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BENJAMIN SUTCLIFFE

THE THIN PRESENT OF TRIFONOV'S THAW: TIME IN *SLAKING THE THIRST*

In 1963 noted author Iurii Trifonov published his first novel in thirteen years. *Slaking the Thirst* (*Utolenie zhazhdy*) has two plots, both set in 1957 and deeply embedded in the cultural anxieties of the Thaw. One, recalling narratives from the 1930s-1940s, deals with the 1950s struggles of those digging the Karakum Canal, a grandiose project to bring water from the Amu Darya River to irrigate Turkmenia. The second, parallel plot depicts embittered Petr Koryshev, a struggling journalist whose father was repressed in 1937. Both lines intersect when Koryshev defends the canal's boss, talented but unorthodox Ermasov, against political opponents linked to Stalinism. The novel is a rambling but fascinating illustration of how conceptions of time intersect with the aftermath of the Twentieth Party Congress.¹

Trifonov himself had a paradoxical relationship with the Thaw: like Koryshev, his father had been unjustly arrested under Stalin, as were his uncle and mother. The author repeatedly returns to this family tragedy in his fiction, depicting it as a dividing point between the innocence of childhood and trauma of adolescence — both were

¹ In English Trifonov's work has been rendered as 'Slaking the Thirst' and 'Quenching the Thirst'. Unfortunately, neither conveys the nuances of overcoming and conquering (*utolenie*) in the Russian title. My analysis of the novel is based on: *Utolenie zhazhdy*, in *Iurii Trifonov: sobranie sochinenii*. 4 vols., S. A. Baruzdin et al. (eds), Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1985, vol. 1, pp. 409-750. The novel originally appeared in *Znamia*, 4-7/1963 and expands on some of the themes in *Under the Sun* (*Pod solntsem*, 1959), Trifonov's volume of short stories about Turkmenia: *Pod solntsem*, Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel', 1959. *Slaking the Thirst* was made into a film for which Trifonov helped write the screenplay: *Utolenie zhazhdy*, director Bulat Mansurov, Turkmenfil'm, 1966. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers at *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies* for their comments on this article.

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coloured by the brutality of the purges. Yet his first novel, *Students* (*Studenty*, 1950), had glorified the late-1940s attacks on academics, winning Trifonov a Stalin Prize, but also focusing attention on his father's status as an enemy of the people. Sudden fame and the suspicion of the authorities provoked a personal and artistic crisis that stymied Trifonov until the appearance in 1963 of *Slaking the Thirst*. What he found particularly embarrassing was the discouraging reaction of Aleksandr Tvardovskii, the editor who had praised *Students*, but who now advised the young author to write short stories before attempting a longer work.²

This is the first article-length discussion in English on the novel; Anglophone and post-1985 scholarship gives short shrift to *Slaking the Thirst* because the novel seems to lack the apolitical introspection dominating Trifonov's later narratives. It is also anomalous for being the author's first major work to depict the Thaw, whereas Trifonov is best known for his Moscow *povesti* written in the Brezhnev years. Along with *Students*, *Slaking the Thirst* is the writer's novel most concerned with contemporaneity, an obsession that makes for a contradictory narrative which conveys the worries of the Khrushchev period. As Polly Jones notes, the Thaw was itself marked by a basic paradox, as it attempted to continue the teleology of Soviet history while revealing the systemic lies of Stalinism. *Slaking the Thirst* has a 'thin' and fragile present overshadowed by a discredited past and utopian future. What is happening in the plot is of less importance than how these actions are shaped by Stalinism and the better years that will supposedly follow. Images of temporality — how time appears in the

² On the fate of Trifonov's family, see Gillespie, David, *Iurii Trifonov: Unity through Time*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 2-3. For the best discussion of *Students*, consult Ivanova, Natal'ia, *Proza Iuriiia Trifonova*, Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel', 1984. Semen Ekshtut discusses the crisis following the publication of *Students* — see his lively but superficial analysis in, *Iurii Trifonov. Velikaia sila nedoskazannogo. Zhizn' zamechatel'nykh liudei*, Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2014. Ivanova discusses Tvardovskii in *Proza Iuriiia Trifonova*, p. 35.

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narrative — convey uncertainty: Koryshev is far from convinced that the future will bring something better than the past.³

There is a sad coda to the history of the Karakum Canal: this waterway, by diverting much of the Amu Darya's flow, heavily contributed to the shrinking of the Aral Sea. The novel's enthusiastic excavators and engineers are based on those in part responsible for one of the greatest ecological disasters to arise from Soviet attempts to remake the natural world. Within Trifonov's work, as Natal'ia Ivanova discusses, water and time appear together to convey a sense of irreparable loss, a pattern that begins in the deceptively optimistic *Slaking the Thirst*.⁴

Style and theme show that this work is a transition between *Students* and the author's novellas of the Brezhnev era. It is tempting to consider *Slaking the Thirst* an unsteady stepping stone: the writer makes his way from the false certainty of Stalinism towards the self-doubt and recognition of past errors in a *povest'* such as *House on the Embankment* (*Dom na naberezhnoi*, 1976). However, here the ambivalence of the Thaw, with its fairly clear heroes and villains, loses ground to the ambiguity of Trifonov's writing in the late 1960s-1970s, famous for gaps and silences along with

³ David Gillespie and Nina Kolesnikoff are the only English-language scholars to substantially discuss this novel: Gillespie, *Iurii Trifonov*; Kolesnikoff, Nina, *Yury Trifonov: A Critical Study*, Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1990. Josephine Woll does not extensively address *Slaking the Thirst* in her otherwise excellent study: *Invented Truth: Soviet Reality and the Literary Imagination of Iurii Trifonov*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1991. On the Thaw and history, see Jones, Polly, *Myth, Memory, Trauma: Rethinking the Stalinist Past in the Soviet Union, 1953-70*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013, p. 9. Concerning the Thaw's paradoxical domination by an unsettled past while yearning for a brighter future, see also Woll, Josephine, *Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2000, and Prokhorov, Aleksandr, *Unasledovannyi diskurs: paradigm stalinskoi kul'tury v literature i kinematografe 'otpepli'*, St. Petersburg: Akademicheskii proekt/Izdatel'stvo DNK, 2007.

⁴ For one of the many discussions of the Karakum Canal and Aral Sea catastrophe, see Micklin, Philip, 'Desiccation of the Aral Sea: A Water Management Disaster in the Soviet Union', *Science*, 241/1988, pp. 1170-76. Ivanova, *Proza Iurii Trifonova*, pp. 53, 104.

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details of everyday life and compromised morality. There is also another difference between the author's early and more mature works: the age of his characters moves from youthful energy and moral righteousness to the tired doubt of middle age. *Slaking the Thirst* already reflects these changes, which is one reason that the production plot (enthusiastic workers overcome heat, vipers, and obstructionists to build the canal) does not combine well with Koryshev's first-person storyline. One critic labelled this second plot a 'confession' (*ispoved'*), a genre crucial to the Thaw and Brezhnev eras, but opposed to the literary genres of Stalinism.⁵

Slaking the Thirst, however, is more than a harbinger of Trifonov's later works. While the author has received substantial attention in Russia and the West, his pre-1965 works have been consistently dismissed as atypical or false starts. Biography is another reason for neglect: in the West and among Russian liberals Trifonov's reputation is greatly due to his anti-Stalinist *House on the Embankment*. For obvious reasons *Students* fits badly into this schema; *Slaking the Thirst* is also problematic, given what appears to be the author's naive tone and mistaken belief that past problems will be eradicated. While keeping in mind Trifonov's oeuvre as a whole, scholars must address *Slaking the Thirst* on its own merits (and deficiencies). Given that it is Trifonov's only major fictional work to appear during the Khrushchev years, this novel is an understudied product of Thaw culture by a key Soviet author. Most intriguingly,

⁵ On *Slaking the Thirst* as a transitional work, see among others Ivanova, *Proza Iurii Trifonova*, pp. 64, 69, 73, and Gillespie, *Iurii Trifonov*, p. 31. For a discussion of *Students* and its role in Trifonov's oeuvre, see Sutcliffe, Benjamin, 'Iurii Trifonov's *Students*: Body, Place, and Life in Late Stalinism', *Toronto Slavic Quarterly*, 48/2014, 207-29, http://sites.utoronto.ca/tsq/48/tsq48_sutcliffe.pdf. On the confessional portion of the novel, see *Istoriia russkoi sovetskoi literatury*, A. G. Dement'ev (ed.), 4 vols., Moscow: Nauka, 1967, vol. pp. 4, 66. Trifonov's *The Bonfire's Glow* (*Otblek kostra*, 1965) is a 'documentary novel' that deals with the author's father and other family members from 1904 to 1937. While this work appeared after 1964, it continues some of the Thaw concerns voiced in *Slaking the Thirst*. See Woll, *Invented Truth*, pp. 20-24.

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Trifonov's narrative reveals worries that the present is being robbed of meaning both by a traumatic past and a radiant future.

Depicting the Thaw: Surface Differences, Underlying Stasis

Along with *Students*, *Slaking the Thirst* is the Trifonov novel most concerned with being relevant to its era. The author's first novel railed against formalism, kow-towing to the West (*nizkopoklonstvo*), and political indifference — all these were markers of the ideological campaigns of the late 1940s and early 1950s. *Slaking the Thirst* is just as invested in contemporaneity, but signals this via a different set of references. Koryshev, who lived outside Moscow before coming to Turkmenistan, is asked about the recent Picasso exhibition in the Soviet capital; in the desert canal workers have a (fairly contrived) conversation concerning which Western nation is to blame for the Suez crisis. These and other items show that 1956 is the clear reference point for this novel, with the Twentieth Party Congress the most important event to appear in *Slaking the Thirst*. The main portion of the novel transpires a year later, with an epilogue taking place shortly thereafter.⁶

Time is compressed within the novel, which reduces the Thaw to events transpiring within a year. The same effect comes from the production plot as it radically (and optimistically) shortens the actual decades-long canal construction (1954-1988). Temporality is inherently artificial: the author moulds 'real' time into a form that fits the needs of a literary work. However, Trifonov's novel repeatedly claims authenticity by focusing on certain details of the project (how workers deal with the heat, exhaus-

⁶ On the importance of relevance, see Ivanova, *Proza Iurii Trifonova*, p. 64. Trifonov, Iurii, *Studenty*, in *Iurii Trifonov: Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1, pp. 250, 222, 267. Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, pp. 561, 497. On the Twentieth Party Congress see, among others, Aleksandrov, L., 'Vremia rabotat' vslast', *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, (26 October) 1963, p. 15.

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tive debates about which equipment is more effective). Given this drive for verisimilitude, how time is remade within the narrative is especially important. As readers we have advantages that Trifonov did not: we know that Khrushchev will be ousted, the Karakum Canal's construction will continue for many years, and that it will destroy the Aral Sea.

Time has multiple layers in *Slaking the Thirst*. The discussion of topical subjects is the most obvious level and the one that emphasises contemporaneity. The major event is the fallout from the Twentieth Party Congress, which for the novel's characters and author allows a more honest discussion of the past. Such an assessment, in turn, privileges justice (*spravedlivost*), a major theme in the novel and how the late 1950s and 1960s responded to Stalinism. At an evening with acquaintances in Ashkhabad, Koryshev follows a spirited exchange that links literal and metaphorical thirst. After lauding the canal and underscoring Turkmenia's need for water, the discussion segues into a discussion of justice.

'Do you know how Turkmens quench their thirst? Just listen: to begin with they quench the "little thirst", two or three small glasses, and then, after eating supper, the "large thirst", when they'll finish off a whole teapot. And a man coming in out of the desert is never given a lot of water. Just a little bit at a time.'

'Otherwise it will make him sick', said Platon Kir'ianovich.

'It won't make anyone sick! That's nonsense! I don't believe it', said Tamara excitedly. 'How can there be too much truth [*pravdy*]? Or too much justice [*spravedlivosti*]?'⁷

⁷ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, p. 662. The translation is modified from: Gillespie, *Iurii Trifonov*, p. 40.

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It is the canal that sparks this central moment in the narrative. Physical construction — one of the era's main metaphors, itself inherited from Stalinism — is subordinated to a higher demand: the need to rebuild justice. In both instances progress must be gradual, just as a man brought in from the desert cannot be given too much water at once. This passage is a favourite for critics, who seized upon it as exemplifying how Trifonov depicts the enthusiasm of the Thaw (and its distance from Stalinism). Ivanova notes how the debate indicates that *Slaking the Thirst* is in tune with the times. It also illuminates the secondary meaning of the novel's title, which alludes to quenching moral thirst via renouncing Stalin and was a favorite trope for Thaw-era critics.⁸

Koryshev does not take part in this conversation but is deeply concerned with justice. Near the end of the novel, he publicly declares his thirst for *spravedlivost'* when Ermasov is being investigated after a hostile newspaper article appears. This scenario, with its overtones of Stalinist persecution, provokes Koryshev to defend those who enact bold action and oppose rigid thinking. As the journalist explains, 'There is nothing more dangerous than dogma: religious, philosophical, or even in the form of planning an irrigation canal...'. This is the moment where the production plot and Koryshev's storyline converge as both oppose 'dogma' (viz, the odious ideology that existed until 1953). At the same time, this moment resembles similar speeches in *Students*, *House on the Embankment*, and other works by Trifonov. These narratives have divergent approaches to Stalinism, yet in all of them such proclamations show that the protagonist is in step with contemporaneity. Koryshev is allegedly motivated

⁸ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, p. 662. For two of the critics who make note of this scene, see Svetov, F., 'Utolenie zhazhdy', *Novyi mir*, 11/1963, p. 236; Rosliakov, V., 'Utolennaia zhazhda', *Moskva*, 10/1963, p. 204.

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by a natural sense of justice, but his public praise of Ermasov is a clichéd political gesture that also weakens the novel's claim to authenticity.⁹

Along with this righteous drive for justice is its darker counterpart: the uncertainty and self-doubt that, while endemic in Trifonov's later protagonists, begin with Koryshev. This unease, never extensively voiced to other characters, is evident to the reader through the protagonist's inner monologue. When applying for a job with a newspaper in Ashkhabad, Koryshev is unsurprised but discouraged by the 'delay' (*volynka*) that is slowing his approval. He, like Trifonov, is the son of a rehabilitated enemy of the people (in both instances the fathers were posthumously cleared of all charges in 1955). The journalist, while eventually hired by the paper, cannot overcome the 'self-doubt' that plagues him 'like a virus'. The reader learns these problems even before learning the name of the protagonist. The 'delay' and 'virus' encapsulate the external and internal difficulties faced by those who thirst for 'justice' in the Thaw. By implication both factors show that, although social and political conditions have changed, the psychological trauma of Stalinism lingers.¹⁰

Koryshev explores the alarming ramifications of this while contemplating the relationship between time and death. Sitting outside and alone in the dark after an onset of panic at a party, he observes:

These episodes are familiar. It seems to me that they come from time. Usually we don't feel time, it flows through us unnoticed, but sometime it gets caught [*zatsepliaetsia*] on something inside us and for

⁹ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, p. 721. On this scene's similarity to prominent speeches in other Trifonov works, see Ivanova, *Proza Iurii Trifonova*, p. 70.

¹⁰ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, p. 431. For a short but telling discussion of the author's father, see Trifonov, Iurii, 'Iadro pravdy', in *Iadro pravdy. Stat'i, interv'iu, esse*, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Pravda, 1987, p. 9.

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a moment we are terrified: it is like the approach of death. But then it goes away, like an attack of asthma.¹¹

Koryshev's 'virus' causes moments of fear: when time latches on to something inside him, he has an impending sense of death. This qualifies the novel's many references to the cultural renewal and youthful energy of the Thaw. What is the use of such moments, of being in touch with contemporaneity, if coming into contact with time brings worries of dying? *Slaking the Thirst* raises a question it cannot answer.

The Karakum Canal itself is another vexed marker of the Khrushchev era. As is typical for the production novel, almost all of the excavators and engineers are devoted to completing this epic task. Only the greedy worker Nagaev puts individual needs before those of the nation, and, in the epilogue, even he has reformed. This vision of collective enthusiasm is congruent with campaigns such as the Virgin Lands movement and, in a different political milieu, echoes the unanimity of purpose Trifonov ascribes to positive characters in *Students*. *Slaking the Thirst* mentions that the Karakum project had a predecessor: the Main Turkmenistan Canal, which was abandoned as impractical in 1953. One critic applauds the substitute of a more pragmatic Khrushchev-era plan for a Stalinist canal. This replacement implies the correction of a false course (Stalinism), while still moving towards communism.¹²

There are two problems with such a substitution. The first is one that neither Trifonov nor those directly involved foresaw: the role the project would play in harming the Aral Sea. As Nina Kolesnikoff reminds us, the production plot in *Slaking the Thirst* is built on the Stalinist precept that the state must wage war on nature (and win).

¹¹ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, p. 485.

