали трудовое и идеологическое перевоспитание заключённых.

⁶ «Строитель БАМа» – главная газета БАМлага.

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Следуя советам Горького, мы начали также издание специальных книжек, посвящённых будущей истории стройки. При этом Алексей Максимович советовал меньше всего фокусничать и заниматься словесными выкрутасами, а в реалистических формах больше показывать живых людей в их живой конкретной действительности. Таким образом, у нас впоследствии возникла целая серия «Стахановцев стройки» (Фирин 1936, 51).

Из гулаговских газет и журналов становится известным, что Горький, приветствуя слёты, не просто приезжал в качестве почётного гостя на стройки ГУЛАГа, но и участвовал в культурно-воспитательной работе лагерей. Поэт Дмитлага С. Фирин замечал: «[Он] по-отечески, заботливо относился ко всем каналоармейцам,⁷ у которых обнаруживались литературные ‘дарования’» (Ставский 1936, 42). При непосредственном содействии Горького в Союз писателей рекомендованы поэты Дмитлага, Николай Жигульский (1906–1937) и Лидия Могилянская (1899–1937) (*Мы приняты в союз* 1936, 22–23):

Для литературного актива канала это факт большого политического значения. Наряду с высокой оценкой журнала, данной Алексеем Максимовичем Горьким и центральной печатью, вступление каналоармейцев в Союз писателей ставит наш журнал на своеобразную, но почётную позицию, открывает нашей работе новые возможности и перспективы (Жигульский 1936, 45).

Горький редактировал тексты лагерных авторов:

⁷ Каналоармейцами называли заключённых Дмитлага, строителей канала «Москва – Волга».

Разбирая произведения наших писателей, Леонида Богдановича и Михаила Брилёва, великий писатель требовал от нас высокого качества литературного материала, без скидок на «бедность», на молодость и неопытность. Это требование для нас священо и обязательно (Жигульский 1936, 45).

Ф. Тихомиров в статье *Реликвии советского гуманизма* (1936), приводя примеры горьковской редакции (Л. Богданович *Время зовёт*, М. Брилёв *Укус*, Н. Жигульский *Метель*), замечал:

Испещрённые пометками карандаша Алексея Максимовича, его редакционными замечаниями и выносками на поля – рукописи эти представляют собой замечательный памятник предельной внимательности, вдумчивости, редкого понимания автора темы и среды. / Не говоря уже о литературном совершенстве самой правки, в которой два-три слова «ставят на место» оборот речи, образ, поясняют и уточняют пейзаж, быт, взаимные отношения действующих лиц, – эти драгоценные для нас страницы учат тому, как надо говорить о творчестве с людьми, вступающими на этот путь (Тихомиров 1936, 18).

Горький покровительствовал не только лагерным литераторам, но и художникам:

[...] ещё на Белморстрое был выявлен художник-самоучка, в прошлом уголовник, Степан Дудник. Горький заинтересовался этим человеком, и после досрочного освобождения Дудника за ударную работу на Беломорском канале он помог ему поступить

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на учёбу и устроил ему стипендию. / [...] С трогательной заботливостью Горький относился и к другому белморстроевцу, графику Глебу Куну, которого Алексей Максимович считал очень талантливым человеком. В настоящее время Глеб Кун – член Ленинского комсомола и руководитель Центральной художественной мастерской Дмитлага (Фирин 1936, 46).

Из материалов лагерного корреспондента В. Ставского узнаём, что Горький «внимательно следил» и за работой самого дмитлаговского журнала, дал ему «высокую оценку»:

Каждый номер журнала убедительно говорит о серьёзной работе редакционной коллегии [...] и о том, что организаторы его искренне увлечены своей высокой, полезной работой. [...] / Значение журнала выражается прежде всего в демонстрации культурно-воспитательной силы государственной важной работы, посредством которой «враги общества» превращаются в полезных работников и даже героев труда (Ставский 1936, 42).

Отрывок из письма, адресованного литературному коллективу «На штурм трассы», и иные высказывания Горького, показывают: ему мировоззренчески оказалась близка идея перевоспитания, или как её именовали в советских исправительно-трудовых лагерях, «перековка». В журнале Дмитлага сообщалось: «На строительстве работает отряд имени Горького, агитбригада им. Горького. Но главное – имя Горького пламенеет в сердцах людей, которые перековались или перековываются, к которым не раз прямо обращался А.М. Горький» (Ставский 1936, 42). Именно «смену кожи» писатель прежде всего актуализирует в книге о Беломорско-Балтийском канале, называя лагерь

«небывалым, фантастично удачным опытом перевоспитания общественно опасных людей» (*Беломорско-Балтийский канал...* 1934). Эпитеты, имеющие гиперболическую семантику, не только указывают на масштабность происходящих перемен, но и обнажают глобальность упований Горького, связанных с его мечтой о возникновении безупречного человека, который «звучит гордо»:

Особый интерес проявлял Горький к выявлению и выращиванию литературных и художественных талантов из среды уголовной молодёжи. Он понимал и чувствовал, что эта прослойка нарушителей советских законов, в массе своей выходцев из городской и деревенской бедноты, – не потеряна для советского общества. Со всей свойственной ему страстью Горький работал над возвращением этих свихнувшихся с прямой дороги людей в радостную семью трудящихся Советского Союза. Отдавая должное политико-просветительской работе, важность которой Горький высоко ценил, он считал, что искусство является также одним из решающих орудий в арсенале так называемой перековки (Фирин 1936, 46).

Веря в идею переделки человека и уповая на неё, Горький, вероятно, в качестве главного примера мыслил себя, сумевшего выбиться, «выломиться» «в люди», преодолеть тиски косной мещанской, тёмной среды. Э. Эпплбаум замечает, что «многолетний интерес [Горького] к тюрьмам восходил к собственному беспризорному отрочеству» (Эпплбаум 2006, 72). J. Draskoczy полагает, что идеализация писателем *босяков* стала одной из причин закрепления в ранней советской культуре понятия «хулиганизм», придания

явлению почти мифологического статуса: ‘While hooliganism may still have been controversial in the early twentieth century, by the early 1930s it was already a popularized phenomenon. Its rise was helped in part by Maxim Gorky's romantic tales from the criminal world [...]’ (Draskoczy 2014, 108). Идеологи гулаговской «перековки» не могли не воспользоваться опытом личной судьбы Горького, его художественными открытиями, удивительно ставшими базой утопической теории и практики по перерождению тридцатипятичников.

Процесс переплавки, как убедительно показал М.М. Голубков, нашёл в сознании Горького и органическое сочетание с его гуманистическими раздумьями, верой в возможность настоящего образцового человека, никак не обнаруживающего себя в реальности:

В связи с этим Его принятие революции, ГУЛАГа, идея «перековки» старого человека в нового были связаны с гуманистической идеей искомого совершенного человека, созидание которого и было, по его мысли, целью всех революционных преобразований. Сентиментальность, о которой пишут все мемуаристы, органическая неспособность принять насилие, что показывают хотя бы *Несвоевременные мысли*, парадоксальным образом сочетались в его мировоззрении с надеждой на появление нового, подлинного Человека, хотя бы на Соловках или на строительстве Беломорканала – в результате прямого социального воздействия, перевоспитания (Голубков 2018, 150-151).

Гулаговская номенклатура, конечно, никаких понятий о высоких раздумьях художника не имела и расставляла акценты по-своему.

А. Плотникова, анализируя архив Горького за 1928–1936 годы, замечает:

Писатель [...] остро воспринимал несовершенство человека, видел путь превращения «социально опасных» людей в «социально полезных» через приобщение к коллективному труду, участие в большом деле, ощущение значимости собственной деятельности, а также пробуждение его собственных творческих сил – научных, художественных, литературных. Эта мысль звучала уже в ранних произведениях и статьях Горького, а в 1920–1930-е гг. была переосмыслена им в терминах индустриализации: переделка, «перековка» людей. Разумеется, представления Горького были очень идеализированы и расходились с реалиями советской действительности, однако именно они обуславливали ту поддержку, которую он оказывал деятельности ОГПУ/НКВД, [...] в деле «перековки» (Плотникова 2023, 305-306).

В качестве примера обратимся к статье *А.М. Горький о перековке* (1936), напечатанной в газете «Перековка на Волгострое». Первое, что подчёркивается редакцией из слов писателя, – это благородная цель «великого дела» перевоспитания: «[...] в корне изменить все условия старой, мещанской жизни, сделать всех людей равноправными, изменить весь мир» (*А.М. Горький о перековке* 1936, 2). Второе, что, вероятно, особенно привлекало Горького, пребывавшего в ожидании идеала всю жизнь, это стремительность процесса:

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Мы делаем всё для того, чтоб облегчить труд, создать трудовому народу жизнь лёгкую, весёлую, здоровую, братскую жизнь. Так как смысл этих слов наглядно подтверждён делом, он и помогает сравнительно быстро превращать бывших «врагов» в тысячи честных рабочих и героев труда, работающих на самих себя, для себя (*А.М. Горький о перековке* 1936, 2).

Завершает материал высказывание (выделено в рамку), не просто отвечающее духу соцреализма, но оправдывающее смертоносную сущность системы. ГУЛАГ создан ради колоссального будущего, для воцарения нового мира, «когда вы, свободные, познавшие великое значение социалистического труда, примете участие в деле дальнейшего укрепления и обогащения вашей родины» (*А.М. Горький о перековке* 1936, 2). Следовательно, необходимо похоронить «старое, мещанское прошлое», потерпеть в чудовищном настоящем и устремиться в грандиозное грядущее. Горький, рассуждая о «перековке», мыслит в контексте собственных мировоззренческих и художественных представлений (соцреалистические упования на обновление мира, противопоставление мещанской старой жизни будущей идеальной реальности и др.). При этом очевиден точечный заказ, связанный с обелением сотрудников НКВД, выполняемый, скорее всего, по просьбе главы комиссариата внутренних дел, Г. Ягоды.⁸

⁸ Горький с Ягодой не раз посещал гулаговские стройки. Об этом свидетельствуют фотографии, опубликованные на страницах газет и журналов ГУЛАГа. Например, см.: *А.М. Горький и Г.Г. Ягода на Перевинском шлюзе* (1935); 1936, *На штурм трассы: литературно-художественный журнал Дмитлага НКВД*, 7, 15.

Несомненен и идеологический заказ однотипных материалов, в которых Горький хвалит быт ГУЛАГа. История всегда построена как воспоминание заключённого о посещении писателем разных лагерных объектов:

И вдруг все оживились, повскакали с места. Кто-то выглянул в окно. / – Едут! Приехали! / Каналоармейцы высыпали на двор, выстроились у столовой, украшенной яркими лозунгами и плакатами, и громкими криками ура встретили подъезжавшую машину. / Мы увидели, как из машины вышел Алексей Максимович. Был он в осеннем коверкотовом пальто, на голове у него была маленькая цветная узбекская тюбетейка. [...] / Алексей Максимович, улыбаясь, отвечал на наши приветствия, потом зашёл в столовую, посмотрел, как мы обедаем, и оттуда направился на кухню. / Как сейчас вижу лицо нашего повара Блема. Не знаю, отчего оно больше горело и сияло – от жара ли плиты или от радости и гордости. / – А ну-ка, дайте попробовать, – сказал Алексей Максимович, и попробовав из котла пищу, произнёс удовлетворённо: – Каналоармейцев вы кормите неплохо! / Потом, выйдя из кухни, он пошёл к нашей великой радости, прямо в наш барак – в третью роту плотников и штукатуров [...]. Мы все бросились за ним. Каждому хотелось услышать, что скажет Алексей Максимович о нашем бараке. / Горький прошёл весь барак. / – А часто ли вас в бане моют? [...] / – Когда только захотим, тогда и моемся, – улыбнулся тот, довольный, что Горький обратился к нему, – можем хоть каждый день мыться. Баня у нас хорошая. / – Стройка требует здоровых и крепких людей, – как сейчас помню, сказал Алексей Максимович и обратился к представителю санчасти Тымановичу: / – Как вы

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заботитесь об ударниках? Что делаете для оздоровления быта?
(Буханов 1936, 7)

Фальшивость подобного повествования очевидна, читатели журнала, заключённые, не могли не знать истинных условий лагерного быта. Однако руководителей ИТЛ их мнение совсем не волновало, поскольку в связи с лживостью главной идеи «перековки», лежащей в основании гулаговского здания, это воспринималось лишь кирпичиком в бутафорском деле всеобщего счастья и перерождения.

Отдельной вехой в гулаговской прессе стали материалы, повествующие о смерти Горького. В Дмитлаге два номера журнала «На штурм трассы» оказались посвящены траурному событию, художники создали новые полотна и рисунки, каналоармейские музыканты написали музыку на кончину писателя. Помимо этого в серии «Библиотека 'Перековки'» была выпущена книга «Максиму Горькому» (1936), собравшая материалы о его сотрудничестве с лагерниками:

Письма Алексея Максимовича к каналоармейцам, к нашему творческому коллективу, воспоминания о выступлении его на слёте белморстройцев, встречи с писателем, посещения на канал, [...], стихи на смерть мастера [...]. Трудно говорить, как она [книга] сделана. Высокое качество издания отмечено центральной прессой Союза. А нам она бесконечно дорога, как память о великом человеке, любимом друге и учителе (Валентинов 1936, 34).

Если в Дмитлага главное внимание фокусировалось вокруг личности Горького, воспоминаний о его участии в производственных и культурно-воспитательных делах ИТЛ, то в БАМлага, вероятно, в связи с территориальной удалённостью лагеря акцент делался на творчестве.

Седьмой выпуск газеты «Литература и искусство БАМлага» за 1936 год был отдан материалам в память о Горьком. На первой странице расположилась большая фотография писателя, обрамлённая его биографией, а также цитаты Ленина и Сталина, фиксирующие значимость личности автора романа *Мать*. Второй разворот демонстрирует выверенный идеологический ракурс, которым руководствовались при отборе произведений. Главное место занимает *Песня о буре* (1901), и на страницах гулаговских изданий трактуемая как революционный призыв к грозной буре. Песня дополняется отрывком из рассказа *Симплонский туннель*, входящий в цикл «Сказки об Италии» (1911–1913). Из рассказа, получившего в газете название *Туннель*, извлечены пейзажные зарисовки и размышления о божьей каре, которая может настичь рабочих, «борющихся с землёй» и нарушающих задумку Творца. Редакция, усекая произведение, акцентирует образ рабочего, способного совершить невозможное. Так заключённым, строителям «вторых путей», «художественно» давалось понять, что они обязаны рассуждать и делать, как написал великий Горький: «– Человек – умеет работать! – продолжал он с гордостью. – О, синьор, маленький человек, когда он хочет работать, – непобедимая сила! И поверьте: в конце концов этот маленький человек сделает всё, чего хочет» (Горький 1936, 2). К отрывку примыкает знаменитая цитата из *Старухи Изергиль* (1894) о том, что «в жизни всегда есть место подвигу», безусловно, мыслимому в БАМлага как стахановский героизм на железнодорожном производстве. Через цитату актуализирована мысль об отказчиках (в рассказе «лентяи» и «труссы»), которые

не стремятся к подвигам и нуждаются в «новом понимании жизни», а говоря по-гулаговски, в «перековке».

Произведения писателя дополнены заметкой *Скорбь*, повествующей о создании в клубе траурного уголка, а также стихотворениями К. Фёдорова и С. Федотова о безмерной утрате советского общества:

Мы склоняем грузные знамёна,
чтобы их победными опять
ввысь рукою многомиллионной
к золотому солнышку поднять.
Мы проходим в похоронном марше
с мутной болью, стиснутой в груди,
чтобы завтра снова песня наша
горячей гремела впереди.
Ведь и сам ты, огневой и стойкий,
нас учил и петь, и побеждать,
и умеем мы, товарищ Горький,
от ударов спины не сгибать.
Революций гордый буревестник,
спи спокойно... Наша скорбь сильна,
и тобою начатые песни
допоёт родимая страна (Федотов 1936, 2).

Образ Горького, созданный в традиционной для соцреализма огненной поэтике, призван воспламенять сердца заключённых, должных, несмотря на боль, потери и горе, двигаться только вперёд. К стихотворениям примыкает рисунок *Алексей Максимович Горький на трибуне слёта в Дмитлаге*, подчёркивающий одну из центральных идей ГУЛАГа о единстве лагерных

строек, об общем деле трудового и культурно-идеологического перерождения страны.

Прямое слово Горького на страницах гулаговской прессы звучало редко. Если оно транслировалось, то оказывалось опосредованно связано с производственной и культурной средой лагерей, как, например, статья об А.С. Пушкине, опубликованная в дмитлаговском журнале. Художественные произведения писателя (*Песня о Буревестнике*, отрывок из *Симплонского туннеля*) встречены лишь в литературной газете БАМлага, в «толстяках» ГУЛАГа они отсутствовали. Это позволяет говорить о том, что представление о Горьком-человеке, о Горьком-писателе, открыто и безусловно поддерживавшем ГУЛАГ, не нашло подтверждения на страницах гулаговских художественно-публицистических изданий. При этом, безусловно, обнаружилось действенное стремление власти использовать биографию Горького, его избранные произведения (в основном раннего периода), мысли, гуманистические упования, склонность к просветительской деятельности в целях обеления смертоносной системы. Нескончаемая масса подобных материалов (как в гулаговской, так и «вольной» прессе) превратила Горького в апологета и культурную мифологему советской системы, потребуется немало времени, чтобы раскрыть и донести концептуально-сложные причины «сотрудничества» Горького с ГУЛАГом.

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ALEXANDRA SMITH

RECONFIGURING TOLSTOY'S VISION OF MUSIC:
MARINA'S TSVETAeva's 'MOTHER AND MUSIC'

Introduction

The autobiographical stories written by Marina Tsvetaeva in the 1930s that were devoted to her childhood in Russia represent modernist *Bildungsroman*. According to Gregory Castle, modernist versions of *Bildungsroman* offer a critical reassessment of 'the Enlightenment concept of aesthetico-spiritual Bildung' and promote the values of aesthetic education and individual freedom (Castle 2006, 1). They also offer 'a new questioning of the ideological subtexts' pertaining to personal development (Castle 2006, 4). The genealogy of modernism reveals the impact of aesthetic ideology influenced 'by the paradigm of *Bildung*' (Ever 2013, 185). Given that many scholars in the 1990s have argued that Russia and its successor the Soviet Union had a strong bond with the European Enlightenment, it is unsurprising that Yuri Lotman saw Russian *Bildungsroman* as an extension of European culture (Steiner 2021, 9). Like other authors of Russian *Bildungsroman*, Tsvetaeva had experienced her coming of age at a time of major political and cultural changes. The fragmented and intertextual style of her 'Mother and Music' (1934) reflects the instability she witnessed as a child.

Monika Greenleaf defines 'Mother and Music' as 'idiosyncratic memoir' containing 'a modernist discourse of memory' which articulates the superiority of 'indelible personal experience over materialist history narrative of transformation' (Greenleaf 2009, 826). The story contains 'comical and musical structures' and showcases Tsvetaeva's associative networks (Greenleaf 2009, 857). While fully acknowledging Greenleaf's analysis of 'Mother and Music' through the lens of Henri Bergson's ideas

on memory and simultaneity, this article will focus on the representation of music in the story as a tool for the construction of Tsvetaeva's identity as a female modernist poet. Tsvetaeva continued the Romantic-Symbolist line of European poetry, yet she 'resisted the Romantic tendency to allow language to float into pure music' (Smith 2016, 240). For Tsvetaeva, the modernist poet serves as an agent in the cultural process by engaging in visionary mediations between the living and the dead, such as T.S. Eliot discussed in his 1919 essay 'Tradition and the Individual Talent'. This vision of modernist poetry presupposes a belief in the organic unity of art. Eliot states that 'the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order' (Eliot 1975, 38). Similarly, Tsvetaeva treats Lev Tolstoy as a contemporary and interlocutor. Lina Kertman aptly points out that Tsvetaeva had a special affinity with Tolstoy throughout her life. Tsvetaeva's friendship with Tolstoy's literary secretary Valentin Bulgakov, and her correspondence with Tolstoy's daughter Tatyana, had special significance for her. Furthermore, Tsvetaeva often contemplated Tolstoy's life; together with her sister Anastasia, she attended Tolstoy's funeral in 1910 (Kertman 2020, 96; 117).

While living in Paris, Tsvetaeva wrote her essay 'Art in the Light of Conscience' (1932) which engages with Tolstoy's treatise 'What is Art?'. She also re-read *War and Peace*, and in her diaries of this period she frequently described Natasha Rostova, a main character in the novel, as 'the ballroom Psyche' (Kertman 2020, 98-99), thereby linking Tolstoy's heroine with musicality. *War and Peace* features two types of musical experience: 'one that gives rise to ecstasy' and another 'that prompts the listener to reflect on the dualism of the human condition' (Kovarsky 2000, 18). Being in full agreement with Kovarsky's thesis that Natasha's singing and dancing

illustrate her 'spiritual openness' and draw others 'into an intuition of the form that gives structure to natural flux' (Kovarsky 2000, 19), I would like to focus more on the association between the young Natasha Rostova and the Rousseauian idea that primitive human beings use musical language to express their feelings. In fact, in Tsvetaeva's 'Mother and Music' the narrator resembles Natasha Rostova: she can be defined as a naïve reader, and a naïve listener too.

As with Tolstoy before her, Tsvetaeva often re-uses Rousseau's association of musicality with emotions. She also relies on Tolstoy's vision of music entwined with 'the natural gift for harmony' as something that pertains to aesthetic, ethical and metaphysical terms (Kovarsky 2000, 19). In a letter to her friend Nikolay Gronsky (1909-1934) Tsvetaeva speaks of her appreciation of Tolstoy's fiction and states that, unlike poetry, fiction does not enchant the reader. In her opinion, all of Tolstoy's fiction excels, but its appeal does not rely on enchanting the reader (Kertman 2020, 15). It appears that in her autobiographical works Tsvetaeva uses Tolstoy's fiction as a template. Her works echo Rousseau's criticism of the upsurge of artificiality in humankind and recognise the importance of communicating emotion through music and melody.

Yet the idea of organic art in modernism does not offer a 'perspective of social harmony' (Ever 2013, 185). Marcel Proust's *In Search of Lost Time*, one of Tsvetaeva's favourite books, and her essay 'Art in the Light of Conscience', presuppose that 'any work of art is a work of nature' (Tsvetaeva 1988 (2), 375). Tsvetaeva's outlook is akin to the worldview of European Romantic poets influenced by natural supernaturalism (Grelz 2016, 7). Meyer Abrams applies this term to the works of Romantic authors whom he describes as 'metaphysicians and bards' and 'elected spokesmen for the Western tradition' (Abrams 1973, 12). Likewise, Tsvetaeva displayed a strong interest in the preservation of European culture amid the rapid social changes of the

1920s-30s. She saw herself as a poet-seer who longed for a spiritual rebirth through engaging with cultural heritage. Abrams suggests that those authors who seek a new unity with nature should be broadly defined as Romantic: they usually aspire ‘to save traditional concepts, schemes, and values’ by reformulating them ‘within the prevailing two-term system of subject and object’ (Abrams 1973, 13). In this context, Tsvetaeva’s works of the 1920s-30s can be described as neo-Romantic. Similarly to Karin Grelz, I see Tsvetaeva as an advocate of innocence who sought the return ‘to memory and childhood experiences as the ultimate source of her creativity’ (Grelz 2016, 7).

While the present article will analyse ‘Mother and Music’ through the lens of the modernist bildungsroman narrative, it will also explore Tsvetaeva’s engagement with Tolstoy’s vision of music as embedded in *Childhood* and in *War and Peace*. As will be demonstrated, Tsvetaeva’s story foregrounds the tension between the two aesthetic modes of representation pertaining to subject formation: the ‘painterly model of *Bildung*’ and its ‘new photographic’ version oriented towards ‘the superimposition of disparate selves’; and subversion of the fantasy of ‘the progressive, self-regulated unfolding of subjectivity’ (Ever 2013, 185). It will be also shown how Tsvetaeva challenges Tolstoy’s vision of female creativity.

Tolstoy’s Images of Music in the Nineteenth-Century Contexts

In her insightful study of musical life in Russia, Lynn Sargeant writes: ‘Over the course of the nineteenth century, Russian musical life was effectively relocated from the private to the public sphere, from the capitals to the provinces, from the intimate confines of the circle and salon to modern institutions such as the conservatory, and from the hands of amateurs to the control of professionals’ (Sargeant 2011, 3). Sargeant emphasises the role of the Russian Musical Society founded in St Petersburg in 1859 in promoting musical education and performances across the whole country.

To her account can be added that in 1858 Tolstoy helped organise a musical society in Moscow (Emerson 2010, 11). Musical life in Russia enabled Russians to define their cultural and national identities (Sargeant 2011, 6). Additionally, Anna Swartz claims that 'pianists and private music tutors were fashionable because they helped the younger generations of Russian aristocracy acquire the trappings of western culture' (Swartz 2002, 120). Although Julia Mannherz contends that Russian musicians were usually judged 'in relation to a consciously Russian or Western ideology' (Mannherz 2017, 294), many performers and composers, including Anton Rubinstein and Petr Tchaikovsky, were admired in Europe and America. While in *Childhood* Tolstoy describes his mother as a performer of European music for her family, in *War and Peace* he shows the growing popularity of European music among Russian audiences in different contexts.

Pianos were often found in the homes of Russian gentry and intellectuals born outside of Russian aristocratic society. Owning a piano and having the ability to play it were seen as signs of wealth (Swartz 2002, 120). Swartz identifies literature as a useful tool in promoting piano playing associated with 'refinement and gentility'. She especially praises the role of piano playing in articulating 'the nuances of romantic love' in Ivan Turgenev's novel *Home of the Gentry* (Swartz 2002, 120). Tolstoy, too, maintained a strong interest in music. While Emily Frey claims that 'Tolstoy often experienced music through the medium of amateur domestic performance', she also mentions his attendance at public events (Frey 2023, 187-188). Commenting on Tolstoy's love-hate relationship with music, Frey notes that Tolstoy was anxious about music's ability 'to imitate, access, and excite the emotions without rational intermediaries such as words and images' (Frey 2023, 188).

Despite Tolstoy's fear of music, Russian musicians appreciated the power of emotional catalysis and musicality embedded in his fiction. Tchaikovsky, for example,

wrote in several letters to friends that reading Tolstoy's works often made him burst into tears because of their ability to invoke a unique feeling which he characterised as tenderness (Frey 2023, 189). Tchaikovsky's observations can be extended to *Childhood* and *War and Peace*. In both novels Tolstoy links music to the expression of emotions and reproduces a popular belief that music 'exists in a mysterious and ineffable world beyond language' (Dubois 2015, 8). According to Tolstoy's son Sergei, for Tolstoy the single purpose of music is 'to unite people in one and the same feeling' (Count Sergius Tolstoy and Aylmer Maude 1926, 701).

This idea is expressed in *Childhood*. It features a young aristocrat Nikolai (Nikolenka) Irtenev who is at the start of adolescence. Tolstoy depicts him as capable of imagining music. Tolstoy considered *Childhood* to be a work that shows 'a universal human experience' (Tolstoy 2012, xxi). Nikolenka's experience of his mother playing the piano is linked to his spiritual awakening. This episode anticipates Tolstoy's explanation of the ability of true art to be infectious owing to its connection with authentic emotional experience. Similarly, in *War and Peace* both Natasha and Petya Rostov 'awaken others to beauty and are themselves sensitive to it' (Kovarsky 2000, 26). These examples echo Tolstoy's treatise 'What Is Art?' which suggests that art is not a product of technical training, because its goal is to transmit 'an intense feeling' (Tolstoy 1951, 389).

In chapter eleven of *Childhood*, Tolstoy portrays a subconscious flow of images invoked by Nikolenka's mother's performance on the piano. Tolstoy's mother was a gifted pianist trained by the popular Irish composer and pianist John Field. The episode describing Nikolenka's mother in *Childhood* is an invention: Tolstoy's mother died on 7 August 1830 when he was almost two years old. The novel describes Tolstoy's imagined effect of his mother's performance on him and, by extension, on any young child. 'To "imagine" music', affirms Pierre Dubois, 'means to represent it for

oneself, beyond the mere perception of it through the senses, and to project sense upon it' (Dubois 2015, 6). Dubois uses the term *imaginaire* to define the interaction between the performer and the listener: 'The *imaginaire* of music supposes that something more than music is added to it, [...] something that is partly invented and that transforms music into a complex construct' (Dubois 2015, 6). As Ernest Simmons affirms, the absence of a real memory of Tolstoy's mother contributed to the emergence of an 'idealised memory' of her (Simmons 1944, 46). Tolstoy's imagination transformed his mother into an embodiment of love and spiritual strength, as well as 'the very quintessence of feminine solicitude' (Simmons 1944, 46).

The presence of the *imaginaire* of music is exemplified by the description of Nikolenka as an appreciative listener. Tolstoy portrays him thus: '*Maman* was playing the second concerto of her teacher, John Field. I dozed off, and light, luminous, limpid memories rose in my imagination. Then she started to play Beethoven's *Sonata Pathétique*, and I recollected something sad, heavy and gloomy. *Maman* played these two pieces often, and I remember very well the feeling they evoked in me. It was like a recollection, but a recollection of what? You seemed to be recalling something that had never existed' (Tolstoy 2012, 38). According to Natalia Dame, Tolstoy differentiated between 'music as a pure form of art' and music that is used 'as an artificial language of social interaction' (Dame 2014, 174). Dame convincingly shows that Tolstoy often links the irrational power of music and femininity. She writes: 'If one accepts the pre-Oedipal metaphor of music and the feminine, Tolstoy's allusion to motherhood in his definition of art in 'What is Art?' serves as evidence for his awareness of the regressive power of music, which is capable of returning one to the pre-verbal unity with one's mother' (Dame 2014, 164). Dame alludes here to Tolstoy's 'What is Art?', which states that 'real art needs no ornaments, like the wife of an affectionate husband'. Commenting on 'Lucerne' (1857), she states that for the later Tolstoy 'the

ineffability of musical expression and its resistance to language do not produce a sense of collective euphoria, but instead create a danger of equivocation' (Dame 2014, 165-66). Indeed, Tolstoy had a long-standing interest in the ability of music to affect one's feelings by activating human emotions. In his diary entry for 19 November 1851 Tolstoy compares music to poetry and highlights its ability to affect people in the way involuntary memories do: 'Music affects the power to imagine your feelings [...]. Poetry affects the power to imagine both the one and the other, i.e. reality or the relations of our feelings towards nature [...]' (Christian 1985, 1, 39-40). Tolstoy also suggests that 'music has the advantage over poetry', because its imitation of feelings is 'more absolute'. For Tolstoy, music lacks the clarity 'that constitutes the property of poetry' (Christian 1985 (1), 40).