¹² Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, pp. 748, 483. On the benefits of replacing the Stalin-era project, see Bocharov, A., 'Kanal — eto, v sushchnosti — zhizn'', *Druzhiba narodov*, 12/1963, p. 269.

The second issue relates to Trifonov's own biography. After the personal and professional tumult surrounding the publication of *Students*, the author travelled to Turkmenia to begin a novella glorifying the Stalinist canal; he discarded the *povest'* when the project was stopped following Stalin's death. *Slaking the Thirst* thus criticises the very effort that Trifonov had planned to praise. Koryshev himself cannot escape from the maximalist thinking that marked both the construction projects and repressions of the previous era. F. Svetov, an early critic, justly upbraids the protagonist for ardently claiming that the canal must be completed at any cost. Svetov points out the terrifying link between this absolute demand for results and the arrest of the protagonist's father in 1937 — no policy is worth sacrificing the lives of others. In *Slaking the Thirst* the present-tense depiction of the Karakum project is influenced by twinned tragedies: erstwhile Stalinist terror and the future desiccation of the Aral Sea.¹³

Criticism of the novel was strongly influenced by how the Thaw/present differs from the past. Responses to the novel used the watchwords of the 1960s (overcoming old habits, returning to Leninist norms, and so forth) signalling that, like Trifonov's novel, these critics were in step with contemporaneity. One recurring target was negative characters who impeded the canal with outmoded thinking: these were lambasted as 'proponents of routine' (*rutinery*) and 'overly cautious' (*perestrakhovshchiki*). Such overly rigid approaches are grounded in the 'cult of personality', critics implied, and threaten both the Karakum Canal and the overall building of

¹³ Kolesnikoff, *Yury Trifonov*, pp. 33-34. Trifonov's plans to write about the Turkmenistan Canal are mentioned in: Trifonov, Iurii, 'Zapiski sosedá', in Iurii Trifonov, *Izbrannye proizvedeniia v dvukh tomakh*, 2 vols., Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1978, vol. 2, p. 526, quoted in Ivanova, *Proza Iurii Trifonova*, p. 34, and Shitov, Aleksandr, *Vremia Iurii Trifonova: chelovek v istorii i istoriia v cheloveke (1925-1981)*, Moscow: Novyi khronograf, 2011, p. 329, quoted in Ekshtut, *Iurii Trifonov*, pp. 57-8. Svetov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, p. 240. Since this comment joins pre-1953 trauma to Thaw-era enthusiasm, Svetov's remark is both unusual and accurate given the ecological disaster precipitated by the canal constructed 'at any cost'.

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communism. At times, however, this rejection of Stalinism uses the language of the discredited era: one critic notes how Ermasov is dismayed that the dictator's adherents continue to cause harm while wearing the 'masks' of new thinking. Those discussing Trifonov's repudiation of pre-1953 events cannot free themselves from the rhetorical tropes of totalitarian culture.¹⁴

The proponents of routine and the overly cautious signal a deeper problem: the quiet momentum of the past. The novel first focuses on this when a member of the newspaper staff is attacking the unseemly delay in publishing certain articles by Koryshev and others: 'There is momentum [*inertsii*]. There are old acquaintances, there is the habit to work in the old way: without asking anyone for advice, without explaining, in a way that [. . .] is undemocratic.' From this viewpoint 'momentum' is a localised threat, connected with the deputy editor Luzgin's predilection for those he has long favoured, i.e., Stalinists. This surface-level critique was taken up by contemporary critics eager to ascribe the wrong type of activity to bureaucrats who threaten progress in the workplace: such people impede the motion of society, leading to inertia.¹⁵

Students had isolated the corrosive force of stasis in intellectually stagnant Professor Kozel'skii, who is denounced by his students and colleagues. Moscow *povesti* such as *The Exchange* (*Obmen*, 1969) and *Taking Stock* (*Predvaritel'nye itogi*, 1970) depict inertia as an imperceptible yet invincible force that poisons relations, prevents honesty, and slowly co-opts the moral integrity so prized by the late-Soviet

¹⁴ On tirades against routine and the overly cautious, see Rosliakov, 'Utolennaia zhazhda', p. 205, and Svetov, 'Utolenie zhazhdy', p. 267. For mention of Leninism versus the cult of personality, see Aleksandrov, 'Vremia rabotat' vlast', p. 15. Rosliakov discusses building communism in 'Utolennaia zhazhda', p. 206. For one example of worrying over what lies beneath masks, see V. Geidenko, 'Liudi na rabote', *Zvezda*, 12/1964, p. 202.

¹⁵ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, p. 576. On momentum, see Aleksandrov, 'Vremia rabotat' vlast', p. 15; Ia. Tikhonov, 'Delo, kotoromu ty sluzhish'', *Oktiabr'*, 1/1964, pp. 213, 214.

intelligentsia. This profoundly apolitical problem is already lurking beneath *Slaking the Thirst*'s debates about justice and coming to terms with the past. In this sense Svetov takes his discussion further than other critics, maintaining that the 'delay' hounding Koryshev has vanished from society, yet remains internalised in the protagonist. For Trifonov the resulting stagnation sometimes has concrete references (often the choices made during Stalinism) but ultimately is the overall condition of modern humanity. Koryshev is a post-Stalinist version of the superfluous man familiar to readers from the nineteenth-century classics: external circumstances are secondary to internal doubt. Stasis is a transhistorical problem, undermining the superficial cultural signals that *Slaking the Thirst* employs to distinguish the Thaw from its frightening past.¹⁶

Shifting, Flowing, Killing: Metaphors of Time

Time is an unsettling force in this work. Despite the claims of the novel's production plot, the torrent coursing between past, present and future refuses to be restricted to an orderly channel. Temporality cannot be separated from the Stalinist past, as the negative characters show and Koryshev reveals through uncertainty and stasis. The Khrushchev era was undecided about time: can it be controlled, advanced and made to serve the will of the state? Or is it yet another elemental force of nature, frustrating humanity with its uncontrollable strength?¹⁷

¹⁶ On morality and the intelligentsia, see, for instance, the unpublished manuscript by Ellen Rutten: *Sincerity after Communism: A Cultural History*, and Boym, Svetlana, *Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 95–97. Svetov, 'Utolenie zhazhdy', p. 236.

¹⁷ Time as an elemental force recalls the classic discussion of the movement between spontaneity and consciousness in socialist realist narrative: see Clark, Katerina, *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

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Two antagonistic metaphors for time — desert and water — guide *Slaking the Thirst*. Both are organically connected to the production plot. While flying over the Karakum sands and arguing with the more conservative Khorev, engineer Aleksei Karabash curses the desert as a scoundrel that no one needs, but whom he could beat into submission with 15 bulldozers. Such comments continue the Stalinist war on nature, now bolstered by the Thaw's renewed energy. Karabash's claim, however, also evokes the past: before the Karakum and failed Main Turkmenistan Canal was the Turksib railroad, constructed during the First Five-Year Plan to link Central Asia and Siberia. This region had long been a showcase for the USSR's attempts to control the natural world, in this way demonstrating to recalcitrant locals the progressive might of Soviet power.¹⁸

The desert must be conquered, as a scientist makes clear when warning Koryshev that the Karakum could expand, the Caspian Sea could shrink, and even the distant Sahara could grow and thus excessively warm Europe's weather. This is a sadly prescient claim, given climate change and the shrinking of the Aral (but not Caspian) Sea. However, the message in *Slaking the Thirst* is that the most enlightened part of humanity — Soviet workers and engineers — must act to correct nature's errors. One critic, celebrating the (fictional) completion of the canal in the novel, paints a rosy picture that is darkly ironic in light of subsequent events. Lauding those involved in the construction project, Ia. Tikhonov in 1964 asserts that they will see 'the days when the canal becomes one of the cheapest trade routes between Europe and Asia and ships from the Baltic moor in the newly born ports of Afghanistan'. For a number of self-evident reasons, this utopian vision of the future did not come to pass.¹⁹

¹⁸ Douglas Northrop discusses Russian attitudes towards Central Asia in his *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Soviet Central Asia*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.

¹⁹ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, p. 714; Tikhonov, 'Delo, kotoromu ty sluzhish', p. 212.

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The desert also shapes the past, embodied in the less-enlightened Turkmen whom the novel depicts via a hackneyed orientalist script. One of the Turkmen workers on the canal, the earnest Biashim Muradov, is reluctant to pay the traditional bride-price, but does so anyway; later, he is killed by his greedy in-laws when they reclaim his wife to sell her to another husband (and thus receive a second bride-price). The canal and growth of the Soviet republic will presumably end such practices. Adzhamal Akmuradova, a Turkmen scholar writing in the early 1980s, praises *Slaking the Thirst* for showing the battle between the old and new ways of life (*byt*) in the region. It is this very focus on the quotidian — as opposed to public life — that will later earn Trifonov the opprobrium of some and the praise of others. *Slaking the Thirst*, like *Students*, posits that the personal is political (as Muradov's death reveals). Another critic lauds this narrative for showing how its Turkmen characters have a common goal: fulfilling the people's dream of bringing water to the desert. Akmuradova for her part praises the canal for diverting flow from the Amu Darya River, which 'pointlessly' carried its water to the Aral Sea. This depiction of the project sees Turkmen identity and its overarching Soviet counterpart building the future, as opposed to a past where humanity was at the mercy of nature and barbarous customs.²⁰

Koryshev views the desert as both a serious foe and inspiration to vanquish it. This second condition supports the optimism with which Trifonov attempts to endow his protagonist. The novel portrays the drive to subdue the natural world as uniting Russians, Turkmen, and the multitude of other ethnicities working together to secure

²⁰ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, pp. 413, 700. Adzhamal Akmuradova, 'Ideino-khudozhestvennoe voploshchenie obraza stroitel'ia Karakumskogo kanala v proizvedeniakh russkoi i turkmenskoi sovetskoi literatury (v plane sravnitel'no-tipologicheskogo analiza)', avtoreferat of candidate dissertation, Ashkhabad Institute of Language and Literature, 1982, p. 22. On the common purpose of the Turkmen characters, see Abdulla Muradov, *Moi russkii brat*, Ashkhabad: Izdatel'stvo Turkmenistan, 1965, p. 97. Akmuradova, 'Ideino-khudozhestvennoe voploshchenie obraza stroitel'ia Karakumskogo kanala', p. 6.

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the region's future prosperity. In the epilogue Koryshev has published a book about the Karakum, presumably celebrating the canal, yet the desert remains unsettling. If this emptiness is not tamed, he worries, it will cover the earth with its grains of sand, 'and in each of these grains will be the end of someone's extinguished life. This is what will happen if man will turn tail [*sdreifit*]. If there is not enough strength to vanquish the desert.' This scenario reinforces the urgency of the Karakum Canal and, more broadly, the Soviet war on nature. Yet it also introduces an unsettling sense of something more powerful than humanity's plans, a force that will engulf society if there is a lack of resolve to defeat it. It is this lack of resolve, along with stasis, that haunts Koryshev throughout the novel. Likewise, the motif of flowing — whether it be sand or water — is one of the key images in Trifonov's later works. *Slaking the Thirst* shows that even the seemingly inert symbol of the desert shifts its meaning when looked at more closely.²¹

The same ambiguity seeps into the novel's image of water, which appears most prominently through the canal. Gokhberg, one of the engineers on the project, proudly notes that in terms of irrigation the Soviets have now 'surpassed (*obognali*) America', with the Karakum waterway presumably playing a role. He then makes more explicit the competitive rhetoric of the Cold War by noting that the canal cannot be compared with the 'launching of Sputnik', but urges his colleagues still to take pride in it. Water, technology and ideology all flow towards the verdant future. This imagery, however, contrasts with the current that Koryshev fears will make his life meaningless. Mentioning how he listlessly reads Plutarch's account of the Parthians, he then turns to his own existence.²²

²¹ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, p. 750. Ivanova notes that one of the stories in *Under the Sun* links the desert sands with time. Ivanova, *Proza Iuriiia Trifonova*, p. 53.

²² Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, p. 651.

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It seemed to me that I was losing time, lagging behind, I was dying. Dead [*Pogib*]! If I don't start something very soon and do some serious work — write about something I at least know, my life, Turkmenia, about how time can fracture [*lomaetsia vremia*], how some people come and others go and how I turn around and around in this current [*v potoke*] as it rushes along amid the noise and the din — if I don't start to simply take down notes, take down notes every day, I am dead, dead!²³

Koryshev, touching on a fear he has throughout the novel, hopes that writing will keep him out of the current of time. The current threatens to empty his life of meaning, condemning him to a living death little better than what befell the Parthians. Gillespie astutely notes this is the first mention of such a danger in Trifonov's prose — in his Moscow novellas this fate will be the only existence allocated to protagonists doomed to live out their own mistakes. Throughout the novel Koryshev compares his personal life to this same flow of events: when he and his girlfriend Katia have sex, he thinks that the current is carrying him like a speck. Later, while wondering if he should end their relationship, he decides not to take any decision, noting that he once again is being carried by the current. Critics simplistically read this as another sign of Koryshev attempting to overcome the problems of Stalinism. In doing so, they did not realise that for Trifonov the immutable power of the current — not the manageable channel of the canal — is how characters experience time. Control over one's fate is illusory and the torrent of time can be neither stopped nor regulated. Ivanova notes the repeated image of the river in Trifonov's works; for Marina Selemeneva the coursing of

²³ Ibid., p. 585. This is a modified version of Gillespie's translation in: *Iurii Trifonov*, p. 39.

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time carries away events, people and entire eras. Koryshev cannot discard his fear of being swept away by the current: this flow is not only a function of lingering Stalinism, but a basic problem within each individual.²⁴

The fate of Denis Kuznetsov reiterates the connection between water, time and loss. This character, who is Koryshev's double within the novel, was away from his family for sixteen years because of war and imprisonment by the Nazis. After 1945 he wandered Europe in poverty until a Soviet amnesty allowed him to return to Turkmenia, where he discovered his wife had remarried and his son had forgotten him. Kuznetsov's mother died of shock after receiving a letter from him; Koryshev's mother died soon after his father was posthumously rehabilitated. In both instances time has irrevocably robbed characters of youth and happiness. Koryshev sadly adds: 'And it was impossible to demand anything — what can you demand from time?' There is no recourse for either character. Kuznetsov dies while trying to plug a leak in a dam along the canal. Critics in the 1960s saw this as a sign that he has given his life to preserve the project. There is a less positive interpretation: Kuznetsov perishes as he has lived, first carried away and then drowned by the current of time. Koryshev too is susceptible to being swept away by forces stronger than himself or his tentatively optimistic era. The canal, in this sense, is a profoundly misguided effort to direct the

²⁴ Gillespie, *Iurii Trifonov*, pp. 39-40. Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, pp. 634, 697. For examples of how critics misread the image of the current, see Rosliakov, 'Utolennaia zhazhda', p. 204, and Kaminskii, M. and Lopusov, Iu., *Rabochii kharakter: sovremennaia sovetskaia literatura o rabochem klasse*, Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1975, p. 129. Ivanova, *Proza Iurii Trifonova*, p. 104. Marina Selemeneva, 'Khudozhestvennyi mir Iu. V. Trifonova v kontekste gorodskoi prozy vtoroi poloviny XX veka', avtoreferat of doctoral dissertation, Moscow State Humanities University, 2009, p. 20. Selemeneva is the best scholar to write on Trifonov in recent years.

rush of time. Kuznetsov's death, Koryshev's fear, Trifonov's later works and the sad fate of the Aral Sea show this optimism to be misguided.²⁵

Kuznetsov and Koryshev are paired characters; the protagonist also has a number of affinities with Trifonov. These similarities imply similar experiences with the current of time. Visiting the mountains in Turkmenia, Koryshev notes that it is his thirty-second birthday, but no one knows this. Indeed, the passage of years has little meaning since, as he sadly reminds the reader, 'real life' ended for him when he was eleven and his father was arrested. The protagonist then divulges that, since this moment, his life has been 'unreal' as he and other victims of Stalin try to rectify what cannot be corrected. Both Koryshev's age and the year of his father's arrest match those of the author and his parent. For Selemeneva, 1937 is the end of 'idyllic' time in the writer's narratives — all subsequent events are an attempt to dam and manage the loss flowing through Trifonov's oeuvre. Already in *Slaking the Thirst* readers sense that nothing can stop or reverse the current of time.²⁶

The Thin Present of the Thaw

Trifonov's narrative depicts an era overshadowed by past and future. Koryshev and doomed Kuznetsov are consumed by Stalinism and the Great Patriotic War, while their involvement with the Karakum Canal binds them to the coming brighter era the state promises. Jones, in her study of the Thaw, notes how critiquing the past also tainted the present and future. All three appear unstable, subject to reinterpretations as the Soviet leadership changes. In Trifonov's oeuvre this novel, along with *Students*, is atypical in its obsession with contemporaneity. Beginning in the late

²⁵ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, pp. 440, 653, 434, 555, 726. For one view of Kuznetsov nobly sacrificing himself to save the canal, see Tikhonov, 'Delo, kotoromy ty sluzhish'', p. 214.

²⁶ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, p. 516. Selemeneva, 'Khudozhestvennyi mir Iu. V. Trifonova', p. 15.

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1960s, novellas such as *The Exchange* show the author's retreat from topical issues as protagonists instead sink into the quagmire of inertia after previous moral missteps. The past is an unquiet presence in *Slaking the Thirst*; it alternately provokes and stymies Koryshev, Ermasov and the novel's numerous other characters. The protagonist asks the well-read editor Diomidov why he fears his Stalinist colleague Luzgin. For Koryshev, Luzgin should be a powerless 'man of the past', yet he continues to impede those around him. This evocation of a previous era recalls the epithets of 'proponents of routine' and the 'overly cautious', vocabulary denoting Thaw efforts to distinguish itself from Stalinism. Similarly, *Slaking the Thirst* appeared in 1963, soon after Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* (*Odin den' Ivana Denisovicha*, 1962) and Evgenii Evtushenko's 'The Heirs of Stalin' (*Nasledniki Stalina*, 1961). All three works depict the horrors of a past that must be confronted by Khrushchev-era society. The future is also a powerful force, ill-defined, but alluring in its promises. In the epilogue Ermasov, having finished work on the canal (and defeated his Stalinist detractors) is now building a large reservoir in the Tian Shan Mountains. The implication is obvious: the literal and metaphorical construction of communism is continuing and past excesses will not be repeated.²⁷

The present is trapped between these forces — it is little more than the temporal battlefield on which an unresolved past threatens a vague future. Koryshev tells nefarious journalist Sasha Zurabov that they can 'help the times (*pomogaem vremeni*)' to defeat conservative Luzgin. Luzgin is replaced near the novel's conclusion; the reactionary deputy editor scorns Kuznetsov, saying that he should have died rather than being taken prisoner during the war. Luzgin's wish is borne out: Kuznetsov does indeed perish for the Soviet cause after the dam ruptures. The cynical Zurabov, while clearly a negative character, voices a thought that could have come from Koryshev:

²⁷ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, pp. 648, 749.

they live in an epoch when everyone has become used to lies. Such a concept, while a strong trope in Brezhnev culture, does not match the earnest optimism Trifonov desperately tries to impart to the Thaw. The era is not as transparent as some critics tried to believe at the time. L. Aleksandrov, for instance, unwittingly roils the interpretative waters when critiquing Koryshev: while the protagonist does not compromise his principles, he is amorphous. By extension, such lack of clarity complicates the status of a present shaped by the horror of the past and the brighter future ahead. If the Thaw is an epoch of lies where even the protagonist is uncertain, what hope is there for the coming decades? Aleksandrov develops his analysis of Koryshev using a telling image: he portrays the canal construction site as a ‘proving ground’ for the character, but nothing more. Trifonov’s alter ego has failed to overcome the challenges that life has brought him. The image of the proving ground is a recurring one in the 1960s, as the novella *On Manoeuvres (Na ispytaniakh, 1967)* by I. Grekova demonstrates. This work portrays military officers cynically drinking and gossiping as they conduct artillery tests. Both Trifonov’s and Grekova’s narratives show that the results from such a proving ground are mixed at best; the future may not be able to redeem the shortcomings of the present, let alone the past.²⁸

The present is robbed of significance and stretched thin by constant references to what has been and will be. This is most evident in the epilogue, when the narrator has seemingly resolved both plots: Ermasov has finished work on the canal; Koryshev has published a book of stories on the desert; Kuznetsov has been eulogised as a hero. Critics were not convinced by this happy convergence of the novel’s two trajectories, their dissatisfaction highlights Trifonov’s inability to reconcile their dissimilarities.

²⁸ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, pp. 578, 712, 553, 604. Concerning Koryshev’s amorphous nature and the canal site as proving ground, see Aleksandrov, ‘Vremia rabotat’ vlast’’, p. 14.

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The last paragraph moves *Slaking the Thirst* in a more interesting direction while undercutting the tidy ending proffered in the epilogue.²⁹

In the novel's final sentences, Koryshev begins with a hopeful formulation that quickly becomes something different. Describing a party with friends, he explains his feelings.

No, I didn't feel bored. There just arose some sort of longing for hope [tomishchee chuvstvo nadezhdy] and desire to get a glimpse of what is in the distance. This is what happens when you part for a long time, forever, and a new life glimmers before you, and it is as if the old one remains behind a glass door: people are moving around, talking, but they are almost not audible.³⁰

Koryshev starts with a nod to the future as he envisions looking into the distance, 'longing' for the optimism of 'hope'. However, this devolves into a sense of loss where the past is 'forever' behind a 'glass door': it is visible but we are irrevocably removed from it, just as Koryshev cannot bring back his father or the millions who died under Stalin. There is no sense of the present in the paragraph — what is happening now is a transition between the past and an uncertain future. Neither Koryshev nor Trifonov knows how to live in such a time. For those supporting the Twentieth Party Congress and Khrushchev's reforms, this fragile existence would soon give way to an era far different from their hopes.

²⁹ For two critics unsatisfied by the ending, see Iakimenko, L., 'Lik vremeni', in Iurii Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literature, 1967, p. 11, and Tikhonov, 'Delo, kotoromu ty sluzhish', p. 245.

³⁰ Trifonov, *Utolenie zhazhdy*, p. 750.

ANNA ARKATOVA

**EROS, FEMININITY AND REVOLUTION: ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN'S FICTIVE
EXPLORATIONS OF THE SILVER AGE**

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is a writer who privileges history. His entire corpus of fictions should be read as an exploration of the manner in which the Russian revolution of 1917 led, by a succession of intermediate and violent stages, to the destruction of a viable and authentic national way of life and the consequent catastrophe of the gulag [ГУЛАГ]. As the writer noted in his 1976 interview with Nikita Struve, 'I really cannot envisage any higher task than to serve reality — i.e., to recreate a reality that has been crushed, trampled and maligned. And I do not consider imagination (*вымысел*) to be my task or goal' (1985, 306). Among his literary works, the author always considered his epopee *The Red Wheel* his most important production, far more so than the novels and stories that won him the Nobel Prize (1970), more so than even *The Gulag Archipelago*, his magisterial and impassioned history of the Soviet prison system. *The Red Wheel*, which Solzhenitsyn conceived as a schoolboy in Rostov-on-the-Don in 1936 and completed in Cavendish, Vermont in 1990, is a four-part, ten-volume, multi-generic fusion of fictional narratives and historical scholarship. It tells the story of the Russian revolution by tracing its causes and ascertaining the degree of individual and collective responsibility for it borne by the political actors and societal élites of that period, as well as other strata of the population from the urban proletariat to the peasant masses.

The Red Wheel depicts the historical process on two different levels. The first level directly describes political, military and economic events, as well as the virtues and vices of leading figures on the national stage — the tsar, his ministers and gener-

als, and the public figures and revolutionary conspirators who oppose them. It also shows the inescapable and often brutal impact of political developments upon the lives of even those characters, many of them women, who have no interest in or personal connection to the political life of the nation. This level is supported by the epic's non-fictional chapters, in which the empirical author, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, speaks as an analytical historian. The second level delves into the hidden side of things. It interprets the lives of the nation and the individual alike through a structured set of images, symbols, and topoi that have a folkloric, or fairy tale, or sui generis figurative meaning. It evokes and indicates, rather than names and describes. This level is mythic and expands the parameters of the text beyond the events of history to the realm of archetype and legend and, ultimately, that of religious faith. In addition, *The Red Wheel* employs experimental forms and tropes which, as we shall see, engage with the practices of Russian modernism. In this sense, the epic represents a notable departure from Solzhenitsyn's previous prose works.

The aesthetic and narrative strategies that shape the representation of history in *The Red Wheel* remain underresearched, a point that may be extended to Solzhenitsyn's entire fictional oeuvre. After all, he has been studied primarily as a political writer, social chronicler, and commemorator of the victims of communism. Yet, his literary productions contain numerous family, amatory and even erotic situations that feature richly textured characters in the tradition of his great nineteenth-century predecessors. The Russian literary critic Andrey Nemzer compares *August 1914*¹ to *War and Peace*, and *November 1916* to *Anna Karenina*:

In its breadth and variety of love- and family-related plots (all of which, however, are intimately intertwined with the story of the relentless ap-

¹ *The Red Wheel* comprises four knots or novels: *August 1914*, *November 1916*, *March 1917* and *April 1917*.

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proach of revolution), *November 1916* can only be compared with *Anna Karenina*, in which virtually every character is presented from the perspective of “family thinking”. [...] In *November 1916* the trials of love [...] occur on every level of Russia’s social hierarchy [...] from a peasant’s house to the palace of the tsar. (Nemzer 2010, 92, 102)

Vladislav Krasnov is right to comment that *August 1914* shows plenty of evidence of a polemical ‘rejection of Tolstoy the philosopher and moral teacher’ (Krasnov 1980, 174) and that it ‘would be [...] appropriate to speak of *War and Peace* as an antimodel for *August 1914*’ (ibid.), yet at the same time *The Red Wheel*’s first two constituent novels are infused with ‘popular thinking’ (‘мысль народная’) and also ‘family thinking’ (‘мысль семейная’), to use Leo Tolstoy’s terms (Tolstoy 1963, 7). In a very Tolstoian manner, this discourse of love and family relationships enters into a fictively productive dialogue with the epic’s discourse of history, which is, however, explicitly anti-Tolstoian, for time and again it rejects the notion of the historical process as the result of the spontaneous action (or inaction) of the masses and stresses the part played by political and military actors in determining its course.

Next, Solzhenitsyn is an emphatically masculine writer whose male characters dominate the narrative, sometimes, arguably, at the expense of their female counterparts. As Solzhenitsyn’s biographer D. M. Thomas observes of *The Red Wheel*, ‘[...] Since history has largely been made by men, women play a very minor part in this vast work’ (Thomas 1998, 479). The writer’s plots are, as a rule, patrilineal: the male characters outnumber the female ones. The male personalities reveal the text’s historical conception explicitly, through direct statements and their narratively privileged evaluations of the events of the present and the past, as well as by virtue of their public engagement as political figures, warriors or revolutionaries. Their female counterparts, on the other hand, usually have agency in the moral, religious, or domestic

sphere, but may carry a higher concentration of purely fictive content. Their presence in the text prompts the reader and the researcher to look more deeply into its imaginative and formal aspects. Yet despite the women's plot-determined relative (and sometimes absolute) dependence on the men in their lives, they are always historically voiced and occupy a significant philosophical and ideological space in the text. In the case of some works (*For the Good of the Cause*, 1963; *Cancer Ward*, 1963-1967), they are fictively co-equal with the male characters. And of course, in several of Solzhenitsyn's productions the women are at the centre of the fictive proceedings and indeed are the protagonists. This is especially true of his shorter fictions such as *Matryona's Home* (1959), *What a Pity* (1965) and *Nastenka* (1995).

The Red Wheel depicts a spectrum of young femininities such as the intellectual Olda,² artistic Likonya, religiously conflicted Zinaida, and earthy Kationa (or Katya as in the Willetts translation). These are women who have complex relationships with their respective families or actual or would-be lovers. Moreover, as they experience joy or suffering in the course of the relationships with the men they love, these characters sustain, each in her own way, the epic's anti-revolutionary discourse, while acting as witnesses to and, occasionally, participants in the large-scale public events that unfold around them. Thus, the thirty-something Olda Andozerskaya, a professor of history who specialises in the European Middle Ages, has a passionate affair with the most important male character in the epic, Colonel Georgi Vorotyntsev, with whom she debates the political and constitutional issues of the day, while 22-year old Likonya, who is one of Andozerskaya's students, constructs for herself an overtly apolitical, artistic identity that attracts the disapproval of her revolutionary minded (female) elders (it should be noted that Andozerskaya is modelled on Olga Ladyzhen-

² The names of the characters in *The First Circle* and *The Red Wheel* are rendered as per the published English translations by H.T. Willetts (Solzhenitsyn 2009; 1989; 1999).

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skaia, a Leningrad mathematician with whom Solzhenitsyn had a romantic relationship in the mid-1960s; Thomas 1998, 288). The spirited Zinaida Altanskaya suffers the death of her infant son and seeks solace in religion while improving her mind through the study of philosophy and literature, and Kationa Blagodareva, a peasant wife and mother, finds fulfilment in caring for her children and planning a future with her husband, a sergeant in the imperial army who is fighting at the front. These female personalities make an essential contribution to the multivocality of the work, that is, its plurality of character voices, each one of which expresses, sometimes implicitly or obliquely, a particular, individualised interpretation of the tragic events of war and revolution.

D. M. Thomas suggests that 'Eros [...] is almost entirely absent from *The Red Wheel*' (Thomas 1998, 487). This is not really the case, however. The chapters depicting Zinaida's two love affairs, Kationa's visit with her husband to a Russian steam bath, or Olda's passionate encounters with Vorotyntsev, contain plenty of erotic content. Moreover, in *The Red Wheel*, among the quantifiable or mythic factors that are shown as shaping the historical process, is the *Feminine Eros*, which is central to my analysis of the epic's representation of female subjects and themes during the period of catastrophic political and cultural upheaval it describes. What I mean by this term is the agglomeration of romantic, sexual and family-oriented drives that forms part of a woman's core identity and manifests itself in both the private and public sphere through her relationships, behaviour and communication practices. Solzhenitsyn's epic depicts two mutually incompatible yet complementary modalities of the feminine Eros, the creative or amatory (Eros realised and evolved through a woman's love for a man), and the destructive or revolutionary (Eros realised and devolved through a woman's participation in, or support for, political violence).

Virtually all of Solzhenitsyn's characters, whether male or female, live through historical traumas. Some female characters, however, preserve their gender and social integrity despite the terrible experiences they endure, as is shown in *The Red Wheel*. They resist fierce pressure from political forces that disrupt the 'natural' patterns of life, which, according to Solzhenitsyn's overarching conception, centre on the family and community. Even Olda, Likonya and Zinaida, who all find themselves involved in extra-marital relationships, believe in the ideal of family life. But there are other female personalities in the epic, radicals and conspirators and political fellow-travellers, who are ideologically motivated and claim to be operating on the side of history. They are hostile or indifferent to the values of marriage and motherhood. Their goal is the violent overthrow of the established order, to be followed by a radical reorganisation of society according to an abstract notion of social justice. As they embrace this vision of a radiant future, they sublimate their erotic potential into a variety of destructive and self-destructive acts and behaviour. This is particularly true in the case of Solzhenitsyn's revolutionary females, who suppress their sexuality and de-gender their identities, indeed, their very appearance as women, out of a passionate ideological commitment, a phenomenon that forms part of a continuum which will eventually lead to the forced depersonalisation and mechanisation of the female body in the gulag.

In philosophy and psychology, *Eros* has been traditionally linked to *Logos*, that is, the category of speech or utterance, in a variety of ways. The Russian culturologist Georgii Gachev argues that the language (Logos) of a given ethnos reflects its type of Eros, just as the particularities of a given literary character's speech reveal his or her secret erotic side. As an example, Gachev adduces one of Nikolai Gogol's characters, the humble clerk Akakii Akakievich, whose passion for laboriously spelling out letters on sheets of paper amounts to the unconscious drawing of the

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curves and curlicues of the female figure. Akakii Akakievich, this scholar adds, is a personality controlled by an infantile kind of Eros, that is, one that is undeveloped and androgynous (Gachev 2009, 120–26).

The speech of Solzhenitsyn's characters, as we shall see, is often eroticised. The female (and male) representatives of the revolutionary and amatory modalities of Eros possess opposing and at times conflicting ways of verbal self-expression, that is, their own idiolects. They also differ in the manner in which they perceive and interpret the cultural productions of the day, that is, the various trends of Silver Age poetry, music and theatre along with the newly emerging street art of political pamphlets, speeches, newspapers and slogans generated by the radicals and oppositionists who are fighting the autocracy.

The heroine who is the focus of this article, the very feminine, artistic and studiously graceful Likonya, who is present in all four of *The Red Wheel's* constituent novels or knots, is a young woman from a merchant background. She is entirely — and demonstratively — indifferent to the ideas of social liberation and the whole tradition of revolutionary womanhood exemplified by a number of characters, some entirely fictional, others actual historical figures, depicted in the epic, with some of whom we see her interact in revealing ways. Instead, she enters the narrative surrounded by the texts, sights and sounds of the Russian Silver Age. This young woman is fascinated and even enthralled by the flowering of Russian avant-garde culture in the first and second decades of the twentieth century. She enjoys equally the stage productions of the Symbolist Vsevolod Meyerhold and his famous associate, the darkly charismatic actress Vera Komissarzhevskaiia, the poetry of the Acmeist Nikolai Gumilev and the lyrical modernist Marina Tsvetaeva, as well as the *chansons* of the café bard Aleksandr Vertinskii. Her enigmatic and elusive manner of presenting and conducting herself evokes the portrayal of poetic femininity in Aleksandr Blok's verse.