Tolstoy's vision of music that could infect the listener presupposes the sincere feeling embedded in the music by the composer. Both the performer and the listener become infected by music. In *Childhood* the mother's performance is understood as a divine grace. In *War and Peace* Natasha's singing is also perceived by listeners as something that inspires them to long for a harmonising vision of reality that helps overcome pain and suffering. Commenting on the bond between spirituality and well-performed music in Tolstoy's fiction, Emerson writes: 'Music restores the sense of being loved' (Emerson 2010, 17). She highlights the importance of sincerity to Tolstoy. 'Sincerity ('iskrennost') of artistic expression', states Emerson, 'dissolves all outside points of view in a one-way, unbroken transmission of feeling' (Emerson 2010, 17).

Childhood presents Tolstoy's mother as a student of John Field (1782-1837). Field trained many Russian pianists and composers during his thirty-year stay in Russia. The list of Field's gifted students includes Maria Szymanowska, Alexander Alyabyev and Mikhail Glinka. Towards the end of Field's life one Russian periodical

stated: 'Russia may boast that she has the best school of piano teachers' (Piggott 1973, 113). Field is also well-known for his creation of the 'wordless love songs' known as nocturnes. They were especially appreciated for their dream-like poetic quality. As Patrick Piggott puts it, Field's nocturne was perceived 'as a crystallisation of an idiom through which a new aspect of the romantic movement could be channelled into the mainstream music' (Piggott 1973, 115). In the 1850s-60s Franz Schubert and Franz Liszt published several collected editions of Field's nocturnes. Field's nocturnes were appreciated for their 'formal simplicity, extended pedalling technique and the flexible use of time' (Clark 2023, 285). Katelyn Clark views Field's nocturne 'as a product of travel and place' and as 'a Russia-based idiom' (Clark 2023, 286). In her opinion, 'the extreme northern latitude of St Petersburg [...] creating long winter nights and pearl-coloured summer evenings' provided Field with the unique environment that inspired Liszt to imagine Field's nocturnes 'as a Russian-created genre' (ibid.). In 1879 George Grove described Field as a Russian pianist whose piano technique was 'distinguished by the most smooth and equable touch' (ibid., 287). It appears that Field was inspired by Russian landscapes and his total freedom from any formal constraints (ibid., 304).

As has been noted above, Tolstoy describes the profound effect of Field's music on Nikolenka as light, luminous and invoking mysterious memories of 'something that had never existed' (Tolstoy 2012, 38). It can be inferred from this description that other listeners of Field's nocturnes felt transported into an idyllic, Eden-like place. In *Childhood* the specific mood of remembering something from a distant past, triggered by music, is inseparable from a nostalgic longing for the myth of happy childhood.

The experience of music in *Childhood* also points to the presence of a strong metaphysical dimension in the author's imagination. 'In Tolstoy's fiction', asserts Emerson, 'music is frequently present at transitions between life and death' (Emerson

2010, 23). Tolstoy was partially influenced by Romantic theories of music that discuss music as an ephemeral artistic mode of expression and something different from verbal communication. Emerson aptly defines Tolstoy's vision of music 'as a kind of optimal energy transfer' (Emerson 2010, 24). In 1906 Tolstoy described music as 'the stenography of feeling' (Sergius Tolstoy 1926, 700). Tolstoy's son Sergei states that Tolstoy's vision of music stands close to Schopenhauer's idea that music does not express the phenomenal world, but only 'the abstract and the general essence' (Sergius Tolstoy 1926, 700).

Some changes in Tolstoy's aesthetics throughout his life notwithstanding, his belief in literature as the main mode of communication with others remained unchanged. Donna Orwin explains that Tolstoy was 'extremely consistent in his analysis of human nature and the human condition' (Orwin 1993, 15). Yet she claims that Tolstoy's extreme individualism and his inner struggle precluded him from developing his own metaphysical concepts. It is his obsession with analysis that 'would destroy beliefs necessary for life and art' (Orwin 1993, 16). It can be added to Orwin's statements that Tolstoy's portrayal of musical performances is related to his vision of the role of music in developing human emotions. His views resemble the ideas of the Austrian music critic Eduard Hanslick (1825-1904) who had published his treatise *On the Musically Beautiful* in 1854, two years after Tolstoy's *Childhood* was published. Like Tolstoy, Hanslick claims that music can awaken feelings in people. However, as Hanslick affirms, music cannot represent emotions because it 'does not possess the attributes of [...] exclusiveness, and uniformity' (Hanslick 1891, 25-6).

Richard Wagner associated music with the female principle and the word with the male one. In 1851 he wrote that 'music is a woman' (Rather 1983, 14). For Wagner, music arises from an 'immediate consciousness of the oneness of our inner essence with that of the world' (Goehr 1996, 200). According to Robin Millner-Gulland

and Olga Sobolev, despite Wagner's concept of music-drama being alien to Tolstoy, 'a more general kinship of attitude should not be denied' (Millner-Gulland and Sobolev 2021, 267). Commenting on Tolstoy's musical taste, they write: 'An enthusiast for Mozart and Italian opera, he was completely "deaf" to late German Romantics (Liszt, Brahms, Wagner and Richard Strauss) as well as to Russian "art" music' (Millner-Gulland and Sobolev 2021, 270-271). Sergey Tolstoy has also acknowledged that his father saw Beethoven as 'the originator of the decline that continued into modern times' (Millner-Gulland and Sobolev 2021, 272). In the first draft of *Childhood* Tolstoy wrote about his impression of Beethoven's music thus: 'These long-familiar sounds of the piece played by maman engendered in me a sweet and at the same time alarming feeling. She played the Sonate Pathétique by Beethoven' (Millner-Gulland and Sobolev 2021, 272).

In contrast to his love-hate relationship with Beethoven's music, Tolstoy was fond of Russian and European folk music. According to Keri Hui, Tolstoy liked folk tunes for 'their melodic simplicity' (Hui 2022, 79). Hui links Tolstoy's vision of art, including folk music, to his ongoing rereading of Rousseau and the Gospels: 'In this Rousseauian gospel, musical simplicity became the means of an artistic, ascetic, and yet not aesthetic salvation that could deliver men from the curse of civilization' (Hui 2022, 79). For Tolstoy, the sincerity of the composer can be discerned in the form of musical brevity and melodic simplicity. Maude explains that Tolstoy's work among peasant children 'has convinced him that the normal human being possesses capacities for the enjoyment of art' (Maude 1911, 378). Yet Hui points to the influence of Rousseau on Tolstoy and affirms that he 'envisioned an idealized universal sound of melodic simplicity that resembled Rousseau's sentimental aesthetics'. Hui aptly suggests that Tolstoy longed for a 'musical return to nature—a childlike, "pre-fall" state that has no need of development' (Hui 2022, 105).

In summary, Tolstoy's ongoing engagement with Rousseau's ideas is also evident in his views on music. Tolstoy scattered throughout his works critical views of classical music that was oriented towards artificial effects instead of inner beauty, challenging the *Bildung's* notion of progressive personal development as something that is heavily influenced by European aristocratic culture. He grew to appreciate instead the childhood experiences and child-like mentality of peasants.

Yet Tolstoy's views on women and music differ from Rousseau's opinions on creativity and gender. Tolstoy's works often feature gifted female performers, including pianists and singers. In contrast, Rousseau strongly held that women were incapable of producing works of passion and significance. According to Rousseau, 'women, in general, do not like the arts, have limited knowledge of them, and possess no genius' (Rousseau 1967, 199-200). Jacqueline Letzter and Robert Adelson explain that women's musical education in the eighteenth century did not encourage women to develop their talent: 'Although women were admitted to the Conservatoire, their curriculum was severely limited' (Letzter and Adelson 2009, 71-72). They also point out that despite Rousseau's dismissal of the possibility of female genius, French women composers and librettists saw Rousseau's sentimentalist novel *Julie, or the New Heloise* (1761) as a model for their own artistic expression. They appropriated Rousseau's ideals for their operas with a view to being successful. 'Women not only seemed comfortable treating themes that celebrated feeling, youthful innocence and domestic bliss', write Letzter and Adelson, 'but were also drawn to a sentimental genre that promoted their own virtues [...]' (Letzter and Adelson 2009, 74). Viewed in this light, Tolstoy's depiction of his mother's piano performance in *Childhood* was meant to invoke in his readers the sentimental style of Rousseau manifested in his operas and his novel *Julie, or the New Heloise*. Rousseau's works advocating sentimental values highlighted the advantages of rural simplicity over the sophistication of

urban life. This view had a resonance with Tolstoy's novels, especially *War and Peace*.

Tsvetaeva's vision of memory and childhood in the 1930s

Vladislav Khodasevich, a leading émigré poet and critic, responded enthusiastically to Tsvetaeva's 'Mother and Music'. He suggests that from its subject matter it can be interpreted as autobiography. Yet for Khodasevich it is not a typical memoir owing to 'the solution of the tasks which the author had undoubtedly set up for herself' (Karlinsky 1986, 219). Khodasevich especially praises 'a psychological pattern which is of interest in itself' (Karlinsky 1986, 219). Khodasevich was a Russian émigré modernist writer familiar with artistic experiments pertaining to psychoanalysis and Surrealism. Khodasevich's fellow émigré writers Irina Odoevtseva and George Ivanov were close friends with the influential French thinker and surrealist poet Georges Bataille (Odoevtseva 1989, 128). Prior to his emigration, Khodasevich knew of psychoanalytical approaches to literature, thanks to his friend Ivan Ermakov, a leading Russian psychoanalyst. In 1938 Khodasevich wrote his essay 'Curious Findings of Psychoanalysis' ('Kur'ezy psikhoanaliza'). Khodasevich's observations on 'Mother and Music' indicate that he saw Tsvetaeva as a modernist writer aware of psychoanalysis. Indeed, 'Mother and Music' offers some snapshots of the narrator's childhood, rather than a coherent chronological account. While most authors of nineteenth-century memoirs narrate real events from the viewpoint of a witness, modernist texts foreground 'a subjective perspective and evaluation' (Holmgren 2003, xi).

The assertion by Toby W. Clyman and Judith Vowels that 'historically, women's texts have often displayed a keener consciousness of gender than men's texts' (Clyman and Vowels 1996, 5) is fully applicable to Tsvetaeva. Olga Hasty rightly notes that Tsvetaeva's stories express 'the rebellion against feminine stereotypes that

is characteristic of her verse' (Hasty 2019, 116). Indeed, 'Mother and Music' reinforces the author's rebellion against the limited opportunities available to female poets and performers in the 1880s-1930s. Tsvetaeva subverts the memoir-like description of the past and emulates literary devices used in Tolstoy's *Childhood* and Andrey Bely's *Kotik Letaev*. Yet, as Khodasevich explains, Tsvetaeva's story has the potential to be developed stylistically into a novel in the style of Tolstoy's and Bely's autobiographical novels in which the child's vision is used for the defamiliarisation effect (Khodasevich 2003, 458).

Tsvetaeva's resistance to producing an autobiographical novel in the style of her predecessors can be explained by her interest in Proust's conception of memory associated with involuntary memories. Proust's new mode of remembrance gained popularity among Russian émigré writers during the 1930s: their memoirs became infused with 'creative transformation' (Greenleaf 2008, 830). Shklovsky's concept of defamiliarisation as articulated in his essay 'Art as Device' is also relevant to Tsvetaeva's 'Mother and Music', especially because Shklovsky uses many examples from Tolstoy's works, including *War and Peace*. Tsvetaeva's allusion to the representation of motherhood and music in *Childhood* was meant to remind her readers about a typical Russian childhood before 1917.

Andrew Wachtel defines Tolstoy's *Childhood* as the first example of the pseudo-biography genre in which the author and the narrator are not the same individuals (Wachtel 1990, 16). Wachtel acknowledges that in *Childhood* Tolstoy borrows from many European sources, including Rousseau's *Confessions*. The use of intertextual links in *Childhood* helps Tolstoy to create his own distinctly Russian pseudo-autobiography (Wachtel 1990, 3). In contrast to Wachtel, Donna Orwin defines Tolstoy's *Childhood* 'as a unique combination of analysis, lyricism, and praise of nature and of the female principle (in this case the mother)' (Orwin 1992, 175). Similarly,

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Tsvetaeva's 'Mother and Music' effectively blends lyricism with reflexivity. Another goal of 'Mother and Music' is to replace Tolstoy's anxieties about music and female sexuality, portrayed in several of his works as disruptive forces, with the celebration of unbound female creativity.

Tsvetaeva's Images of Childhood and Music in 'Mother and Music'

Tsvetaeva, like Tolstoy, was an attentive reader of Rousseau. She engaged with Rousseau's works on many occasions. Sarah Cheang contends that Tsvetaeva 'shared with the eighteenth-century philosopher an experience of personal, social and existential isolation'. Cheang rightly asserts that Rousseau's influence is felt in both Tsvetaeva's views on childhood and 'in her unwavering commitment to her [...] literary vocation' (Cheang 2013, 619). Tsvetaeva acquired her near-native fluency in French in childhood, and her childhood home was a 'particular world of French spirit' (ibid., 620). In addition to her French lessons at home, Tsvetaeva interacted in French with her Swiss great-aunt Tio. She studied in a French-speaking school in Lausanne in 1902. During the summer of 1909 she studied French medieval literature at the University of Sorbonne.

Tsvetaeva's worldview was largely influenced by Rousseau's philosophy of the freedom of thought. Cheang explains that on the existential level Tsvetaeva, like Rousseau, 'experienced personal and social isolation'. Cheang also notes that they had 'a common interest in literary forms allowing the expression of the self', and that their understanding of the nature of humankind was similar, too. It suggests 'close proximity between divine and human principles' (ibid., 620-621). Rousseau and Tsvetaeva also shared a strong interest in theatre and in sentimentalist literature.

The difference between Rousseau and Tsvetaeva lies in the sphere of gender politics: 'Mother and Music' openly rebels against the uncontested superiority of men

in arts. It also invokes the views of French female composers and librettists who fought against repressive misogynist ideology. Letzter and Adelson state: ‘Women composers and librettists of the 1790s were the most vocal in protesting their continuing exclusion from the many advantages brought about by the democratization of the institution of opera and society as a whole’ (Letzter and Adelson 2000, 90). In Russia, the process of democratisation was associated with the reforms of the 1860s. Yet most Russian female pianists struggled to gain recognition as professional performers, despite attending the Conservatory in either St Petersburg or Moscow, which both achieved fame outside Russia. In December 1912, for example, the St Petersburg Conservatory received numerous greetings from foreign conservatories and musicians for its fiftieth anniversary. They indicate that Russian music had become an integral part of European musical culture (Sargeant 2011, 4).

Maria Aleksandrovna Mein (1868-1906), Tsvetaeva’s mother, grew up during a period of significant change in Russia. She lost her mother when she was a few weeks old. Her father Aleksandr Danilovich Mein was of German origin. He was well-known in Moscow for being head of Chancery for the Governor-General of Moscow, editor of *The Moscow Provincial News* and director of the Land Bank. He also collected books and antique casts. According to Viktoria Shveitser, Maria lived in a beautifully furnished house with an excellent piano and grew up ‘under the tutelage of a Swiss governess Susanna Davydovna [...]’ (Shveitser 1992, 14). Maria Aleksandrovna had a passion for reading books and playing music. Shveitser notes: ‘She was given an excellent education at home, became fluent in four European languages, had an excellent knowledge of history and literature, wrote verse in Russian and German [...]. Her piano teacher was one of Nikolay Rubinstein’s best pupils. She also had artistic ability and had lessons from the well-known genre painter Mikhail Klodt’ (Shveitser 1992, 14).

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Mein wanted to be a concert pianist, but her father would not approve of this career because of prejudices held by him and his friends towards emancipated women artists (Shveitser 1992, 15). Shveitser thinks that Mein's submission to the desire of her father reveals her love for him, as well as 'meekness inculcated by her upbringing' (Shveitser 1992, 15). In 1891 she married Professor Ivan Tsvetaev, a widower with two children, who was twenty-one years her senior. Many scholars describe this marriage as an escape after Maria's infatuation with a married man and her father's intervention into the affair. Marina Tsvetaeva asserted that despite her grandfather ruining her mother's life she always adored him (Shveitser 1992, 16). Shveitser contends: 'It is to Maria Aleksandrovna's credit that she never [...] departed from the ideals of her youth, but continued to live for music, literature, and the beauties of nature, and brought up her daughters in the same way' (Shveitser 1992, 18). Tsvetaeva's father was busy with administrative and teaching duties at the University of Moscow in the Department of Fine Arts and Antiquities and at the Rumyantsev museum. He also was a founder of the Museum of Fine Arts in Moscow. As Shveitser puts it, Tsvetaeva's parents were both 'fanatically devoted to their own world' (Shveitser 1992, 19).

Tsvetaeva in her 1926 'Reply to a Questionnaire' wrote of the impact of her parents' morality on the formation of her character: '[...] the dominant influence was that of my mother (music, nature, poetry, Germany). The passion for heroic action. One against all. Heroica. My father's influence was less obvious but no less powerful. (His passion for work, the absence of careerism, his simplicity, his singlemindedness). Father's and mother's influence fused in a Spartan attitude to life. Two leitmotifs in one house – music and the museum. The atmosphere of the house was neither bourgeois nor intellectual – it was "chevaleresque"' (Shveitser 1992, 11). Tsvetaeva always emphasised her parents' role in her early life, omitting almost any references to her piano teachers and her private tutors. Grelz writes: 'Musical education was a natu-

ral part of their upbringing — Marina was sent to Zograf-Plaksina's music school for piano lessons before six years of age — and both Marina and her sister attended the classical high school (*gimnaziia*) and had private tutors (Grelz 2016, 9). In her story 'Father and His Museum' ('Otets i ego muzei', 1936) Tsvetaeva portrays her mother as her husband's ardent supporter, helping him with administrative duties.

In 'Mother and Music' Tsvetaeva depicts her mother as a gifted pianist who treats piano playing as a sacred activity. Tsvetaeva writes about her temptation to play the piano with her foot, but she was told that 'the piano was a sacred object' and that one should not put anything on it, 'not only feet but even books'. She gives this example of her mother's ritualistic type of behaviour around the piano: 'As for newspapers – mother, with undefined, lofty persistence of a martyr, every morning, without saying a word to father, who invariably and innocently put them there, took the newspapers off the piano – swept them off – and who knows if it was not from the juxtaposition of the piano's mirror-like, ultimate cleanness and blackness with the disorderly and colorless rustling of newspaper, and from mother's simultaneously broad and pedantic gesture of revenge that there arose my ineradicable, intrinsically axiomatic conviction: newspapers are the Unclean, and all my hatred for them, and all the newspaper world's reciprocating revenge' (Tsvetaeva 1983, 272). Despite Tsvetaeva's aversion for newspapers, it is difficult to imagine the hatred originating from her mother's desire to keep the piano clean. More likely it is related to Tsvetaeva's criticism of mass culture and the political situation in 1930s Europe. In her poem 'Readers of Newspapers' (1935) Tsvetaeva describes one editor as the author of 'the newspaper uncleanness'. In this poem, she also mocks passengers on the Parisian metro who read newspapers. For Tsvetaeva, the act of reading newspapers on the metro signifies conformity and the mass consumption of sensationalist news. She describes newspaper readers as 'swallowers of emptiness' (Tsvetaeva 1988 (1), 313-314). The poem re-

sembles many avant-garde works that depict Paris in the 1920s-30s as a multidimensional dynamic space.

'Mother and Music' uses the notion of simultaneity that enables the reader to experience places and events separated from each other by distances. Tsvetaeva's depiction of the sense of simultaneity both in 'Mother and Music' and 'Readers of Newspapers' reveals her Parisian identity shaped by her urban experiences. The fluidity of Parisian identity is well captured in Andrey Bely's description of Paris: 'Paris does not hold the eye: it is not a composition; it is a battle of compositions. [...] Here everyone lives in one of several Parises, and you could spend your life in a space that separates them, flying underground from quartier to quartier in the Metro, beneath people's feet, beneath towers, churches, unfamiliar theatres' (Sweeney 2011, 35-36). Tsvetaeva's criticism of readers who prefer newspapers to poetry invokes the resistance of London modernists to the daily newspaper in the 1910s. Similar criticism of mass consumerism can be found in the Futurist poetry of Vladimir Mayakovsky. In his poem 'Mother and the Evening Killed by Germans' ('Mama i ubityi nemtsami vecher,' 1914) Mayakovsky calls for 'the newspaper's eyes' to be shut (Mayakovsky, 1955-61 (1), 66-67). Tsvetaeva's anxiety about the future of poetry reading also resembles William Yeats's criticism of the growing number of newspaper readers in modern times. Richard Aldington writes: 'Mr Yeats is right when he complains that newspapers have spoiled our sense of poetry' (Aldington 1915, 22). Yeats was opposed to any utilitarian mode of reading, and he considered poetry being superior to reading newspapers. He appreciated poetry's ability to create a 'mood' in the reader (Kibble 2002, 63). Similarly, Tsvetaeva saw poetry as being an important tool of communication with the reader.

Furthermore, Tsvetaeva thinks that poetry communicates its ideas more clearly than music. Similarly to Tolstoy's articulation in *Childhood* and in *War and Peace* of

the association of motherhood, music and spirituality, Tsvetaeva talks of the enlightening effect of her mother's piano playing upon her. She mentions Beethoven and Schumann as her mother's favourite composers and traces their influence on her poetry. She also writes: 'When, later on, forced by the necessity of my rhythmic patterns, I began breaking up syllables using a dash, unusual in poetry, for years everyone scolded me for it, and a few praised me (both the former and the latter for "being modern" [...])' (Tsvetaeva 1983, 285). The narrator of 'Mother and Music' reveals that she had an epiphanic moment one day: 'Then all at once I suddenly saw with my own eyes those romances of my youth with their law-abiding dashes going all through the text, and I felt that I was washed clean: by the whole of "Music" from any "being modern": washed clean, supported and legitimized, like a child who because of a secret birthmark proves to be a blood relative—confirmed in my right to life, after all!' (Tsvetaeva 1983, 285). Her discussion of music as a special force resembles Tolstoy's ability to imagine music. Yet, unlike Tolstoy, Tsvetaeva associates music only with life-affirmative qualities, not with destruction. In 'Mother and Music' she states that her mother 'flooded' her daughters with music, alluding thereby to Tolstoy's notion of infectious art that stems from the sincerity of the artist.

The association between music and water is also featured in a passage of the story describing potted plants near the piano. The proximity of plants to the piano enables Tsvetaeva to link femininity and the natural world. This association alludes to the presence of divinity in everyday life. She writes: 'But from that combination: of piano water and watering water, mother's hands that played and mother's hands that watered, hands that poured out in turn first water, then music, the piano was forever identified in my mind with water, water and green: leafy and watery sounds' (Tsvetaeva 1983, 288). Here Tsvetaeva brings together the artist and the art. Likewise, she wrote about Natalya Goncharova in her 1929 essay 'Natalya Goncharova', describing

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how Goncharova would draw flowers on her own face. By stating that 'Goncharova is her own canvas' (Tsvetaeva 1988 (2), 84), Tsvetaeva suggests that the artist and the art object are the same. For Tsvetaeva, art is the best manifestation of one's life (Tsvetaeva 1988 (2), 50). Both examples featuring Tsvetaeva's mother and Goncharova exemplify the blurred perception of inner and outer spatial distinctions as part of the aesthetic experience. For Tsvetaeva, the creative process is inseparable from remembering and reconfiguring the past.

Tsvetaeva portrays her mother as a musician who sacrificed her career as a pianist for her family. She reproduces her mother's comment about the future of her two daughters thus: 'And now not in the least joking but with deep, heartfelt joy and bitterness: "So my daughters will be the 'free artists' I wanted so much to be"'. The narrator of 'Mother and Music' adds her own comment about her mother's education in brackets: 'Her father stood firm on staying at home and being educated there and she stood only once on a stage, along with the aged Possart a year before his and her death' (Tsvetaeva 1983, 274). Tsvetaeva suggests that her mother wanted her children to live the life she could not have: 'Mother deluged us with all the bitterness of her own unrealized vacation, her own unrealized life, she deluged us with music as if with blood, the blood of a second birth' (Tsvetaeva 1983, 283).

Clearly, Tsvetaeva interprets her mother's life from the vantage point of a female writer concerned with a woman's right to pursue a vocation of her choice. She depicts herself as a child who was born to be a poet and who resisted all her musical training. 'Poor mother,' writes Tsvetaeva, 'how I embittered her and how she failed ever to realize that all my "unmusicalness" was nothing more than *another* vocation!' (Tsvetaeva 1983, 289). Tsvetaeva also suggests that the discipline that her mother imposed upon her during music lessons taught her how to be devoted to poetry. She confesses: 'If mother had lived longer, I would certainly have finished at the Conservato-

ry and emerged a fair pianist for the essential capacities were there. But there was something else: *the one essential thing* that was not to be compared with music and that sent music back to its proper place in me: a general musicality and ‘fair-sized’ (how inadequate) abilities’ (Tsvetaeva 1983, 293-294). Tsvetaeva’s statement indicates that in the 1930s she wanted to be seen in Russian émigré circles as a professional writer who had effectively managed to transgress her boundaries by carving out space ensuring parity with men. In her works Tsvetaeva uses musical structures and establishes herself as a modern author in the style of Bely who infused his works with musical elements. Her writing style in ‘Mother and Music’ also invokes Vassily Kandinsky who believed that musical analogy ‘would help to guide the way toward a non-objective art comparable to music’ (de Mille 2011, 84).

Furthermore, Tsvetaeva challenges Rousseau’s vision of female creativity based on a lack of passion. In ‘Mother and Music’, she criticises the rigidity of the training of female musicians. Karen Evans-Romaine rightly observes: ‘In “Mother and Music” Cvetaeva depicts her inability to fulfil her mother’s musical ambitions for her by citing two examples of musical torment: the unattainable example of the child genius Mozart and the mechanical, repetitive discipline of practice represented by the metronome and Hanon exercises’ (Evans-Romaine 2016, 135). Evans-Romaine defines Tsvetaeva’s depiction of music lessons as ‘a clever parody’ of Charles-Louis Hanon’s exercises included in his book *The Virtuoso Pianist* published in 1873 (Evans-Romaine 2016, 136). There follow some examples from ‘Mother and Music’: ‘But apart from everything I have just said, true not only for me but for every beginner, I see now that it was simply too early for me to have notes’ (Tsvetaeva 1983, 275); ‘The note-and-key process is much more complicated than the letter-voice process, as the actual key is more complicated than your own voice’ (ibid., 276); ‘The result is a game with three unknowns and for a five-year-old – one unknown is enough, beyond

which there is still another unknown [...]' (ibid., 277); 'It was the Chromatic that stayed there, lodged in my backbone. I'll say even more: the chromatic scale is my spinal column, a living stairway on which everything in me that can stretch, run and leap – does stretch, run and leap' (ibid., 278); 'I played without cheating the two hours assigned to me in the morning, two hours in the evening [...] and I didn't even turn around very often to look at the clock's saving circle' (ibid., 281). Being like French and German piano methods of the period, Hanon's exercises aimed at progression from simple exercises to 'a variety of basic technical elements' (Adams and Martin 2009, 20).

Tsvetaeva's 'Mother and Music' questions the usefulness of compulsory musical education for girls in Russia and in Europe. Laura Vorachek elucidates: 'Absent from male education, learning to play the piano was a standard part of a middle-class girl's training since it was believed to provide discipline, diversion, and [...] would help her attract a husband' (Vorachek 2000, 26). It was widely believed that European nineteenth-century piano manuals were designed to appeal to the middle-class female audience. Yet, as Vorachek aptly states, 'the middle class attempted to control the leisure time of its female members by instituting music-making' (Vorachek 2010, 309). 'Mother and Music' supports this view: Tsvetaeva's half-brother Andrey was not required to play piano like his sisters. He enjoyed playing guitar, but it was part of his leisure, not education.

Michel Foucault's ideas discussed in *Discipline and Punish* (1975) are relevant to the musical education of girls. According to Foucault, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 'an art of the human body was born' (Foucault 1995, 137). Rather than aiming at developing human skills, it was meant to make bodies more obedient and useful because 'disciplinary coercion establishes in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination' (ibid., 138). Foucault

thinks that political anatomy also promotes the correlation between the body and the gesture (ibid., 138). In 'Mother and Music', Tsvetaeva shows how she was expected to train for a long time despite her aversion to the metronome: she defines it as a coffin filled with death. She describes her stool in front of the piano as 'the stool of my martyrdom' (Tsvetaeva 1983, 284), suggesting thereby that piano practice requires much self-discipline and dedication despite the monotonous nature of the activity. Both her mother's instructions and the manuals she read made her realise how she was subjected constantly to the invisible gaze of a disciplinary power. Tsvetaeva's critical description of her training as a young pianist reveals her resistance to instructions aimed at training creative individuals like actors.

In 'Mother and Music' Tsvetaeva describes herself as a rebel resisting her mother's disciplinary framework based on the manuals that require women to practice every day for several hours and advise them how to behave in front of the piano. Throughout the story, Tsvetaeva uses the defamiliarisation device: as a child she keeps translating the images pertaining to piano playing into her own set of images that display signs of synaesthetic vision. She visualised her piano as a hippopotamus not because of its look, but because of its sound: '*hippopo* – (the actual torso) and then tail – *tam* (right there)' (Tsvetava 1983, 291). She also confesses that she visualised notes as sparrows sitting on different branches: 'Then I understood that notes live on branches, each one on its own branch, and from there they jump onto the keys, each one onto its own' (Tsvetaeva 1983, 274). The idea of translating the music that she was expected to play into the stream of consciousness created by a child's imagination inculcates a novel effect upon the reader in the style of Natasha Rostova's naïve interpretation of opera in *War and Peace* as something ridiculous. Her mode of writing in 'Mother and Music' resembles the poems for children penned by Daniil Kharms and Samuil Marshak, especially their poem 'Cheerful Finches' (1930) which

utilises the 'Allegretto' tune from Beethoven's Symphony number 7 in A-major (Marshak 1973, 214).

Furthermore, 'Mother and Music' overcomes Tolstoy's anxieties about the meaning of music and its ambiguous language. While Tolstoy was influenced by the idea of absolute music popular in the nineteenth century, Tsvetaeva engages with the new paradigm. Corrine Chong describes the paradigm as the 'aesthetics of vagueness'. It was especially popular among Symbolists who perceived music's vague content as a virtue rather than a deficiency. In the 1900s-1920s the concept of the 'the autonomy of music' became popular in Europe and it 'permeated the consciousness of visual artists, composers and poets alike' (Chong, 2011, 123). However, the ability of Nikolenka to imagine music in *Childhood* can be seen as a precursor of new artistic experiments.