Likonya uses these different and sometimes incompatible artistic models and productions to form her own flamboyant, bohemian persona, one that is both fragile and fissionary.

Accordingly, this article aims to analyse Likonya's self-textualisation through contemporary poetry and art, with a view to showing how Solzhenitsyn's conception of the feminine and the erotic, as embodied in this character, brings the text of the epopee into direct and polemical dialogue with certain verse productions of the Silver Age. Likonya is situated at the nexus between the avant-garde cultural practices of the period and the political and social factors which, in Solzhenitsyn's interpretation, led to the fall of the Russian Empire. The chapters that feature Likonya amount to a discontinuous fictive exploration of Silver Age literature and culture not only as a source of artistic and linguistic experiments or of a particular type of Bohemian lifestyle, but also as a historically contextualised site of ethical and philosophical contestation.

Likonya belongs to what is the most important cluster of female characters in *The Red Wheel*. The oldest members of this group are Adalia and Agnessa, two middle-aged spinster aunts in the revolutionary Lenartovich family. Despite their respectable years, Adalia and Agnessa are enthusiastic adherents of the Russian tradition of political terrorism which began in the second half of the nineteenth century and was associated with 'The People's Will' ['Народная Воля'], a secret organization of extremist Populists that used assassinations and bombings as an instrument of revolutionary struggle. The ranks of these Populists included both men and women, all of them young. In manner and speech the two aunties recall a range of famous *narodovolki* or female Populists, who came to be admired as heroines and martyrs by an influential segment of Russian society, including non-revolutionary liberals and moderates. The *narodovolki* took part in the murder of several high-ranking government officials, and most notoriously, were active members of the successful plot to assassi-

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nate Tsar Alexander II in 1881. These women Populists are revered by the two aunts, who constantly set them up as paragons for their niece Veronia (or Veronika as in the Willetts translation), Likonya's best friend. Adalia and Agnessa hope that the violent deeds of these female political activists, indeed, their very type of femininity, will arouse Veronia's dormant revolutionary enthusiasm and free her from the influence of the otherworldly, disturbingly individualistic and artistic Likonya. Like her, Veronia is a student of Professor Andozerskaya, who, as an academic and scholar, exemplifies a very different kind of feminine identity, intellectual, analytical, though also intuitive and, as the reader eventually learns, attuned to the mythic meaning of revolutionary events.

Before proceeding to the analysis of Likonya as a fan and acolyte of the Silver Age and the treatment of that period in Russian cultural history in the epic, I should mention that Solzhenitsyn's own attitude to modernism in general, and its Russian manifestations in particular, was equivocal. Aesthetically and structurally, most of his fictional works gravitate towards the traditions of nineteenth-century critical realism, but as a writer who was active throughout the entire second half of the twentieth century, he inevitably absorbed certain modernist techniques and devices. *The Red Wheel*, especially its last two Knots, *March 1917* and *April 1917*, contains many instances of elliptic prose, stream of consciousness and formal experimentation, the most vivid example of which are the Screens [Экраны], chapters (or parts of chapters) that take the form of short movie scripts. Moreover, many of the twentieth-century Russian writers and poets Solzhenitsyn admired were modernists. In his interview with Struve, he stated:

[...] I consider that for us writers of the twentieth century — and that includes me as well — there are definite models to be found in the

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prose of Zamiatin and Tsvetaeva. (Tsvetaeva's prose is altogether concentrated in an unbelievably powerful way.) Hers is a prose for writers, not for readers, and it would have to be diluted ten times over in order for ordinary people to be able to read it. [...] A verbal compactness with such dynamic twists and turns, and explosions. (1985, 326)

Richard Tempest notes Solzhenitsyn's generally sceptical attitude to modernism, which the writer considered a self-indulgent cultural practice largely devoid of a sense of historical or moral responsibility and divorced from the nation's core religious and cultural values. At the same time, this scholar points out that Solzhenitsyn's attitude to modernist art was never wholly negative:

Modernism or "avant-gardism" was the art of "destruction" and played a sinister role, especially in Russia, where it "preceded and foretold the most physically destructive revolution of the twentieth century". [...] The writer singles out the Futurists for special censure as the artistic enablers and collaborators of the new Bolshevik regime [...]. Solzhenitsyn has a particular disdain for Vladimir Mayakovsky, the most famous Russian Futurist of them all. In *The First Circle* Klara Makarygin, whose views on literature are the author's, thinks of Mayakovsky not as cutting-edge and shocking, but boring, boring, boring! [...] Yet, in the same novel the truth-seeking Innokenty Volodin is culturally intoxicated when he stumbles across a treasure trove of letters and journals from the Russian Silver Age. [...] Things, it seems, are not that simple where the author's attitude to modernism is concerned. (Tempest 2010)

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In this regard, Solzhenitsyn's ambivalent attitude towards modernism relates in interesting ways to Olga Matich's concept of the 'decadent imagination'. Her notion takes into account the breadth and variety of the Symbolists' artistic achievements, while stressing their creative-destructive, apocalyptic impulse to 'bring history to an end' (Matich 2005, 9) by means of an 'erotic utopia' (ibid., 4). Like the Bolsheviks, the Symbolists longed for a collapse of the existing order of things, but conceived of this grand unravelling in mystical terms. They, too, tried to mould themselves into a new human type that would best accomplish this much-awaited breakthrough to a new era. This identity-building endeavour resulted in a range of experiments, which rejected traditional gender roles or marital arrangements and which the Symbolists implemented both in their textual productions and private lives. Matich states:

The program for erotic revolution [...] aimed at [...] creating new forms of love and corresponding life practices that would transform the family and even the body itself. [...] Living in the stage of historical decline, the early Russian modernists grafted onto it apocalyptic rupture, which would mark the end of cyclical history [...]. Utilitarian ideas lay hidden below the top layer of the symbolist palimpsest of life creation, and there were indirect links between the symbolist and Bolshevik visions. (ibid., 4, 9, 277)

The representation of modernism in Solzhenitsyn's artistic works is more flexible and varied than his critical statements about it would lead us to expect. The textualisation of Likonya as a fan and consumer of Silver Age art goes beyond the anti-modernist strictures in Solzhenitsyn's publicistic writings. In fact, her modernistic identity and lifestyle serve as a counter-argument against the utilitarian and masculin-

ised approach of the two extremist aunts. Silver Age culture, as it is embodied in Likonya, is intrinsically opposed to the ideology of revolution. At the same time, she stands in clear contrast to a certain type of Silver Age erotic femininity identified by Matich, that of the symbolist poet Zinaida Gippius. Here let us note that Likonya is not a creator of modernist texts, but their selective reader. She may be artistic, but she is not an artist. Unlike Gippius, who employed her body and sexuality in pursuit of apocalyptic and utopian symbolist goals (she took an ‘anti-procreative position’ (ibid., 164) and formed same-sex relationships and triple sexual or asexual unions), Likonya’s aura of eroticism is non-ideological, non-revolutionary and non-apocalyptic. Her love life does not form a part of an artistic or ideological project, but amounts to a succession of life events of a rather traditional kind that occur naturally and spontaneously: she falls in love with a married Volga merchant and has an affair with him, all the while hoping that he will be faithful to her and will give her a child. While Gippius, like Matich’s other ‘decadent utopians’ (ibid., 4), frequently perceived of Eros in metaphysical and divine terms, rather than physical and sexual ones, Likonya’s own erotic situation is rooted in the realities of her life as a young woman who is romantically involved with a married man. When she makes love with her beloved or draws up plans for a future together with him, she privileges these private and intimate concerns over the political events occurring in the country. Last, in contrast to Gippius, who possessed an unstable sexual identity and cultivated an androgynous appearance, thereby acquiring a public reputation as a ‘cross-dresser’ (ibid., 172) and a ‘female dandy’ (ibid., 177), Likonya is clearly heterosexual and emphatically (initially, even exaggeratedly) feminine in speech, manner and appearance.

The Red Wheel is not the only work of fiction by Solzhenitsyn that adduces the artistic productions of the Silver Age for a fictionalised historiographical purpose. In his novel *In The First Circle* (1968; 1978), which is set in 1949, one of the main char-

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acters, the high-ranking diplomat Innokenty Volodin, reassesses his life values, relationship with his promiscuous, selfish wife Dotnara, the beautiful daughter of a coarse-minded Stalinist prosecutor, and his allegiance to a tyrannical state and eventually embarks on the path of direct struggle against the latter.

Volodin is a 1940s version of that classic Russian literary type, the idealistic and passionate seeker after the truth. Solzhenitsyn's hero is the son of a famous revolutionary of humble origins, who perished in the civil war, and a refined woman of noble birth, who is also no longer living. His point of departure on his moral and political quest is the archive of his late mother, a member of the pre-revolutionary Silver Age generation. He becomes a kind of cultural archeologist, studying her papers, letters, diaries and printed artifacts of the period such as art magazines and theatre programmes. As he does so, Volodin gradually forms a picture of his mother's pre-marital identity and her artistic tastes. Her diaries include a section entitled 'ethical records' ('этические записи'), in which she wrote of her desire to live and conduct herself according to the ideals of Compassion, Fairness, Truth, Goodness/Kindness and Beauty. For her these ethical terms, which are capitalized in the 'records', did not possess a social, class-based or revolutionary meaning. Rather, they were oriented towards absolute moral norms, which the Soviet state dismisses as 'bourgeois' and obsolete. Volodin is now brought face to face with an entire lost world of artistic and cultural endeavours, of which until then he had been completely ignorant. By going back in time through the medium of literature, he acquires a new, more accurate perspective on the pre-revolutionary period and realises that he is a 'savage, reared in the caves of social science, clad in the skins of class warfare' (Solzhenitsyn 2009, 440):

Early twentieth-century Russia, with its ideological battles, its dizzy proliferation of trends and movements, its unbridled imagination, and

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its anxious forebodings, looked out at Innokenty from these yellowing pages — Russia of the last pre-Revolutionary decade, which he had been taught at school and at the institute to regard as the most shameful and most barren in Russia's history, a decade so hopeless that if the Bolsheviks had not come to the rescue, Russia left to itself would have rotted and collapsed. (ibid., 439–40)

Volodin experiences a life situation that constitutes a common topos in the genre of the *Bildungsroman*: having reached a certain level of maturity and personal experience, the protagonist begins to gain a better understanding of the two most important figures in his childhood and youth, his parents. As he studies his mother's diaries, Volodin makes a sinister discovery: he realises that his father, the famous Bolshevik, took his mother as a trophy bride, won in the class struggle. He also learns that she never loved his father and that she always remained her own woman:

But in these diaries his mother was revealed as not just an appendage to his father, as their son had been accustomed to thinking, but as someone with a world of her own. [...] He sat there for days on end, on the little stool by the wide-open cabinets, breathing their air, intoxicated with it and with his mother's little world, which his father had once entered, wearing a black raincoat, girded with hand grenades. And bearing a Cheka search warrant. (ibid., 438–39)

Volodin's father carries the threat of violence even in his body and clothes. Thus, the ring of grenades encircling his waist and his black coat: in Solzhenitsyn's work, black is a frequent marker of revolutionary identity. The leader of the Provi-

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sional Government, Aleksander Kerensky, is depicted in *The Red Wheel* as wearing a black jacket.

Gradually the reader of *The First Circle* becomes aware of a set of conceptual binaries: a subtle, Silver Age-inflected femininity versus a hyper-aggressive, militarised revolutionary masculinity; the variety and multi-layeredness of pre-revolutionary culture versus the shallowness and crudity of the Leninist-Stalinist culture that replaced it. It becomes evident that the split in Volodin's personality arises from his family background. Throughout his life, except in early childhood when he was close to his mother, the diplomat has engaged in the thoughtless, passive assimilation of his father's values, basking in that heroic, black, paternal shadow. Innokenty's moral crisis, which leads him to embark on his search for personal and historical truth, is due to the posthumous, *textual* influence of his mother. Her highly literary, ethical femininity ultimately triumphs over her husband's weaponised, ideological masculinity in the mind and personality of their son. The art of the Silver Age, as refracted through Volodin's belated discovery of his mother's real cultural and familial self, is the catalyst behind his decision to confront the Stalinist system. Eventually he takes direct action against the Stalinist regime by making a phone call to the American embassy in Moscow in order to give warning of a Soviet plot to steal US nuclear secrets. Three days later he is arrested.

Likonya is Volodin's mother's generational peer and her artistic soul mate, even though they belong to different texts and lead different lives. With her consciously eroticised, mannered feminine persona, Likonya is quite unlike the warm, idealistic figure that Volodin encounters on the pages of his mother's diaries. Yet, both these characters experience the formative influence of Silver Age culture. Like Volodin's mother, Likonya likes attending plays and accumulating cultural artifacts in her room: theatre posters, bits of stage scenery, portrait silhouettes. She, too, stands in

contrast to an aggressively masculine revolutionary figure. Sasha Lenartovich (the aunts' nephew), who comes from a family with a long history of revolutionary commitment and hates the imperial government and all its works, is passionately in love with Likonya, but she does not return his feelings. There is a cultural and ethical gulf that separates them; and, in addition, she just does not find him particularly attractive. He is out of place in the bohemian, ornamentalised private space she has constructed. For his part, Sasha is convinced that his beloved's interest in Silver Age culture distracts her from the pursuit of social justice and other worthy political causes. He cannot imagine himself squiring her to the 'Stray Dog' ['Бродячая собака'] café, Likonya's favorite haunt and a famous site of Silver Age social life.

Sasha is of a piece. All of his thoughts and ambitions are directed towards the pursuit of revolutionary violence, even if for much of the epic he is shown as rather vain and lacking in a coherent ideology to underpin his revolutionary pedantry and destructive drives (eventually, he joins the Bolsheviks). In contrast, Likonya is a multilayered, evasive and inscrutable heroine who is engaged in a non-politicised quest of her own, searching for a higher artistic truth. The situation plays out on the familiar novelistic plane of female/male incompatibility and mutual incomprehension. Likonya's behaviour always bewilders Lenartovich, who sees her as both enticing and exasperating:

Sasha was achingly drawn to her but not to those others, who had a clear understanding, a clear vision, and spoke in clear words. Sasha himself was all clarity and precision and everything that was intricately

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confusing usually repelled him, yet he found himself longing for baffling, ever-changing Elen'ka.³ (14: 451)

Among the 'eccentricities' that Sasha discerns in Likonya is what he considers her unclear speech, that is, her Silver Age-inflected, feminine idiolect. Sasha finds Likonya's language inaccessible because it relies on a vocabulary he does not know and is underpinned by an aesthetic he does not appreciate. The source for both is the verse of the modernist poets Likonya reads, commits to memory and occasionally recites in public or private. To be precise, her speech is a self-designed, imitative mix of Acmeist and Symbolist tropes and quotes, held together by intermittent sighs and pouts. In *August 1914*, the aunts frequently express their disgust at Likonya's studiedly poetic way of expressing herself. For these retired women of action, Likonya's favorite poets are nothing but purveyors of perfumed nonsense. The aunts sneer at the 'incantations of murky prophets' and 'nebulous ravings' (8:62; Solzhenitsyn 1989, 444). Likonya is especially fond of declaiming the verses of the Acmeist Gumilev; and like the Symbolist poets she equally admires, her manner of self-expression is oblique, allusive, mysterious and full of vague but sinister portent.

Otherwise, Likonya speaks infrequently, and never at length, expressing herself in laconic, almost aphoristic phrases such as: 'We have to be citizens of the universe' (8:64; 1989, 446). In fact, this heroine constructs her silences as judiciously as her statements. When appearing in a social setting she is usually estranged, sometimes mentally absent and occasionally spatially distanced from the people around her. After releasing her cryptic statements into a given (usually hostile) discursive space, Li-

³ Further references to Solzhenitsyn's original work of *The Red Wheel* are to the same 30-volume edition and are identified by volume and page number only. Unless otherwise noted, translations of *The Red Wheel* are mine throughout. *August 1914* and *November 1916* are available in English translation by H.T. Willetts (Solzhenitsyn 1989; 1999). *March 1917* and *April 1917* have not yet been translated.

konya withdraws either verbally, by falling permanently silent, or physically, by leaving the locus in which she had spoken. The heroine's quality of evanescence and her enigmatic utterances make them invitingly open for readerly interpretation. Like the poetic texts of the Symbolists, they prompt the receptor to search them for hidden, esoteric meanings.

Even Likonya's body language is shaped by Silver Age values and practices. As Sasha ponders his beloved's personality and conduct, he uncharacteristically lapses into a style of speech that is almost Symbolist-like in its allusive, poetic tone: '[...] she is like a ghost that always slips away even when your arms encircle her, — she walks the spirit world with uncertain, shaky steps' (11:99). Images of circles and rings are central to *The Red Wheel's* imaginative schema (cf. the title), in which they denote the demonic (in the sense of Dostoevsky's novel *Demons*, 1871–1872) values and practices of the political conspirators who plot the destruction of Holy Russia. The Red Wheel = the Revolution. When 'ghostlike' Likonya breaks out of the 'circle' of Sasha's arms, that confining loop of unwanted love crafted by the male revolutionary hero, unbeknownst to herself she wins a small victory against the gigantic Red Wheel of the revolution that Sasha is helping to direct toward the destruction of Russia, and, incidentally, of the very culture that Likonya so loves. Physically and metaphorically, Likonya is effecting an escape from this circular, revolutionary, masculine space.

As a matter of fact, Likonya's language, formed as it is by the aesthetics of Silver Age culture, possesses, on the imaginative plane, a watery quality: ever-flowing and therefore impossible to grasp or hold. Sasha's reaction to Likonya's erotic appeal expresses itself along similar lines (or waves): he sees her as always changeable, forever flowing away to some place beyond his understanding, 'chatoyant [переливчатая]' (11:99), as he likes to describe her (derived from the verb *лечь*, to

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stream or to pour). Gachev also connects what he calls the 'Russian Eros' to water. To quote Gachev:

The world is made in such a way that in order for contact with the soil to be established you need not move, for it is right there, you can step on it with your two feet and touch it with your hands; where respiration is concerned, air is also everywhere, you can breathe your full of it. Light also falls from everywhere above to everywhere below. Water, however, is not found everywhere, but only in certain special places: people must walk to it, assemble around it, they must make an effort to move [...] toward water = the path to life. (2009, 69)

This is exactly how water-themed Likonya, without ever wishing to do so, acquires erotic dominion over Sasha, whose movements within the epic's fictive space are determined by his desire to be close to her. Lenartovich goes from the town of Orel, where he has established his revolutionary-military base, to Petrograd where Likonya lives, thence to the theatres that Sasha hates, but obediently attends in order to have the opportunity to be with her, and, finally, to her apartment, where he comes uninvited. Yet, his attempts to 'catch' and 'hold' her are always unsuccessful, for she *is* like water: 'Just as a treacherously gentle swell steals upon ships to rock and toss them, so did Elen'ka's waverings threaten to pull Sasha and this life of great deeds he had planned off course and into her wake' (7:315–16; Solzhenitsyn 1989, 292).

Likonya's governing image or totem is the 'world well' ['мировой колодец', 8:62] — a phrase that she borrows from Gumilev's poem 'Choice' ('Выбор', 1908). This trope counterbalances the images of fire and flames, with which Lenartovich is associated in the text, where his speech is peppered with combustible revolutionary clichés such as 'flames', 'beacons', and 'sparks'. In *The Red Wheel*, fire metaphorical-

ly correlates with political violence and the colour symbolism in the epopee's title (*krasnoe/red*). The water maiden Likonya neutralises, 'cancels' Sasha's fiery lexicon. Just like their respective types of Eros, their idiolects fail to connect. The power balance in this erotic (non) relationship is definitely on Likonya's side, for water has the capacity to put out fire, whereas fire can never set water aflame. In the realm of history, however, Sasha is, or will be, one of the victors. And so, he may yet achieve his longed-for love conquest: 'Oh, but one day you may find that you will need me. There will be no one to hide you in some quiet corner, because soon there will be no quiet corners' (14:457). A proleptic hint, perhaps, of what will happen to Likonya after the epic ends and the revolution triumphs, when a heroic Sasha will have his pick of the beautiful and cultivated acolytes of the Silver Age, just like Volodin's father in *The First Circle*.

The turning point in Likonya's life occurs when she embarks on an affair with the merchant Gordei Polshchikov. The owner of a company that operates steamships on the Volga River, he too is surrounded by water images and contexts. The locus of their meetings is the theatre, for Gordei shares Likonya's interest in drama. As they grow closer, he enjoys listening to Likonya as she recites poetry for his pleasure. Once she finds herself in love, Likonya acquires a measure of life's wisdom and discovers a new poetic source, the poetry of Marina Tsvetaeva, and particularly her early verse (1910–11). The epic formats Likonya's language of love as a true Tsvetaevian discourse. Tsvetaeva's poems of passionate femininity now give voice to Likonya's evolving emotional state. When the heroine finds herself alone and feels the need to come to terms with her feelings for the man in her life, she recites Tsvetaeva. These poems, penned by an adolescent hand, confirm the freshness and purity of Likonya's feelings. By borrowing Tsvetaeva's poetic diction, stylistics and aesthetics, Solzhenitsyn's heroine assimilates herself to the young poet's vision of Eros: like Tsvetaeva's

lyrical persona, she too craves passion, lives at the highest emotional pitch and longs for her beloved. Interestingly, Tsvetaeva's poetic subject associates her unique femininity, sensibility and poetic gift with water images: 'Мне имя — Марина, Я — бrenная пена морская [My name is Marina/I am the mortal foam of the sea]' (Tsvetaeva 1994, 534).

Likonya's idiolect, whether in its initial Symbolist/Acmeist or later Tsvetaevian phase, stands in contrast to the thwarted, distorted Eros that governs the speech and actions of the female revolutionaries portrayed in the epic. The texts that are quoted or referenced by the retired radicals Adalia and Agnessa have a very different provenance. They belong to the established discourse of Russia's revolutionary Populists and express a sense of political exultation combined with an austere rejection of the idea of private happiness. Indeed, the Populists were famous for denying the need for love, whether of the romantic, lyrical or domestic kind.

In its own way, the aunts' language is as vivid as that of Likonya. They insist that the ideal woman should possess an 'armour-plated heart [*бронированное сердце*]' (8:70; Solzhenitsyn 1989, 452), closed to any emotional, let alone romantic contact with the opposite sex. The aunts' political lexicon contains many figurative references to marriage and motherhood. They long to be *married* to the idea of social justice: 'mystically wedded to the idea [*мистический брак с идеей*]' (8:81; *ibid.*, 462). They see the revolution as an epic act of parturition: 'Revolution is a great new birth [*'Революция — это великие роды*]' (8:85; *ibid.*, 466). Even the aunts' clothes express their political identity and amount to an artifactual extension of their revolutionary discourse: they wear no make-up or jewellery and have the appearance of nuns:

Well, in *their* time, when Adalia and Agnessa were young, there was no shortage of what might be called "nuns of the revolution", heroines

of the populist movement who looked everyone (and everything) in the face, made no attempt to be amusing [...]. They concealed their beauty, if beautiful they were, so that it would not distract others, wearing coarse brown dresses and kerchiefs like peasant women. (8:60; *ibid.*, 442)

Unlike Likonya, whose allusive and poetic speech sets off her femininity to vivid and exuberant effect, the aunts' ideologically driven sublimation of their female and erotic essence is so intense that their language and, perhaps, their core identity, lack any gender specificity:

The female characters in question and others like them have the function of “loudspeakers” and “transmitters” of this or that system of radical political beliefs. Were one to replace the names of the heroines with male ones and were one to change their sex, the reader would, in all probability, remain ignorant of the substitution. (Urmanov 2009, 376)

While Adalia and Agnessa impatiently await the coming of the revolution, Likonya sits alone in her room declaiming lines from Tsvetaeva's poem ‘The Wild Will’ (‘Дикая Воля’, 1910–1911):

... Let it tear me to pieces!
The hurricane! (13:511)

The image of the hurricane [*ураган*] frequently occurs in *The Red Wheel*, where several characters employ it to refer to the revolution *after* it happens. Empress Aleksandra Fedorovna thinks of it as ‘the hurricane whirl of these days’ (13:239). The

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wise seer Pavel Varsonofiev, who is visited by mystical visions of the future, speaks of 'the hurricane-like sweep of events' (14:10). In this epic of the national catastrophe of 1917, the word in question carries a specific historical meaning. For apolitical, un-historical Likonya, however, it stands for something entirely different. By vocalising Tsvetaeva's verses, she expresses her longing to be carried away by her own, private 'hurricane' of love, those amorous and erotic feelings that matter to her more than anything else. Her lover encourages her to live and feel to the full, regardless of the catastrophic developments taking place in Russia: 'People say that the Germans are approaching Petersburg, that they have already taken Riga and Dvinsk. But all this was like a pale shadow, a backdrop' (14:301).

The deadliness of Tsvetaeva's *hurricane* is linked to the two modalities of Eros, the creative and the destructive. In *The Red Wheel*, the words spoken by Likonya and the aunts contain frequent references to death, but the death images which these female characters are so fond of have different connotations. Adalia and Agnessa's ideology is explicitly, flamboyantly death-oriented. Intoxicated by their ideal of revolutionary violence, they proclaim the necessity and desirability of death in general and young female death in particular, for the sake of that ideal: "'Go, fight, die!'" — the revolutionary's whole life is in those three words' (8:87; Solzhenitsyn 1989, 468). For this murderous pair, the violent pursuit of universal happiness means that individual happiness is of no importance. On the contrary, Likonya embraces the romantic notion of death as a mode of private, supremely aestheticized *being*: 'I even wanted to die. Yes, to die: so that nothing else could supplant this feeling' (11:204). That said, Likonya is one of the epic's most life- and love-affirming characters. It is no wonder that the two death-affirming aunts disdain her. They cannot comprehend this young woman's unwillingness to sacrifice her self and her life for the sake of a public ideal. When the aunts ask Likonya and Veronia one of those weighty questions

that have traditionally featured in Russian novels, the response they get is impeccably apolitical:

“Tell me, girls, what do you want to achieve in life? What is your ambition?” The girls exchanged cautionary coughs. Likonya, taking care to purse her bee-stung lips beautifully, vouchsafed a reply: “To live.” (8:63; Solzhenitsyn 1989, 445)

Although this is a mannered reply, accompanied by one of Likonya’s characteristic pouts, it gives expression to a central motif in *The Red Wheel*. Extracted from its immediate conflict-of-generations context, it has a palpably Tolstoyan ring: human life matters infinitely more than any ideology and ought not to be disrupted or destroyed by political terror, war or revolution.

Another Tsvetaeva quotation which Likonya privately enjoys and which illustrates her love situation and eroticised feminine identity is the introductory lines of the poem ‘In the Park’ (‘В сквере’, 1911):

My cheeks are burning in the wind —
He is chosen! he is — the King!⁴ (11:205)

In a different context, the words ‘king’ or ‘queen’ might have political connotations. For revolutionaries of every stripe, the king (i.e., tsar) and the queen (i.e., tsarina) are the enemy. Also, the young Populist females were fond of coding themselves as ‘queens’, as a way of asserting power, status and glamour in the revolutionary movement. The aunts make this point in suitably grandiloquent terms:

⁴ In the text of *The Red Wheel*, the original punctuation is changed, to convey Likonya’s idiosyncratic inflections.

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But Iron Sofia perhaps eclipsed the rest of them. [...] She seems to have grown up with an awareness of her extraordinary destiny, of the enormous tasks ahead of her (one of her childhood dreams was of becoming a queen). [...] Then there was Yevlalia Rogozinnikova. Another of the queens of terror! (8:70, 78; Solzhenitsyn 1989, 452, 460)

By claiming to be 'queens', the female revolutionaries separated themselves from the run of humanity and, importantly, proclaimed their independence from, even superiority to, their male revolutionary colleagues and, more broadly, from all men. The reference in the above-quoted passage is to the celebrated Populist Sofia Perovskaya (1853–1881), a leading member of the successful plot to assassinate Tsar Alexander II, who was executed by the authorities following the Tsar's death. Perovskaya 'always treated men with reserve and respected women more [...]' (ibid., 452). This is a proto-feminist stance, corrected for the requirements of revolutionary snobbery. Likonya, on the other hand, adopts Tsvetaeva's poetic voice to declare her lover, Gordei, *her* king. She is happy to acknowledge his power over her, which is in keeping with her propensity for self-sacrifice and with the reality of her life situation: the man she is involved with is married and she is prepared to put up with it. He is the ruler and she is the subject. He leads, she follows.

The character of Likonya is intertextually connected with another famous Silver Age figure, the Stranger [*Neznakomka*], who appears in Blok's eponymous poem of 1906. This set of Blokian associations is most vividly present in *November 1916*. This novel features a scene in which Likonya arrives at the Cubat restaurant in Petrograd and has dinner there with a male companion of decidedly 'decadent' appearance. She is observed by the epic's near-protagonist, the patriotic and manly Colonel Voro-tyntsev, who unbeknownst to himself adopts the visual perspective of Blok's lyrical *I* in 'The Stranger' and recognises Likonya's erotic appeal:

A slender girl in a reddish-brown coat and a black hat which did not quite cover her hair, she jumped lightly down, lost her footing, and was steadied by her companion in what looked like an embrace. They went in before the two officers, and a whiff of perfume followed the girl into the vestibule. [...] Likonya was sitting half turned toward him and could be conveniently studied. [...] and yet some residual awareness of them lingered in his eye and in his mind. What could they be talking about? What kind of lives did they lead? Some piquant essence emanated from her, it was impossible not to feel her presence. (10:13, 16; Solzhenitsyn 1999, 501, 504)

Likonya's body language and clothes are coded so as to evoke Blok's lyrical heroine. Like that enigmatic figure, she too is fashionably hatted and fills the air with an otherworldly fragrance. She is supple and graceful, and her movements are almost preternaturally fluid (*liquidy*). The beguiling aura of mystery and beauty surrounding her draws and arrests Vorotyntsev's male (and uninformed) gaze.

Matich defines Blok's Stranger as a female image associated with death and antiquity ('древние поверья') and interprets her as 'the dead body of history' (2004, 102). The 'funereal feathers' ('траурные перья') on the Stranger's hat symbolize a 'connection with the underground world and death' (ibid.). Through her 'dark veil' ('тёмная вуаль') the poetic *I* 'for a brief moment penetrates the past', while her 'silks' ('шелка') 'represent layers of history and myth' (Matich 2005, 133; Blok 1997, 122–23). As Matich imaginatively argues, the dead female body, particularly one that connotes ancient times, was a common 'fetish' (2004, 99) of decadent art. The worship of this body was one of the ways in which the Symbolists affirmed the death of history and strove to bring it to an apocalyptic end:

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Decadence feminized history [...]. By giving its preference to death instead of procreation, the decadents rejected the concept of biological continuity, associated with the female body. By rejecting a woman as a manifestation of life, they glorified her as a representation of death. (ibid.)

Despite the Blokian references surrounding Likonya in the restaurant scene, she does not correlate with the death-oriented feminisation of history discerned by Matich. For this poetry-loving character, Symbolism and its works are mainly a matter of style. As a fan of Symbolist verse, Likonya adapts her appearance and public demeanour so that they conform to its preferred notions of femininity. However, her own erotic appeal is not death-, but life-affirming, even before she meets Gordei with whom she desperately hopes she can find fulfilment as a lover and a mother. She is not 'antique', nor does she strive to be so. In fact, she is one of the most modern (also modernist) characters in the epic. For the observant Vorotyntsev, who spent much time at the front and therefore looks at life in the capital with a fresh eye, Likonya is a manifestation of modernity, a living indication of cultural and social change: 'Did young ladies like that come here in the old days? Wasn't Cubat's a place for talking business? When we get back a lot of things will be unrecognizable [...]' (Solzhenitsyn 1999, 501).

The representation of revolutionary and non-revolutionary femininity in *The Red Wheel* is intricately coded and structured on multiple levels of meaning. The female personalities depicted, particularly Likonya, stand at the center of a network of intertextual linkages and allusions that enrich the reader's understanding of these characters, as well as of the historical events they witness. Although Tsvetaeva's and Blok's poems appear in the narrative in the form of recitations, quotations or implied references as articulated by Likonya, they are much more than mere markers of her

literary predilections. The interplay between the two poets' texts and the historiographic dimensions of the epic, which is enacted via the character of Likonya and her attendant relationships, adumbrates the place of the Feminine Eros in the epic's mythic schema. When Sasha Lenartovich laments that the woman he loves is forever breaking *free* of the *circle* within which he hopes to hold and constrain her, he allows us to recognize that Likonya's erotic self has defeated the totalising demands of revolutionary ideology and revolutionary masculinity.