Tsvetaeva's story also reinforces Tolstoy's point about the infectiousness of art and suggests that, in addition to technical skills, one needs creativity and passion. Following the Russian Symbolists, she portrays art as a new form of religion by showing her mother as a pianist who expressed her inner self through performance. At the end of the story, Tsvetaeva describes a conversation with her mother before Maria Mein's death from tuberculosis, where she asks her mother why her performance of Robert Schumann's set of eight pieces for piano, *Fantasiestücke*, Op. 12 (1837), was so different from other pianists' performances, to which Tsvetaeva's mother replies: 'When you grow up and look around you and you ask yourself *Warum* everything came out – the way it did come out, *Warum* nothing at all come out well, not only for you, but for everyone whom you loved, whom you played – nothing came out for anyone – then you will know how to play *Warum*. But for now – try your best' (Tsvetaeva 1983, 293). Mein's vision of music was grounded in the nineteenth-century belief that art and life were mutually reflective.

Tsvetaeva's reference to Schumann in 'Mother and Music' is not coincidental, because Schumann was well-known for his interest in literature. In his early life Schumann considered becoming a poet, and many literary texts impacted his compositional style and his views on art (Guan 2018, 1). According to Erika Reiman, Schumann's compositional approach was influenced by Jean Paul's novels that featured devices such as defamiliarisation and the opposition between story and plot that distorted chronological narration. Reiman states that Schumann's works mimic Paul's digressive interpolations (Reiman 2004, 4). By disorienting the reader, Paul carved himself a role of a commentator on his characters and events. Commenting on Schumann and Paul, Guan states that both were fascinated 'by dualistic and odd characters, puzzles, strange plots, and infinite imaginations' (Guan 2018, 5-6). A similar interest in disrupting the chronological account of events is evident in 'Mother and Music'.

As for Tsvetaeva's musical taste, Evans-Romaine mentions Schumann, Beethoven and Chopin among her favourite composers: 'Like Pasternak, Cvetaeva favors Frédéric Chopin; among composers, only Beethoven is cited more often than Chopin in her work.' In a letter to Anna Teskova, Tsvetaeva explains her love for Chopin by her 'Polish blood, childhood reminiscences, and George Sand's love for him' (Evans-Romaine 2016, 138). By mentioning George Sand as an important literary predecessor, Tsvetaeva validates her choice of becoming a poet rather than a musician, suggesting that in the age of psychoanalysis and the popularity of Richard Wagner's musical drama, literature and music had become interconnected. By infusing literary works with musical structures, modern writers articulated their stream of consciousness and their experiences of temporality more imaginatively than their predecessors.

Conclusion

Tsvetaeva's 'Mother and Music' was written when music became widely used for mass entertainment, radio programmes and cinema halls. As Charlotte de Mille states, 'Modernism involved a radical change in perception that was fundamental to the re-writing, re-painting, and re-composing of art for contemporary times' (de Mille 2011, 5). 'Mother and Music' develops the experiments pertaining to the transposition of music into literature that Bely and Kandinsky undertook. A comparison undertaken in this article of the aesthetic experiences of music listening, as discussed in the fiction of Tolstoy and Tsvetaeva, highlights the differences between the nineteenth century's use of music for rendering emotions and the modernist infusion of paintings and literary texts with musical imagery. Given that de Mille conceptualises Modernism as a movement that emerged around the time of the publication of Richard Wagner's 'Art and Revolution' (1859), and then demised at the time of the invention of electronic music (de Mille 2011, 2), it is unsurprising that Tsvetaeva's memoir reconfigures Tolstoy's vision of art and reconsiders his depiction of music and femininity in spiritual terms. In contrast to Tolstoy, Tsvetaeva points to the failure of bildungsroman narratives to improve women's chances of becoming professional musicians. Her memoir affirms a new role for the musical metaphor in expressing experiences and memories. It creates a new imaginary space for the creative development of women, accommodating subjectivity and the modernist temporality of consciousness. In 'Mother and Music' Tsvetaeva replaces the 'painterly model' of *Bildung* with its photographic version, foregrounding the superimposition of disparate selves and favouring the child-like artistic outlook.

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**‘THEY JUST EXPLOITED AN OPPORTUNITY’: THE MIGRATION DRIVERS
AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THEIR PEERS AMONG UKRAINIAN REFUGEES**

Abstract

The concept of migration aspirations, emerging as criticism of traditional migration theories, emphasises bottom-up self-represented individualistic migration ambitions associated with personal development, incentives and desires. However, the theoretical implications of migration aspirations do not address attitudes towards the aspirations of others from the same migrant community, and this article debates this question by using the notion of deservingness and belonging. This study is based on qualitative research and semi-structured interviews with Ukrainians who have obtained temporary protection in the Czech Republic and Poland since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine (24 February 2022). It shows that participants usually refer to the fear of war and the safety of their children, but others from the same community, from the participants' point of view, migrated because of non-deserving economic reasons and exploitation of opportunities provided by European countries. Therefore, this research introduces the notion of non-deserving migration aspirations and suggests that the (non-)deservingness of migration aspirations differs in the case of self-represented aspirations and presumed aspirations of the broader community.

Keywords

Ukraine; refugees; migration aspirations; war in Ukraine; deservingness; belonging

Introduction

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 caused the most significant influx of displaced persons in Europe since the Second World War. In December 2022, 7.9 million Ukrainians fled their country (UNHCR 2022) to the European Union, Russia, the United States, Canada, Turkey, the Caucasus or Central Asia. Within the European Union, Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland accepted the highest number of refugees. Poland provided shelter for 1.6 million Ukrainians (UNHCR 2023) and the Czech Republic assisted the highest number of refugees per 100,000 inhabitants (Klimešová, Šatava and Ondruška 2022). Poland and the Czech Republic willingly accepted Ukrainian refugees. Compared to displaced persons from Syria who faced difficulties entering these countries, Ukrainians who had obtained temporary protection under the Temporary Protection Directive (Council of the European Union 2001) were not limited by any restrictive measures. They benefited from housing, language courses, social benefits, health insurance and an immediate free entrance to the labour market and educational system. However, the situation of Ukrainian refugees is peculiar in other ways – for example, owing to mobilisation and a ban on leaving Ukraine for men aged between 18 and 60. the main influx of Ukrainians is composed of single women or women with children.

The war is an obvious trigger of migration flows from Ukraine. However, as noted by de Haas (2021), and Carling and Collins (2018), despite the war, refugees still have individual objectives, intentions or plans which determine their mobility. Thus, subjectively represented migration ambitions can offer valuable insights into the pathways affected by the existing pressures (Carling 2014). Migration aspiration provides bottom-up cognition. However, this notion focuses on individuals and inadequately addresses the social dynamics of the broader migrant community. As such, the way in which subjective migration aspirations interact with the migration ambitions of

community remains understudied. Further, some authors elaborate on notions of ‘deservingness’ and ‘belonging’. These notions usually refer to the attitudes of host societies towards migrants or inter-ethnic relations between migration groups (Blachnicka-Ciacek et al. 2021). Nonetheless, the notion of ‘deservingness’ could also provide insights into social dynamics within the migrant community, because some aspirations of co-migrants might be seen as more deserving than the aspirations of others which may give rise to inclusion or exclusion principles (Verkuyten et al. 2017). Therefore, adding notions of ‘deservingness’ and ‘belonging’ might help explore the acceptance or non-acceptance of particular members and their aspirations within one community (Blachnicka-Ciacek et al. 2021).

In-group perspectives can provide different types of perception of deservingness or non-deservingness associated with contribution, misbehaviour, and the hierarchy of specific social, economic (or other) aspirations related to the perceived appropriateness of migration status. Therefore, this article aims to analyse how the aspirations of participants – members of the Ukrainian refugee community living in the Czech Republic and Poland – interact with the aspirations of others from the same migrant community, and how they create social boundaries based on deservingness and non-deservingness. It introduces the notion of *non-deserving migration aspirations* of Ukrainian refugees, elaborating on which in-group migration aspirations of refugees – from the study participants’ standpoint – are seen as deserving and which are not.

Background to the situation in the Czech Republic and Poland

The Czech Republic experienced an unprecedented rise in the number of Ukrainian refugees in 2022 and swiftly established temporary protection measures. According to data from the Czech Ministry of the Interior, the country issued 504,107 temporary

protections and still hosted 325,742 refugees as of April 2023 (MVČR 2023). Not only is this the third highest number among the EU countries, but the Czech Republic also had the highest number of Ukrainian refugees per 100,000 inhabitants in 2022 (Klimešová, Šatava and Ondruška 2022).

In line with state social policy, the Czech Republic – much like other European countries – provides benefits to refugees. The temporary protection status allowed Ukrainian refugees to receive humanitarian welfare benefits of 5,000 Czech korunas per month until July 2023 when this amount was lowered and conditions were changed: refugees now receive CZK 4,860 for the first five months, which is then lowered to CZK 3,130; vulnerable groups, such as children, disabled persons, students, pensioners, pregnant women, or persons taking care of children up to the age of six receive higher amounts, housing (at least until July 2023), free healthcare (by registering with the General Health Insurance of the Czech Republic) and the possibility of entering the labour market and all levels of education (PAQ Research 2023). Refugees may also receive help from regional authorities, civil society, non-governmental organisations and grassroots movements which provide Czech language courses, clothes and food. Refugees relying on social allowances are mainly young women with small children or pensioners.

A survey by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in 2022 found that 44% of Ukrainian refugees in the Czech Republic are women and 36% are children. The most common type of Ukrainian refugee family in the Czech Republic is a mother with one child (Klimešová, Šatava and Ondruška 2022). Two thirds of refugees live below the poverty threshold, and households with children are most at risk. The share of Ukrainian newcomers who are university graduates is twice as high (35%) as the percentage of the Czech population with university degrees (17.6%). Most refugees still work below their original qualifications, often in precarious conditions (PAQ

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Research 2023). However, almost half of Ukrainian refugees can communicate in Czech in everyday situations, and two-thirds of those who are economically active have jobs in the Czech Republic (PAQ Research 2023).

The harsh conditions for Ukrainians in the Czech Republic are also a result of state policy. Unlike the situation in Germany, Ukrainian refugees in the Czech Republic do not have to attend language courses before they enter the labour market. However, without sufficient knowledge of the Czech language, many refugees easily fall into the trap of low-skilled jobs with lower salaries. Czech politicians also insist on a quick entry to the labour market and this is associated with the labour force demand of Czech companies and the low unemployment rate in the country. As a consequence, two thirds of Ukrainian refugees face low living standards. All this means that the Czech Republic is not taking full advantage of the high level of education of Ukrainian refugees and their potential.

Poland experienced a similar influx of Ukrainian refugees after February 2022, and the ensuing humanitarian crisis and aid efforts were a major challenge. Previously, Warsaw's attitude towards refugees was rather negative as a result of the migrant crisis at Poland's border with the Republic of Belarus (Majority of Poles Oppose the Admission of Migrants From Polish-Belarusian Border 2021), and Russia probably expected that the situation after the invasion would be similar. Nevertheless, more than 2 million Ukrainians crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border after the invasion (Istel 2022). The number of Ukrainian refugees in March 2023 reached 968,390 persons (Ukrainian Refugees by Country 2023), and in December 2022, 80% of them were women and 20% were men (Ukraine Refugee Pulse 2023).

Poland was the first country to launch humanitarian welfare benefits for refugees based on temporary protection. This comprised a housing programme (Horbaczewski 2022) and a one-off payment of 300 PLN (*Jednorazowe...* n.d.). It is worth

noting that refugees could also benefit from the same social policy as anyone living in Poland, such as the 500+ programme (welfare of PLN 500 per month for each child under 18 years old) (*500+ dla obywateli Ukrainy* 2022) and social assistance for low-earning people or single-parent families (with families being classified as single-parent if one of the parents is outside the EU) (*Zasilek rodzinny...* 2022). Refugees also receive a Polish PESEL (identification number), which allows them to use free medical care, and Poland also allows them to enter the labour market and all levels of education. Regional authorities, civil society and non-governmental organisations have also tried to facilitate the refugees' stay by introducing numerous grassroots initiatives, such as job fairs and Polish language classes, and helping provide them with food and other necessities (*Centrum Pomocy...* 2022).

Most Ukrainian refugees in Poland are women (80%), often with children below the age of 18 (53%). Most of them are of an economically active age and hold a university degree (61%) (*Ukraine Refugee Pulse* 2023). However, there is also a mismatch between education and their placement in low-skilled jobs. Thus, their high level of education is not properly capitalised on. Nevertheless, unemployment levels are relatively low, with only 28% of them seeking jobs. Refugees affected by unemployment are usually those without childcare options (Gromadzki and Lewandowski 2023). In Poland, refugees typically have their basic necessities met, including food and accommodation, but language courses are not obligatory, and they still struggle with a rather poor knowledge of Polish (*Ukraine Refugee Pulse* 2023). As in the case of the Czech Republic, this limitation forces them to take up low-skilled jobs with insufficient pay. Therefore, the problem of integration, as in the Czech Republic, has not been adequately solved.

Over the months, public sentiments in Poland have changed, and this has had an impact on the government's actions. The most significant changes were introduced

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in January 2023 and were related to an amendment to the Act of Social Assistance for Ukrainians (including accommodation and full board) available to refugees covered by the Act. After 120 days following a refugee's first entry into Poland, assistance may be provided if the refugee (with a PESEL number) covers 50% of their costs in advance (no more than 40 zloty per person per day). After 180 days, assistance may be provided if 75% of their costs are borne by the refugee (no more than 60 zloty per person per day). However, some groups are not required to cover these costs (*Ustawa* 2023).

Some Ukrainian refugees from Poland and the Czech Republic have moved to Germany, which overtook Poland and the Czech Republic in terms of the overall number of Ukrainian refugees at the turn of 2022 and 2023. This was due to the better economic and social conditions that refugees could expect in Germany. The country also offers assistance through job-seeking schemes, which further encourages refugees to stay in Germany (Zymnin et al. 2023).

Overall, jobs, benefits and social policy are crucial for migration aspirations and deservingness. Nevertheless, they may also be related to the 'exploitation' of benefits, as some refugees may rely on them instead of looking for (low-skilled) work in the Polish or Czech labour market. This might create a space for boundaries between those refugees who are attached to normative and 'proper' refugee behaviour and those who instrumentally use the benefits for their own welfare.

Voluntary migration aspirations

Migration research still assumes the traditional dichotomous sense of forced and voluntary mobility. In the context of forced migration, external push factors that motivate migrants to leave are often studied. The case of voluntary migration tends to highlight the economic determinants that influence migrants' actions. However, these macro-

structural causes of migration, be they war or poverty, are not sufficient to explain migration flows.

Carling and Collins (2018) and De Haas (2021) have discussed the inappropriateness of ‘causes’ or ‘determinants’. The traditional approach, viewing forced migrants as powerless to generate a particular effect on their livelihood opportunities as a result of external pressures, and voluntary migrants as reacting to economic conditions in the relevant countries, is fallible. The problem is the migrants’ alleged automated response to push factors (De Haas 2021) – studying them as passive actors affected by structural conditions which resonate in their actions rather than as actively participating human beings. Accordingly, scholars have also provided unrealistic presumptions of human behaviour with regard to maximising profit, costs and benefits concerns, as well as utilitarianism, rationalism and pragmatism, and viewing migrants as passive actors (Aslany et al. 2021, Carling and Collins 2018, Collins 2018). The main critical point is applying a top-down view of migration (De Haas 2021), instead of studying the self-representations of migrants and their own evaluation of their pathways, which is related to the abilities, capabilities, desires, aspirations and drivers of migrants (Carling and Collins 2018, De Haas 2021, Van Hear, Bakewell and Long 2020). Rather than studying migrants as ‘soulless individual utility-optimisers or passive victims’ (De Haas 2021: 8) who perform their roles rationalistically (Carling and Collins 2018), it is more appropriate to study migrants’ intrinsic perspectives (De Haas 2021, Erdal and Oeppen 2018).

To understand migration as a social process, it is necessary to adopt a human-centred and bottom-up perspective, instead of asserting impersonal aspects that could affect migrants’ behaviour. It is the social drivers related to migration opportunities, and not detached objective facets, that can trigger the intention to migrate. Tailoring social drivers and personal ambitions and capacities to act is, therefore, a matter of

life pursuits, strategic planning, personal development and taking action with the possibility of achieving certain goals. These goals are ambiguous, as is the individual pathway towards achieving them (Collins 2018).

In this regard, a reference to causes and determinants is fallible. Persecution as a result of war continues to be a significant pressure on refugees, but does not completely limit their capabilities. While a war implies constraints that negatively affect lives, forced migration should also be associated with personal decisions, agency and meaningful goals, all of which guide the migrants' mobility. In contrast, voluntary migrants can make decisions more freely, but their mobility is also related to personal objectives and intended plans. Thus, the capability to act is an important starting point for both groups (Cairns and Smith 2011, Carling 2014).

In-group migration aspirations, deservingness and belonging

Migration aspirations are focused on the cognitive and emotional orientations of individual self-consciousness (Aslany et al. 2021), which could again be analysed through structural factors (Aslany et al. 2021; Helbling and Morgenstern 2023), but this still leads to an individualised dimension of aspirations. However, due to individualisation, the concept of migration aspirations is more focused on self-representation. There is a lack of research on attitudes towards the migration aspirations of others from the same migrant community.

It is necessary to analyse how individual migration aspirations interact with the migration ambitions of the whole community in the migration process. Some attention has already been paid to how migration aspirations are triggered by social drivers (Collins 2018) or how they are distributed between social groups before migration (Grabska et al. 2019). The social dynamics in the notion of migration aspirations are thus associated with social inequalities and positions. Yet, all this is still re-

lated to facilitating migration, while the interaction of migration aspirations with the migration ambitions of the whole community remains understudied. The interrelation between individual aspirations and community aspirations is not unequivocally predictable. The differences or similarities in the migration aspirations of an individual and other members of a given community could result in a more comprehensive view of the whole migration process.

Another theoretical elaboration with notions of ‘belonging’ and ‘deservingness’ (Blachnicka-Ciacek et al. 2021, De Coninck and Matthijs 2020) or ‘advantageousness’ (Bontenbal 2023) could provide insight into the problem. These notions usually refer to the perception of host societies towards the deservingness of migrants and are normally related to the hierarchisation of migration groups. Few studies deal with the self-perception of migrants, and those that do usually research inter-ethnic relations between minorities of different migration backgrounds (Osipovič 2015, Bontenbal 2023) rather than hierarchies and differentiation within one migrant community.

Deservingness means the acceptance or disapproval of migrants and refers to strategies related to belonging, legitimisation and recognition (Blachnicka-Ciacek et al. 2021). Belonging could be associated with a normative view of the host society or with social embeddedness in the majority, but it also touches on keeping distance from them and closing the distance to those who are ‘more successful’ to retain legitimacy. It is also based on ‘communities of value’ (Anderson 2013), comprising ‘proper’ citizens with shared values, ideas, perceptions, etc. The notion of migrant deservingness is linked to different types of migration, because voluntary migrants are seen as less deserving than refugees (Verkuyten et al. 2017). Similarly, the notion of perceived threat is also important in deciding about migrant deservingness (Landmann et al. 2019). Migrants seen as less threatening (such as women and children) are deemed

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more deserving. Belonging itself is also by no means stable but rather fluid in nature (Davis, Ghorashi and Smets 2018).

This results in differentiations of inclusion and exclusion. Accordingly, the discourse within the migrant group might motivate different types of conduct based on deservingness and belonging, as migrants could recognise their ability to contribute and disavow those who use their position to exploit benefits instrumentally, such as welfare. Therefore, migrants could create a hierarchy within their own group based on belonging and non-belonging, as well as deservingness or non-deservingness. Aspirations may thus be based on normativity, and creating the boundaries between ‘abnormal’ and ‘normal’ conduct could be related to expected ambitions, performance and worthiness of migration status. More specifically, attitudes towards others might be based on aspirations while entering the labour market, exploiting opportunities, economic benefits or social welfare, but also on language proficiency and learning local habits, i.e. the level of integration with the host society (Gibson, Crossland and Hamilton 2018). This creates the hierarchisation within the group regarding their migration aspirations, ambitions and motivations.

Presumably, anyone who is viewed as ‘one of us’ would be perceived as more deserving, and the analysis should be devoted to specific principles of differentiation. While refugees from regions affected by war may have migrated for reasons that diminished their agency, it could be expected that they will see themselves – according also to the rationale of temporary protection in the case of Ukrainians – as more deserving owing to harmful effects on their security. At the same time, others – for instance, labour migrants – will be seen as non-deserving (Crawley and Skleparis 2018). The reason is that refugees from war-torn regions might be perceived as more in need of protection than other refugees from the same community who are viewed as migrants with specific aspirations.

This might create a distinction within one migrant community associated with migration aspirations. The ambitions of particular members might be ambiguous and the notion of deservingness might also be based on a rhetoric of negative and positive denotations. Thus, this study poses the question of how Ukrainians covered by temporary protection see members of their community with respect to migration aspirations, deservingness and belonging.

Methodology

The interviewees were Ukrainian citizens who arrived in the Czech Republic and Poland after 24 February 2022. Their selection was based on one basic condition: they had to be covered by temporary protection. The research was conducted between June and September 2023, with a total of thirty-seven interviews – seventeen in Poland and twenty in the Czech Republic.

Interviewees were mostly born in Ukraine. There were two exceptions; one participant was born in Tynda, Amur region, Russia, and another one in Shymkent, Kazakhstan, while it was part of the Soviet Union. However, both were living in Ukraine at the time of Russia's invasion and had parents of Ukrainian nationality. One participant was born in Sevastopol in Crimea, but she moved to Kyiv before Crimea was formally annexed by Russia in March 2014.

Most participants were from regions severely affected by the war: thirteen from Eastern Ukraine, ten from Central Ukraine, eight from Southern Ukraine and six from Western Ukraine. Among those from Eastern Ukraine, five participants were from Kharkiv, and among those from Central Ukraine, five used to live in Kyiv. One interesting exception was a participant from Southern Ukraine who happened to be in Egypt as a tourist at the onset of the invasion and who travelled to Poland and obtained temporary protection there. Another exception was a soldier from Eastern

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Ukraine. He was injured during the war and was recovering in Poland at the time of the interview. The gender breakdown was as follows: all participants except one were women. As for the language breakdown, three participants were interviewed in Russian and all the others in Ukrainian.

The interviews were mostly conducted in Prague, and its close surroundings (Kolín, Beroun, Tursko, Kladno, Lány). One interview was conducted in Hradec Králové and one in Pardubice. The Polish part was conducted in Olkusz, a town in southern Poland located thirty-five kilometres from Cracow. The interview locations were selected based on the participants' wishes and options. Thus, interviews in the Czech Republic were usually held at the participants' homes or in parks and cafés. One interview was held at the author's office at the university and one at the police department for foreigners. In Olkusz, participants were interviewed at playgrounds, supermarkets and hostels for Ukrainian refugees. Therefore, it was not always possible to choose a calm and quiet location. Interviews were sometimes disturbed by external circumstances (waiters, noisy cars) and by the participants' mobile phones or their smaller children. One interview, based on the participant's wish, was conducted online.

In the case of the Czech part, the authors decided to advertise in Facebook groups for Ukrainians in the Czech Republic. The advertisement contained information about the research, noted the preference for interviews in Prague and promised anonymity of participants. Participants responded via the author's Messenger account, with face-to-face meetings arranged afterwards. Some responses indicated a preference for online interviews, but this option was discarded, as the authors chose to conduct the interviews in person. The assumption was that personal meetings enable longer interviews and help to develop confidentiality and trust between participants and authors. Only one meeting was held online as an exception, owing to the partici-

pant's strong desire to be interviewed remotely. In the case of Poland, all interviews were conducted in person, and participants were approached personally in the streets, parks or hostels. Participant responses signified a certain motivation to provide a personal point of view. Therefore, during the interviews, the participants expressed their gratitude for the warm welcome from the Czech and Polish states and their willingness to help the authors. Another key motivation was telling their story about fleeing from Ukraine. Naturally, the discussions were affected by nationalistic feelings and anti-Russian attitudes.

Some interview participants had experienced trauma and terrible circumstances associated with the war. For example, one participant had survived the Bucha massacre and another had fled from Druzhkovka, a city near Bachmut in Eastern Ukraine, now totally obliterated. As already mentioned, one participant was a soldier who fought against the Russian army.

We applied a qualitative methodology, using a semi-structured interview. The method in question is suitable for studying migration aspirations, because it explores personal ambitions, values, identification and self-representation. The authors prepared an identical list of questions for each participant, but the situation of every one of them had to be examined based on the interview context. Therefore, the interviews included the same questions, but some circumstances associated with a given participant's life story were explored through additional contextual questions. Eight questions from the whole list were used for this article. These questions were related to migration aspirations before Russia's 2022 invasion, as well as the migration drivers of participants and their fellow citizens fleeing from the war. The questions aimed to reveal the drivers for migration among the participants and other Ukrainians. Interviews were held in Ukrainian, as the two authors, who also conducted the interviews, are fluent in this language. The authors learned Ukrainian thanks to their long-term

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study and research stays in Ukraine before the war. Ukrainian is relatively similar to Czech and Polish, and the authors' linguistic proficiency limited possible misunderstandings.

According to research ethics, we applied precautions to prevent possible negative impacts of participating in the research. Although the participants were interviewed almost a year after they had fled from Ukraine, many of them still suffered from disturbing psychological effects. Thus, it was necessary to provide a safe environment in terms of reliable social and cultural conditions and war-related factors. This was achieved by conducting the interviews in Ukrainian and understanding the Ukrainian environment. The article's authors are familiar with Ukrainian social and cultural specificities owing to their long-term stays in Ukraine. This helped to create a space for interactions and mutual understanding between the authors and the participants. Regarding emotional harm and war events, the research did not aim to explore traumatic memories, and participants were not asked about tragic personal situations. In some interviews, participants referred to their traumas themselves, but the authors did not ask for details. The authors also decided not to ask about the names and locations of their relatives living in Ukraine, in order to avoid evoking the feeling of danger (this was intentional; the participants had relatives fighting in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and disclosing their names and locations was risky); the participants' names were also anonymised. As a rule for conducting the interviews, we did not contradict the statements of participants and, as expected, we created a safe environment for our participants based on mutual rapport regarding the condemnation of the Russian invasion and the actions of Russia's armed forces.

Every participant was informed about the purpose of the research and signed an informed consent form, which ensures permission for audio recording, anonymity, disclosure of non-transmission of data to third parties, storage of data only in the au

thors' personal archives and the opportunity to withdraw from the study at any point. The Ethics Committee of the University of Hradec Králové, Czech Republic, also confirmed the ethical integrity of the research (reference number 10/2023).

Table 1 below shows the distribution of the participants regarding their region of departure and their town or village of birth. It shows that most participants fled from regions directly attacked by Russians (Eastern, Central and Southern parts of Ukraine), while a few had fled from the Western part of Ukraine, where the impact of the war was not as severe. The reason why the research included more Ukrainians from non-Western regions was purely the result of the responses to the Facebook advertisements. The respondents were mostly from non-Western regions and they themselves explained that this was because Ukrainians living in Western Ukraine had only exploited the possibility of obtaining temporary protection and/or had nothing to say about the serious impact of the war on their lives. Table 1 also shows that some participants fled from occupied territories (Bilozerka, Melitopol), which they did either through Crimea, Russia or the Baltic states. There is one exceptional participant: a Donetsk native who fled from Donetsk to Kyiv in 2014 and from Kyiv to Hradec Králové in 2022.

Table 2 shows the educational level of participants and their occupations in Ukraine and both destination countries. Most participants held university degrees (or had studied at a university before the invasion) and effectively experienced a job downgrade after arrival. Participants with primary, secondary and vocational education were employed, their jobs often matching their occupation in Ukraine.

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Participant	Region and city/village before invasion	Location and year of birth	Interview location
1.	Central/Kyiv	Mykolajiv/1993	Prague
2.	Central/Kyiv	Kyiv/1986	Prague
3.	East/Kharkiv	Dergachi/2001	Prague
4.	East/Kharkiv	Zaporizhia/2001	Lány
5.	West/Uzhorod	Mukachevo/1985	Beroun
6.	East/Druzhkovka	Tynda(Russia)/1984	Prague
7.	South/Mykolaiv	Novopetrivka/1989	Prague
8.	Central/Kyiv	Sofijivska Borsh-chahivka /1982	Lány
9.	West/Chernivtsi	Chernivtsi/1983	Kolín
10.	East/Donetsk	Donetsk/1983	Hradec Králové
11.	East/Sumy	Sumy/1974	Prague
12.	South/Mykolaiv	Shymkent (Kazakhstan)/1978	Kladno
13.	South/Bilozerka	Bilozerka/1990	Prague
14.	South/Melitopol	Zaporizhia/1980	Pardubice
15.	East/Kharkiv	Mariupol/1976	Prague
16.	East/Kharkiv	Kharkiv/1986	Prague
17.	East/Kharkiv	Kharkiv/1986	Prague
18.	Central/Bucha	Sevastopol/1989	Tursko
19.	East/Pavlohrad	Ternivka/1968	Prague
20.	South/Odessa	Rovenskaya/1990	Prague
21.	East/Romny	Romny/1994	Olkusz

Participant	Region and city/village before invasion	Location and year of birth	Interview location
22.	West/Rivne	Rivne/1985	Olkusz
23.	Central/Rudzka	Rudzka/1939	Olkusz
24.	East/Kharkiv	Kharkiv/1969	Olkusz
25.	East/Konotop	Konotop/1985	Olkusz
26.	West/Bialokrynica	Bialokrynica/1986	Olkusz
27.	Central/Dnipro	Dnipro/1993	Olkusz
28.	East/Izium	Izium/1968	Olkusz
29.	Central/Kyiv	Kyiv/1961	Olkusz
30.	Central/Kyiv	Kyiv/1983	Olkusz
31.	South/Melitopol	Melitopol/2006	Olkusz
32.	West/Radechiw	Radechiw/1984	Olkusz
33.	South/Zaporizhia	Zaporizhia/1993	Olkusz
34.	West/Stryj	Stryj/1985	Olkusz
35. (man)	East/Sumy	Sumy/1992	Olkusz
36.	Central/Cherkasy	Cherkasy/1975	Olkusz
37.	Central/Kryviy Rih	Kryviy Rih/1993	Olkusz

Table 1: List of interviews

Source: authors

Participant	Level of education	Occupation in Ukraine	Occupation in Czech Republic/Poland
1.	Bachelor's degree	Marketing Specialist	Marketing Specialist (online)
2.	Master's degree	Accountant	Cleaner

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Participant	Level of education	Occupation in Ukraine	Occupation in Czech Republic/Poland
3.	University student	Student	Student
4.	University student	Student	Shop assistant (several months), unemployed
5.	Master's degree	Nurse	Nurse
6.	Master's degree	Restaurant Director, Sales Manager	Cleaner
7.	Secondary education	Confectioner, entrepreneur	Fruit picker, cook
8.	Master's degree	Manager	Unemployed
9.	Master's degree	Journalist	Journalist
10.	Master's degree	Accountant	Teaching Assistant
11.	Master's degree	Entrepreneur	Warehouse worker, IT worker
12.	Secondary school	Nurse	Caregiver for the elderly, volunteer
13.	Bachelor's degree	Confectioner, entrepreneur	Warehouse worker
14.	Secondary school	Entrepreneur	Unemployed
15.	Master's degree	Administrative worker	Warehouse worker
16.	Master's degree	Accountant	Unemployed
17.	Secondary school	Shop assistant, secretary, manager	Operator
18.	Master's degree	Musician	Confectioner's Assistant
19.	Bachelor's degree	Shop Assistant	Unemployed
20.	Master's degree	Sales Representative, Visual Merchandiser	Assistant Archaeologist
21.	Master's degree	Entrepreneur	Entrepreneur

Participant	Level of education	Occupation in Ukraine	Occupation in Czech Republic/Poland
22.	Master's degree	Waterworks engineer	Unemployed
23.	Primary education	Retired	Retired
24.	Secondary education	Entrepreneur	Entrepreneur (online)
25.	Master's degree	Bank clerk	Bank clerk (online)
26.	Secondary education	Unemployed	Office work, volunteer
27.	Vocational education	Store manager	Unemployed
28.	Secondary education	Nurse	Unemployed
29.	Master's degree	Medical clinic administrator	Caregiver for the elderly
30.	Bachelor's degree	Marketing specialist	Cashier
31.	University student	Student	Student
32.	Master's degree	Teacher	Unemployed
33.	Master's degree	Engineer	Painter
34.	Master's degree	Artist, teacher	Unemployed
35. (man)	Master's degree	Lawyer	Car mechanic
36.	Master's degree	Teacher	Unemployed
37.	Master's degree	Artist, painter	Painter

Table 2: Level of education and occupations in Ukraine and the Czech Republic/Poland

Source: authors

Deserving and non-deserving migration aspirations

The participants in our research are mainly from Eastern, Central and Southern parts of Ukraine, with only six from Western Ukraine. Before the invasion, the Western part of Ukraine was seen as the region most affected by migration (Jaroszewicz 2018), including emigration. However, emigration also impacted other Ukrainian regions owing to the war in Eastern Ukraine (since 2014) and the developments following the Maidan protest (since 2013).