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EMBRACING AND RESISTING THE GERMAN LEGACY:
THE EARLY VERSE OF IURII FED'KOBYCH¹

Iurii Fed'kovych (1834-1888) conventionally figures in Ukrainian literary histories as the initiator of literature in the Ukrainian vernacular in the multi-ethnic Habsburg province of Bukovyna. A picturesque biography has contributed to the interest that over 150 years the poet, author of short prose works and dramatist has enjoyed as a figure in the Ukrainian literary canon. The son of a Polish Roman Catholic father of aristocratic origin (whom he despised) and a mother who was the daughter of an Orthodox priest, Fed'kovych spent part of his teens making a living in neighbouring Moldova. For ten years he served in junior officer ranks in the Austrian armed forces, participating in the Italian war of 1859 that ended with Austria's loss of Milan and much of Lombardy. Fervent in manifesting his solidarity with the Hutsul mountain people of whom he claimed to be a member, in his life after the army he made a point of always wearing in public the *sardak*, the romantic Hutsul cape. For a significant period he was a diligent civic leader in his home village. In his later years he developed a deep interest in astrology. Early in the twentieth century his most serious biographer, Osyp Makovei, was driven to exasperation by the trail of false information that Fed'kovych laid in his three autobiographies and framed his account of Fed'kovych's life as a case study in the psychiatric disorder known at the time as neu-

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rasthenia² – a view that the more sympathetic recent biography by Lidiia Kovalets' has sought to moderate.³

I should like in what follows to focus on Fed'kovych's poetry of the early 1860s, both original and translated, in Ukrainian and in German, with the objective of suggesting how Fed'kovych's literary texts responded to the Ukrainian-German dimension of Western Ukraine's multi-ethnic cultural environment, and how we might read these texts as seeking to sway their target audiences. The central part of my discussion is an analysis of two companion poems, 'Rus' and 'Ukraïna', the first of which is explicitly framed as a rejoinder to Goethe's famous and influential poem 'Mignon'.⁴

Fed'kovych's work played a role in the formation in the nineteenth century of a modern Ukrainian literature and a national readership for it. Like the early authors of literature in vernacular Ukrainian in the Russian Empire in the 1830s and 1840s, Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko and his younger Romantic contemporaries, for Fed'kovych the cultural starting point was familiarity with a high culture carried in a language other than Ukrainian. But unlike the authors and editors of *Rusalka dnistrovaia* (The Nymph of the Dnister) in the Habsburg crown province of Galicia two decades earlier, or their contemporaries the Kharkiv Romantics, Fed'kovych did not have an active program of cultural development for the Ukrainian nation. Rather,

² Osyp Makovei, *Zhytiypys' Osypa Iurii Hordyns'koho-Fed'kovycha* (Lviv: Naukove Товариство ім. Шевченка, 1911), 1. Another commentator did not hesitate to diagnose Fed'kovych as subject to an Oedipus complex: Denys Lukiianovych, *Spivets' hutsul's'kykh hir Iurii Fed'kovych: Syliueta liudyny i poeta u 100-littia ioho narodyn* (Lviv: Yu. Ias'kiv, 1934), 15.

³ Lidiia Kovalets', *Iurii Fed'kovych: Istoriia rozvytku tvorchoï individual'nosti pys'mennyka* (Kyiv: Akademiia, 2011), 94-134, 182.

⁴ For accounts of the resonance of Goethe's poem in European culture, see, e.g., Julia König, *Das Leben im Kunstwerk: Studien zu Goethes Mignon und ihrer Rezeption* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1991) and *Goethes Mignon und ihre Schwestern*, ed. Gerhart Hoffmeister (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1993).

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he responded to the initiatives of other actors in the Ukrainian cultural sphere in the Habsburg lands – a sphere still dominated by the clergy, practically the only educated Ukrainian social estate there. Fed'kovych's literary debuts took place in the context of the tension between the so-called *moskvofily* (Russophiles) and *narodovtsi* (populists). The former, an older generation of clergymen who had at their disposal such cultural and publishing resources as the newspaper *Slovo*, favoured a discourse of high culture in a language containing elements of the Church Slavonic of the Eastern Christian liturgy, alongside Russianisms for much of the newer vocabulary. At various times some of the *moskvofily* also manifested sympathies towards Russian culture and even the Russian Empire. Their more liberal opponents, the *narodovtsi*, advocated the use of the vernacular Ukrainian as a vehicle for national rebirth and development.⁵

In 1859 Fed'kovych's regiment was quartered in Chernivtsi. Here he befriended two young intellectuals from Galicia, students of Orthodox theology but ideologically allies of the *narodovtsi*. Antin Kobylans'kyi and Kost' Horbal' were so radically opposed to the *moskvofil* outlook that they advocated the abandonment of the Cyrillic alphabet in favour of a Latin one with Czech diacritics. In Fed'kovych they discovered an unpublished poet of talent who had received his incomplete education in a German-language middle secondary school and had little exposure to any form of Ukrainian but the vernacular of the Hutsuls. Kobylans'kyi penned a polemical brochure, *Slovo na slovo do Redaktora 'Slova'* (A Word in Reply to the Editor of *Slovo*, 1861), mocking the linguistic usage of the *moskvofily* and of Bohdan Didyts'kyi, the editor of *Slovo*, personally. As a counterexample to the discourse of *Slovo* Kobylans'kyi held

⁵ For accounts of the competition between Russophiles and populists in the Ukrainian educated stratum of the Habsburg domains, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule', *Austrian History Yearbook* 3.2 (1967): 394-429 and Anna Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1848-1915* (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2001).

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up the poetry of Fed'kovych, whom in prophetic tones he hailed as no less than a folk genius:

A ja Vam kažu šo pryjde nebavom čolovik z hir huculjskych, z sveji rodyny: Toj, solovij, Vam zaspivaje tak šo vsi naši poetčuky obrnut sie v žaby. Lipianka nedoukiv knyžnykovych neostojit sie, jak sie pokaže naridnoji movy palata.⁶

And I tell you that soon there shall come a man from the mountains of the Hutsuls, his native land: he, a nightingale, will sing in such a way that all of our poetasters will turn into frogs. The adobe hut of the bookish ignoramuses will not endure once the palace of the vernacular language has revealed itself.

The brochure contained some vernacular poems set in Latin type; the eight by Fed'kovych were, indeed, a head and shoulders above the rest in lyrical force and prosodic competence.

Not to be outdone, Didyts'kyi recruited Fed'kovych for a larger collection to be published in his more conservative orbit; *Poeziy* appeared in 1862, after Fed'kovych and his army unit had been relocated to Transylvania. Referring in a long introduction to Fed'kovych as 'our singer, a natural genius of folk poetry' similar to Taras Shevchenko, Didyts'kyi claimed that the two poets possessed the 'great gift of popularising the form even of elevated subject matter in such a way that subject and form become accessible and somehow native to the apprehension of ordinary peo-

⁶ Anton Kobyljanski, *Slovo na slovo do Redaktora 'Slova'* (Černivci: V drukarny Jana Ekharta i syna, 1861), 2. The brochure was printed using Kobyljans'kyi's Czech-based orthography, preserved in this quotation.

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ple'.⁷ What Didyts'kyi saw in Fed'kovych's works was a model for bridging the gap between the old-style clerical culture and a potential audience encompassing, not only intellectual *narodovtsi*, but the previously untutored populace as it emerged from illiteracy: in short, for modernising, democratising and expanding the Ukrainian public.

These matters, it appears, were not so critical for Fed'kovych himself, however. Didyts'kyi's introduction incorporated an autobiographical statement by the poet, in which the latter was at pains to stress both his Hutsul credentials ('I was born [...] among Hutsuls')⁸ and the civilising mission that two men, introduced as banner-bearers of German culture, had exercised upon him. In Moldova 'the famous German painter R.' (Rudolf Rothkühl, an obscure landscape painter active in the 1850s)⁹ had introduced him to German poetry, while 'the beloved German poet of Chernivtsi, Professor [Ernst Rudolf] Neubauer' had been so impressed with his German-language original poems and translations from Ukrainian folk poetry that he promised to pub-

⁷ Bohdan" A. Didytskii [Didyts'kyi], 'Slovo ot" yzdatelia', *Poeziy Iosyfa Fed'kovycha* (L'vov": Tipom" Ynstituta Stavropyhiiskoho, 1862), iii-xvi, here viii. For an account of Didyts'kyi's publishing activity in Chernivtsi, see Myroslav Romaniuk, *Ukraïns'ka presa pivnichnoi Bukovyny (1870-1918 rr.)* (Lviv: L'vivs'ka Natsional'na Biblioteka im. Vasylia Stefanyka, 1998), 21-22. On the city's German-language periodicals, see Markus Winkler, 'Deutschsprachige Presse und Öffentlichkeit in Czernowitz vor 1918', *Presselandschaft in der Bukowina und den Nachbarregionen: Akteure – Inhalte – Ereignisse (1900-1945)* (München: IKGS Verlag, 2011), 13-24.

⁸ *Poeziy Iosyfa Fed'kovycha*, x.

⁹ A museum that lists one of Rothkühl's works among its holdings gives 1850-1860 as the years in which he was professionally active. See Muzeum Narodowe w Warszawie, <<http://www.cyfrowe.mnw.art.pl/>>, accessed 6 August 2016. According to Rothkühl's memoir about Fed'kovych, translated in full in Makovei's biography (*Zhytjepys'*, 74), the painter encouraged Fed'kovych to read August Friedrich Christian Vilmar's *Geschichte der deutschen National-Litteratur* (1845), from the introduction to which the budding poet would have been able to learn that German national literature comprises 'only those literary works of art of our people that in content and form recreate and reflect its distinctive opinions, sentiments and customs, the spirit and way of life that are most native to it' (quoted from the 21st edition [Marburg: Elwert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1883], 1). The content and form of Fed'kovych's literary works suggest that he held a similar view of the Ukrainian literature that he was called upon to help create.

lish them in the newspaper that he, Neubauer, was about to establish. (Neubauer was as good as his word: several of Fed'kovych's poems and adaptations of folksongs appeared in 1862 in *Sonntagsblatt der Bukowina*.) Fed'kovych anticipated that these publications would 'not only send my German poems out into the world, but also acquaint the German people with the marvels of Rus' folk poesy'.¹⁰

Fed'kovych's autobiographical sketch appeared to reflect two assumptions. The first was that his Ukrainian audience would spontaneously approve of his Hutsul and, more generally, folk, connections. Yet the conservative, mainly clerical readers of *Slovo* could not simply be assumed to be enthusiastic admirers of the folklore of the untutored majority; the articulation of such an assumption was a rhetorical ploy urging that readership to develop a favourable attitude toward folk culture. Fed'kovych's second assumption was that his addressees would concur with him in his deference to the authority of the dominant German culture – the culture of the élite of the Habsburg lands, but also the main vehicle for the educated life of the whole of Central Europe. In the kind of dialectic, familiar to the discipline of postcolonial studies, that is only seemingly paradoxical, Fed'kovych's explicit piety toward the dominant culture went hand in hand with various forms of resistance to it¹¹ – resistances that Fed'kovych may well have been only partly aware of articulating.

Some of the eight poems in the *Slovo na slovo* collection addressed familiar Romantic themes: the naturalness and dignity of folk poesy (one poem is a pan-Slavic call for the resurrection of the mythical bard Boian); or the idyllic beauty of a 'national' landscape, that of the Dnister River. Others drew on Fed'kovych's military experiences to tell of the sorrow of soldiers recruited from their native Bukovyna to face an

¹⁰ *Poeziy Iosyfa Fed'kovycha*, xiii.

¹¹ See, e.g., George Steinmetz, 'The Sociology of Empires, Colonies, and Postcolonialism', *Annual Review of Sociology* 40 (2014): 77-103, here 90-91.

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uncertain future in war, while their dear ones at home suffer the psychological and material consequences of their absence. In addition, the collection contained Fed'kovych's translation into Ukrainian of the Habsburg anthem.

There is a German cultural and politically Austro-German presence in many of these poems, and in a number of respects that presence is an object of disapproval.¹² Most obviously – and this endeared Fed'kovych to the pre-First World War Ukrainian left and to Soviet scholars – the poems protested against war and conscription.¹³ In 'Nichlih' (Night Quarters), 'Vyprava v pole' (Sortie Into the Field), 'U Veroni' (In Verona) and 'Pid Madzhentov' (At Magenta, quoted below) the motifs of the tears of mother and recruited son, the threat of death and the loss of the soldier's true homeland, Bukovyna, could all be read as criticism, almost but not quite explicit, of the oppressions endured by a people not in control of its destiny:

¹² The extensive secondary literature about Fed'kovych includes several titles dedicated to the theme of his connection to German literature. See especially the detailed descriptive study by Halyna Huts', *Iurii Fed'kovych i zakhidno-ievropeiska literatura* (Kyiv: Vyscha shkola, 1985), 9-139 and the suggestive but all too brief proposal for an inquiry into the consequences of Fed'kovych's bilingualism for his world-picture and its creative reproduction by Taras Luchuk, 'Nimets'ko-ukraïns'kyi vysliv dumky u Fed'kovycha', *Ukraïns'ka literatura v Avstriï, avstriiska – v Ukraïni (Materiialy mizhnarodnoho sympoziumu)* (Kyiv: Brama, 1994), 124-26.

¹³ *Borba: Ukraïns'kyi sotsial-demokratychnyi robitnychi organ* (Chemivtsi) lauded Fed'kovych as a 'writer against militarism' in whose works 'the social note plays a great role, as does criticism of the regime of the day' (15 January 1912): 5-6. See also the favourable judgments of Fed'kovych's verse on military themes in, for example, Mykhailo Nechytaliuk, 'Bukovyns'kyi spivets'', introduction to Iurii Fed'kovych, *Tvory v dvokh tomakh* (Kyiv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo khudozhn'oï literatury, 1960), 1: 5-42, here 18-19, and the chapter 'Iurii Fed'kovych' in *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury u vos'my tomakh*, vol. 3 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1968), 315-49, here 320-24.

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Ой пізнаю, пізнаю:
Лиш одного тя маю –
Одного сина, красний, як калина,
Та як калина в гаю.

Ой бо в гаю калина
Не для него зацвіла;
Гей, цвіла, цвіла висока могила –
Твому сину дружина. (50)¹⁴

Oh, I do recognise you, I recognise you: / You are my only one – / One
son, beautiful as a guelder rose, / Like a guelder rose in the forest. //
Oh, the guelder rose in the forest / has not bloomed for him; / Oh, there
has bloomed, there has bloomed a tall burial mound – / A wife for your
son.

Romantic, Herder-inspired assumptions about the mystique of peoples, their cultures and their poets inhabit the poems ‘Na den’ dobryi’ (Good Day to You), ‘Dnister’ (The Dnister) and ‘Oskresny, Boiane’ (Arise, O Boian!), which are recipients of a subtle, if pervasive German legacy. Yet this very legacy becomes a vehicle for anti-imperial sentiment and for critique of the geopolitical state of affairs in which the Habsburg Empire is as deeply implicated as its neighbour, the Russian Empire. Such is the argument of the poem ‘Spivats’ka dolia’ (The Singer’s Destiny):

¹⁴ Iurii Fed’kovych, *Tvory v dvokh tomakh* (Kyiv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo khudozhn’oi literatury, 1960), 1: 50. Unless otherwise specified, page numbers in parentheses refer to the first volume of this edition.

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В місті Гумані на золотій бані
Сидить сокіл сивесенький:
«Куди ж ти їдеш, поручнику-пане,
Федьковичу молоденький?»
«Їду я, їду з гори Черногори
За бистрії за річеньки;
Гей, на день добрий, жовнярський суборе,
Ви, славної козаченьки!»
«Бог дай здоров'є, поручнику-пане,
Федьковичу молоденький;
Просимо тебе, ой просим тя – з нами
Сідай на мід солоденький».
«Ой не прийшов я до вашого двору
На меду си напивати,
Але-м приїхав славному субору
Співаночку заспівати.» (51)

In the city of Uman' atop a golden dome / There sits a grey falcon: /
'Where are you going, Mr Lieutenant, / O young Fed'kovych?' / 'I am
coming, I am coming from Mount Chornohora / Across fast-flowing
rivers; / Good day to you, O soldierly company, / You glorious Cos-
sacks!' / 'God grant you health, Mr Lieutenant, O young Fed'kovych! /
We invite you, oh, we invite you, / Sit down with us for some sweet
mead'. / 'Oh, I have not come to your abode / To drink my fill of mead,
/ I have come to sing a song / To your glorious company.'

The bard to whom the folkloric falcon (*sokil*) addresses the appellation
'Fed'kovychu moloden'kyi' (O young Fed'kovych!) undertakes a symbolic journey

from Chornohora (in the Carpathian Mountains and in the Habsburg Empire) to Uman', a city, now within the Russian Empire, that had been a significant site of Cossack history and the focus of Cossack-inspired anti-feudal peasant uprisings; it was made familiar as a literary topos by the poetry of Shevchenko.¹⁵ The bard, 'young Fed'kovych', undertakes the journey so that his voice may be heard in that city, symbol of Cossack glory and of the violent popular quest for liberty. To do so the bard must cross 'fast-flowing rivers' – and, implicitly, the Austro-Russian border, a line drawn along one such river, the Zbruch. Such obstacles, physical and political, artificially divide the proto-national community attested by the capacity of the bard from the Habsburg lands and the 'glorious Cossacks' to understand one another's songs.

'Pisnia za Cisaria' (Song for the Emperor), Fed'kovych's Ukrainian-language version of the imperial hymn, which one might expect to be an expression of loyalty to the Habsburg monarchy and empire, turns out to contain some politically significant deviations from the German text of which it explicitly claims to be the translation.¹⁶ Johann Gabriel Seidl's lyrics of 1854 pay homage, not only to the emperor, but also – in contrast to most earlier German-language versions of the anthem – to Austria, a term that is to be taken as synonymous with the whole Habsburg realm.¹⁷ Fed'kovych's version, which turns out to be less a translation than an adaptation, de-

¹⁵ Most memorably, Uman' was one of the settings of Shevchenko's historical poem *Haidamaky* (1840), an account of the sanguinary 1768 uprising known as 'Koliivshchyna'.

¹⁶ Author and translator are named at the head of the verses: 'Pisnia za Cisaria. Zklav po nimecky: J. G. Seidl. Pereviv na ruske: J. Fedkovyč', Anton Kobyljanski, *Slovo na slovo do Redaktora 'Slova'*, n.p. All further quotations from 'Pisnia za Cisaria' are from this unpaginated part of the brochure.

¹⁷ Johann Gabriel Seidl, 'Österreichische Volkshymne', *Ausgewählte Werke in vier Bänden*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Max Hesses Verlag, 1905), 93-94. For a history of the Austrian anthems, see Franz Grasberger, *Die Hymnen Österreichs* (Tutzing: Schneider, 1968).

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clines participating in the Austrian nationalisation of Habsburg loyalty and avoids mentioning Austria altogether. The lines ‘Innig bleibt mit Habsburg’s Throne / Österreichs Geschick vereint’ (With the Habsburg throne / Austria’s destiny remains profoundly intertwined) are replaced by ‘Svitle sonce zasnyjaje / V zhodi, myri nad krajem’ (The bright sun will shine / In concord and peace over the land’) and ‘Heil dem Kaiser, Heil dem Lande, / Österreich wird ewig sein’ (Glory to the Emperor, Glory to the Country, / Austria will exist forever) by ‘Slava Cariu, slava cari, / Dai Im Bože vičnyj vik’ (Glory to the Emperor; glory, Emperors! / May God grant them eternal life). Loyalty to the person of the emperor and to his dynasty is preserved, but the translation balks at the prospect of wishing eternity upon a state conceived of as Austrian. Likewise, Fed’kovych declines to replicate Seidl’s identification of religious piety as a feature of the imperial subject: in place of the lines ‘Fromm und bieder, wahr und offen / Laßt für Recht und Pflicht uns stehn’ (Pious and honest, true and open / Let us stand for justice and duty), Fed’kovych proposes ‘De za pravdov staty treba / Stanjmo bratja vsim a vsim’ (Where it behoves us to stand up for truth, / Let us stand, brothers, every one of us). The adaptation thus becomes a correction of the original for Ukrainian readers. It mildly secularises the anthem, continuing to pray to God for the longevity of the current emperor and emperors (presumably Habsburg) in general, but not seconding Seidl’s inclusion of religiosity among the civic virtues of the ideal Habsburg subject. Fed’kovych’s version is also prepared to endorse both monarchism and patriotism, but a patriotism dissociated from Austria and focussed, ambiguously, on ‘naš kraj’ (our land), where ‘we’ might just as plausibly be the Ukrainians of the Habsburg lands as the whole multiethnic population of the empire.

The 1862 collection *Poeziji* contains fifty-nine poems dedicated to similar themes: poetry in its national-prophetic role (the opening poem, ‘Dumy moi’ [My Thoughts], transparently alludes to Shevchenko); the mythically imagined Ukraine as

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the land of the Cossacks; unhappy family and love relationships among Hutsul folk, treated in folksong-like manner; and the evils of war and the burdens of army life. A new category, to which a separate section is dedicated, comprises narrative poems, some dealing with semi-mythical biographies like those of the folk bandit-hero Dovbush and his lover Dzvinka or semi-mythological historical circumstances, like the wars of Slavs against Turks in the Balkans.

This balladic section begins with three translations. The Ukrainian Romantic miscellanies of the late 1830s and early 1840s, both in the Russian and the Habsburg empires, had included translations, mainly of Slavic folksongs and genuine or counterfeit folk or courtly epics from the Middle Ages, in the spirit of pan-Slav reciprocity as advocated by Ján Kollár. Fed'kovych, on the other hand, included in *Poezyi* poems from the repertoire of German high culture: two by Schiller, who alongside Goethe had become a pillar of the German cultural canon, and one by Ludwig Uhland (1797-1862), one of the representatives of the late phase of German-language Romanticism. Each of the three poems was a narrative with a clear ideological or ethical message. Uhland's 'Des Sängers Fluch' (The Minstrel's Curse, 1814;¹⁸ Fed'kovych's translation is titled 'Iak to spivak proklynaie' [How a Singer Places a Curse]) tells of an old and a young minstrel who sing at a tyrant's court:

Співають о коханню, співають о гаразді,
О вірі і о честі, о славі, о слажді,
Співають усе красне, що в людях людських є,
Співають усе любе, що в серці людським б'є. (101)

¹⁸ Ludwig Uhland, 'Des Sängers Fluch', *Werke*, ed. Hans-Rüdiger Schwab, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1983), 1: 220-22.

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They sing of love, they sing of well-being, / Of faith and of honour, of
glory, of sweetness, / They sing of all that is beautiful in good people, /
They sing of all that is precious that beats in the human heart.

The court and the tyrant's consort are moved and morally uplifted by the minstrels' message, but not the ruler, who slays the younger minstrel. The surviving bard curses the tyrant, wishing the castle to fall to ruin and the tyrant's memory to be extinguished. Schiller's poem 'Der Alpenjäger' (The Hunter of the Alps, 1804,¹⁹ translated by Fed'kovych as 'Strilets' [The Shooter]) is the story of a youth who disdains the gentle tasks of the shepherd, preferring the hunt. After a treacherous chase he is about to shoot a gazelle which he has driven to the edge of a precipice, when a supernatural being intervenes,²⁰ chastising the hunter for bringing 'smert' i muky' (death and suffering) into the mountains, when the world is large enough to rejoice in all creatures (102-03). If these first two translations constitute political statements (an indictment of tyranny and an appeal to non-violence and tolerance),²¹ the third, a rendering of Schiller's 'Die Bürgschaft' (The Pledge, 1799;²² in Fed'kovych's translation, 'Poruka' [The Pledge]) praises the ideal of friendship: Damon, Dionysus's would-be assassin, apprehended and sentenced to die, arranges a three-day reprieve so that he may see his sister married; his friend, who agrees to remain hostage in Damon's place,

¹⁹ Friedrich Schiller, 'Der Alpenjäger', *Werke und Briefe in zwölf Bänden*, ed. Klaus Harro Hilzinger et al., vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1992), 349-51.

²⁰ In Schiller's poem this being is 'der Geist, der Bergesalte' (the Spirit, the Elder of the Mountains) who possesses 'Götterhänden' (godly hands). Fed'kovych, no doubt bearing in mind the cultural formation of his intended readership, renders the divine being explicitly Christian as 'dukh Hospodnii' (the Spirit of the Lord) (103).

²¹ A Soviet-era dissertation describes these works as instances of 'antifeudal protest'. Tsezar' Rozhkovskii, 'Poeticheskoe tvorchestvo Iurii Fed'kovycha na nemetskom iazyke: Avtoreferat dissertatsii', Odesa 1977.

²² Friedrich Schiller, 'Die Bürgschaft', *Werke und Briefe in zwölf Bänden*, 1: 26-30.

will die should the latter fail to come back. When Damon overcomes almost insurmountable obstacles in order to return before the allotted time, the tyrant, moved to admiration, pardons him and asks to be admitted as a third member of the bond of friendship (103-07).

What messages may these translations have been expected to transmit to their Ukrainian-reading audience? First, they signal the translator's sympathy with the values, political and human, that the originals profess, thereby recommending them to readers. Second, they demonstrate Fed'kovych's prowess at the tricky task of approximating in the target language the content and mood of the original, and finding equivalent metrical structures and rhyme patterns. Third, they show that the Ukrainian language in the vernacular form familiar to Fed'kovych was as good for art poetry as it was for folk poetry, a task that in the Russian Empire had been consummately performed by Shevchenko, whose poetry Fed'kovych was at that time discovering.²³ The translations were not designed to make Schiller and Uhland accessible to a Ukrainian audience – literate West Ukrainians could read them in the original – but to persuade this Ukrainian audience that its native vernacular was adaptable to high literary uses. Fed'kovych's translations made a more than creditable fist of this. They paraphrased the originals accurately, resorting only occasionally to localisation (the substitution of the Christian God for Schiller's mythological Elder of the Mountains in 'The Hunter of the Alps' being a case in point). In each case, they were faithful to the original's metre and rhyme. They also succeeded in replicating the tone of the originals and reproduced the straightforward, unembellished style of the three ballads in a language that was equally simple and dignified. Fed'kovych's betrayed no inclination to lower

²³ Makovei, *Zhytjepys'*, 133, 204-07; Nechytaliuk, 'Bukovyns'kyi spivets'', 10. On the influence of Shevchenko's works on Fed'kovych see, e.g., Mykhailo Shalata, *Iurii Fed'kovych: Zhyttievyyi i tvorchyyi shliakh* (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1984), 84-87.

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the stylistic register or resort to parody, as an entire tradition of carnivalesque writing in the wake of Ivan Kotliarevs'kyi's travesty of the *Aeneid* – the so-called *kotliarevshchyna* – had done in the early decades of modern Ukrainian literature within the Russian Empire.²⁴ Fed'kovych's translations acknowledged the poet's admiration for canonical texts of German literature. In no sense, however, did they imply that the Ukrainian language into which he translated was culturally subordinate or unsuited to the tasks of high culture. They set themselves the task of demonstrating the opposite.

Fed'kovych's most interesting work with a text from German literature in the *Poezyi* collection, however, resulted not in a translation, but an adaptation. On the basis of Goethe's 'Mignon', Fed'kovych wrote a structurally similar poem which he titled 'Rus'', the name by which Ukrainians of the Habsburg lands of the time knew their ethnic homeland. This he paired with a companion poem, 'Ukraïna'.

In the novel *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* (Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, 1795-96) the poem is spoken by Mignon, a girl of Italian heritage who yearns to return to her Italian homeland – 'the land where lemon trees blossom'. The first of the poem's three stanzas describes an idyllic Mediterranean landscape and climate:

Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühn,
Im dunkeln Laub die Gold-Orangen glühn,
Ein sanfter Wind vom blauen Himmel weht,
Die Myrte still und hoch der Lorbeer steht –

²⁴ See, e.g., Petro Hulak-Artemovs'kyi's rendering of Horace's odes (1832) and his translation of Goethe's 'Der Fischer' (1827). Hulak-Artemovs'kyi, *Baiky, balady, liryka* (Kyiv: Radians'kyi pys'mennyk, 1958), 125-31 and 76-77. For a discussion of the role of the comic and parodic mask in the Ukrainian literary process in the early nineteenth century, see George G. Grabowicz, 'Subversion and Self-Assertion: The Role of *Kotliarevshchyna* in Russian-Ukrainian Literary Relations', *History of the Literary Cultures of East-Central Europe: Junctures and Disjunctures in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, ed. Marcel Cornis-Pope and John Neubauer (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2004-06), 1: 401-09.

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Kennst du es wohl? Dahin! Dahin
Möcht ich mit dir, o mein Geliebter, ziehn!²⁵

Do you know the land where the lemon trees blossom, / Where gold
oranges glow amidst dark foliage, / Where a soft wind blows from a
blue sky, / Where the myrtle stands quiet and the laurel stands tall – /
Do you know it? There, there I wish to go with you, O my beloved!

Goethe's second stanza articulates nostalgia for a dwelling reminiscent of an ancient temple, where the 'roof rests on columns, / The hall gleams, the rooms shimmer / And marble statues stand and gaze', and the third describes the dragon-infested mountains and treacherous torrents that must be crossed en route to this alluring place. The closing couplet of each of the stanzas, slightly altered in each iteration – articulates a wish to travel, together with a person who is loved and trusted ('beloved', 'protector', 'father'), to an idyllic place far away. Goethe's poem formulates yearning for another place and another culture, and anxiety concerning the dangers to be overcome in seeking this remote ideal Other – which, given that it is Mignon's homeland, is at the same time a place that is cherished, if no longer familiar.

Fed'kovych inverts this orientation and writes 'Rus'' as a declaration of love for one's own place:

Ци знаєш, де країна тая мила,
Де явір ріс і де калина цвила,
Де Дністер грав, де Галич печаліє,
Де руський край, де руське серце мліє?

²⁵ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, *Goethes Werke*, 8 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Buch-Gemeinschaft, 1967), 3: 297-815, here 3: 415.

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Чи знаєш де, чи занєш, моя доле?
Туда, туда піду з тобов, соколе.

Чи знаєш, де там Лєвова палата,
А в їй мурах вибивана кімната,
Де образи по стінах золочені.
«Де Лев наш, де?» питають засмучені.
Чи знаєш де, чи знаєш, моя доле?
Туда, туда піду з тобов, соколе.

Чи знаєш, де ті сині наші гори,
Де Черемшу, де буйного ізвори,
Де рутин цвіт з барвінком зеленіє,
Де божий дух на землю з неба віє?
Чи знаєш де, чи знаєш, моя доле?
Туда, туда підемо, мій соколе. (70)

Do you know where that beloved country is / Where the sycamore
grew and the guelder rose blossomed, / Where the Dnister played and
where Halych grieves, / Where the Rus' land is, where the Rus' heart
swoons? / Do you know where, do you know, O my destiny? / There,
there shall I go with you, O my falcon. // Do you know where Lev's
palace is, / And within its walls a panelled room / Where gilded por-
traits on the wall / Ask woefully, 'Where is our Lev? Where?' / Do you
know where, do you know, O my destiny? / There, there shall I go with
you, O my falcon. // Do you know where those blue mountains of ours
/ Or the whirlpools of the wild Cheremosh are, / Where the rue flower
and the periwinkle grow fresh and green, / Where God's Spirit wafts

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from heaven to earth? / Do you know where, do you know, O my destiny? / There, there we shall go, O my falcon.

The addressee of Goethe's 'Mignon' is Wilhelm Meister. By contrast, the addressee of the questions posed by Fed'kovych's lyrical subject is not a person but an abstract personified entity: the lyrical subject's destiny (*dolia*). The poem thus becomes one half of an internal dialogue between two parts of the lyrical subject's consciousness: a present Self, moved by yearning, and a future Self whose task it is to accompany that yearning to its destination. This inner drama is played out before the implied readership with a purpose: to persuade it that, because poet and audience see and know the same cultural and historical realities, the audience's destiny and direction should be the same as those of the poet.

The readers of Goethe's novel know that for Wilhelm the land where the lemon trees blossom is distant and exotic, but for readers of Fed'kovych's 'Rus'' the places about which the lyrical subject inquires are familiar: they are landscapes with sycamore and guelder-rose, 'our blue mountains', and the rivers Dnister and Cheremosh; Halych, the erstwhile capital of the medieval principality of Halych; and (implicitly) Lviv, from which Lev, the Rus' prince for whom the city was named, is sadly absent. These symbolic places are in the 'Rus'kyi krai' (Rus' land) where Fed'kovych's readers themselves live. Their exact geographical distribution is significant: while the Cheremosh and the mountains are features of Bukovyna, the river Dnister and the historical cities are in the other Habsburg province where Ukrainians live contiguously, Galicia (Halychyna), whose name derives from Halych. The beloved country ('kraïna taia myla'), the lyrical subject's native land, seat of 'the Rus' heart', therefore, corresponds to the whole of the Ukrainian-settled land under Habsburg dominion, and the places for which the speaker of the poem wishes to set course constitute not the exotic

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Other, but the familiar physical and historical entourage of the Self. Unlike the Italian Mignon who addresses the German Wilhelm across a cultural gap, the voice of the poet in 'Rus'' calls on his own future-projected self – his destiny – to join him in a shared journey, and the grammatical form of the conclusion of each of his three stanzas signals confidence that this call will be heeded. Whereas the repeated or almost repeated final line of Goethe's stanzas is an exhortation, the corresponding lines in Fed'kovych's 'Rus'' make a direct statement about the future: 'There, there shall I go with you, O my falcon'. The journey into the familiar, geographically scarcely a journey at all, is a psychological journey: it promises to lead to a rediscovery and revalidation of yearned-for landscapes and histories. Love for this territory, this story, and the 'Rus' heart' constitutes what can only be recognised as an instance of that characteristically modern European sentiment, nationalism.

But the yearning for a remote Other, the substance of Goethe's poem, is not discarded by Fed'kovych. It is reinvoked in the poem that immediately follows 'Rus'' in the collection, 'Ukraïna'. Here the declaration of intent to recover the geographical and historical Self is augmented with the formulation of a yearning for an Other that, however, unveils itself as yet another part of the Self.