Only six participants from the whole sample had never been abroad before Russia's invasion. The remaining participants had visited foreign countries for tourism-, work- or study-related reasons. Those who travelled as tourists usually did so on a short-term basis and visited the typical tourist destinations popular among Ukrainians (Egypt, Bulgaria, Turkey), European Union countries or other countries (Russia, Israel or Greece); one participant from a relatively wealthy family had visited Mexico, Dominican Republic and Thailand.

Five participants had already worked abroad; two in the Czech Republic, two in Poland and one in Russia for a brief period (between three months and a year). Seven participants noted that they had had work-related goals linked with migration before the invasion. One participant was already preparing to leave for Germany to work there when Russia launched the invasion.

Some participants had extensive experience of living abroad. One was a journalist who had often stayed in the European Union and wrote for Ukrainian journals about news from Europe, one had worked on a cruise ship with an orchestra and another had frequently travelled back and forth from Poland to Ukraine in the 1990s on work trips. As for study-related stays, one participant had spent time in the USA on the Work and Travel Programme and another had attended a language school in Poland. One participant had spent time in Germany in an activist-study camp and another

er had studied in Poland. Three participants had lived outside Ukraine with their parents when they were younger, spending some of their childhood in other countries (Germany, Russia and Kazakhstan). Therefore, all but six participants had had experience with foreign countries before the invasion.

Only three participants had specific plans to migrate permanently before the Russian invasion. Six other participants were considering migration: their reasons were educating their children abroad or family reunification. Thus, most participants, despite their stays in foreign countries as tourists, workers or students, did not have migration aspirations to settle permanently abroad and planned to stay in Ukraine.

Participants were asked about their primary and additional motivations to flee from their country. Most of them (twenty participants) associated their motivations with the fear of war: *'The town [Sumy] was isolated. We all hoped that the Ukrainian army would liberate us, but then air raids started, and an aerial bomb was dropped on our town and twenty people died, whole families. We understood that we could die. It was just a matter of time. At that time, there was heavy fighting near Kyiv and the Russian army had no way of capturing our town; they were too busy with Kyiv. So they agreed to open a Green corridor [...]. First, women with small children left, and I was on one of the last buses with my son. Because we understood that air raids would continue.'* Another main reason (for eight participants) was their children's safety: *'I fled because I wanted my children to be safe. She should grow up normally, be calm in the streets, talk with children of the same age and not sit in the shelter and live in fear. I wanted my children to be safe and this was the main reason why we left and received temporary protection.'* Though less frequent, family reunification was also stated as one of the main reasons (for five participants): *'The main reason was that my husband was in Mexico and we did not know if he could come back or if he should join the army. At that time, we did not know the law. I thought that the best*

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[option] was to meet somewhere in Europe. It did not matter if it would be in Germany, France, Portugal or Spain, this was not the issue. I just wanted to meet him, to live together, so he could help us and support [his] wife and children.'

Much like in the case of other studies (Brücker et al. 2023), the fear of war and children's safety are usually inter-related, because the participants who claimed the fear of war as a reason for fleeing stated the safety of their children as a secondary reason, while others ranked the safety of their children first and the fear of war second. Here, it must be noted that most participants were from the Southern, Eastern and Central parts of Ukraine – regions invaded by Russian troops and experiencing constant bombing. Thus, their self-expression of drivers and self-representations of reasons is understandable in the context of the war: *'Why I fled from Ukraine. On the second day [of the invasion], I no longer had glass panes in my windows. Near our apartment building [in Kharkiv], everything was destroyed. We had no food, the stores were closed. We only had a small chifonier with food. And what else – no one knows. We had almost nothing and did not know what to do. We sat in the cellar with people from our house. And that's it. For twenty days. We could not sleep or eat, and there was nothing we could do. So, one day, it was a hard decision, but my mother asked my father to get us to the station. First of all [we travelled] to Lviv.'*

While the participants were unwilling to leave voluntarily before the Russian invasion, external circumstances forced them to leave their home towns and cities. The war negatively affected their everyday lives and exposed them to physical insecurity, encouraging them to seek protection outside Ukraine. However, this did not mean that the participants had no agency – as they stated, they could still decide where to settle, whether to stay or flee and even arrange time for their decision to flee. Their agency was constrained by the war circumstances, and their ability to decide was limited, but they were not completely deprived of choice. To sum up, their agency was

limited by external circumstances, and their decisions were based on the need to ensure their health and the health of their children, but they still had personal intentions.

The participants were also asked about the reasons why their fellow citizens migrated, and they frequently mentioned the fear of war (twenty-one participants). However, the second most frequent answer was economic reasons (for sixteen participants) related to exploiting humanitarian welfare benefits in Europe: *'I am volunteering here, and I see refugees from towns where there is no war, where there is a normal life, it is possible to live there, continue living, but they arrive here and rent out their apartments [in Ukraine]. They earn money from it. They do not work in the Czech Republic; they receive humanitarian help from the Czech state. Thus, they live normally and travel back home just to visit someone there, pick up the [rent] money, and so on. This is not right, the temporary protection should not support that.'* This participant was convinced that some members of their migrant community do not work in the Czech Republic. Still, others assert that work is the primary reason why other Ukrainians fled: *'[Those] from the Transcarpathian region, it is no secret for anyone, they arrived here to work. And others really fled from war, really from war, because it is terrible there. Morally, it is a bad [situation].'* Some participants noted that many Ukrainians arrived there to work not only in the Czech Republic but, more broadly, in the European Union. Another reason stressed by participants was finding accommodation: *'We do not have free accommodation. I did not even claim it. Since the first day, I have been paying a considerable amount of money for one room in the hostel. And some girl from Western Ukraine arrived here to work, she legalised her stay and has free accommodation. This is not right, I should have it as a refugee from occupied territory. And it is really like that.'*

Other participants did not specify whether their fellow citizens migrated for work or to exploit humanitarian aid, but they generally referred to taking advantage of

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the opportunity that the Czech Republic and Poland offered to Ukrainians. Furthermore, the participants viewed it as something that was also used by their fellow citizens who did not experience frequent air raids or shelling: *'Maybe they were going to their families, maybe also because they had wanted to leave earlier and took advantage of the moment.'* This participant expressed the important point that the war sped up the likelihood of migration for many Ukrainians. Again, this participant's interpretation is not an exception: *'The war was like a catalyst which sped up everyone's decisions. Some people had more financial support, not like me, and they had departed earlier. They had a car, one or two; the husband would drive one, the wife the other. They took the children, some stuff and some starter money, which others did not have. Did not have. And for us, it was a question of going to another country, registering, reporting to the authorities to receive some minimum money to be able to afford food. So the war was a catalyst.'* Other reasons were less common, such as fleeing from domestic violence, personal development and self-realisation, decreased support from the Ukrainian state, protection, no possibility of returning, loss of jobs and housing, and older parents accompanying some Ukrainian migrants.

Apart from fear, which remained an important factor, the other main reason given for others to migrate was economic. In this respect, they linked the motivations of other members of the migrant community to voluntary, instrumental decisions to move, as the pressures caused by the war were not, according to the participants, a cause that could introduce physical insecurity into the lives of such people and force them to seek safety. Instead, their migration was perceived as an instrumental exploitation of the opportunities offered by European countries in the wake of the Russian invasion, a decision motivated by subjective desires and interests. Thus, evaluating the migration aspirations of others involves recognising the instrumentally valuable

dimension of migration contributing to opportunities for social mobility in the new country, and improved conditions in personal, social and economic situations.

Accordingly, apart from the fear of war, the participants refer to the economic constraints of others in Ukraine who see their opportunities abroad rather than at home: *'Some of them took advantage of the opportunity to get out of Ukraine, maybe they did not have the opportunity [to do so before the invasion], they did not have the money to live [abroad before the invasion], so, when they got the opportunity, they took advantage of it and escaped.'* Allegedly, then, their solution is to find opportunities outside of Ukraine to achieve higher incomes and quality of life, causing envy and complaints among the participants who find themselves in a comparatively worse situation: *'At the borders, we saw many different people. When we were in the queue, we waited for approximately six or seven hours. It was possible to hear them talking. Many talked about money or how they would receive free accommodation. I think that information [was] from those who had already arrived and phoned their friends: 'Come on, you can receive a lot free of charge.' This was... I had only my backpack and a small suitcase, and people went through borders with such big suitcases.'* Mentioning the economic reasons means that the participants latched on to the idea that the movement of others was based on choosing where and how to live according to their capability. For example, perceiving the economic incentives for others indicates an awareness of the freedom of movement, which differs from how participants refer to their own situation: *'We were stressed, nervous. I will tell you, that I have been here for more than a year and only [now] during these days, these months, am I starting to cry less and fear the outside world less. And other refugees departed freely and they had planned it.'*

The participants' self-represented migration aspirations and deservingness were associated with forced migration because of external circumstances which lim-

ited their agency. Thus, they perceived themselves as more deserving. In terms of non-deservingness, putting the fear of war aside, they related the aspirations of others to economic reasons connected with the instrumental exploitation of benefits that European countries offered to Ukrainians. However, they also noted that others could migrate owing to the bad economic situation in Ukraine: *'There is also the fact that there is no work in Western Ukraine. There is nothing to live for. So they arrived here also for this reason.'* Thus, they rationalise the migration aspirations of others in the sense that they act, consider and decide based on logical aims and goals with a certain purpose. In this case, it is for economic reasons.

The findings show that the participants regarded those with economic aspirations as non-deserving; their hierarchisation was based on considering themselves – who had experienced trauma and harsh circumstances – as deserving, because their situation is in line with the requirements for temporary protection. The migration aspirations of those with economic incentives were not regarded as legitimate for receiving temporary protection, as this was not aligned with the temporary protection criteria. This differentiates deservingness and non-deservingness based on the exploitation of economic benefits and social welfare. Similarly, other research shows that welfare-dependent migrants are less desirable (Bontenbal 2023). However, the results of this study provide a perspective which is different from previous research. For example, Dempster and Hargrave (2017) noted that migrant communities could be assessed in terms of deservingness owing to their economic benefit to the destination country.

Discussion and conclusion

The present authors found that the participants presented in-group social boundaries within the same migrant community of Ukrainian refugees based on deservingness and non-deservingness. The participants express the view that non-deserving and non-

legitimate migration aspirations include economic aspirations and benefiting from social welfare, as this is not aligned with the terms of temporary protection. On the other hand, migration aspirations conforming to the temporary protection criteria are seen as deserving. While one may have expected such findings, the novelty regarding the in-group differences concerning the deservingness and status of Ukrainian refugees is crucial.

The findings support the notion of the legitimisation, recognition and hierarchisation of deserving and non-deserving aspirations. The idea of deservingness is usually attributed to the attitudes of the majority towards other migrants or the inter-ethnic relations between minorities and migration groups based on exclusion or inclusion (Bontenbal 2023). The findings of other researchers show that migrants who are voluntarily mobile are seen as less deserving than refugees (Verkuyten et al. 2017), but also that dependence on social welfare is perceived as less deserving (Bontenbal 2023). However, some authors have found that the economic benefit to the destination country is seen as deserving (Dempster and Hargrave 2017), which seems to contradict the first statement about voluntary mobility. Our research partly supports this thesis concerning the *non-deservingness of economic aspirations*. It also contributes to research on in-group perspectives within a single migrant community and how these affect aspirational differences in one group. Thus, we do away with the notion of ‘groupness’ – because deserving or non-deserving aspirations were usually aligned with one group by other authors – and show how members of the same migrant community have different attitudes towards each other. Regarding migration aspirations, this notion is usually examined as an individualised dimension rather than examined through how the aspirations of individuals relate to the aspirations of others in the migrant community (Carling and Collins 2018, De Haas 2021). Our study is a response

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to the individualisation of migration aspirations regarding the in-group perspective of deserving or non-deserving aspirations.

Nonetheless, this study has certain limitations. Firstly, it has not captured the notion of deservingness, normativity and values of the majority. Thus, the extent to which the participants' notions of deservingness (conforming to the migration status of forced migrants) aligns with the perception of the majority could not be determined. Secondly, the notion of 'deserving' and 'non-deserving' attributes is based on a dichotomy, and future research should go beyond the rationale of polarisation. Thirdly, there were significant regional differences in our research. The participants were mostly from the Southern, Eastern and Central parts of Ukraine, with few originating from its Western part. The regional differences – given that it was especially Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine which were attacked by Russia – could provide meaningful differences in terms of deservingness and non-deservingness.

In future research, more emphasis could be placed on how migration aspirations relate to the social sphere, as the concept of migration aspirations can extend beyond the individualised context and relate more to the social environment. Future research could provide a comparison of the situation of Ukrainian refugees in different European countries and regional differences towards accepting Ukrainian refugees. Many questions regarding the situation of Ukrainian refugees remained unanswered – from the aspirations to stay in host societies or return to Ukraine to the notion of their physical well-being in a new country.

Thus, it is vital to research Europe's biggest refugee flow since the Second World War according to the principle of deservingness and aspirations. In this regard, it is also crucial to determine whether temporary protection is fit for purpose and fulfils the goals for which it was created. This is significant because it marks the first time that temporary protection has been applied in the European context since its

adoption in 2001. It is important to see whether this policy ultimately succeeds or fails.

This paper is associated with the perception of migration aspirations, deservingness and non-deservingness. Our findings show – as the participants framed it – that there is an accepted rationale and logic of temporary protection (seen as deserving) and a refusal to exploit the temporary protection permits based on economic aspirations (seen as non-deserving). This has created a particular understanding of temporary protection associated with the notions of deservingness, aspiration and belonging.

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LUNYKA PERTIWI

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS
SEPARATISM IN GEORGIA AND CRIMEA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY**

Abstract

This study seeks to explore how external and internal factors, along with historical lessons, influenced Dmitry Medvedev's foreign policy decisions regarding separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, compared to Vladimir Putin's decisions concerning separatism in Crimea. The analysis incorporates concepts of foreign policy learning, and examines the external and internal environments related to foreign policy theory. In addition, this article applies a qualitative comparative study to the decision-making process. The analysis concludes that Russia's response to the separatists in Georgia and Crimea were shaped by distinct beliefs under different political leaders, influenced by lessons from previous experiences and various external and internal factors. This research offers new insights into how the learning processes of Russia's political leaders guided the adoption of specific policy measures in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Crimea respectively.

Keywords: Russia, foreign policy, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Crimea, learning

Introduction

From 2008 to 2014, Russia encountered intricate challenges with two Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – Ukraine and Georgia. The conflict with Georgia centered on Russia's military assistance to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatists. This eventually led Russia to acknowledge officially the independence and sovereignty of these regions. Conflict between Ukraine and Russia escalated as Russia, responding to the claims of separatism and self determination made by certain commu-

nities in Crimea, facilitated its accession to the Russian Federation through a relatively non-violent referendum, involving unidentified armed individuals (little green men).

In the sphere of Russian foreign policy concerning the nations within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), various research studies have delved into Russia's approaches towards the separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia) and Crimea (Ukraine).

The United States and NATO at that time supported Georgia to fight against separatists in Abkhaz and South Ossetia. This policy actually further strengthened the unity among Russian decision-makers, prompting military interventions and peace-keeping operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Kremlin chose to pursue conflict with Georgia and perceived no potential for a constructive resolution with Georgia on the matter. Russia's military intervention illustrated a comprehensive strategic approach aimed at safeguarding its national interests and ensuring security in the Near Aboard (Lomia 2020; Kropatcheva 2009).

Meanwhile, Russia aimed to undermine the Ukrainian government's authority in Crimea and safeguard the presence of Russia's Black Sea Fleet stationed in Sevastopol, a key port city. Furthermore, the proximity of Russia's geography shaped perceptions of potential threats to Ukraine, especially following Ukraine's 2008 bid for NATO membership. Russia viewed Ukraine's potential accession to NATO as a significant menace, as it could facilitate increased U.S. influence in the nearby region. In contrast to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the separatist movement in Crimea might not prompt Russia to deploy peacekeepers (Gadner 2014; Golani 2014; Hadenskog 2008; Kuzio 2010).

Russia defended its military engagement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by framing it as a defensive action aimed at safeguarding its citizens and ethnic groups residing beyond Russian borders. Additionally, Russia cited humanitarian grounds as

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a rationale for deploying additional troops to these regions. In contrast, Crimea witnessed the application of tools such as escalation control, political pressure and non-linearity. These strategies were perceived as a continuation of the old Soviet concept, indicating the Kremlin's implementation of an expansionist agenda driven by the reinforcement of Russian national identity sentiments, particularly feelings of humiliation by the West (Sherlock 2020; Bruusgrad 2014; Frostad 2014).

The aforementioned literature effectively elucidates the motives behind Russia's approach to separatist movements in Crimea (Ukraine), South Ossetia, and Abkhazia (Georgia). Nevertheless, it falls short in elucidating the interconnection of external and internal factors and historical events that form the basis of Russia's policy learning process in decision-making. It is noteworthy that Russia's foreign policy, rooted in its Soviet Union legacy, consistently involves an ongoing learning process (Holloway 2021: 57-58; Götz 2017).

Based on the knowledge gaps in the existing literature, the article will address the question, 'What are the differences in Russia's learning process in determining policy instruments towards separatism in Crimea (Ukraine) and its learning process towards the separatism of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia)?'

Discussions of these variations in Russian policy toward separatist movements in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea will draw on concepts of foreign policy and foreign policy learning. This examination will take into account components of the external environment, domestic Russian conditions, and past successes and/or failures of Russian policy. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to contribute to areas of Russian foreign policy making and the continuity and change of Russian foreign policy.

Conceptual Framework

Foreign policy

Foreign policy is executed through a minimum of five categories of tools: politics, diplomacy, the economy, the military and information, as outlined by Lentner (1974: 216-220). According to Kenneth Waltz (1979: 74-79), political institutions play a pivotal role in shaping foreign policy, influenced by a nation's experiences, traditions, and external pressures from other countries. The establishment of a country's policy direction, subsequently reflected in its foreign policy, demands meticulous consideration by decision-makers among the nation's elite. This precision in decision-making is motivated by the objective of avoiding previous failures or errors. The foreign policy preferences of a state may be influenced by the perspectives of its decision-making elite, which can evolve over time. Kenneth Waltz elucidates that policy shifts arise from experiences and observations (Goldsmith 2005: 25). These accumulated experiences and observations contribute to the accrual of information that guides a country in pursuing its objectives.

Foreign policy learning

In general, foreign policy learning is the process of changing foreign policy beliefs or procedures after observing and interpreting an experience. All interpretations involve a structured process of analysis (Levy 197: 279-312). In regard to foreign policy learning, Goldsmith (2005) offers three explanations:

1. Policy beliefs serve as information that supports decision making under uncertain circumstances and are based on prior experience.
2. The learning process in the international arena is often driven by events that have a significant impact on the country, such as major successes or failures.

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3. The impact of an event is felt more strongly when the country experiences it directly.

Learning is not passive, but active, as actors learn lessons from past events. A learning process that does not influence or change the actors' behaviour cannot be considered useful for foreign policy development.

The learning process on a state's past experience is often intertwined with both the external and internal environments. External and internal (domestic) factors play a crucial role in shaping an actor's learning process (Snyder et al. 2002).

1. External environment

In the field of international politics, much can be gleaned from the external environment of particular actors. First, there are (state or non-state)¹ actors who hold a direct central position and can make various decisions. These actors can use diplomatic negotiations with other actors if necessary. In addition, there are peripheral actors that operate at a lower level than the direct central actor and transfer certain resources to the central actor. There are also target actors that become instruments or targets of the direct central actor's actions.

The policies pursued by these actors shape the different characteristics of the interactions between them, such as conflicts, alliances, wars, arms races in the political and military spheres, or trade competition, cooperation, economic sanctions and embargoes in the economic sphere. The behaviour of these actors is studied in the

¹ Non-state actors include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), interest groups, lobby groups, private military companies, think tanks and others. However, the focus of this article will be solely on non-state actors from Russia's hardline nationalist lobby group in the context of internal environment.

arena where the central actor directly applies its instruments, which can range from the local to the regional to the global level.

The events in the external sphere of these actors have an impact on the consideration of the political constellation and the emergence of certain ideas in the internal sphere.

2. Internal environment

In addition to considering the external framework or background, decision makers also consider the internal (domestic) background. Internal factors may include (a) coalitions or political and economic conditions within the national setting, and (b) the ideologies or beliefs of the majority of certain political elites and the public regarding particular issues and their treatment.

Changes in domestic political conditions may serve as incentives or opportunities for certain political or social leaders or groups to express certain ideas and proposals. These ideas and proposals may then foster consensus among decision makers (countries) and/or trigger a re-evaluation of their assumptions about an event.

However, it is important to note that states with a competitive authoritarian system are more selective in adopting ideas from society than states with a fully democratic system. According to Levitsky and Way (2010), competitive authoritarian states, such as Russia, are inclined to manipulate all democratic norms rather than abandoning them, and eliminating all opposition organisations and public opinion that challenge their regime. In order to solidify their power and image, competitive authoritarian states often incorporate the perspectives of pro-regime domestic groups into narratives about international threats that affect their countries. In the light of media, competitive authoritarian states tend to use threats, bribes and the sorting of information in order to control their opinions (Günay 2016).

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Furthermore, policy learning by a state actor involves (Brown & Kenny 2017):


1. observation and/or interpretation of the external and internal environment, experiences that lead to:
2. change in fundamental policy belief or increasing confidence in one's own policy belief, which influences the state's behaviour and changes in the foreign policy procedures and instruments.

The learning process becomes effective when it guides and enables actors to act more precisely in setting policies and policy instruments, leading to the achievement of their main goals.

In the context of Russian foreign policy, Russia remained a country that bore the hallmarks of the Soviet Union, which led it to monitor developments closely in other countries of the former Soviet Union. The emergence of separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and separatist movements in Crimea in Ukraine forced Russia to adopt a different approach to foreign policy.

The cases examined in this study share similarities. Consequently, the analysis will emphasise factors that distinguish Russia's learning process and its associated foreign policy beliefs towards regional outreach and the patterns of relations influenced by the West.

Figure 1. Mechanism of Decision Making



Research Method

The research method in this article is a qualitative comparative study, which allows us to gain a better understanding of a certain phenomenon that has not been thoroughly studied by previous research and to compare the phenomenon in two different periods.

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In collecting data, this study relies primarily on library research to gather secondary data from online academic journals, books, official statements from government websites, and media articles. The data collected relates to the history and developments of separatist movements in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as Russia's past and current policy goals and instruments toward these two countries.

For data analysis, this research uses qualitative interpretation to structure the data into variables of Russian policy toward separatist movements in Georgia and Ukraine, compare them, and analyse their meaning.

Discussion

Goals of Russian foreign policy

Russia's foreign policy under Putin has sought to realise Russia's national goals of being a 'counterbalance' to U.S. hegemony and restoring his country's image as an independent international actor (Mankoff 2009: 24). Russia recognised its geopolitical influence, and acknowledged that it had the capacity to contribute to both international and regional security through the strategic utilisation of diverse policy instruments encompassing politics, economics, media, military, and information (Jackson 2003: 6).

However, the 9/11 attack on American soil somewhat softened Russia's views and foreign policy toward the United States under Putin's leadership. At the time, Russia said it was ready to support the United States in the fight against terrorism, especially because Russia had faced terror from Chechen militant Islamists who had wanted to secede since 1992. Officially, Vladimir Putin said in 2001:

Russia knows directly what terrorism means, and because of this we, more than anyone, understand the feelings of the American people. On

behalf of Russia, I want to say to the American people – we are with you (Saunders & Strukov 2010: 519).

With this objective, Russia sought to enhance discussions and military collaboration with the United States concerning the Taliban regime. More specifically, McFaul (2001) in his testimony published on the *Carnegie Endowment* website explained that Russia proposed to (1) exchange intelligence information with the United States, (2) permit the use of Russian airspace for flights delivering humanitarian aid, (3) collaborate with allies in Central Asia to grant airspace access for U.S. flights, (4) actively participate in international search and rescue operations, and (5) enhance its direct humanitarian assistance to both the NATO alliance and the recognised government of Afghanistan. Regrettably, this dialogue was short-lived. The United States persisted in its unilateral approach, exemplified by the invasion of Iraq in 2003. From Russia's perspective, this invasion lacked approval from the UN Security Council, contributing to the erosion of regional and global stability and undermining a sustainable world order (Lukyanov 2013).

Medvedev's learning process in determining instruments of foreign policy towards secessionists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

In formulating its foreign policy tools directed at Abkhazia and South Ossetia, regions aspiring for independence from Georgia, Russia considered both external and internal contexts, along with the shortcomings of its previous policy towards Georgia.

Recognition of Kosovo's independence by the Western alliance, and Nato membership offer to Georgia

From June to July 2008, two external events had an impact on Russia's policy toward Georgia: the U.S. recognition of Kosovo's independence and the offer of NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia.

In the first event, the United States, wielding significant political influence, endorsed Kosovo's independence, affecting Serbia and diminishing its sovereignty. Russia, aligning with Serbia, opposed the recognition of Kosovo's independence, viewing it as a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. This situation caused the alliance of the United States, its allies and Kosovo to come into tensions at the regional level and in the United Nations Security Council with the Chinese-backed alliance of Serbia and Russia.

The second event involved Georgia, which was engaged in a civil war against separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It received an offer for increased cooperation and military training with NATO, in order to enhance deterrence and defence in Europe. Although the issue of separatism occurred in Georgian domestic politics, because Georgia and the secessionists were each supported by major powers with opposing views, the patterns of interactions (i.e. conflicts and alliances) played out at the regional level. The interaction between Georgia, which was increasingly pro-Western, and the Abkhaz and South Ossetian militants, who were pro-Russian, escalated at that precise time.

Domestic opinion on Georgia's ambitions

In the domestic context, Russia demonstrated selectivity in acknowledging the aspirations or opinions of its people. The prevailing public sentiment toward Georgia played a role in influencing the learning process, particularly when it favoured the Russian

government. The majority of Russians supported the government's decision to intervene in the conflict between Georgia and the separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, viewing Russia's military actions as justified. Additionally, Russian public opinion saw the intervention as a signal to the West, emphasising Russia's commitment to maintaining security stability in the Near Abroad region (Nygren 2008: 66).

According to a Levada Center survey conducted prior to the Russia-Georgia War, the majority of the public agreed that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were part of Russia. 47% of Russian respondents agreed that Russia had to interfere to safeguard Abkhazia and South Ossetians (JIEBAJIA-IQEHTP 2008). Meanwhile, the hardline nationalist elites in Russia, a grouping with a longstanding presence and loyalty to the Kremlin since the inception of the Russian post-Soviet state, had their own views. Until the escalation of the conflict between Georgia and the separatists, these elites held the belief that Eduard Shevardnadze, the second president of Georgia and a former minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union, had played a role in the Soviet Union's collapse, even though Georgia during his administration joined the CIS. During his tenure as the Soviet Union's prime minister, many of his actions were perceived as weakening the country's superpower status (Zygar 2016; Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty 2009; Matlock Jr 1997). For instance, he allegedly influenced Gorbachev to downsize the number of military officers, ending military monopoly over national interests, eased political tensions with the United States, and advocated for a democratic Bolshevik faction in Central and Eastern European countries (Sullivan 2015; Wallander 2003; Ekhdahl & Goodman 1997). Shevardnadze, along with Alexander Yakovlev (a pioneer of perestroika) and Stanislav Shatalin (one of Gorbachev's economic advisors, in addition to Nikolay Petrakov, who also supported market reforms), were signatories to the Democratic Reform Group of the Russian Communist Party.

Subsequently, these perspectives of the hardline nationalist elites established a self-fulfilling prophecy that Georgia was a hostile aggressor, troublemaker, and a zone of instability that needed to be addressed by Russia. They even made mention of the fact that Georgia had committed genocide against the Abkhaz and South Ossetians from 1992 to 1993 (March 2011). In Russia's upper house, or Federation Council, these elites voted 130-0 to urge Medvedev to endorse the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Harding 2008).

Russia's errors in addressing Chechen secessionists

Chechnya was a thorn in the side of Russian integrity. If Chechnya succeeded in liberating itself, it would likely provoke other regions in the Russian Federation to do the same. Nevertheless, Russia committed numerous errors during both the first and second Chechen wars. Some of these errors cannot be separated from Georgia's role.

During the first Chechen war from 1994 to 1996, the majority of Russia's military personnel, who were predominantly young, lacked sufficient experience and had not undergone prior collective training. 6000 to 14000 Russian soldiers were killed in action (Cassidy 2003: 1). Russia was unprepared for the strategic use of modern technologies, such as mobile phones, by Chechen fighters. Additionally, Russia experienced a significant reduction in military equipment following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, peace negotiations which Russia tried to offer failed miserably, as Chechnya maintained its status as an independent country and continued to increase the strength and number of its military personnel. The spirit of Chechen separatism even spread to the Dagestan and Ingushetia regions (Felgenhauer 2016; Grau & Thomas 2000).

Moreover, the Russian authorities neglected to suppress the rise of domestic freedom of speech and often critical media coverage of Russia's efforts to handle

Chechen secession. Consequently, these media-related issues presented an increasing difficulty for the Russian government in upholding its public reputation, especially given the persistent battle against poverty within the nation (Pack 2011).

With regard to the second Chechen war, Georgia contributed significantly to Russian errors. In 1994, Georgia opened its borders to Chechen refugees. Consequently, Russia accused Georgia of cooperating with Chechen extremists, because the Chechen commander, Ruslan Gelayev, had managed to carry out several attacks on Russian soldiers from Pankisi Gorge (Georgia) (Devdarini & Hancilova 2002). At that time, Pankisi Gorge was regarded as a hub for Muslim extremists. Despite its superior military forces, Russia did not succeed in containing the Chechen guerrillas entrenched there. Nevertheless, the Russian authorities exerted significant control over the media, which effectively prevented these errors from being exposed to the public (Pack 2011).

Although Russia won a victory in the second Chechen war, Chechen fighters stayed and hid in various areas, including Georgia. In 2002, the United States helped train the Georgian military to overcome terrorist attacks in the Georgian border region and fight Chechen guerrillas.

Policy developed from internal and external factors, and previous experience

Medvedev increasingly felt that the recognition of Kosovo's independence showed that the Western alliance could not be trusted (Staack 2017). Russia could have continued its cooperation with Europe and NATO begun by Germany after the Cold War. Russia was promised to be able to participate in the restoration of stability and security in Kosovo. NATO even signed an agreement with Russia on the management of the Kosovo-Serbia conflict. Both sides agreed on three things: (1) the Allies would stop the plan to bomb Kosovo; (2) Serbian troops would be withdrawn from the

conflict zone and replaced by a multinational peacekeeping force, which would also be maintained by Russian military personnel; and (3) the role of Russian peacekeepers was to guarantee Serbian interests and sovereignty (Yesson 1999). In 1999, however, NATO decided to intervene militarily in Kosovo, citing its responsibility to protect the territory. This action ignored the principles of a rules-based international order. Russia maintained that the Western alliance's unilateral military actions and recognition of Kosovo's independence were efforts to prevent Russia from playing major roles in international conflict management and peacekeeping.

Furthermore, NATO's act of promising membership to Georgia in 2008, following Georgia's official expression of its desire to join NATO at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002, served as a symbolic representation of the unchallenged supremacy of the Western alliance in Europe. In doing so, the alliance disregarded Russia's substantial involvement as a critical player in the realm of peace and security, and underestimated its military and political capacity to be a major global force. Moreover, NATO and Georgia signed a bilateral partnership for peace in 1994,² and they commenced their first joint military exercise in 1996 (Puzio 2022). This partnership for peace stemmed from the alliance's persistent belief that it remained the ultimate winner of the Cold War. The alliance also believed that the partnership would serve as a defensive coalition against Russia if Russia's political direction became problematic (Gallis 1994).

Georgia's role in the past, public opinion, and the persistent attitudes of hard-line elites regarding Georgia (together with their support for military action), influenced Medvedev's policy belief towards Georgia and the West. Medvedev be-

² The partnership for peace arrangement is aimed at enhancing cooperation on defence and security issues among NATO member states and partners.

lieved that the U.S. and NATO were utilising Georgia as a tool to undermine Russia's southern borders (Borozna 2022: 119-120). By exploiting the presence of Chechen separatists who sought refuge in Georgia, the U.S. aimed to influence Georgia's government with pro-Western values. Initially, the U.S. overlooked Russia's efforts to fight against Chechen guerrillas and to participate in counter-terrorism endeavours. However, after Georgia permitted Chechen rebels to enter its borders, the U.S. sided with Georgia in combating them. This situation resulted in ongoing instability in Russia's southern borders. Additionally, despite Russia's better military training, they lacked the ability to coordinate tasks effectively on the battlefield in order to counter Chechen fighters' covert tactics.

In the view of Medvedev, Georgia suddenly sought to forge closer cooperative ties with the West by making its foreign policy dualistic, i.e. by accepting U.S. military aid and money to repel Chechen separatists and then attempting to regain control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Coggins 2014: 190). These Georgian manoeuvres fuelled the sense that Georgia would do anything to ensure that Russia, which inherited the Soviet legacy, lost its legitimacy to the countries in the CIS. Medvedev further stated that Georgia was the one who initiated aggression against Abkhazia and South Ossetia so that the intervention carried out by Russia was no different from that of NATO in Kosovo (Harding 2008).

The experience of errors in the first and second Chechen wars, and the intertwining of Russia's external and internal environments, was part of the chain of Medvedev's learning process. Despite Russia consistently declared the winner in the first and second Chechen wars, its failure to anticipate Western strategies and Georgia's manoeuvres, as well as its less modernised political and military tactics, dealt a severe blow to its pride. In addition, Medvedev believed that the colour revolutions, specifically Georgia's Rose Revolution in 2003, signalled an increase of the West's

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interests in Central and Eastern Europe. He believed that these revolutions were a rehearsal for the West to undermine Russia's regime by supporting similar uprisings led by opposition leaders during the critical moment when Russia was confronted with the issues in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (March 2011). Subsequently, this learning became a basis for Medvedev's finalisation of military instruments, peacekeeping forces, and recognition of independence in support of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Medvedev justified these measures by emphasising humanitarian pretexts – to guarantee entities' rights to 'self-determination'. He also employed media manipulation to construct a one-sided and highly emotive message, with a particular focus on the narrative that Russia, under himself and Putin (the Prime Minister), was the triumphant protector of its suffering sister nations, while also highlighting Russia's reputation as a formidable nation (Dubas & Rogoza 2008).

In spite of facing criticism from Western nations, for the Kremlin these political-military measures showcased Russia's military resolve and strength in the case of open confrontation with a liberal international order advocated by the Western alliance (*The French EU Council Presidency* 2022). Moreover, these measures were intended to respond to the West's ambition and arrogance in Central and Eastern Europe. Employing substantial military forces to back Abkhazia and South Ossetia had the additional purpose of causing significant harm to Georgia and undermining its resolve to resist Russia's intentions (Petro 2009). Furthermore, the dispatch of peacekeeping missions and the acknowledgment of Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence were efforts to camouflage the assertive nature of Russia's military interventions against Georgian forces in these specific regions.

Putin's learning process in determining instruments of foreign policy towards secessionists in Crimea

In determining its foreign policy instruments against separatism in Crimea, Putin had taken into account the external and internal environments, as well as the failure and success of Russia's previous policy toward Ukraine.

NATO's plan of missile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic

The conflict between pro-Western Ukrainian groups and the pro-Russian Ukrainian government from November 2013 to March 2014 was intricately linked to international relations involving NATO and various Central and Eastern European nations. Collaboration among Poland, the Czech Republic and NATO contributed to a heightened arms race or military tensions between NATO and its allies against Russia, with potential repercussions for both regional and global security.

From 2013-2014, the United States initiated an activation of its operational missile defence capabilities in Poland and the Czech Republic. This initiative had been in progress since the signing of an agreement between the Czech Republic and the United States on July 8, 2008. Subsequently, on August 20, 2008, Poland also signed a similar agreement. According to these agreements, the United States committed to deploying early warning systems, military radars, and 200 U.S. personnel at Brdy, located 90 kilometers southwest of Prague. Additionally, 10 long-range missiles and 500 U.S. personnel were to be stationed at Slupsk-Redzikow in northern Poland. In the initial phase, Poland was to receive a Patriot AR missile defence battery. Eventually, the ballistic missile defence system was endorsed as a NATO project during the Strasbourg summit in April 2009. Furthermore, Poland harboured an aspiration to establish its own missile defence system, even if the project fell under the NATO framework. Poland's deputy defence minister in 2013, expressed Poland's intention to

allocate a budget of US \$10 billion for the implementation of this system, coupled with plans to augment its military budget in 2014. Within the agreement, the U.S. assumed the responsibility of furnishing military resources to both Poland and the Czech Republic (Market Intelligence 2022; Kupiecki 2015; Giles & Andrew 2014).

Simultaneously, Ukraine's First Deputy Defence Minister, Oleksandr Oliynyk, convened a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) on February 27, 2014, to continue discussions regarding Ukraine's potential NATO membership. This matter, however, was left unclear during the Yanukovych regime (NATO, 2014). Acting on behalf of NATO, the United States pledged to extend US \$1 billion in financial assistance packages and other emergency budgetary support to aid Ukraine in restoring stability and sovereignty. Additionally, the EU offered financial assistance (Sofer 2014: 6; Welt 2017: 11-17) to prevent Ukraine from succumbing to a currency crisis and to facilitate its integration process into the EU.

Stagnant economy, the rise of the opposition in Russia, and support from nationalists

Internal conditions within Russia were rather precarious during 2013-2014. The country experienced sluggish economic growth, numerous corruption revelations by opposition leader Alexey Navalny, and a decrease in foreign exchange revenues from the oil and gas sector owing to global price declines. Faced with this situation, Russia's government employed intimidation tactics and security forces to deter various opposition groups and the general public from engaging in street protests.

Simultaneously, nationalist groups, and military and political elites in Russia strengthened. According to them, Crimea was simply an unjustified 'political gift' to Ukraine in the past (Merezhko 2015). The term 'political gift' can be defined as follows:

(1) the cession of Crimea was a ‘noble act on the part of the Russian people’ to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the ‘reunification of Ukraine with Russia’ (a reference to the Treaty of Pereyaslav signed in 1654 by representatives of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmanate and Tsar Aleksei I of Muscovy) and to ‘evinced the boundless trust and love the Russian people feel toward the Ukrainian people’; and (2) the transfer was a natural outgrowth of the ‘territorial proximity of Crimea to Ukraine, the commonalities of their economies, and the close agricultural and cultural ties between the Crimean oblast and the Ukraine SSS’ (Kramer 2014).

This ‘political gift’ was a decision made collectively by Soviet political entities, not just by Nikita Khrushchev, who was the Communist Party’s secretary at the time. Furthermore, approval for this transfer was incorporated into the Constitutions of both the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (RSSU) (Dolya 2016). However, nationalist groups, and military and political elites believed that the Russian and Crimean populations did not provide consent for this hand-over of Crimea to Ukraine (Merezhko 2015).

Advantages of Russia’s propaganda in Crimea and errors in Russia-Georgia war

In January 2013, the Chief of the General Staff, General Valerii Gerasimov, said that non-military tools such as social culture and information could be used as guerrilla tactics to respond to the ‘revolution in military affairs’ of Western states exemplified by NATO’s intervention in Libya (Сущенцов 2015). Although Russia was not a winner or loser in the Russia-Georgia war, senior military officials and analysts criticised the Kremlin for rushing into a conflict with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They high-

lighted the challenges of dealing with malfunctioning, outdated military equipment, noting that Russian forces had failed to neutralise Georgian air defences, which successfully shot down a Russian TU-22 (Dugas 2016: 30-35). Furthermore, Russia's military was observed to lack adequate topographic knowledge of the mountainous terrain in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This had led commanders to experience hardships in changing their movements and formations in order to anticipate the Georgian forces' attacks in land zones (Pertiwi and A. Jafri 2019).

Malyarenko (2013) emphasises that separatism in Crimea was not violent and was not intrinsically linked to issues of identity as Russians or non-Ukrainians, as Crimeans could be of Russian, Ukrainian, Tartar or Slovak descent. Local grievances and social tensions between Crimea and Ukraine, particularly in relation to poverty, social insecurity, unemployment, resource allocation and Ukraine's land reform plan in Crimea, served as the impetus for separatist claims in the region. She also highlights that the desire to establish economic ties with Russia was a major driving force behind the separatist claims expressed by Crimean Slovaks.

Furthermore, with regard to Russia's propaganda in Crimea approximately a year following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Russia actively pursued non-military strategies in Crimea, focusing on designated ethnic Russian entities (Cadier & Light 2015: 64). They were specifically identified as government officials, cultural or educational figures, media representatives and journalists. They were responsible for carrying out the provision of Russian passports, information dissemination, the broadcast of pro-Russian media, and engagement in social, humanitarian, cultural, and educational activities which promoted Russian ideologies, histories, cultures and values.

For example, Russia persisted in fostering and promoting the Russian language as a symbol of identity for the people of Crimea. Consequently, the majority of

Crimea's population, particularly parents, began to perceive learning another language (Ukrainian) as a disadvantage. They preferred to enroll their children in schools where Russian served as the language of instruction.

In 2006, American and Ukrainian marines arrived in Crimea and Feodosiya. This sparked immediate anger among the people of Crimea, leading to demonstrations where they chanted slogans like 'Occupiers go home' ('Go, invaders'), even though their presence was part of a cooperative program involving joint military training between Ukraine and NATO. The growing protests from residents eventually compelled U.S. marines to depart from Crimea, particularly after the Crimean parliament issued a decree declaring Crimea a NATO troop-free zone.

Subsequently, on August 24, 2009, anti-Ukrainian demonstrations erupted in Crimea, orchestrated by ethnic Russians with the backing of Sergei Tsekov, deputy speaker of the Crimean parliament. Tsekov expressed hopes that Russia would extend maximum support to the pro-Russian movement, akin to its support for separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to the Razumkov Centre Poll conducted in May 2009, 32.3% of respondents from Crimea expressed their support for the notion of separating from Ukraine. This proportion decreased to only 24.4% in May 2011. However, the decline in separatist claims did not necessarily indicate an increase in trust among Crimeans towards the Ukrainian government, nor did it guarantee the prevention of local conflicts (Malyarenko 2013).

Conversely, the Ukrainian government struggled to acknowledge fully the long-standing anomalies in the governance and societal structures of Crimea and failed to undertake substantial measures to rectify them. The potential repeal of a 2012 language regulation that permitted the use of minority languages significantly eroded the trust of Crimeans in the Ukrainian administration. As a result, Russia's

propaganda successfully brought advantages for the implementation of hybrid strategies to worsen relations between Crimea and Ukraine.

Policy beliefs developed from internal and external factors, and previous experiences

Putin believed it was imperative to exercise caution regarding all NATO activities in Central and Eastern European countries (Staack 2017). The deployment of defensive missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic was perceived by Putin as a potential threat to Kaliningrad,³ as it had the capacity to obstruct Kaliningrad's access to the Baltic Sea politically and militarily. However, given the geopolitical dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe, Crimea, where the Black Sea Fleet operated, represented the last strategic region remaining free from Western influence. The annexation of Crimea was deemed crucial, since, without it, Russia would have limited access to the Black Sea, especially if Ukraine joined the European Union and NATO (Демидов 2015). Crimea served as Russia's direct maritime link to the sea, given that a significant portion of Russia's western territory bordered pro-Western countries from the former Soviet Union. This strategic positioning in Crimea allowed Russia to maintain maritime access to Turkey via the Black Sea, a country often at odds with Western values and policies.

³ Kaliningrad is an administrative enclave within Russian Federation, which lies between Baltic Sea and borders Poland in the south and Lithuania in the north and east. Kaliningrad is geographically separated from mainland Russia and is 300 kilometers from Moscow. Russia annexed this area from Germany in 1945. The area was a closed military zone during the Soviet era. Kaliningrad, formerly known for its military industry, is still part of Moscow's strategic interests. Kaliningrad hosts the Russian Baltic Fleet in the port of Baltiysk and is its only ice-free port in Europe.

Furthermore, within the context of Russia's domestic politics, Putin and Russia's nationalist politicians, military leaders and experts gave credence to the growing range of unconventional challenges and threats to Russia's national security, and accused the West of asserting support for opposition groups in order to foment instability in Russia (Афанасьевич 2021; Комлева 2017). This belief had been indicated by Putin in April 2005 in an Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. He said that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a disaster. Regardless, Russia had to maintain its state sovereignty, make crucial decisions in choosing a new direction for its thousand-year history and its own path of democracy (*The Russian President's official website* 2005).

Therefore, the annexation of Crimea, carried out with minimal bloodshed, demonstrated Putin's strategies for protecting Russia's values and ensuring the survival of his regime. This annexation served as evidence of the fact that Putin appeared to have absorbed the cue from domestic nationalist factions regarding the Crimea as a political gift to Ukraine and accommodated their subtly expressed expectations of Crimea's return to Russia. Moreover, this annexation enabled his regime to manipulate its approval ratings and to obscure public perceptions regarding whether the economic downturn was a result of his own government's mismanagement or Western interference.

Additionally, propaganda through the designated ethnic Russian entities that Russia had invested in Crimea since 2005 bolstered Putin's self-assurance, reinforcing the annexation process as a means to unify Russians within the country and across the world, and as a signal to Central and Eastern European states to align their political direction towards Russia. The pro-Russian sentiment in Crimea pronounced by Putin was crucial not only for ensuring the presence of the Russian fleet patrolling the Black

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Sea, but also for strengthening Russia's military position on both regional and international fronts.

In contrast to military involvement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Putin believed that a cost-effective military operation in Crimea – where advanced military equipment and a large deployment of regular military personnel were deemed unnecessary – would yield greater advantages and provoke the Western alliance (Mankoff 2014). This combat style was aimed at disrupting the coordination of the adversaries' defences without causing excessive damage from a full-scale military confrontation in Simferempol. Putin's evolving policy belief was that Moscow could no longer engage in battles by using the same tactics as in the Russia-Georgia war. Instead, non-military strategies were seen as capable of reducing the potential for conflict with adversaries and achieving success (Iasiello 2017). Furthermore, as per Dugas (2016), Russia under Putin's administration fostered a shift in its policy perspective, emphasising that success was not solely about winning the war, but also involved employing more precise strategies to minimise failures and casualties, utilising existing assets and entities in Crimea.

According to Andrey Vinogradov, a resident of Crimea, many Crimean residents believe that the unrest in Kiev associated with the Maidan movement had the potential to cause chaos in Crimea. He added that there was a widespread rumour during that period that the Ukrainian Right Sector intended to eliminate all authority in Crimea. Consequently, some civilians formed their own self-defence groups (Meduza 2017) and Putin exploited this fear in Crimea for his benefits.

He opted to deploy 'little green men' – individuals who he asserted were merely self-defence groups comprised of local residents in Crimea. Operating under the cover of little green men, Russia reportedly dispatched 20,000 to 30,000 troops from its military base in Crimea to the southern district, along with 2,000 marines.

There was a proliferation of bunkers and checkpoints. This proliferation enhanced the manoeuvrability of Russian marines and personnel, who could also screen out individuals deemed undesirable or dangerous. As a result, they compelled Ukrainian marines to surrender with minimal resistance, occupied various public facilities and government buildings, secured Black Sea Fleet facilities in Simferopol, and took control of approximately 190 Ukrainian military establishments and arsenals in Crimea (Galeotti 2015: 158; Bobick 2014). This tactic sought to facilitate Russia's peaceful access to Crimea, prevent the Ukrainian military from mounting a strong defence and gaining more control over Crimea, and ultimately reduce Ukraine's sovereignty.

Putin proposed a referendum once the little green men had already outnumbered Ukrainian forces. Despite the decline in separatist claims, this move benefited from the fact that the vast majority of the population of Crimea was Russian-speaking. He unilaterally established a connection between language and identity by asserting that individuals who spoke Russian in Crimea were fundamentally Russians. Irrespective of the allegations of fraud or manipulation, the referendum yielded a 96.77 percent (according to the Crimean electoral committee: 96.8 percent) agreement among voters to secede from Ukraine and join Russia. The voter turnout for the referendum in Crimea was approximately 83.1 percent of the total population of 2.3 million (AZERTAC 2014; Bopick 2014; Malyarenko 2013).

The result of this referendum was subsequently approved by the Crimean regional government and Russia's State Duma constitution. This constitution, signed by Putin as well, played a pivotal role in Russia's disengagement from and disavowal of the Black Sea Fleet Agreement and the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership. The strategic purpose of Putin's annexation decision was to lessen Ukraine's legitimacy over Crimean coastal regions and to restrict its power over Russia's Black Sea military. Consequently, it facilitated Russia's implementation of specific rules and

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procedures, and the additional deployment of regular naval forces and ships within the vicinity of Sevastopol. Russia asserted that Crimea was no longer a part of Ukraine and that the legal status of the marine zones surrounding the peninsula's shore had been changed. Russia imposed limitations on the entry of Ukraine's vessels into the Black and Azov Seas, as well as the Kerch Strait. In 2018, Russia's Black Sea Fleet even seized three naval vessels belonging to Ukraine in the Kerch Strait (Åtland 2021; Демидов 2015).

In terms of foreign policy objectives, Crimea stood out as the region most likely to bolster Russia's national identity and elevate its standing as a regional power. With a population of 2 million, Crimea held the potential to reinforce Russia's identity as a sizable and robust nation. Russia aimed to reassert control over Crimea for the Russian Federation with minimal bloodshed, particularly on the Russian side, and to present the event as a peaceful and symbolic, historical occurrence. This narrative sought to persuade former Soviet Union countries to reunite and foster strengthened political, economic and security cooperation with Russia (Osborn 2014). Ukraine and the Western alliance had difficulty in analysing the nature of the conflict's dimension and the networks developed by all actors embedded in this Russian hybrid war, and this made Western military strategy appear backward. For Ukraine, in particular, the loss of Crimea was a bitter consequence stemming from the pro-Western policy adopted by its new government.

Table 1. Russia's External Environment, Internal Environment, Errors and Advantages of Previous Policies in its Learning Process

Area	Learning process				Policy belief	Policy instrument
	External environ.	Internal environ.	Error	Advantage		
Abkhazia, South Ossetia	Recognition of Kosovo's independence by Western Alliance Georgia offered membership by NATO	Support for military intervention from Russia's extreme nationalist groups and political elite, driven by dissatisfaction with Georgia	Russia's lack of foresight on Georgia's role in Chechen War	-	Russia excluded from participation in conflict management and peacekeeping cooperation. Russia's southern border and legacy of Soviet Union weakened by Western alliance cooperating with Georgia Georgia was ambitious to ally with the Western states and NATO Russia had to counter-balance NATO and West	Military support Peace-keeping mission Recognition of independence of Abkhazia and Ossetia

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Area	Learning process				Policy belief	Policy instrument
	External environ.	Internal environ.	Error	Advantage		
Crimea	Plans of US defence (NATO) missile deployment in Poland and Czech Republic NATO and EU membership offer to Ukraine	Lower economic growth Corruption exposed by opposition Protests by internal opposition Support from nationalist groups and political elites, especially that Crimea merely 'political gift' to Ukraine	Russia's military demonstrated ineffectiveness during the Georgia-Russia War	Russia's propaganda through designated ethnic Russian entities in Crimea	Threats posed by NATO to Kaliningrad and Russia's access to Baltic Sea would be obstructed Russia's need to secure Crimea before access to Black Sea blocked by Western alliance Western alliance creates domestic turbulence in Russia Annexation as a low-cost approach with few losses to accommodate expectations of nationalist factions, to manipulate public perception about Russia's economic situation, and to initiate a confrontation with West	The use of 'little green men' Referendum and annexation of Crimea

Conclusion

Russia's development of its foreign policy towards the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was influenced by Medvedev's evaluation of patterns of interaction between NATO and former Soviet states in Europe, Russian nationalist sentiment domestically, and the shortcomings of Russia's previous foreign policy towards Georgia.

In making decisions regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Medvedev interpreted the West's recognition of Kosovo's independence and the offer of NATO membership to Georgia as deliberate actions aimed at undermining Russia's role in conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Europe. Medvedev also believed that its failure to anticipate Georgian support for Chechen rebels led to errors by Russia in countering Chechen guerrilla tactics. Furthermore, radical Russian nationalists perceived Georgia as a disruptive force and a source of instability in Russia. This perception affected Medvedev's belief that Georgia had acted aggressively towards Abkhazes and South Ossetians, and sought to undermine Russia's inheritance of the Soviet Union's legacy. Consequently, based on these policy beliefs and his anticipation of the likelihood of a colour revolution in Russia, Medvedev opted to deploy regular armed forces and acknowledge the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by framing it under a humanitarian cause and using media propaganda to justify Russia's operation in Georgia. These measures enabled Russia to present itself as a guardian for the local population and neighbouring countries in the Near Abroad, as well as to increase its international position.

Regarding Crimea, Putin's learning process for formulating foreign policy in a response to secessionist movements was shaped by a comprehensive evaluation of patterns of interaction involving NATO, the EU and Central and Eastern European countries. Putin perceived NATO's plans for missile defence deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic, along with offers from NATO and EU of accession to Ukraine, as strategies aimed at limiting Russian influence and its access to the Baltic Sea, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Black Sea. Putin was also influenced by nationalist sentiment in Russia, economic challenges, opposition dynamics and the partial failure to address Georgia's military operation during the Russia-Georgia War. In

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addition, the advantage of Russia's prior foreign policy in mobilising designated ethnic Russian entities played a significant role in his learning process.

As a result, he adopted measures involving confrontation with the West, but exercised moderation in deploying regular military forces and equipment in Crimea to avoid worsening economic challenges at home. These tools were deemed essential for the Kremlin's domestic survival and for exerting geopolitical influence over the Black Sea in order to restore the Soviet Union's former glory. Consequently, Russia displayed confidence in utilising the 'little green men' and supporting the Crimean population's referendum, which leaned towards annexation by the Russian Federation and led to the actual annexation of Crimea based on the Russian constitution.

Ultimately, Russian foreign policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, as well as Crimea in Ukraine, can be attributed to their respective leaders' incorporation of both Russia's external and internal environments, as well as Russia's previous foreign policy experiences, into their own decision-making learning process. These findings offer valuable insights which shed light on the nuanced factors influencing Russia's leaders' decision-making on two analogous issues. Given the limitations of this study, it is anticipated that further research will facilitate a comparative analysis, including a case study of Russia's foreign policy towards separatism in Eurasia.

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РУСТАМ НАБИЕВ

К ВОПРОСУ ОБ ЭТИМОЛОГИИ ЭТНОНИМА «СЛАВЯНЕ»

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to investigate the origins of the ethnonym 'slavjane' (Slavs). The research is carried out taking into account historical information about the period preceding the entry of the Slavs into the international arena. The author offers his own version based on the proximity of Sanskrit. As a result of the study, the ancient eastern form 'saklab' is concluded to be primary. The name of the ancient community was given in the ancient language of the priests - Sanskrit or a language close to it. At the same time, several important features of their early ethnogenesis are taken into account. The word 'saklab' denoted the community of farmers of the Scythian union. The 'sclavin' were the descendants of the 'saklab'. According to the author, the lexemes 'sclaviny' (*склавины*) and 'slavjane' (*славяне*) were fully-fledged ethnonyms.

Аннотация: Основной целью исследования является этимология этнонима древней общности «славяне». В ходе исследования комплексно применялись приёмы и методы истории, языкознания, этнографии и географии. Наибольшую значимость в исследовании имели приёмы лингвистической компаративистики. В результате проведённого исследования автор пришёл к следующим основным выводам: по отношению к современному этнониму *slavjany* (*славяне*) более ранней автор считает древневосточную форму *saklab* (*саклаб*). Имя этой древней общности было дано на древнем языке жрецов – санскрите или языке, близком к нему. Термином *саклаб* изначально обозначалась общность земледельцев скифского союза. Термины *sclaviny* (*склавины*) и *slavjane* (*славяне*)

были последующими полноценными этнонимами, обозначавшими потомков саклабов.

Key words: Slavic languages, Sanskrit, ethnonyms, India, proto-Slavonic, sklav, saklab

Ключевые слова: славянские языки, санскрит, этнонимы, Индия, прото-славяне, склав, саклаб

* * *

Вступление

Славянские народы занимают сегодня значительную часть евразийского континента. Весьма значителен их вклад в мировую историю и культуру. Вместе с тем, до сих пор широкой общественности не представлено убедительного толкования имени крупного этнического образования *славяне/словене (slavjane/slovene)*.¹ Причиной этому нам видится политические приоритеты: противники славянских стран в идеологической борьбе используют сходство этнонима с европейским обозначением рабов,² славянские учёные, стараясь избегать неприятных аналогий, предлагают для раскрытия смысла этого имени благозвучные версии, которые работали бы на авторитет

¹ Чередование гласных фонем «а» и «о» по нашему представлению обусловлено лишь диалектными различиями. Например, русские называют себя *славянами*, но при этом новгородские русские в исторической традиции – *словене*.

² Так в фашистской Германии был популярен лозунг *slawen = sklaven (Slawen, Sklaven und deutsche Propaganda, n.d.)*.

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этнической общности. При этом и те и другие вынуждены отклоняться от реальной обстановки и, в итоге, приходиться к ошибочным результатам.

Прежде чем перейти непосредственно к толкованию этнонима *славяне*, мы предлагаем вкратце вспомнить предыдущие версии по этимологии этнонима *славяне*. Николай Карамзин вслед за Мавро Орбини (Орбини 2010: 23) предлагал трактовку имени *славяне* исходя из термина из понятия *слава*.

Роман Якобсон предлагал производить объяснение рассматриваемой словоформы от термина *слово*. Такой подход строится на оппозиции к обобщаемому названию германских народов – *немцы*, которое считается дериватом термина *немой* (Jacobson 1959: 271).

Существуют трактовки, исходящие из названий местностей и рек.

Встречаются толкования унижительные, исходящие из германских, ирландского, греческого языков: например, *sklab*, *sklawen* – ‘рабы’, *slowan* – ‘быть немым’, *slowien* – ‘медленно зреющий лён’ и др. (Фасмер 1987, 3: 664-665). Обширный перечень мнений по данной теме из различных европейских словарей начала XX века представлен в монографии А.С. Орлова (Орлов 1907: 347-359). В настоящее время принципиально новых теорий не появилось, распространены варианты вышепредставленных предположений.

Раскрывать все версии подробно нет необходимости, т.к. все они обладают одним существенным недостатком, который делает их научную значимость ничтожной. Авторы этих конструкций подвергали этимологии современное звучание этнонима, порой, даже не зная о его более ранних формах.

Кроме того, очевидно, что лексемы, обладающие негативной коннотацией, не могут быть приняты сильными народами ³ в качестве самоназвания.⁴

Неудовлетворительность трактовки вышеизложенных версий давно была определена авторитетными специалистами. Так, Ф.П. Филин уверенно заявлял:

Имеется немало [...] попыток объяснить происхождение этнического самоназвания славян, но среди этого множества догадок и предположений пока нет ни одной гипотезы, которая опиралась бы на более или менее достоверные и доказуемые основания (Филин 1962: 57).

С тех пор принципиально новых научно обоснованных трактовок не появилось. Тем не менее, ошибочный подход продолжает тиражироваться в силу инертности исторической школы.

Автор не является славянином, и не имеет каких-либо политических пристрастий по отношению к славянскому вопросу и *a priori* был готов принять любой результат своих исследований. Славянские культуры автор

³ О могуществе славян: с первых же упоминаний о них в письменных источниках славяне выступают как многочисленное и воинственное объединение, которое (по Иордану) первоначально нанесло поражение готам. Позже, при первой встрече с аварами славянский (антский) посол Мезамир вёл заносчивую речь перед аварским каганом (!), рассказывая о длительной истории своих предков и неких славных победах. Вряд ли он мог существенно приукрашивать свою историю, т.к. в состав аварского объединения уже вошли восточные булгары и покорены сабары/савиры (бывшие гегемоны Восточной Европы).

⁴ Возможно, поэтому историки-популяризаторы предлагают широким массам населения удовлетворяться версией происхождения от термина *sláva*, несмотря на явную близость русского термина с тюркским *сюляу* – ‘разговор, речь’.

воспринимает и изнутри (как личность, сформировавшаяся в русской среде) и снаружи, – как татарин, обучавшийся в разных странах. Поэтому автор способен вычленять в славянских языках влияние и европейских, и ряда азиатских языков. К основным выводам по данной теме автор пришёл ещё в середине 80-х гг. XX века и впоследствии неоднократно критически перепроверял свои доводы с учётом новых научных данных. Поэтому свой подход автор считает объективным.

В данной работе автор ставит перед собой целью раскрытие первичного смысла термина *slavjane* (*славяне*), с учётом той исторической информации, которой мы располагаем относительно периода, предшествующего выходу славян на международную арену и наиболее ранних форм этого этнонима. Авторская версия, основывается на близости санскрита и балто-фракийской языковой общности, на базе которой, по мнению ряда учёных, сформировалась славянская группа языков.

Историческая справка

Завершение формирования славянской общности, по признанию ряда ведущих специалистов, происходило в первые века нашей эры (Трубачов 1988: 292-347; Русанова 1976; Балановский & Маркина 2023 и др.). В целом, этот процесс (что прослеживается по историческим источникам) завершился к V-VI вв. н.э., когда это этническое объединение выступило на международной арене под именами *склавины* и *анты*. В это время в Восточной Европе (условно) иранское доминирование сарматов и алан сменяется господством алтайских народов (гунны, булгары, авары и др.). Из этого следует, что этапу гунно-болгарского доминирования должен предшествовать длительный период выделения

протославян из балто-фракийской общности в условиях существенного влияния языков, близких к иранскому языку.

Примерно об этом свидетельствуют недавние междисциплинарные исследования. Результаты исследования международной группы генетиков и лингвистов под руководством Олега Балановского в целом подтвердили предшествующие выводы историков и лингвистов:

После разделения балтской и славянской ветвей самая первая развилка на славянской ветви оказалась тройной – разделение славян на западную, восточную и южную ветви – и датированной около 1900 лет назад. Дальнейшее разделение славянских языков началось в V-VI веках (около 1300-1500 лет назад): восточная ветвь разделилась на русский и украинский/белорусский, западная ветвь – на чешско/словацкий, протосорбсколужицкий и польский-кашубский, южная ветвь – на сербско-хорватский, болгарский, македонский. Выделение современных языков произошло 1000-500 лет назад. Такая датировка дерева соответствует историческим и археологическим данным, которые говорят о быстром распространении славян по Европе во второй половине 1-го тысячелетия н.э.» (Балановский & Маркина, n.h).

Примечательно, что исследования последних лет часто опускают предполагаемый рубеж выделения прото(?)славянской общности на несколько столетий ранее первых упоминаний о них в письменных источниках. И это вполне логично: период становления этноса редко прослеживается историками «за спинами» крупных политических игроков, действующих в данный конкретный момент.

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Мы также считаем, что обособление славян должно было происходить на несколько столетий ранее их письменной фиксации в период господства в регионе ираноязычных и некоторых других индоевропейских сообществ. Схожей позиции придерживаются некоторые прибалтийские компаративисты. В настоящее время её поддерживает ряд ученых, например, Герман Дзибел (German Dziebel), который утверждает:

Я рассматриваю возможность, что восточные славяне наиболее близки праславянскому генетическому состоянию, чем западные и южные славяне. Но я также рассматриваю возможность того, что славяне и балты наиболее близки праиндоевропейскому генетическому состоянию, чем другие индоевропейцы...» (Балановский & Маркина, n.d.).

Сведения о народах, предшествующих славянам, а также различие нескольких дославянских археологических культур не позволяют однозначно решить вопрос об одном единственном предшественнике славянства. По всей видимости, их могло быть несколько.

При анализе этногенеза славян обычно учитывается вклад финно-угров, балтов, иранцев и «алтайцев». Реже рассматривается индоиранский слой в общеславянском массиве (Филин 1962: 167).

В данной статье мы предлагаем уделить основное внимание индоарийскому субстрату. В этом отношении примечательно мнение (например, Натальи Романовны Гусевой) об «особой близости и даже родстве славянских языков с некоторыми диалектами санскрита» (Гусева 1982: 51-52). Эта «особая близость» не могла быть следствием влияния «алтайцев» и, несомненно,

образовалась в период, предшествующий выходу славян на политическую арену в качестве крупного самостоятельного субъекта международных отношений.

Как нам представляется, в ходе исследования необходимо учитывать тот факт, что до гуннов гегемония в Степи принадлежала скифскому союзу, в ядро которого составляли «царские скифы», а после них – сарматы, аланы.⁵ О скифах-саках сохранились некоторые известия из разных источников, поэтому появляется возможность проверить версию об их причастности к формированию протославян.

Исследование

Именно скифское и сарматское влияние должно было быть определяющим в процессе формирования нового этнического образования, т.к. предлагаемая родина славян (т.н. «Славия») входила в зону господства скифов и сарматов (Топоров 1988: 264-292). На этот факт прямо указывают письменные источники: так Плиний Старший отмечал в главе четвёртой: «...Энингия. Некоторые передают, что она населена вплоть до реки Висулы [р. Висла – Р.Н.] сарматами, венетами, скирами...» (*Свод древнейших письменных известий о славянах* 1994: 22-23).

Более того, некоторая информация о бывших гегемонах Восточной Европы сохранилась у самих славян. Так, примечательно, что договоры Украины с Польшей, Литвой и Москвой начинались со слов «от одной крови

⁵ Начиная с Геродота существует довольно значительная научная литература о скифском присутствии в Восточной Европе и его следах в культурах народов Восточной Европы. По утвердившемуся в науке мнению, они были ираноязычными. О заметных следах иранского влияния неоднократно писали лингвисты Макс Фасмер, Василий Абаев, Андрей Зализняк и мн. др. Оно, действительно, заметно в русском языке.

нашей сарматицкой» (1339 г.), «от единого корня славянского альбо сарматского...» (1596 г.), «..поляки [...] от нас савроматов и руссов уродившись...» (1648 г.) «Мы от рода сарматского...», «единокровные» и т.д. (Конинский 1846: 9, 36, 69, 79, 144, 145, и др.).⁶

О близком родстве славян и скифов в аллегорической форме свидетельствуют некоторые предания, утверждающие, что «Славен и Скиф родные братья». ⁷ Русская «Никаноровская летопись» утверждает ещё более определённо: «Словен [...] произошёл от Скифа...», (*Никаноровская летопись* 1962: 138).

Собственно скифы-саки (как позже и сарматы) были лишь элитарной частью скифского союза, поэтому Геродот называл их «скифы царские» (Геродот 1999: 241 и др.). Они контролировали обширную территорию, заселённую народами, говорившими на разных языках.

Гегемония скифов и сарматов сопровождалась процессом активного смешения народов, о чём и свидетельствуют упоминания ряда античных историков. Корнелий Тацит, например, засвидетельствовал, что певкины и венеды (*Venethi; Venethorum*) «Из-за смешанных браков [...] приобретают черты сарматов [...] венеды переняли некоторые из их нравов...» (Тацит, 1969: 372-373). Мы полагаем, что зафиксированная культурная экспансия сарматов неизбежно должна была сопровождаться активным процессом заимствования из их языка. Это важно в свете нашей темы так, как: «...Венеды теперь называются

⁶ Автор этой «Истории руссов» Георгий Конинский оценивал события прошлого с позиции своего времени и приравнивал понятия «сарматы» и «славяне». Между тем, поляки относили к потомкам сарматов лишь наследственную шляхту (дворян), но не посполитых крестьян-хлопков.

⁷ Сведения «Иоакимовой летописи» из многотомного сочинения В.Н. Татищева «История российская с древнейших времен...» (Татищев 1768: 80). Схожие фразы содержат некоторые иные русские летописи.

антами и склавинами» (*Venethi, Anti, Antes, Sclaueni*) – констатировал Иордан (Иордан 1960: 71-72).

Русская «Никаноровская» летопись отмечает: «Скифы стали зваться словены...» (*Никаноровская летопись* 1962: 138). Таким образом, по свидетельству историков разных веков, до-гуннские степные империи оказали существенное (возможно – определяющее) влияние на процесс формирования славянства и смены этнонима.

Господство скифов-саков обеспечило союзным народам протекцию на международной арене, доступ к «Великому шёлковому пути» и достижениям других цивилизаций. Близость к скифам обеспечила высокий международный авторитет, поэтому вассальным народам было выгодно отразить эту близость в имени своего этнического образования. Что, по нашему мнению, и было сделано в наиболее ранних формах этнонима *славяне*, а именно – в зафиксированном в арабописьменных источниках наименовании *саклабы* (*ас-сакалиба*).

При этом наиболее значимым может быть тюркское название славян. Тюрки веками непосредственно контактировали со славянами, длительное время господствовали в Восточной Европе и не могли не знать их подлинного названия. Тюркские искажения этнонимов не совпадают с особенностями арабских искажений. Поэтому особенно важны этнонимы, зафиксированные в языческой легенде об Огуз-хане (и в «Родословной тюрков» Абул Гази), называвших славян *saklap* (*Histoire genealogique des Tartares*: 23). Учитывая, что тюрки длительное время боролись с арабскими нашествиями и арабским влиянием, заимствование их понятий в свою родословную практически невозможно до VIII века и маловероятно до XIV века. Это означает, что

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этноним *saklap* из этого эпоса был результатом и частью собственной системы этнонимов.

Мы можем объяснить незначительное тюркское искажение этнонима в «Легенде об Огуз-хане» (*saklap* вместо *saklab*). В этом эпическом произведении присутствует т.н. народная этимология, и названия народов трактуются исходя из тюркского языка и понимания их роли в тюркских империях. Из текста следует, что Огуз-хан поставил славянам задачу охранять завоёванные территории – служить **охраняя** (*саклап*).⁸ Вывод: тюрки знали этот этноним с доисламских времён и самостоятельно его использовали.

Отметим, что предполагаемая первичная форма *saklab* встречается в текстах историков разных древних культур – арабской, еврейской, древнегрузинской (*Свод древнейших письменных известий о славянах* 1995: 513 и др.) и тюркской, что практически исключает возможность сугубо национального обозначения чужого народа.⁹ Отклонения в произношении (*saklab*, *seklab*, *sakaliba*, *saklap*) незначительны.

Таким образом, различные языковые семьи сохранили практически одинаковое древнее обозначение славян, которое следует считать первичным. Это вариант из текстов восточного происхождения – *саклаб*.

⁸ *Саклап* (*saklap*) тюркск. – ‘охраняя’. Кстати, так и поступали болгары и авары, расселяя славян для закрепления территорий. Этот процесс способен объяснить быстрое и часто мирное расселение славян на обширных территориях Европы во времена господства гуннов, булгар и авар. Это обстоятельство может помочь в разгадке многих загадок славянских археологических культур (городки без культурного слоя, следы кибиток среди землянок, шпоры и стремена в поселениях земледельцев...).

⁹ Так, например, германцев соседи нередко обозначают своими именами, не схожими с базовым этнонимом, да и сами немцы называют себя другим словом. Это же явление нередко встречается и у других народов.

Вариант этого этнонима – *склаб* (*Σκλαβος*) видится нам вторичным, более поздним. Подтверждение нашего предположения мы встретили у специалистов. Форма *Σκλαβος* в византийской традиции признаётся специалистами «более старой», нежели привычное нам *Σλάβοι* (славяне) (*Свод древнейших письменных известий о славянах* 1995: 75).

Исходя из закономерности упрощения слов с течением времени в сторону неполногласия, форма *sklab/sklav* (*Σκλαβος*), могла образоваться в результате естественного выпадения фонемы «а» в первом слоге.¹⁰

Примечательно, что этноним и политоним *склавины* сохранялся в период позднего европейского средневековья. Так, например, историческая область «Склавония» упоминается в «Послании епископа краковского Матвея» (*Послание епископа краковского Матвея Бернарду Клервоскому* n.d.), а также в ряде немецких средневековых источников из Прибалтики. Более того, существует подтверждение того, что формант *склав* некоторое время применялся в качестве самоназвания. В Восточной Словакии, в центре предполагаемой области формирования первичной славянской общности, условно именуемой «Славия», зафиксирован топоним *Склабина* (Бабинов 1985: 51). Александр Виноградов, обратил внимание на статью Влада Улара, который выявил в средневековых источниках латинизированные формы подобных названий. Так, в составе балтской средневековой топонимии отмечался хороним *Sklawonija* (Виноградов 2022: 17; Uhlar 1989: 256).

На наш взгляд, сохранение этого топонима в границах предполагаемой «Славии» объективно свидетельствует о том, что архаичная форма этнонима

¹⁰ Чаще всего это происходит в результате записи слов одними согласными буквами, либо применения апострофа. Так, в русском языке параллельно применяются полногласные обыденные формы и сокращённые из церковнославянского (староболгарского) языка.

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склавины, зафиксированная в работах византийцев, не является искажением чуждого для греков термина, а реально применялась славянским населением.

Выше отмечалось, что в числе старинных названий славянской общности, нашедших отражение в древних источниках (преимущественно в восточных), встречается форма *saklab*.¹¹ Однако кроме арабских и иранских источников этот этноним (*saklav*) встречается в древнегрузинских исторических произведениях. Более того, как отмечал Корнелий Самсонович Кекелидзе, вариант *saklav* применялся наряду с формой *sklav* (Кекелидзе 1962: 241). То есть в исторической традиции одного из древнейших государств эти варианты этнонима приравнивались друг к другу.

Форма *sklavini* скорее всего является завершающим этапом логического развития термина во времени. Отметим, что суффикс *-in(-y)/-an(-e)* обозначает, как правило, происхождение или принадлежность к некой социальной, территориальной или национальной общности (*терюхане, мокишане, устюжане, поляне, земляне, россияне* и т.п.). Причём применяется, как правило, с положительной коннотацией.

Следующим этапом развития этнонима по нашему мнению было удаление буквы и фонемы *-к-* в этнониме. Современный, привычный нам этноним *славяне/словене (slavjane/slovene)* является наиболее поздней формой, которая могла образоваться в результате смысловой оппозиции к

¹¹ Именно эта форма являлась общепринятой в арабоязычной литературе. Например, в широко известном описании путешествия на Волгу Ибн Фадлана (Ковалевский 1956 (2016); Гаркави 1870, 1871 и др.). Одним из наиболее ранних упоминаний народа *ас-сакалиб* является «Диван» Гияс ибн Гаус [...] Ал-Ахтала, созданного около 690 г. (*Свод древнейших письменных известий о славянах* 1995: 509).

латиноязычному *sclaven*, применявшемуся в европейских странах со значением ‘раб’.¹²

В пользу большей архаичности формы *sklavini* чем *slavjane* привёл ряд веских аргументов из разновременных свидетельств письменных источников Александр Виноградов, опираясь также на мнение В.П. Кобычева, А.Г. Манакова, О. Прицака (Виноградов 2022: 17).¹³

Исходя из вышеизложенного выстраивается следующая последовательность изменения этнонима во времени:

saklab / *sakaliba* – *sklabina* / *sklavini* – *s-lovjane* – *s-lovaka*

Таким образом, автор считает верными все три вышеприведённых варианта рассматриваемого этнонима, но верными для различных периодов времени. Первичной, является форма *saklab*, которую мы подвергнем несколько ниже формантному анализу.

Следует отметить, что мы не были первыми, кто обратил внимание на взаимосвязь этих этнонимов. Ещё в середине XIX века ироничный Осип Сенковский¹⁴ саркастически высмеивал Йозефа Хаммера-Пургштала за подобный подход (Сенковский 1858, 5: 360-361). Йозеф Хаммер, в частности,

¹² Знакомясь с европейскими переводами средневековых источников, нередко встречается непреднамеренная (реже – преднамеренная) подмена смыслов в применении формантов *sklav* и *slav*. Например, встречается в скандинавских сагах при описании боевых в отдалённых регионах, где рабов вообще не могло быть, и они не могли выступать в качестве организованной и агрессивной силы. Но славяне вполне могли там встретиться.

¹³ Он считал возможным допускать неславянское происхождение этого термина.

¹⁴ Публиковался под псевдонимом «барон Брамбеус».

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связывал в единую цепочку следующие этнонимы: *сак* – *сакалиба* – *саклаб* – *склаб* (Hammer 1827: 60).¹⁵

Формант *lab/lav* оказался более устойчивым и не подвергся выпадению гласной во всех вариантах рассматриваемого нами этнонима: *saklab* / *sakaliba* – *sk-labina* – *sk-lavini* – *s-lovaki* – *s-lovjane*, которые также можно сопоставить со славянским названием племенного союза *du-leb* (*дулебы*).

Словарный состав живых языков с течением времени подвержен изменению. Многие слова со временем меняются как по форме, так и по содержанию, поэтому мы полагаем, что было бы неверно расшифровывать древний этноним при помощи современных языков. По нашему глубокому убеждению все предыдущие версии ошибочны именно потому, что не учитывают этого обстоятельства. С течением времени языки подвергаются существенным изменениям, под влиянием письменности, религий, заимствований, моды, делопроизводства, переосмысливания. Поэтому вполне логично предполагать, что имя древнему народу давалось на древнем языке, отличающемся от современных.

Кроме того, этноним, сохранившийся в качестве самоназвания, должен был, как и всё в древности, выполнять конкретно прикладную функцию – поднимать авторитет народа. Именно поэтому версии, приравнивающие понятия 'славянин' и 'раб' не могут быть верными. Но если самоназвание было призвано прославлять и охранять народ, то язык, к которому относился этноним, должен был быть достаточно широко известным. В идеале он мог быть языком международного общения (*lingua franca* своего времени) и понятным жрецам

¹⁵ Представляется, что мнимая «ущербность» предположения Йозефа Хаммера заключалась в неприемлемости его версии по идеологическим причинам. «Азиатчина» не приветствовалась в императорской России. Впрочем, как и в наши дни.

соседних народов, а значит, относится к языку, широко известному у наших древних предков.

Язык, отвечающий указанным требованиям, был. И он сохранился до наших дней без существенных изменений. Индийские брахманы почти без искажений пронесли сквозь тысячелетия гимны, исполняющиеся на языке далёких предков – санскрите. По мнению ряда специалистов, он (или один из его диалектов) наиболее близок к иранским и балто-славянским языкам. Поэтому мы считаем возможным, что санскрит (или язык близкий к нему) в древности мог выполнять функцию элитарного или сакрального языка у некоторых народов северной Евразии.

Наука накопила значительный объём информации о субстратном культурном слое, оказавший существенное влияние на формирование протославян и славян – его можно условно обозначить как индо-арийский.

Широко известно, что несколько волн индоевропейцев, известных как арии, мигрировали на территорию Ирана и Индии из северных степей. Строки индийских «Вед» и Махабхараты сохранили предания о прежней северной Родине.

Некоторые сведения «Ригвед» о прежней Родине могут быть сопоставлены с иранской «Авестой». Сведения Вед одним из первых обобщил в своей книге «Арктическая Родина в Ведах» Локоманья Бал Гангадхар Тилак (Тилак 1903). На основе анализа древних текстов он пришёл к выводу о том, что родина предков индийцев находилась на севере, на территории современной России. Его предшественниками можно считать ряд европейских лингвистов. Например, индоевропеиста Франца Боппа и Вильгельма Томсена, который высказывался о возможном индоиранском влиянии на древнеуральские (финские) языки (Thomsen 1869; 1870).

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Это положение о северной родине ариев быстро нашло отклик и подтверждения в работах российского геолога Евгения Елачича (Елачич 1910).¹⁶ В наши дни убедительные свидетельства предоставляет генетика. Так, Анатолий Клёсов обратил внимание на общую Y-хромосомную гаплогруппу R1a1, которая в наибольшей степени представлена в Европе у восточных славян, у некоторых народов Поволжья, Средней Азии и брахманов Индии. Причём у брахманов этот показатель по мужской линии достигает 80-90%.

Лев Самуилович Клейн (как и некоторые индийские учёные) полагал, что это генетическое соответствие порождено за многие тысячелетия до вторжения ариев, и вектор распространения этой гаплогруппы изначально имел обратное направление (из Индии в Европу) (Клейн 2013: 392-393). На наш взгляд, версия об изначальном движении народов носителей гаплогруппы R1a1 из района Тибета и северной Индии не исключает последующее многократное возвращение их потомков назад – в регион Ирана и Индии. Подобные сведения лишь усиливают тезис о древнем родстве культур северной Индии и Европы.

В настоящее время некоторые учёные предполагают, что этими ариями на территории России, Украины и Казахстана до их ухода в Среднюю Азию могли быть представители т.н. «ямной», «андроновской», «катакомбной» и «срубной» археологических культур (Клейн 2013: 390, 392 и др.). Причём, что немаловажно, эти культуры длительное время охватывали территории формирования будущего славянства.

Независимо от генетиков и задолго до них к выводам о северной родине ариев пришли компаративисты. В частности в регионе Северного

¹⁶ Это направление в той или иной степени в XX веке отрабатывали центры Елены Блаватской и семья Рерихов, удостоенных звания махатм.

Причерноморья индоиранцев локализовывали Отто Шрёдер (Schröder, 1927), Франц Шпехт (Specht 1934), Томас Барроу (Фома Буров) (Burrow 1973), Вальтер Порциг (Porzig, 1954), Рихард Хаусшильд (Hauschild 1962) и др.

Некоторыми учёными предполагается, что часть индоарийцев оставались в Восточной Европе до скифской эпохи – (Василий Абаев, Эдвин Грантовский, Олег Трубачёв и др.) (Бонгард-Левин & Грантовский 1983; Трубачев 1998, 1999; Абаев 1972: 26-37).

Ряд параллелей в орнаменте и топонимии был выявлен на Русском Севере и даже в Волго-окском междуречье, где русскому населению предшествовали в основном финно-угры. Так, Светлана Жарникова приводит десятки гидронимов, созвучных описанным в «Махабхарате». В ряде случаев совпадают не только названия крупных рек, но и их притоков (Жарникова n.d).

Важно учитывать, что смена доминирующего языка и культуры в крупных государствах – не единовременный акт, а длительный процесс. Так, после падения Римской империи, модернизированная латынь господствовала в европейской науке около тысячелетия и продолжает своё развитие в наше время. Давно нет Британской империи, но её язык господствует в мире. Поэтому мы допускаем, что язык индоариев мог сохраняться у потомков в виде сакрального языка длительное время после утраты их политической гегемонии на территории северной Евразии.

Во многих случаях, когда имеются сведения о языках жрецов древних цивилизаций, мы видим, что они были непонятны для простых людей. Это явление мы можем наблюдать и в современном католичестве и в исламе.¹⁷

¹⁷ Нечто похожее было зафиксировать у монголов, у которых спустя сто лет после завоеваний «древний язык» на территории «Золотой Орды» знали только несколько мудрецов. Если под «древним языком»

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Известно, например, что одной из причин волнения плебеев в Древнем Риме были непонятные для народа судебные формулы. Это недовольство было причиной разработки «законов 12 таблиц». Нередко специалисты, как и Вольфганг Акунов, отмечали, что тексты священного песнопения «салиев», дошедшие до эпохи Гая Юлия Цезаря из тьмы веков, были давно уже непонятны никому из римлян и даже известным знатокам древностей – этрускам (если имеются в виду специалисты по древностям – этруски, которые ещё встречались в Риме среди членов сената). В этой связи мы видим вполне естественным, что язык древних индоевропейцев мог длительное время использоваться жрецами ряда народов Европы.

Некоторые учёные (как Роджер Д. Вудард в книге «Индоевропейское священное пространство: ведический и римский культ») считают возможным рассматривать сакральные формулы и ритуалы римских понтификов и авгуров в одном ряду с обрядами других индоевропейских народов, начиная с положений индийских Вед (Woodard 2006). Некоторые конкретные соответствия прямо отмечены в «словаре древнеримской религии» (*Glossary of ancient Roman religion* n.d.).

Некоторые языческие имена славянских богов и религиозные термины также находят себе соответствие в древнеиранских и древнеиндийских преданиях.

предполагался т.н. «письменно-монгольский», то он больше похож на маньчжурский язык. В свою очередь в официальном маньчжурском языке выявлялись санскритские слова, которые объяснялись влиянием буддизма.

Б.Г. Тилак отмечал некоторые примечательные глоссы в восточноевропейской мифологии. Так, например, латыши именуют зарю *диэво дукте* – ‘дочь неба, дочь бога’, в Ригведе – *диво духита* (Тилак 1903: 154).¹⁸

Это такие слова, как *бог*, *Хорс*, *Симаргл* (иранск.); *Сварог* – *сварга*, *капище* – *капа*, возможно *Сурья* (инд.).¹⁹ Некоторые имена индийских божеств (*Вишну*, *Агни*, *Рудна*, *Мара*...) довольно правдоподобно трактуются со славянских языков. И напротив, *Стри-бог*, непереволимый со славянских языков, правдоподобно переводится с санскрита (*Славянский след в индуизме* п.д.). Борис Заходер обратил внимание на упоминавшееся арабами сжигание славянами покойников и самоубийство их жён (Заходер 1962: 65-66).

Об общем культурном источнике косвенно может свидетельствовать схожий набор религиозных сюжетов, включающий спасение царевны, «непорочное зачатие», хождение по воде, всемирный потоп и др. Языковые, астрономические и сюжетные соответствия выделяли в целом ряде работ ещё Макс Мюллер (1856-1899), Б.Д. Тилак, Николай Рерих, Елена Блаватская. Центры Рерихов строили новый тип религии «Агни йога» на основе древнеиндийских практик.

В свете нашего исследования примечательно мнение Павла Иосифовича Шафарика, который предполагал, что этноним предшественников славян – венедов (*vened/ened/vind*) мог быть связан с формантом *ind* (Шафарик 1847: 187-193).²⁰

¹⁸ Этот ряд можно продолжать *духтари* (таджикск.), *die tochter* – немецкий.

¹⁹ *Сурья* отмечается в некоторых сомнительных русских произведениях.

²⁰ Действительно, протетическое *v-* нередко встречается у славян (*осьм* – *восемь*) и чувашей (*urus* – *vyras*).

По мнению известного лингвиста Олега Николаевича Трубачёва, следы применения древнеиндийского языка (или языка, схожего с его диалектами) в скифской зоне сохранила субстратная топонимика степей Восточной Европы. Предполагается, что санскрит мог быть и живым языком некоторых народов, например, упоминавшимися на кавказском побережье Чёрного моря древних *синдов*, проживавших в *Синдике* (Трубачев 1999).

В России ещё Антон Ашик (1832) предполагал индоарийское происхождение понтийских синдов. Впоследствии Степан Мельников-Разведенков (1896) поддержал эту гипотезу, затем – исследователи Павел Вяземский (Вяземский 1876), Евграф Савельев (1915) и Прокофий Короленко (1894). Такого же мнения был Пауль Кречмер (Kretschmer 1930: 1-21; 1943: 35-42).

Олег Трубачёв считал синдов арийцами и нашёл для них индоарийскую этимологию – *sindhavas* ('речные жители'). Он предполагал, что синдо-меоты – это реликт индоарийского населения Кавказа, которое не двинулось на восток с основной массой завоевателей. В результате многолетних исследований он нашёл тому косвенное подтверждение в субстратной топонимике Причерноморья (Трубачев 1999). Эдуард Берзин развил эту гипотезу и получил поддержку кавказоведа Георгия Климова, который видел в этом явлении объяснение присутствия индоарийских слов в абхазском языке (*Киммерийцы: отклонения в языке, загадка синдов и меотов и наступление раннего железного века n.d.*).

Отметим также, что около VIII в. до н.э. из региона Северного Причерноморья в Малую Азию мигрировали и предшественники скифов киммерийцы. Примечательно, что один из их царей около 640 лет до н.э. (согласно ассирийской надписи) носил имя Сандакшатру (*Šandakšatru*)

(*Киммерийцы: отклонения в языке, загадка синдов и меотов и наступление раннего железного века n.d.*).²¹ В этом отношении примечательны работы лингвистов, отмечавших субстратные следы древних «ариев» в топонимике Севера Восточной Европы (Б.В. Горнунг, Р.М. Гиршман, А.И. Соболевский, В.И. Абаев и др.).²²

Имеются и другие свидетельства былого присутствия индоариев в Восточной Европе. Это, например, сведения арабских хронистов о схожести похоронных обрядов славян и индийцев или прямое указание одной легенды в армянской «Истории Тарона» на индийских принцев, бежавших от индийского царя и основавших города в Закавказье (Арутюнова-Фиданян 2013: 16).²³ Их имена проявляют странное сходство с легендарными основателями города Киева (*Кий, Щек, Хорив*), обнаруживая неожиданную и связь сюжета с территорией восточных славян.

Примечательно, что индийская диаспора до начала XVII века существовала в низовьях Волги в городе Астрахани. Встречалось единичное упоминание о принятии ими ислама в связи с восстанием Степана Разина. К сожалению, мы не располагаем сведениями, когда эта община обосновалась в низовьях Волги (Ра).

²¹ О допустимости этимологии этого имени с позиции санскрита, пракрита и хинди (संदक्षतु; शांडक्षत्र; संदक्षत्र), должны будут высказаться специалисты более глубоко знающие эти языки.

²² Русский махатма Н.К. Рерих, как своего рода знак свыше указал прежнее название своего поместья *Извара*, которое Рабиндранат Тагор признал за возможное санскритское слово (*Indian Panorama n.d.*).

²³ Примечательно, что месть «индийского царя» достала беглецов даже на Кавказе (Арутюнова-Фиданян 2013: 16). Первым эти сведения опубликовал в России Н.Я. Марр (Марр 1925).

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Совокупность перечисленных сведений послужила нам основанием для разработки древнеиндийской версии в толковании этнонима *славяне* в его развитии.

В составе этнонима *saklab* достаточно уверенно выделяются две устойчивые морфемы *sak* и *lab*.

Обе эти морфемы обособленно участвуют в образовании различных этнонимов. Первая из них встречается в качестве самостоятельных этнонимов: *саксы* (*saksy*), *саксонцы* (*sakson*), *саксины* (*saksin*),²⁴ и, что важно, в качестве этнонима скифов. Они, как известно, называли себя *саки* (*saki*). Мы полагаем, что формант *sak* в составе этнонима *саклаб* (*saklab*) был призван зафиксировать связь с самоназванием скифов (*saki*).

Санскрит представляет возможность перевести анализируемый этноним без каких либо натяжек и допусков в случае, если за основу брать древнейшую полногласную его форму – *saklab* и выделять из неё две устойчивые морфемы *sak* и *lab*. Формант *sak* (सक्) может переводиться с санскрита, как 'вместе, сообща'. Его выделение объективно, т.к. он употреблялся и в качестве самостоятельного этнонима.

Формант *labh* (लभ) содержится в составе ряда слов из санскрита с общим значением 'получать, доставать, добывать, жать' (Кочергина 1978).²⁵ Таким

²⁴ Следует оговориться, что мы пока не утверждаем о родстве этих этнонимов, а лишь обращаем внимание на фонетическое сходство имён народов, некогда проживавших в Восточной Европе.

²⁵ Заранее оговариваемся: не будучи специалистом по санскриту, мы даём лишь примерное обозначение исследуемых формантов, не следуя буквально правилам садхи. К тому же, весьма возможно, что этих правил в древнейшее время ещё не было.

образом, термин *saklab* (सक्लाब् ; सुक्लाब्) мог обозначать жнецов или переводиться как ‘совместно добывающие’.²⁶

Помня, что *sakī* (सकी) – самоназвание степного союза племён скифов, возможен другой перевод, более точный и не противоречащий первому. Исходя из кратких сведений о том, что союзные земледельческие племена (протославяне ?) отличались от царских скифов образом жизни и ролью в государстве, перевод можно трактовать, как ‘саки работающие’, ‘саки-жнецы’. То есть ‘скифы работающие’, «скифы-жнецы».

Весьма к месту, на мой взгляд, вспомнить основателя европейской школы истории Геродота Галикарнасского, отмечавшего проживание «скифов-земледельцев» севернее расположения царских скифов. Судя по контексту сообщения Геродота, скифы-земледельцы подчинялись скифам царским и поставляли для них зерно. То есть наша версия о том, что формант *sak* может иметь отношение к названию протославян, находит косвенное подтверждение у самого раннего профессионального историка Европы (Геродот 1999: 241).

Нельзя не отметить, что происхождение славян от скифов-земледельцев предлагал в 60-е годы XX века авторитетный в то время советский историк Б.А. Рыбаков (Рыбаков 2016). К сожалению, это его предположение было практически бездоказательно и подвергалось справедливой критике. Но некоторые аргументы в пользу этой версии приводили в своих работах

²⁶ В арабской традиции *саклабами* длительное время обобщенно имелись в виду северные, светлые народы (Гаркави 1870; 1871). Татарский (булгарский) историк Шигабутдин Марджани утверждал, что под этим именем в булгарской традиции подразумевались также и финно-угорские народы (Марджани 2005: 66-67).

языковеды Любомир Нидерле, Олег Трубачёв (Трубачёв 1988: 292-347) и некоторые другие.

Интересно то, что предложенная нами версия подобно математической задаче поддается «проверке от обратного». Дело в том, что формант *sak* в санскрите имеет сокращенные формы *sa* и *s* (स), которые соответствуют русским предлогам и предлогам *so-* (*so-*) и *s-* (*s-*) и также стоят в препозиции в составе лексем. Формант *lab* имеет производную *lāvākā* (लावाका / लवक) – ‘жнец’ (Кочергина 1978: 554).

Применяя эти выявленные дериваты, для реконструкции этнонима во множественном числе, мы получим $s + lāvākā = slāvākā$ (स + लावाका). Аналогия с реальным этнонимом *slavak* (*словаки*) настолько очевидная, что на наш взгляд, не требует более подробных комментариев.

Признание возможности подобной реконструкции позволяет не только подтвердить правильность выдвинутой нами версии, но и объяснить выпадение фонемы *-к-* в этнониме *славяне*. Это выпадение закономерно ещё на уровне древнеиндийского языка. По мнению автора статьи, этноним *slaviny/slavjane* получился путём присоединения к форманту *sklab/sklav* морфемы *-vini* (санскр.) – ‘порожденный кем-либо’, ‘потомок кого-либо’, применение которой предполагается в постпозиции слова.²⁷ То есть этот термин должен обозначать ‘родившиеся от саков-земледельцев’. Возможно, именно это сочетание могло

²⁷ Для этой морфемы значение общего происхождения является основным в славянских языках (ср. исторические *куряне*, *поляне*, *россияне* и др.).

ошибочно трактоваться древними историками как ‘потомки (слепых) рабов’ (Геродот 1999: 241).²⁸

Применение формы *sclaviny/slaviny/slavjane* (‘рожденные от саклабов’) характеризует, на наш взгляд, уже оформившийся этнос, который считал своими предками *саклабов/склабов*. Мы предполагаем, что выпадение буквы и звука -к- было обусловлено смысловой оппозицией латинскому термину *sklavus* – ‘раб’, который получил развитие в большинстве европейских языков.²⁹

Исходя из вышеизложенного, как нам представляется, первичный термин *saklab* поначалу не нёс этноопределяющей нагрузки, а был призван обозначать совокупность податных земледельческих народов, в составе скифского государства, то есть изначально это был соционим.

Примерно к такому же выводу в своё время пришёл и известный языковед Омелян Прицак. В своей работе «The Slavs and the Avars» он предполагал, что термин *склавины* имел не славянское происхождение и обозначает профессиональную принадлежность. Однако он полагал, что именами *склавины* и *анты* гунны, булгары и авары обозначали профессиональных воинов вспомогательных войск (Pritsak 1983: 383-384, 392, 394, 400; Труба-

²⁸ Известно, что труд Геродота неоднократно переписывался в рамках «*Pax Romana*», что явно сказалось в домысливании сюжетов его произведения, большинство списков которого дошло до европейцев в рамках корпуса *stirps Romana*. Отгадка странного «этнонима» может заключаться в созвучии форманта *sak* с латинском *caecus* – ‘слепой’. Вероятно, в результате латинского прочтения термина *saklab* появились «слепые рабы», а затем ещё более странный этноним «троглодиты».

²⁹ В европейских источниках нередко встречается непреднамеренная (реже – преднамеренная) подмена смыслов в применении формантов *sklav/slav*. Например, при описании столкновений и боевых действий в отдалённой пустынной местности, где не рабы не могли выступать в качестве организованной и агрессивной силы. Довольно часто в политических или религиозных текстах авторами закладывается негативная двусмысленность.

чов 1988: 301). Напомним, что для такого предположения имеются некоторые основания, учитывая санскритский термин *labha* – ‘завоевание’ (Кочергина 78: 554) и древнегреческий *λαβ* – ‘брать, хватать, взятие, получение, схватка’.³⁰

Не исключено, что дерзкие амбиции посла славян-антов Мезамира перед каганом аваров и великодержавные настроения панславистов подобных Мавро Орбини опирались именно на такое понимание древнего термина. По сведениям ранних письменных источников, на практике они, действительно, могли демонстрировать высокую боевую эффективность при использовании их в качестве вспомогательных войск или для засад на пересечённой местности.

Это не единственный этноним древней Европы, который может быть успешно раскрыт при помощи санскрита. Думается, что успех нашего подхода будет более очевиден при этимологизации некоторых других названий славян. Так, известно, что ещё до возвышения гуннов в противоборстве с готами славяне выступили на международной арене уже в качестве могущественного объединения, но при этом их современники ещё помнили, что ранее славяне звались по-другому (*споры, венеды*). Восточные славяне длительное время помнили иное своё имя. Так, в первых строках ПВЛ указывается, что славяне некогда звались «*нарцами*» (*Повести временных лет* 1978: 24).³¹ Примечательно, что в индийской «Махабхарате» присутствует формант *nar*. Индийские

³⁰ В 90-е годы XX века в отделе редких книг Казанского государственного университета мне попалась безымянная статья XIX в. о вторжениях славян в Малой Азию и Африку. Её автор отмечал, что этноним *славяне* с некоего «древнего языка» переводится как «совместно воюющие». К сожалению, он не указал ни языка, ни методики исследования, а материал не содержал установочных данных.

³¹ ПВЛ – принятое сокращение названия «Повесть временных лет». ПВЛ – это начальная и во многом легендарная часть русских летописей. По мнению В.Н. Татищева, работавшего с подлинными старинными списками летописей не сохранившимися до нашего времени, это название ошибочно принято в русской историографии вместо подлинного названия «Повесть временных дел».

«Веды» сохранили формант *nar* в значении ‘человек, муж, герой’, что сближается с общепринятым значением морфемы *ar* (*ary*; *arii*). Санскрит сохранил и важный дериват – *narata* – ‘человечество’ (Кочергина 1987: 316), который мог явиться основой для русского термина *narod* и, возможно, связан с летописными *нарцами*.³² Нам кажется допустимой и связь лексемы *narata* с коллективным антропонимом *нарты* (*nart*), которым называли своих священных героических предков народы Северного Кавказа.³³ Нам кажется весьма перспективным дальнейшее исследование взаимосвязи этих понятий.

Олег Николаевич Трубочёв, длительное время трудившийся над темой былого присутствия индоарийцев в Северном Причерноморье, предполагал, что геродотовские скифы-земледельцы, иначе – «низкорожденные скифы» («дети рабов» по Плинию Старшему) территориально и этнически тождественны «низкорожденным», «подлым» (Аммиан Марцеллин) синдам – предполагаемым индоарийцам Причерноморья. Именно к синдам применялось греческое определение *дулоспоры* (*δοῦλοσποροί*) – ‘дети рабов’ (Трубочёв 1999: 55).³⁴

Однако Олег Трубочев не довёл свою логическую цепочку до конца, заявив, что нельзя связывать «детей рабов» со славянами на основании заявления Прокопия Кесарийского о былом именовании славян и антов «спорами» (*Σποροί*), как это делал Туомо Пекканен (Pekkanen 1968: 123).

³² Наша версия была предварительно одобрена доктором С.В. Куландой (Институт Востоковедения РАН г. Москва) в конце 80-х гг. XX века.

³³ Отметим, что часть адыгских племён проживает на месте бывшей Синдики.

³⁴ В русской истории «завис» без должного объяснения вопрос, почему Прокопий Кесарийский в середине VI века называл славян и антов «спорами» (*Σπόροι*). По всей видимости он зафиксировал дериват в виде сокращённой формы от термина *дулоспоры* [*δοῦλοσποροί*]. Этот термин, как нам представляется, следует переводить буквально ‘семя Дуло, наследники Дуло’, особенно, если учитывать, что самый мощный союз славян так и назывался *дулебы*. Известна также болгарская династия Дуло.

Мы же обращаем внимание на абсолютное сходство нашего перевода термина *sclaviny* – ‘рожденные (дети) от саков-**ра**ботающих’, ‘потомки саклабов’ с вышеприведёнными греческими определениями народов, на месте проживания которых впоследствии образовалось славянское сообщество.³⁵

В целом выдвинутая нами версия выглядит достаточно убедительно, однако академик Миркасым Усманов (Татарстан) в своё время отметил, что эта версия будет безупречной, если найти в источниках упоминание о «саклабах/сакалибах» более раннее, чем «славяне». Отметим, что изначально в европейских источниках упоминались именно *склавины*, а не *славяне*. Этот факт общеизвестен среди специалистов. Пока мы не нашли доарабского упоминания о *саклабах/сакалибах*, (если не считать легенду об Огуз-хане),³⁶ однако давно известен и признан древний этноним, который также может быть поставлен в один ряд с рассмотренными этнонимами по смыслу и форме. Это этноним *ашкеназ*. Сейчас этот термин означает европейских евреев, но согласно мнению некоторых толкователей, ранее он обозначал европейцев в целом. Имеются основания полагать, что ещё раньше он обозначал общность северных народов.

Учитывая соответствие семитской фонемы -š- европейской -s-, слово *aškenaz* в европейском варианте будет звучать *askenaz*. Если начальную фонему *a-* считать протетической (что характерно для ряда языков), то термин,

³⁵ К выводу о том, что уже модернизированный этноним «славяне» был призван обозначать в Киевской Руси примерно такое же по статусу (по отношению к руси) податное население, исследователи приходили неоднократно. Одним из последних с подобной версией, на основе анализа текста «Русской правды», выступил Генрих Иосифович Анохин (Анохин 2000: 56).

³⁶ «Огуз-наме» не имеет точной датировки, но носит ярко выраженный доисламский характер. Время её создания определяется некоторыми учёными до рубежа нашей эры, например, Пётр Рычков и Олег Туманович относили его к VII в. до н.э. Иакинф Бичурин считал, что Огуз-хан - имя гуннского кагана Моде (Огузхан n.d.).

действительно, может толковаться ‘как сак’, или ‘подобный сакам’ – *sak-en + az*, где суффикс *-az* (ивр.) имеет значение ‘как, подобный’. О подобном толковании морфемы *-az* в иврите, например, писал в своё время известный писатель Айзек Азимов (Азимов n.d.).

В других источниках отмечается, что «современные авторы, в основном иудейского происхождения, замечают, что термин «ашкеназ» известен более 2700 лет из семитско-ассирийского языка и означает ‘скиф’» (Погребной, n.d.; Ашкенази, n.d.).³⁷ Таким образом, наша реконструкция подтверждается специалистами и следует учитывать, что:

- 1) этноним *aškenaz* содержит в своём составе морфему *-sk-*, которую мы рассматриваем как сокращённую форму форманта *sak*;
- 2) возможно, этноним *aškenaz* имел отношение к скифам-сакам и обозначал принадлежность к ним;
- 3) фиксировался более чем за 1000 лет до первых упоминаниях о *склавидах*.

Таким образом, у нас снимаются последние сомнения в верности выбранного нами подхода к этимологии этнонима *славяне*, исходя из его исходной формы *саклаб*.

В первую очередь хотелось бы оговориться, что применение санскрита автором не означает, что мы апеллируем к нему, как неизменному языку глубокой древности и конкретному языку-источнику. Специалисты отмечают длительный путь развития диалектов санскрита. Мы попытались использовать его, как своеобразный ключ, к вероятному сакральному пра-языку (или нескольким близким языкам).

³⁷ Предполагается, что в основе термина находится ассирийское именование скифов *Ašguza*.

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Наша реконструкция представляет собой наиболее общее видение проблемы, которое даёт возможность более узким специалистам выйти на более точные ответы. Различия в отдельных морфологических деталях могут объясняться диалектными разночтениями и влиянием соседних культур. Кроме того, лингвистами редко учитывается периодическая смена письменности, каждая из которых, несомненно, сказывалась на произношении слов. В частности синкретическое соединение морфем в слове *саклаб* теоретически может объясняться наличием в прошлом письма иероглифического или идеографического типа. Следы таких письменных систем достаточно надёжно выявляются в культурах и языках Евразии.

Проблема этимологии этнонима «славяне» не может считаться окончательно решённой без участия узких специалистов различных вспомогательных исторических и филологических наук. Ещё очень многое предстоит сделать. Можно в большей степени освещать историографию проблемы, углубить базу сведений о ранних славянах и скифах, детализировать хронологию процессов по регионам, в сопоставлении с процессом развития диалектов санскрита, пракрита и девангари на разных этапах истории, а также их статуса по отношению к диалектам языкового континиума скифского союза.

Заключение

Какие выводы можно сделать из вышеизложенного исследования?

Первичной следует считать форму *саклаб*. Она, как нам кажется, изначально не несла этноопределяющей нагрузки, а была призвана обозначить совокупность народов-земледельцев скифского союза.

Мы полагаем, что в этнониме *саклаб* (*saklab*) зафиксирована связь с самоназванием скифов (*saki*) и обозначал совокупность земледельческого

населения (скифы-земледельцы, скифы-пахари). Вместе с тем, многозначность санскритских терминов позволяет трактовать это слово и иной коннотации – «саки-завоеватели, бойцы...», что позволяло их потомкам гордиться своим именем и даже похваляться перед другими народами.

Этническая общность склавины (*sclaviny*), чей этноним понимается нами как 'потомки саклабов' с первых упоминаний в письменных источниках выступают уже как оформившееся этническое образование, которое в целом прошло к этому времени длительный период формирования. Этноним *славяне/словене* является наиболее поздней формой, которая могла образоваться в результате смысловой оппозиции к латиноязычному *sclaven*, применявшемуся в европейских странах со значением 'раб'.

Первоосновой общности славян, по всей видимости, изначально была совокупность земледельческих племён скифской конфедерации, среди которых могли быть и индоарийцы.

По всей видимости, обозначение общности народов, подвластных «царским скифам» было дано на языке близком к санскриту. Античные историки и писатели также могли иметь представление о сакральных языках греческих и римских жрецов; такими языками могли быть языки близкие к санскриту.³⁸

Предложенная нами версия кроме непосредственной задачи объяснения названия этнической общности сама может служить новым свидетельством о

³⁸ Это предположение может иметь большое значение для компаративистики, т.к. способно переместить родство многих индоевропейских слов с неопределённого времени гипотетического индоевропейского единства к более определённым временам массовых миграций степных культур евразийских степей на территории южных цивилизаций.

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древнейших связях народов Евразии, ныне удалённых друг от друга на многие тысячи километров.

В заключение следует отметить, что авторы не считают представленную работу полным и всесторонним исследованием. Имеются большие возможности для дальнейшего развития этой темы. Вместе с тем она обладает большим потенциалом и научной значимостью. Надеемся, что эту работу продолжат и завершат наши счастливые последователи.

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Companion to Victor Pelevin, Sofya Khagi (ed.), Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2022, xxxiv + 208 pp. ISBN 978-1-64469-776-4.

Victor Pelevin is widely known in Russia and abroad as a prolific representative of Russian literary postmodernism. His parodic renderings of Soviet myths and the Russian literary canon are mixed with allusions to Buddhism, the occult and the Gothic. In 2001 his novel *The Clay Machine Gun* was shortlisted for the International Impact Dublin Literary award, and in 2004 his collection of stories *The Blue Lantern* (1991) was awarded the Russian National Bestseller prize. The volume which Sofya Khagi has edited can be seen as another recognition of Pelevin's international literary success. In Khagi's view, in addition to making his readers think 'about the world they live', Pelevin 'has chronicled the post-Soviet condition with photographic precision, anatomized global postmodernity, techno-consumerism, and media mirages' (pp. ix-x).

The present collection comprises Khagi's Introduction, eight chapters, an Appendix and an Index. The chapters have been organised thematically: Part One titled 'The Post-Soviet' discusses Pelevin's early works; Part Two comprises four chapters exploring the time-space representation in his novel *Chapaev and the Void* (also known as *The Clay Machine Gun*); Part Three includes two chapters analysing *Generation P*; and Part Four focuses on dystopian themes and images found in Pelevin's later works such as *The Sacred Book of the Werewolf*, *S.N.U.F.F.* and *Love for Three Zuckebrins*.

Khagi's 'Introduction' provides a comprehensive survey of Pelevin's literary career and scholarly responses to his works, paying attention to their contextual setting too. It explains that the present volume aims to provide a resource to scholars,

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teachers and university-level students with a view to reveal to them ‘the philosophical and aesthetic complexities of Pelevin’s oeuvre’ (p. xxx).

Michael Martin’s ‘The Early Years: Post-Soviet with a Capital “S”’ discusses *The Blue Lantern*, *Omon Ra*, and *The Life of Insects*. It shows persuasively that these works ‘critique the ideological chaos after the Soviet collapse’ and portray the characters who manage ‘to free themselves of the need of ideological certainty’ (p. 3). The chapter offers an illuminating analysis of *Omon Ra* (1992) and its engagement with the Soviet version of the *Bildungsroman*.

Part Two, ‘Space, Time, and History’, discusses extensively Pelevin’s most acclaimed novel *Chapaev and the Void* (1996). Khagi’s chapter scrutinises the use of spatio-temporal models in relation to the development of non-Euclidian ideas in the novel and its allusions to Chinese parables and philosophy. It thoroughly examines the role in the novel of metaphysical reality in the construction of selfhood. In contrast to Khagi’s interest in the philosophical aspects of *Chapaev and the Void*, Christopher Fort analyses the use of parody in the novel and states: ‘By making dreams the novel’s central trope, Pelevin parodies the ever-conscious Socialist Realist hero who is constantly depicted as an insomniac’ (p. 55). He also examines the playful appropriation of the character from Chernyshevsky’s canonical novel *What Is to Be Done* (1863) in Pelevin’s short story ‘Vera Pavlovna’s Ninth Dream’ (1991). Additionally, Fort links Pustota’s dreams to the revival of Eurasianist ideology in Russia in the 1990s. Alexander McConnell interprets *Chapaev and the Void* as a novel that defies generic definitions and concerns itself with the performance of history. McConnell identifies Pelevin’s indifference to ‘the notion of meaningful past’ (p. 103) and his interest in manipulative uses of history for creative effect. This chapter would have benefited from an engagement with Linda Hutcheon’s seminal study *Historiographic Metafiction Parody and the Intertextuality of History* (1989): it could have anchored

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Pelevin's treatment of history to the broader postmodern trend found in Anglophone fiction.

Part Three, 'Simulation and Mind Control', comprises Dylan Ogden's chapter on Pelevin's novel *Generation P* (1999) that discusses its philosophical aspects in relation to western theories on mass media, simulacra, capitalist culture and spectacle found in the works of Baudrillard, Debord, Herbert Marcuse, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Although the chapter is thought-provoking and informative, I am not convinced that Pelevin was 'undoubtedly influenced by some of these cultural theorists' (p. 126). In my opinion, it would be more fruitful to identify clearly only those theoretical approaches that could help with unlocking Pelevin's vision of the post-Soviet media-driven modernity in *Generation P*. Similarly, Meghan Vicks's thesis that the depiction of the prevalence of consumerism over literature-centrism in *Generation P* should be interpreted as absolute fulfilment of literature-criticism (p. 129), showcasing 'the totalitarian potential of literature-centrism' (p. 155), appears to be exaggerated, especially because of the many references to post-Soviet popular culture in the novel, including music and visual culture. Regrettably, this part does not talk about Victor Ginzburg's film adaptation of *Generation P* (2011).

Part Four, 'Metamorphosis and Utopia', features two chapters. Grace Mahoney's analysis of *The Sacred Book of the Werewolf* as an example of metamorphosis is insightful and rewarding. Mahoney suggests that in Pelevin's novel 'metamorphosis both produces and embodies paradox, subversion, transgression and dynamism' (p. 161). She talks about 'the transgressive hybridized identities that appear in post-Soviet culture' that strive to 'overcome the past and the self through continual reinvention' as something that has a special meaning to Pelevin himself. She argues that Pelevin needs to experience transformation in order to bring 'spirit into literature' and to create a new mode of writing 'from the perspective of a were-creature, a female,

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and supernatural being' (p. 185). It could be added to Mahoney's conclusion that Pelevin's interest in the alterity of literary discourse invokes Emmanuel Levinas's ethical philosophy of 'the other'.

The final chapter by Theodore Trotman discusses Pelevin's *S.N.U.F.F.* and *Love for Three Zuckerbrins*, and their links to Soviet Utopian fiction. In Trotman's view, while *Love for Three Zuckerbrins* is 'a purely dystopian novel', *S.N.U.F.F.* can be seen as 'a hybrid work that blends positive and negative utopian ideas with the cynicism, hyper-reality, and satire of postmodernism' (p. 187). Trotman's analysis suggests that these novels reformulate 'old Soviet utopian dreaming' with a view 'to adequately represent contemporary Russian life' (p. 202).

In summary, the present collection of article serves as a balanced introduction to Pelevin's literary career. It offers many thoughtful and insightful interpretations of Pelevin's works. While it provides an adequate contextual setting for Pelevin's writings, it is a pity that it does not engage with important books on the post-Soviet cultural landscape such as Adele Barker's edited volume *Consuming Russia: Popular Culture, Sex, and Society since Gorbachev* (1999) and Ekaterina Kalinina's book *Mediated Post-Soviet Nostalgia* (2014).

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Наталья Кабьяк, *Любимые советские фильмы на уроке РКИ*, Русский язык как иностранный, Москва: ФЛИНТА, 2022. 392 страниц. ISBN 978-5-9765-4956-2.

Content-based instruction is a language-teaching approach that informs intermediate and advanced Russian-language curricula across institutions worldwide. While course material is diverse and varies from one institution to another, Soviet cinematography is often used as language-rich content for courses for more advanced students. Natalia Kabiak's textbook *Любимые советские фильмы на уроке РКИ* presents itself as a comprehensive resource for building a course centered around Soviet films or even for self-study. The textbook offers a variety of vocabulary and grammar exercises that offer an integrated approach to learning Russian through Soviet films.

The book is designed for students that have achieved *первый сертификационный уровень* (p. 3), i.e. the level of B1 according to the Common European Framework of Reference. As such, the book is entirely in Russian, making it a resource available for intermediate and advanced learners of Russian regardless of their first language.

The book has ten chapters, each dedicated to a particular Soviet film produced by *Mosfilm*. In addition, the book also features a foreword, a list of abbreviations, bibliography, and answer keys, adding to the completeness of a book as a course or self-study resource. The author explains that because these movies represent different epochs of the Soviet Union, the textbook can not only be used in film-themed courses, but also in other content-based courses such as Russian history (p. 3). In order to be able to view the films, the author invites teachers and students to use the *Mosfilm* website.

Each chapter opens with information about the film's director, producers, cast and release date. Following this, it has pre-viewing exercises that introduce learners to

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the film and help to activate their background knowledge, ‘while-viewing’ exercises that help students remember characters, their names and their relationships to each other, and ‘post-viewing’ exercises that open with questions about the plot and expose students to important vocabulary through paraphrase, dialogues and follow-up questions. There are then more post-viewing exercises that fall into the following categories: *Герои фильма*, *Словообразование*, *Лексика и фразеология*, *Крылатые выражения*, *Грамматика*, *Речевая практика* and *Письмо*. Finally, there is a short quiz at the end of each chapter that tests how well students remember the plot of the film. Ultimately, the exercises are designed for students not only to practice language skills, but also to understand and discuss the films and Soviet culture and society. To scaffold different types of learners, the book contains not only text, but also images and tables. Different media help to organise information, to remember films, and to systematise learning. For example, the tables are present across all sections of pre-, while-, and post-viewing exercises to focus students’ attention on new vocabulary and provide them in the target language with definitions and synonyms for film-related vocabulary.

In each chapter, all tasks are centred around the film in question. The exercises throughout the chapter allow the student to use the language from the film, helping them not only to improve their language skills, but also to construct a more meaningful relationship with Soviet cinematography as both a language and culture resource. For example, the *Крылатые выражения* section features fill-in-the-gap tasks where students complete dialogues from the film, as well as more meaningful tasks where they use the language in context to learn culturally specific idioms and expressions. Lastly, the post-viewing exercises in the *Речевая практика* section vary from film to film, making it a good opportunity for students to move from a smaller film perspec-

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tive to a larger cultural one. For example, the exercises include role-play, skits inspired by the film events, reader's theatre, scenarios, and others.

As a theme-based textbook for intermediate and advanced students, the book primarily emphasises engagement with the content (i.e. films) and does not offer any grammar, word-building and/or writing composition information, probably because of the expectation that the grammar, word-building and writing are at a level lower. Instead, the book heavily emphasises the target vocabulary. For that reason, instructors should bear in mind that if they adopt the book for their course and would like to have a less content-driven approach to teaching Soviet films and to include more grammar teaching, they should supplement it with relevant grammar, word-building and writing sources. While it is true that theme-based textbooks may lack grammar explanations, it would make the book a more useful resource for instructors and students alike to have grammar revisions or sections on writing tips in each chapter.

Another thing that may be important to consider is that while the textbook offers the *Mosfilm* website as an essential component for using the book, access to the website may be limited from certain countries and may require the use of a VPN that should in turn be authorised by the institution offering the course. This thus raises issues concerning information access and language access. If the textbook, however, came with a licensed DVD or a companion website specifically designed for the book and had all the films licensed and available, it could make the textbook more accessible to learners in different countries.

Lastly, while the book has a wide variety of tasks that are built on the integrated skills approach, the book would benefit from additional listening tasks. Even though the students watch a film for each chapter, most tasks for each film are in the post-viewing section, making it sometimes difficult for students to perform tasks in the *Речевая практика* where they imitate characters' intonation and/or then say it

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with a different one. The listening tasks and tracks could then scaffold students in completing certain activities and may even allow for other tasks that can be better integrated.

Overall, the textbook is a good addition to the content-based literature in the teaching of Russian which stresses the complete use of the target language and which offers students and instructors alike engagement with Soviet cinematography in order to develop more advanced Russian-language skills. As the book itself states, this book would be especially helpful for a content-driven course at an intermediate or advanced level, where students have a solid foundation on which to build.

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Voices in the Wilderness: A Digest of the Russian-Language Press in Australia, (Elena Govor and Kevin Windle, trans.), Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2024. 453 pp, incl. illustrations, biographical notes, bibliography and index. ISBN 978-1-923068-67-4.

Voices in the Wilderness: a Digest of the Russian-language Press in Australia 1912-1919 by Kevin Windle and Elena Govor is a collection of the first Russian newspapers established and run by early Russian-speaking migrants in Australia. The digest is not only an accurate, chronological presentation of the Russian-language press, but also a portrayal of the first wave of the emigrants from the Russian Empire, settlers on the new land, who ‘comprised the fourth largest ethnic community in Brisbane’ (p. 13).

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The topic of Russian immigration has been extensively researched by the authors, and the present collection of the newspapers provides a comprehensive coverage of various aspects of the immigrants' lives, such as fighting for their rights, looking for jobs, getting to know the new environment and, in general, trying to survive in the new land. Readers of the digest see Australia through the lens of the early settlers and find out that the above-mentioned topics were of the same relevance to the Russian-speaking migrants as to the representatives of other communities at that time. However, some popular topics of contemporary Russian-speaking newspapers, such as Australia's unique wildlife and social events in Australia, are not covered in these 1912-1919 newspapers. Most issues reflect men's lives in Australia, but we know little about how women and children settled in their new home country.

The collection of newspapers is preceded by an introduction which outlines the historical, social and cultural background of the early press. The historical notes provide important information which helps readers understand the political climate of the early twentieth century, including the intricacies of Australia-Russia diplomacy, Russia's socio-political 'strains of thought', various events in Russia, and the protests against British 'militarism' in Australia, among others. According to the authors, there were two types of immigrants – the revolutionaries, escaping the Tsarist regime, and the peasants and newly established working class, seeking a better life in Australia. The latter, initially disengaged from politics, would later be turned into avid socialists by the former, as a result of the poor economic conditions. From a linguistic perspective, the spelling conventions of Russian names and the difference between *rossiiskii* (Russian, referring to state) and *russkii* (Russian, referring to language and culture) are explained for non-Russian readers. Furthermore, to avoid potential misinterpretation of the adjective *russkii* and/or to reflect its subtlety of meaning, 'Russian-language' appears in the title of the book.

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The seven chapters of the digest represent seven weekly or fortnightly newspapers that the first Russian-speaking settlers in Australia had access to. It is important that the newspapers are chronologically presented, in the order of their appearance, as they constitute the historical evidence of the development of the Russian-speaking Press, as well as the first immigrants' lives in Australia. The reader learns that the newspaper was the new settlers' 'auditorium, in which [they] examined and discussed [their] affairs' (p. 30), and a space that would 'defend the interests of Russian-speaking workers in Australia' (p. 52).

Some newspaper issues are purely political, containing calls for action, meeting agendas and reports, while others – under the rubrics 'Readers write' and 'Letters' – provide glimpses of life in the 1910s. In particular, one of the newspaper readers outlines the unbearable conditions of working at Gympie, 'the most dreadful railway line in Australia' (p. 35); another reader is concerned that 'Russians get along badly with one another' (p. 41). Letters from the public contain little-known facts about the early Russian-speaking community, such as the presence of 'Little Siberia' near Cairns and the existence of an Australian grandmother of the workers' movement, who was also a representative of the international women's movement in Australia (p. 228); about Old Believers who constituted the majority of 'Sydney folk', and the politically indifferent Melburnians. Besides multiple entries about unemployment and lack of professional employment, the digest provides information about certain events, such as the 1913 Christmas celebrations in Brisbane, which included meetings and reports, as well as a play by a dramatist, a talk on 'The Psychology of Exile and Hard Labour', and the Gopak dance (p. 100).

From 1912–1919 there were eight newspapers in circulation for Russian-speaking migrants in Australia, most of which had very short lives owing to legal restrictions and censorship. However, when they tried to bring issues to the public's at-

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tention and called for protection of the new settlers' rights, they would indeed become 'voices in the wilderness'.

The present digest will be of great interest to historians of immigration to Australia, as well as to the general public, including the descendants of the first Russian-speaking settlers.

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Smola, Klavdia, *Reinventing Tradition: Russian-Jewish Literature between Soviet Underground and Post-Soviet Deconstruction*, Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2023. 420 pp. ISBN 979-8-88719-190-4.

This book is part of a series entitled 'Jews of Russia and Eastern Europe and their Legacy'. Its structure consists of ten discursive chapters, bookended by a detailed Introduction and a very brief Conclusion. In her Introduction, Smola frames the leading question that motivates her research under this title: 'In this book, I ask: How do contemporary East European Jewish literatures (in my case, the Russian Jewish) deal with the Jewish tradition?' (p. 3).

A large number of theoretical points fall out of this deceptively simple question, most of which are prefigured in the rest of the Introduction. Some of these points are expressed as issues, others are asserted, and yet others expressed as questions. These points are spread across the five sections of the Introduction, the first of which – entitled *Tradition and Innovation in Judaism* – is devoted to the 'historically evolving dialectic of continuity and innovation' (p. 8) embraced by the elements of text and

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commentary. This section deals with Jewish hermeneutics, specifically the exegesis of the Torah as embodied in the Talmud and the tradition of *midrash*.

The next section of the Introduction – entitled *Semantics of the Posthuman Era: The (Re)Invention of Jewishness* – deals with ‘the civilizational break caused by the Holocaust ... [t]he tendency towards reconstruction, collection of traces, explanation, and canonization transformed narration into a form of reminiscence of the past’ (p. 9). This section uses the concepts of postmemory (p. 10), anamnesis (p. 12) and the ‘performativity of Jewishness’ (p. 14) to establish how being Jewish was reinvented after the rupture of the Shoah destroyed the continuity of oral transference of tradition.

Semiotic context – the third section of the introduction – uses Lotman and Uspenskii’s concept of ‘double culture’ (p. 16) to unpack the nature of Soviet/Jewish acculturation. This is amplified by the distinction between ‘restorative’ and ‘reflexive’ nostalgia (p. 21), providing a link to the previous section on semantics. This section raises such questions as: ‘How could the new Judaism speak for itself from the center of the repressive system it negated? How was the repatriation discourse perceived by its actors and especially by its writers and poets? And how did the new Zionism build its own metaphysics?’ (p. 20).

The fourth section – headed *Cultural-Historical Context* – frames the research around *samizdat* and *tamizdat*, but also explores the rich, and sometimes arcane, textual sources of Jewish tradition. It concludes that: ‘The state of Israel, the Holocaust, the Jewish question in Russia, and Judaism are the most important political and historical issues of the Jewish underground [“Samizdat”]’ (p. 27).

The last section of the Introduction – entitled *Poetics of (Anti)Imperial (Anti)Assimilation* – draws the threads together, referring back to the ‘process of Jewish cultural and literary “archeology [sic] of the self”’ (p. 27). The shtetl-based re-

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ethnisation is seen as an essential part of the centrifugal movement holding ‘the possibility of cultural subversion and a way back to local values’ (pp. 29-30).

The Introduction is followed by a chapter on *Research Approaches* which covers research trends and deficits, the state of the art, and the perspective and boundaries of the study. In the latter section, Smola focuses ‘almost exclusively on literature that could not be officially published in the Soviet Union or was created after the perestroika’ (p. 45). She stresses a focus on recent Russian Jewish literature that has remained unrecognised, large portions of which ‘belong both to Russian and to multilingual Jewish literature(s), meaning that they [...] are a part of a double or even multiple literary history’ (p. 53). Apart from considerations of poetics, Smola stresses a cultural studies approach, which examines ‘[...] problems of collective myths, postmemory, topographical constructions that paradoxically draw on the mythic-religious and real-historical at the same time, postmodernist discourse, semiotics of Jewish communication and, in general, cultural practices and historical motivation of ethnic revival’ (p. 54). A section on the temporal and geographical constraints of the study concludes this chapter.

More theoretical discussion ensues: a brief chapter on *Russian Jewish Literature as a Bicultural Phenomenon* (Chapter 3), closely followed by a detailed analysis of dissent in Chapter 4 (*Jewish Dissent of the Late Soviet Era: Underground, Exodus; Literature*), in which themes aired earlier in the Introduction are articulated more fully.

The next three chapters are devoted to close reading of illustrative texts – novels or stories: *Prose of Exodus* (Chapter 5), *Axes of Nonconformist Jewish Literature* (Chapter 6), and *Negated Dichotomies: The Failed Utopia of Aliyah* (Chapter 7). These chapters are each divided into a number of sections, each of which addresses one or more novels/short stories. The scope of Chapters 5 and 6 is fairly obvious, but

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the title of Chapter 7 may need some explication for non-specialist readers: Aliyah in this context means 'immigration to Israel'.

The need to unpack this term raises a general issue with this title: the lack of a glossary. This non-specialist reviewer's reading experience was further complicated by terms that are specific to Jewish religion and culture, including concepts expressed by Hebrew, Aramaic and Yiddish words. A detailed glossary would ameliorate this problem for the general reader.

Chapter 8 deals with *Time and Space Structures in Nonconformist Jewish Literature*, followed by an absorbing chapter on the *Reinvention of Yiddish Storytelling* (Chapter 9), which explores Jewish narrative and the semiotics of Yiddish, before embarking on analyses of a Sevela novel and a Berman short story. The chapter ends with a section centred around the Yiddish storyteller par excellence, Isaak Babel'.

Smola then briefly examines the *Aftermath and Impact of Jewish Counter-Culture* (Chapter 10) before a detailed examination of *Russian Jewish Literature after Communism* (Chapter 11). The latter chapter is divided into two sections: *(Post)Memorial Literature: Palimpsests, Residuals, Reinvention* and *Jewish Deconstruction of the Empire*. It was in the last section that I found the most stimulating analysis in this book, a discussion of Mikhail Iudson's novel *The Ladder onto the Closet: A fairy-tale for emigrants*.

This discussion (pp. 292-316) represents the whole book in microcosm. Smola introduces Baudrillard's concept of the 'simulacrum' to discuss Soviet realism as postmodernism, using her own term 'discursive dystopia' to reflect on the reality that appears in Iudson's novel. She describes the work as a 'linguistic laboratory of power' (p. 293), in which Russian medievalism is connected with contemporary concerns by using archaisms such as Church Slavonic wording. This approach enables Iudson to portray 'antisemitism as an everyday ritual legitimized by language' (p. 295). In this

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way Iudson's linguistic playfulness echoes the Russian practice of *dvoeverie* (double belief). Through close reading, Smola picks out 'Sdreĩfil, beĩlisralsia?' (p. 301) as a reference to the Dreyfus and Beilis affairs – both of which involved anti-Jewish law suits – as well as many other intertextual references in the following pages. She concludes the section with a series of observations that Iudson's dystopian vision embraces not only Russia and Germany, but also Israel (pp. 311-316). Chapter 11 is followed by a brief Conclusion (Chapter 12).

Whilst this book is analytically rich, thus opening a lot of doors for the enquiring reader, there is a tendency towards theory overload, as writ small in the section on Iudson. As a consequence, this is a demanding book and, while deeply erudite, it is not for the faint-hearted. As mentioned above, it would have been much the better for a detailed glossary to aid non-specialists interested in the legacy of Ashkenazic Jewry. Of more importance is the absence of an index of topics; the index of names provided is insufficient to track the theoretical frameworks used. Notwithstanding those issues, Klavdia Smola's book represents an excellent resource for the academic library.

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Queer(ing) Russian Art: Realism, Revolution, Performance (Brian James Baer and Yevgeniy Fiks, eds.), Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2023. 401 pages. ISBN 979-8-88719-251-2.

In this impressive, wide-ranging volume, Brian Baer and Yevgeniy Fiks aim not only to take the initial steps in creating 'a history of queer Russian art and artists', but also

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to imagine ‘queer interventions in art histories’ (p. 18). The volume, therefore, not only covers ostensibly queer figures (e.g. Sergei Eisenstein, Konstantin Somov, Timur Novikov), but also offers fresh interpretations of supposedly ‘straight’ canonical artists (e.g. Aleksandr Ivanov or Aleksandr Deineka) from a queer perspective. Indeed, the editors take a broad definition of queering to include ‘any intervention that exposes, challenges, or subverts dominant heteronormative assumptions, beliefs, and practices’ (p. 10).

In Part I, ‘Theoretical Framings’, Baer develops this methodology further. His approach to queering Russian art proceeds along three interlinked axes: (1) tracing Russian engagements with the queer beauty of the classics and Renaissance art; (2) recognising visual art’s potential to challenge dominant ideologies of gender and sexuality through techniques such as allegory or citation; (3) highlighting the viewer’s potentially queer gaze. Baer’s chapter illuminates how these axes operate with examples from across Russian art history, but also sets up the volume as a whole.

Part II, ‘Queer Beauty in Context’, comprises eleven chapters, arranged chronologically, covering key artists and movements from the eighteenth century to the present. Olga Khoroshilova examines androgyny in eighteenth-century painting and masquerade, while Nikolai Ivanov takes up a queer interpretation of Aleksandr Ivanov’s nudes. Baer suggests that Somov’s art offers ‘a distinctly queer form of modernism’ (p. 117), usefully contrasting his work – which he sees as indebted to eighteenth-century libertinage – with Mikhail Kuzmin’s art, which draws on the Italian Renaissance. Bringing us into the Soviet period, Gleb Napreenko’s short but powerful chapter uses Deineka’s wartime drawings to expose ‘the crisis in the well-oiled machine of Stalinist representation’ (p. 154), while Ada Ackerman interprets Eisenstein’s erotic drawings as ‘a subversive, carnivalesque practice’ (p. 163). Moving into the 1970s, Yelena Kalinsky contends that the Moscow Conceptualists used queer erot-

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ic imagery 'to grapple with the problem of individual and collective artistic identity' (p. 182).

The next four chapters all address different aspects of the New Artists movement in Leningrad founded by Novikov in the 1980s, which would evolve into the New Academy of Fine Arts in the 1990s. Maria Engström calls the New Academy 'the first and leading queer art community in post-Soviet Russia' (p. 193). Her chapter focuses on Georgii Gur'ianov and how his work queered the socialist visual canon. Andrei Khlobystin evocatively places the New Artists within a broader 'schizorevolution' in the 1980s as Soviet certainties faded away. For Khlobystin, the New Artists offered an 'ever-shifting kaleidoscopic refraction of perpetual metamorphoses', yet maintained an '[i]nner integrity' and a 'heroic worldview' (p. 207). Helena Goscilo's chapter on Bella Matveeva demonstrates how her work 'embodies in voluptuous form a cult of luxurious beauty, the eroticism of androgyny, and sundry modes of implied transgression' (p. 232). Andrey Shental returns to Gur'ianov, finding his work casts a 'homosexual gaze' (p. 263) on Soviet culture, before switching to a Butlerian reading of performance artist Vladislav Mamyshev, who channelled both American film star Marilyn Monroe and her Soviet counterpart Liubov' Orlova. Shental shows how Mamyshev's performances 'foreground[d] the political implications of gender identity' (p. 268) and 'expos[e] gender codes in the cultural production of meaning' (p. 270). Rounding out this section is Roman Osminkin's thoughtful chapter on Badi Badalov, whose art and poetry play with language and identity to explore his position as a queer migrant, with a critical eye both to nationalism and to mainstream gay culture.

Part III is titled 'Beyond Queer Beauty? Contemporary Post-Soviet Perspectives on Queer(ing) Art, Art History, and Artists'. Here, the focus shifts away from historical scholarship towards contemporary practice, with materials from recent queer art projects, essays and interviews. Georgy Mamedov and Oksana Shatalova

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discuss ‘The Kollontai Commune in 1970s Frunze’, a conceptual art project imagining what an alternative model of sexuality in the Soviet Union might have looked like. Fiks’s performance art piece, ‘Soviet Union, July 1991’, stages a transnational dialogue between American and Soviet queer activists at two key junctures, the fall of the USSR and Russia’s passing of the gay propaganda laws. Victoria Smirnova-Maizel discusses the artist Polina Zalavskaya’s watercolour series *Material Evidence*, a collaborative project with sociologist Alexander Kondakov based on documenting murders in the Russian LGBT community. Activist and artist Seroe Fioletovoe addresses the politics of queer activism in contemporary Russia, arguing that sexuality has become ‘a weapon in a war between different symbols’ (p. 325).

An incisive essay by Nadia Plungian asks whether the Western concept of ‘queer’ can apply in Russia, making the case for an ethical, honest scholarship that is willing to challenge the politics of today when investigating the art of the past. An interview with Slava Mogutin offers another way to queer the Soviet past, locating one source of his own inspiration in the Russian avant-garde, especially Mayakovsky. A dialogue between Katharina Wiedlack and Masha Godovannaya provides a highlight of the volume, as they discuss the ethics of queer art and scholarship, and how to move beyond Western identity politics. They propose a re-imagining of the closet as a positive space, and suggest that opacity – rather than visibility or coming-out – can serve a valuable strategy for queer people in precarious positions. In the final chapter, Baer interviews Fiks, who reflects on his own positionality between Russia and the USA, how his recent projects explore sexuality both locally and globally, and the tensions between gay and queer.

Queer(ing) Russian Art does not purport to be a comprehensive history. There are gaps: pre-Petrine Russia receives short shrift, while the New Academy is arguably over-represented. Yet the volume is groundbreaking for Russian queer studies, partic-

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ularly in its methodological sophistication and openness, which will undoubtedly inspire further work. In particular, Part III of the volume demonstrates how researchers and practitioners can come together, and the political urgency of such collaboration at a time when queer people face a precarious future.

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Tony Brown, Tatiana Balykhina, Ekaterina Talalakina, Jennifer Bown and Viktoria Kurilenko, *Mastering Russian through Global Debate (Mirovye debaty: russkii iazyk na prodvnutom urovne)*, Georgetown University Press, 2014. 216 pp. ISBN 978-1-62616-088-0

Mastering Russian through Global Debate, co-authored by a team of American and Russian linguists, is aimed at Russian language students progressing from Advanced to Superior level proficiency. The book series *Mastering Languages through Global Debate*, published by Georgetown University Press, also includes textbooks for students who learn English, Spanish, Italian and Chinese, as well as a resource for instructors, *Teaching Advanced Language Skills through Global Debate: Theory and Practice*.

In *Mastering Russian through Global Debate*, the authors encourage students to discuss controversial topics, to express and support opinions, to hypothesise and to use sophisticated vocabulary related to urgent concerns of the modern world: economy versus ecology, intervention versus non-intervention, wealth redistribution versus self-reliance, cultural preservation versus diversity, freedom versus security, higher

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education versus field experience. Each chapter of the book prepares students for effective classroom debates. Helpfully, instructions for exercises in the first chapter of *Mastering Russian through Global Debate* are given in English in addition to Russian, which allows English-speaking students to understand exactly what is required in this and the following chapters of the book. The remaining five chapters are entirely in Russian, making the book suitable for students from all language backgrounds. Full-colour illustrations employed as prompts for discussion along with engaging debate topics make this book highly useful for the modern classroom.

Each chapter of *Mastering Russian through Global Debate* starts with pre-reading activities ('Podgotovka k chteniiu') so that students can establish their own opinion on a given topic (e.g. brainstorming words and phrases associated with the topic and arranging them in mind maps to show logical connections; compiling a list of problems in the text based on the title of the article; reading claims related to the topic and agreeing or disagreeing with them). Students then move on to the section 'Izucheniie problemy' in which they read an article presenting both sides of a debate topic; they then complete post-reading activities (e.g. filling in the table with arguments presented in a text and adding their own arguments; determining true and false statements and completing sentences based on information from the text). These tasks are followed by 'Osvoenie leksiki' – exercises dedicated to vocabulary expansion and activation of vocabulary newly acquired from the article (e.g. completing mind maps created during pre-reading activities, matching new words with their meanings, then inserting them into sentences in the correct grammatical form). Further exercises prompt students to use new vocabulary and word combinations actively (e.g. composing sentences that reflect their position 'for' or 'against' a given problem).

The next section in each chapter ('Postroenie kriticheskogo diskursa') is devoted to developing the ability to build hypotheses for the debate. It includes role-

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playing exercises involving active vocabulary items. This is followed by listening exercises ('Audirovanie') in which students listen to mock debates on the publisher's website and complete 'pre-listening' and 'post-listening' activities (such as predicting arguments that students will hear, listening to audio recording firstly for general comprehension and then for specific details by evaluating the arguments as 'strong' or 'weak'). In 'Postroenie argumentatsii: pis'mo', students are asked to synthesise material studied in the chapter and then write about the topic. The culmination of each chapter – 'Postroenie argumentatsii: praktika rechi' – is an oral debate, after which, in 'Podvedenie itogov', students analyse their own work and identify the most beneficial vocabulary collocations from the chapter.

Despite linguists recognising the increasing value of discussion and debate as a way of teaching, this is the first debate textbook for advanced Russian students, and the only one known to me. The book is, therefore, a valuable resource not only to instructors who teach Russian at universities and vocational language centres: chapters related to ecology and higher education, for example, could be offered in the original or in modified form to students who are planning to sit a Russian VCAA Australian high school exam. Tasks on completing mind maps, writing out arguments 'for' or 'against' in tabular form, discussing problems in pairs, identifying multiple types of sources for the discussion topic can each be employed by language instructors to prepare high-school students to succeed in speech situations, both interpersonal and presentational, to construct arguments for the Discussion part of the oral VCAA exam. It also encourages students to think critically when completing a writing task in Section 3 of the written exam (e.g. to evaluate controversial environmental impacts of tourism in a form of a report, or to write an article for a school newspaper persuading high school students that having a part-time job is beneficial to their future [VCAA written exam 2020, Section 3, Question 12; 2018, Section 3, Question 12, retrieved

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from <https://www.vcaa.vic.edu.au/assessment/vce-assessment/past-examinations/Pages/russian.aspx>].

This unique book includes everything Russian language teachers need to prepare students for successful debates. It is, without doubt, an ideal textbook for structured coursework or a valuable companion for mastering selected discussion topics.

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Maria Grazia Bartolini, *'In the Tight Triangle of the Night': The Early Poetry of Yuriy Tarnawsky (1956-1971), Between Modernism and Postmodernism*, Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2024. ISBN 9798887193885.

Yuriy Tarnawsky was born in 1934 in Ukraine and spent some of his formative years as a post-Second World War refugee in displaced persons camps in Germany. In 1952 he emigrated to the United States, where he studied engineering and subsequently obtained a doctorate in linguistics. He built a career at IBM, specialising, among other fields, in artificial languages and artificial intelligence. An author of poetry in Ukrainian and, later, poetry and prose in English, he relentlessly experimented with literary form. Tarnawsky was a founding member of the New York Group of Ukrainian poets. Active in the second half of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s, the Group's members were linked more by rebellion against the traditional forms and ideologies of Ukrainian literature than by any positive creative program.

This early, Ukrainian-language, part of Yuriy Tarnawsky's oeuvre is the subject of Maria Grazia Bartolini's accomplished study. One of an all-too-small number

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of books in English dedicated to the oeuvre of a single Ukrainian author, Bartolini's monograph first appeared in Italian in 2012. An exemplary inquiry in many respects, it balances finely between incisive analyses of Tarnawsky's always challenging texts, and exposition of the literary and intellectual contexts – global, Ukrainian, and Ukrainian émigré – to which Tarnawsky's texts responded. The book is erudite and lucid in its presentation of the complex thought-worlds and aesthetic paradigms of modernism and postmodernism, Tarnawsky's points of departure and arrival in the decade and a half in question.

The book's structure guides readers from the general to the particular. A compact Introduction illuminates the inflections of modernism prevalent in Europe and North America in the two decades following the Second World War and summarises the argument elaborated in the core of the inquiry: Tarnawsky's early poetry follows a trajectory characterised by 'a loosening of symbolic unity, and the textualization of reality – developed at the interstices between modernism and nascent postmodernism. [...] From [Tarnawsky's] debut collection, *Zhyttia v misti* (*Life in the city*, 1956), which depicts the alienation of modern life and the overall loss of a sense of reality without any rhetorical pretense, through his subsequent works, we proceed through the radical suspension of the subject as a grammatical and cognitive agent to the replacement of the referent (external and internal) with a fictional reality devoid of historical, moral, and psychological consistency' (p. 4).

After an account of the evolution of the New York Group against the background of its émigré predecessors, the Prague group and MUR – the Modern Ukrainian Movement that animated Ukrainian cultural life in the post-war refugee camps (Chapter 1) – and of Tarnawsky's life and works (Chapter 2), the book maps Tarnawsky's early poetry against the grid of Western thought laid out in the Introduction, detecting three phases in the output of this period. The first, in which Sartre is the

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dominant influence, is Existentialist. The poems of *Zhyttia v misti*, the author contends, articulate disconsolate alienation of the self, failure to engage with an Other, apprehension of the world as absurd, and an acute sense of the self's incapacity for moral action (Chapter 3).

The second phase, which Bartolini labels Phenomenological in the light of its affinities with Husserl's insistence upon a 'return' to 'things themselves', encompasses the collections *Idealizovana Biohrafia* (*An Idealised Biography*, 1964), *Spomyny* (*Memoirs*, 1964) and *Bez Espanii* (*Without Spain*, 1967). In the poems of this period, space, and the arrangement of objects in it, comes to the fore; the subject surrenders its function of giving order and meaning to reality. Formally, this intellectual stance is reflected in verbal counterparts of collage and Cubism in the visual arts (Chapter 4).

The third phase of Tarnawsky's poetic creativity, which Bartolini does not name, takes shape in the collections contained in *Poezii pro nishcho ta inshi poezii na tsiu samu temu* (*Poems about Nothing and Other Poems on the Same Theme*, 1970). Here poetry records the dissolution not only of the subject, but also of the world, into entities that exist solely thanks to the operations of language. Objects dissolve; if they are present, they are so without purpose or meaning, and even without relation to other objects. Their signs remain their sole traces (Chapters 5-7).

Maria Grazia Bartolini has given us a sophisticated, persuasive study of a closed period in the creative biography of a Ukrainian poet deeply imprinted by his Western intellectual environment. The book is a major contribution to the understanding of a unique figure in Ukrainian literary history, as well as a revelatory case study of the difficulty of rejecting inherited tradition without succumbing to the levelling force of contemporary cultural convention.

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Tarnawsky's mainly English-language writings, initiated after an eight-year hiatus in his literary output by the collection *This Is How I Get Well* (1978), remain objects for future inquiry.

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Natasha Grigorian, *Visions of The Future: Malthusian Thought Experiments in Russian Literature (1840-1960)*, Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2023. 122 pp. + index. ISBN 979-8-88719-055-6 (hardback).

In the Introduction to her book, Grigorian states that this publication is a pilot study of thought experiments in Russian literature. As the study is devoted to futurity, Grigorian attempts to explain the relationship between thought experiments and utopias and/or dystopias. She maintains that not all utopias and dystopias are written in a format of thought experiments, as a thought experiment must contain a narrative, which, she asserts, is not obligatory for a utopian or dystopian text. To further support this claim the author maintains that a thought experiment 'always implies a *dynamic* evolution of a narrative' (p. 5) in contrast to 'the inherently static evocation' (p. 5) that is sufficient for utopias and dystopias. The Introduction states that concerning the thought experiment format, the selected texts in this book are linked to Thomas Malthus's famous *An Essay on the Principle of Populations* (1798).

Grigorian explains that the chosen texts employ thought experiments within an argumentative framework in the same way as Malthus's work; all writers either mention the problem of overpopulation and in some cases even discuss Malthus's theory

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in their personal or critical writing. Grigorian states that for her pilot study ‘argumentative clarity and concision are more important than quantity’ (p. 7), which explains the limited number of the texts studied. Despite this, the author poses quite a wide spectrum of questions, ranging from issues of the initial conditions that compel writers to make use of thought experiments to the structure and key features of thought experiments, as well as the ‘epistemic and cultural value’ of these experiments ‘both within and beyond their original historical and artistic settings’ (p. 19).

In Chapter One Grigorian gives a concise overview of Malthus’s work as an example of counterfactual thought experiments and explains that his experiment is ‘foremost a rhetorical structure that is reliable as the two postulata on which it is based: the geometrical ratio of population growth and the arithmetical ratio of food production increase respectively’ (p. 31). In terms of the relevance of Malthus to our times, Grigorian asserts that unchecked population growth may potentially have disastrous consequences. Chapter Two studies Vladimir Odoevsky’s *Russian Nights* (1844) as utopian/dystopian frame narrative inspired by Malthus and Jeremy Bentham. In particular, the focus is on two texts by Odoevsky, ‘The Last Suicide’ and ‘A City without a Name’. ‘The Last Suicide’ has been considered by commentators as a response to and a development of a chapter by Malthus, while ‘A City without a Name’ is inspired more generally by Malthus’s work. The two literary texts are concerned with Malthus’s notion of overpopulation, as well as with Bentham’s famous principle of utility. Bentham argues in *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789) that society’s pursuit of utility as the goal will lead to its downfall. Grigorian convincingly demonstrates that in both of Odoevsky’s stories, Malthusian thought experiments act as rhetorical devices which undermine particular philosophical theories. The value of these short stories is in their ability to demonstrate both positive and

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negative effects of certain ideas, as Odoevsky typically uses the technique of *reductio ad absurdum* which exposes contradictions in formal postulates.

Moving in chronological order, the next chapter studies elements of thought experiment in Nikolai Chernyshevsky's work, including his canonical novel *What Is to Be Done?* (1863). Grigorian rightly brings Chernyshevsky's negative attitude to Darwin's Malthusianism into her discussion and pays attention to the social context of Russia in the 1860s as different from the needs of England around 1880. In his guise as a political economist Chernyshevsky uses scholarly work in agronomy to discredit Malthus's idea that food production can grow only in arithmetical ratio. He points out that innovations in the distribution of labour and use of machinery and new technologies will bring food production to new levels in future. Grigorian convincingly shows that in his novel, in the famous fourth dream of Vera Pavlovna, Chernyshevsky polemically uses 'Malthus's own weapon of narrative thought experiment against him' (p. 61). Chernyshevsky thus uses 'the mimetic potential of a "dream within a dream" structure to suspend the reader's disbelief and to create a convincing image of future life' (p. 61). Chernyshevsky's deconstruction of Malthus's thought experiment results in an alternative scenario for the future, based on the principles of co-operation and technological progress in harmony with nature.

Bogdanov's *Red Star* (1908) and Aleksey Tolstoy's *Aelita* (1923) are the two pre-revolutionary science fiction novels explored as the portrayal of revolutionary societies on Earth and Mars in the next chapter. The problem of population plays a key role in these utopian novels and Grigorian argues that both contain a counterfactual thought experiment which addresses the issue of population by looking at constructive solutions. Both narratives undermine a Malthusian pessimistic and deterministic scenario. Alexander Chayanov's *My Brother Aleksei's Journey* (1920) is a lesser-known text that is explored in Chapter Five. Chayanov, a professor of agricultural economics

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both before the Revolution and after uses a fictional narrative to support his agricultural utopia. Grigorian characterises Chayanov's vision as 'a projected solution to some of the problems predicted by Malthus' (p. 87).

While most chapters deal with utopian narratives, the final chapter is dedicated to Nina Berberova's dystopian story 'In Memory of Schliemann' (1958) – a case of a form of hypothetical thought experiment. A concise Conclusion summarises the idea that literary discourse effectively promotes particular ideas and belief systems and can even transform mindsets. The texts grouped together in a dialogic relation in Grigorian's approach emerge as part of a bigger epistemological tradition that incorporates literature, philosophy and science.

This focused study makes a welcome contribution to the series 'Studies in Comparative Literature and Intellectual History'. It will appeal to everybody interested in discourses of futurity, their structure, dynamics and efficacy.

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