'O Ukraine, O Zaporizhzhia, it is impossible to forget you', the poem begins. The term 'Ukraïna' would only begin to be accepted as meaning the whole of the territory inhabited by Ukrainians late in the nineteenth century. Fed'kovych's contemporaries in the Habsburg Empire thought of Ukraine as the lands on either side of the Dnieper where the Cossacks had been active and where the Cossack State had been; Zaporizhzhia refers to the sparsely settled steppe lands beyond the Dnieper rapids where, until its abolition by the Catherine II, the Zaporozhian Cossacks had their headquarters and conducted their picturesque military way of life. There follows an evocation of the stereotypical attributes of the landscape and culture of the Cossack

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lands: flowering steppes, neighing herds of horses, falcons and eagles, Cossacks who also 'fly' with the wind, burial mounds, and heroic epics (the *dumy*):

Україно, Запороже, годі вас забути,
Ах, бо мило тамки жити, мило тамки бути,
Де ті трави шовковії славні степи криють,
Де ся квіти поза квіти в зимних росах миють,
Де стада ржуть, де соколи, де вірли співають,
З буйним вітром у заліжку козаки літають.

Хто ж то може знов забути могили, кургани,
Де козацтво українське, славні атамани
Свою славу сном провадять, славов серце гріють,
А ті думи богатирські так-то гарно піють,
Що аж тут ся відзивають, що аж тут їх чути,
Україно, Запороже, можна вас забути? (70-71)

O Ukraine, O Zaporizhzhia, one cannot forget you, / For – oh! – it is
delightful to live and to be / Where those silken grasses cover the glo-
rious steppes, / Where flowers upon flowers bathe in cool dews, /
Where horse herds neigh, where falcons and eagles cry, / Where Cos-
sacks fly with the wild wind through the grassland. // Who, again, can
forget the burial mounds – the barrows, / Where the fame of the Cos-
sacks of Ukraine and their glorious chieftains / Is the stuff of dreams
and warms our hearts, / Where epics of heroes are sung so beautifully /
That they echo even here, that even here one can hear them. / O
Ukraine, O Zaporizhzhia, can one forget you?

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The lyrical subject is from a place other than the lauded Ukraine and Zaporizhzhia. We know that the lyrical subject's initial location is remote from where the *dumy* are sung, because it is a matter of astonishment that they should be heard at such a distance: 'azh tut' (as far away as here), the poem twice tells us. Implicitly, this location is the geographical and cultural space from which the poem 'Rus' had emanated – the lands, now within the Habsburg realm, which harbour the historical legacy of Halych and Prince Lev. And yet, this lyrical 'I' has so fully absorbed Ukraine and Zaporizhzhia into consciousness that they have become unforgettable memories: three times in twelve lines the impossibility of forgetting is stressed.

Having established the significance of Ukraine-as-Cossack-memory and Ukraine-as-Cossack-landscape for the (non-Cossack) lyrical subject, who is physically remote from the Cossack lands, the poem proceeds to enumerate additional congenial natural and human elements of Ukraine that present themselves to the lyrical subject's senses. At this point the poem abandons its initial figuration of Ukraine as remote from the lyrical subject. The Dnieper, the white village house, apiary and pond, and young men and women with their beautiful songs are now presented through the eyes of an observer wandering through an unfamiliar landscape and spying, sometimes at a distance and sometimes close by, the things that impress him (unquestionably *him*, for the lyrical subject's perspective, it soon becomes evident, is that of a heterosexual male): 'Onde hraie zhvavyi khlopets' u torban veselo' (Over there a lively youth is playing a cheerful tune on a lute), 'Onde divcha ide po vodu' (Over there a young girl is fetching water), 'On kolyshes' tykhyi Dniper' (There is the quiet Dnieper, rocking itself to sleep), 'Dali vydko bilyi khutor' (Further on a white farmstead is visible). The situation is one of exploration: this land – or the preconceived idea of it – is imprinted indelibly upon the consciousness, yet its detail remains beguilingly unknown and awaits presentation to the senses. The explorer moves through the coun-

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tryside, whose landscape reveals itself as a series of vistas that open out to him, allowing objects of note heave into his view as he proceeds. The exploring viewer does not control the order in which these objects cross his line of vision, and therefore he can be ambushed by particular sights that threaten to disrupt the geographical, historical and ethnographic portrait of 'Ukraine' that he is in the process of observing and recording (and thereby constructing for his audience).

The appearance of eros in this landscape is such an ambush. In a boat on the Dnieper the lyrical explorer observes a beautiful maid and her lover:

А хороший керманиченко ляг їй на коліна,
Обзирає сороківці, що в коралі в'яжуть,
А потому, а потому – далі вже не скажу;
А хоть рад би-м і сказати, але наші милі
Вже пропали в синій мраці, що Дніпер укрила. (71)

And the handsome young helmsman has laid [his head?] down upon
her lap, / Inspecting the coins linked into her necklace, / And then, and
then – I'll say no more; / Though I would do so gladly, but our lovers /
Have already disappeared in the blue mist that has covered the Dnieper.

The topos of the elision of the depiction of a sexual encounter, characteristic of nineteenth-century literature, has a double function. On the one hand, it pays homage to puritan convention, albeit disingenuously, for it draws attention to the very action that it purports to conceal. On the other hand, the speaker's decision, temptation notwithstanding, to prefer silence over prurient description represents a correction – an admission that the episode is a mistake, a deviation from the task at hand, which is the representation of the peopled landscape as an idealised, spiritualised, indeed sa-

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cralised space sufficiently dignified to be national. The allusion to sex has been a breach of tact, a lapse into carnivalesque *kotliarevshchyna*.

And yet, so irresistibly enticing is the standpoint of the voyeur that the lyrical subject assumes it all over again, and in the very next stanza. A veritable pursuit of an object of male heterosexual interest across an entire landscape is enacted (across farmstead, apiaries and pond), followed by a 'zooming in' from a panoramic view of sycamore grove and cherry orchard, to a house within the orchard, to the threshold of the house, to the girl sitting on the threshold, to an alluring detail of the young woman's body:

Далі видко білий хутор, пасіки, ставочок,
Знов байрак там яворовий, вишневий садочок,
А в садочку мила хатка, тамки на порозі
Сіло дівча русокосе, – ах, які ж там нозі! (71)

Further still are visible a white farmhouse, apiaries, a pond, / Then a sycamore grove and a cherry orchard, / And in the orchard a charming little house; there on the threshold / A girl with chestnut-coloured braids has sat down – ah, what pretty feet!

Again, the male gaze of the lyrical subject threatens to discredit as sensual self-indulgence what has hitherto figured as enthusiastic, but respectable delight in his encounter with the strange-yet-familiar natural and cultural landscape of Ukraine. But here, too, the threat of the lyrical subject's lascivious carnality is averted. If in the previous instance a convenient curtain of mist descended upon the potentially titillating scene, here the eye does not dwell upon the erotic object: the zooming in continues, producing a now microscopic focus upon the ethnographic (and, from the per-

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spective of populist cultural nationalism, ideologically impeccable) activity of embroidery:

Та й іголков тонесеньков шиє в хустку квіти. (71)

And, with the thinnest of needles, she sews flowers into a kerchief.

To the girl's joy, her proper lover appears, and the lyrical subject generously confers upon him the dignifying folkloric appellation of 'sokil' (falcon), whose positive associations are familiar to the reader from 'Rus', the preceding poem in the collection:

А сокіл вже на подвір'ї, дівчину любить;
Вна го хоче посварити – годі, бо цілує. (71)

But the falcon is already in the courtyard; he embraces the maiden; /
She would gladly scold him, but cannot, for he is kissing her.

The poem's struggle to suppress the pleasure of a sexualised gaze in the interests of remaining within the register of an enthusiasm suitable for public expression may be viewed as an instance of 'intrapersonal communication' that one scholar has defined as 'a type of conscious reflection in which our mind addresses the feelings (and vice versa), in an effort to rationalise our emotions (or to sensitize our reasoning). Both parts exchange messages in the interests of sorting out feelings and/or ideas in

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order to take a decision about somebody or something'.²⁶ What the lyrical subject undertakes in the poem is an inner debate about the tone that is apt for national discourse, and the decision falls in favour of the solemn, not the carnivalesque, the demure, not the uninhibited and, as the poem will make clear before its ends, the sacred, not the profane.

'One of the vicissitudes an instinctual impulse may undergo is to meet with resistances which seek to make it inoperative [...]. Rejection based on judgement (*condemnation*) will be found to be a good method to adopt against an instinctual impulse', Freud wrote in his paper 'Die Verdrängung' (Repression, 1915).²⁷ The lyrical subject's twofold abstention from the 'unsayable pleasure of looking', as one author has termed it,²⁸ may well be described as such a judgment-based exercise in self-control.

The logic of such self-limitation derives not only from the perceived need to legitimate national discourse by lodging it within the bounds of conventional respectability. It also flows from the aggressive nature of voyeurism. 'To treat something as a voyeuristic spectacle', Joel Rudinow writes, 'is to ruin it for other more fundamental human purposes [...]. In general, one cannot enter into a relationship with it which is mutual, reciprocal, or symmetrical'.²⁹ The lyrical 'I' of Fed'kovych's poem cannot simultaneously maintain a voyeuristic gaze upon amorous couples representative of the plebeian stratum of the Ukrainian people, and enact the 'mutuality, reciprocity and

²⁶ Jordi de San Eugenio-Vela, 'Approaches to the Study of Individual-Landscape Interaction as an Evocation of Intrapersonal Communication', *Convergencia* 21.64 (2014): 13-38, here 17.

²⁷ Sigmund Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works*, vol. 14 (London: Hogarth Press, 1957), 146-58, here 146.

²⁸ Claudia Öhlschläger, *Unsägliche Lust des Schauens: Die Konstruktion der Geschlechter im voyeuristischen Text* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1996).

²⁹ Joel Rudinow, 'Representation, Voyeurism, and the Vacant Point of View', *Philosophy and Literature* 3.2 (1979): 173-85, here 176.

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symmetry' of affect and respect for them that national solidarity requires. He must renounce the former and choose the latter, and present this choice to his audience for approval and emulation. The objective of this textual strategy is the construction of a national community in which the poet, the untutored populace represented in his poem, and the educated Ukrainian-reading public are all participants.

It is a matter for speculation whether the happy and respectable end of the encounter between the returning Cossack and the maiden who awaits him is a deliberate response to Taras Shevchenko's poem 'Prychynna' (The Bewitched Woman, 1841, composed 1837). Shevchenko had depicted the Dnieper landscape as nocturnal and sinister; his heroine had gone mad with uncertainty about the fate of her beloved Cossack; she was slain by demonic water-sprites, and the sight of her dead body drove her returned lover to suicide. The falcon in Shevchenko's poem is a destructive force, representative of nature (and of carnal passion) as an amoral domain:

Чи винна ж голубка, що голуба любить?
Чи винен той голуб, що сокіл убив?³⁰

Is the she-dove at fault for loving the he-dove? / Is it the he-dove's
fault that he is slain by the falcon?

Fed'kovych's restoration of the harmony of his 'Ukraina' through the apotheosis of young love that blocks the further encroachment upon the Ukrainian idyll of the lyrical subject's carnal vision may or may not be a counterproposal to Shevchenko's

³⁰ Taras Shevchenko, *Zibrannia tvoriv u shesty tomakh* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2003), 1: 73.

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dark and tragic vision of his homeland.³¹ In any event, the poem ends on as affirmative a note as the one on which it had begun. The penultimate socio-cultural image to be invoked is that of itinerant salt traders (*chumaky*; Fed'kovych's 'chumachen'ky' is an affectionate diminutive) returning from Crimea with their ware. Their encampment, their campfire, their preparation of a hearty evening meal, their singing of songs and telling of tales evoke a comforting outdoor masculine solidarity undisturbed by the stirrings of desire that distant glimpses of women in erotic circumstances had aroused. The last image of all, recorded at the end of the day and at the very edge of the lyrical explorer's landscape and soundscape, is a church where all that has gone before under the name of 'Ukraina' and 'Zaporizhzhia' receives benediction:

Далі, далі — онде небо багром рум'яніє;
Слухай добре, як-то мило десь дзвіночок піє!
То в тій церкві там за лісом з дев'ятьма верхами,
Всі покриті срібнов бляхов, злотними хрестами,
А священик старець ходить по святій контині,
Молих слави Запорожу, щастя Україні. (71-72)

Further still, further still, over there, where the sky blushes crimson – /
Listen well [and hear] somewhere a little bell sweetly singing! / It is
over there, on the other side of the forest, in that church with nine
domes, / All roofed with silver and topped with crosses of gold. / An

³¹ For this reading of 'Prychynna', see Leonid Pliushch, "The Bewitched Woman" and Some Problems of Shevchenko's Philosophy' [1979], *Shevchenko and the Critics 1861-1980*, ed. George S. N. Luckyj, trans. Dolly Ferguson and Sophia Yurkevich (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), 454-80.

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aged priest walks about the sacred shrine, / Praying for glory for Zaporizhzhia and happiness for Ukraine.

‘Rus’’, in contrast to Goethe’s ‘Mignon’, had asserted the validity and force of a desire for attachment to the symbolic attributes of one’s own nation, as well as to its essence or ‘heart’; ‘Ukraïna’ defined the emotional register appropriate to expressions of such an affinity. In combination, the two poems demarcated the territory and identified the people that, together, form the ethno-cultural nation which Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi in his magisterial history of Ukraine, commenced in the mid-1890s, would refer to as ‘Ukraïna-Rus’’.³²

For all his proclaimed indebtedness to things German and his absorption of the Romantic legacy in its German form, in his Ukrainian poetry Fed’kovych was able to avoid imitating too closely the German verse of his professed mentor Neubauer. An epigone of Late Romanticism, Neubauer contrived to purge his poetry of any reminiscence of the revolutionary fervour that he had manifested in 1848 and that was the cause of his posting as a teacher to the remotest corner of the Habsburg domains.³³ Neubauer’s *Lieder aus der Bukowina* (Songs from Bukovyna, 1855), the collection’s title notwithstanding, had no local Bukovynian specificity save for two mentions of the river Bystrytsia.³⁴ The *Songs* are mostly about Romantic loneliness experienced in generalised untrammelled natural landscapes. The human world is represented as a mythicised quasi-Medieval rural realm inhabited by such persons-turned-symbols as

³² Hrushevs’kyi’s *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* appeared in nine volumes in 1898-1937.

³³ For a biography of Neubauer, see Alfred Krug, *Ernst Rudolf Neubauer: Der Mann und das Werk. I. Teil.* (Czernowitz-Cernăuți: B. Mühlendorf, 1931).

³⁴ Ernst Rudolf Neubauer, *Lieder aus der Bukowina* (Wien: Friedrich Manz, 1855), 40 and 71.

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'the Wanderer', 'the Hunter', 'the Fisherman' or 'the Pilgrim'.³⁵ The opening poem of Neubauer's collection is characteristic: it comprises four lengthy stanzas, each beginning 'Mein Herz ist im Urwald' (My heart is in the primeval forest) and ending 'Mein Herz ist im Urwald auf den einsamen Höhn' (My heart is in the primeval forest upon the solitary heights).³⁶

Fed'kovich's preface to the first instalment of his poems in Neubauer's *Sonntagsblatt der Bukowina* in 1862, titled 'Die Nationalpoesie der Ruthenen' (The National Poetry of the Rus'), praised the musicality of the Ukrainian ('ruthenische, besser: russenische') language, the wealth of Ukrainian folk poetry and song, and the 'noble sentiments [and] profound emotions of which this nation is capable'. He also made explicit his intentions with respect to German-speaking readers and his liberal understanding of his task as a translator:

Since the editors have granted space in this periodical for my literary endeavours, I shall present with the well-disposed reader's indulgence the most appealing Rus' [*ruthenischen*] national songs in German translation, so that non-Rus' persons [*Nichtruthenen*], too, can make themselves familiar with the spirit of this poetry.

However, because it is not my intention in these translations to give samples of Rus' syntax, I have not timidly clung to the latter, but have striven all the more conscientiously to capture and faithfully transmit their ideas.³⁷

³⁵ Respectively, 'der Wanderer' (*Lieder aus der Bukowina*, 53 and 72-73), 'der Jäger' (59-60), 'der Fischer' (65) and 'der Pilger' (66).

³⁶ Neubauer, n.p.

³⁷ v. Fedkowicz [Fed'kovich], 'Die Nationalpoesie der Ruthenen', *Pysania Osypa Iurii Fed'kovicha*, 4 vols, vol. 1 (Lviv: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1902), 717-18.

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The corpus of Fed'kovych's German-language poems is not large. In addition to the works in the *Sonntagsblatt*, they comprise the 16-page brochure *Gedichte von J. Fedkowicz* (Poems by J. Fed'kovych, 1865), the later and larger collection *Am Tschermusch! Gedichte eines Uzulen* (On the Cheremosh! Poems by a Hutsul, 1882), and a small number of casual publications. Most of these works, including those identified as translations of Ukrainian folksongs, resemble Ukrainian folkloric prototypes less closely than they do the nature poetry of late German Romanticism, with which they share formal structures, choices of theme and image, and an archaicising tone. The exceptions are Fed'kovych's poems on military life, where, typically, the folklorically inflected voice of a conscript articulates the misery suffered in service far from home or, as in 'Kriegers Tod' (Death of the Warrior), an anticipation of death:

Und am Grabe baut 'nen Hügel,
Einen hohen sollt ihr bauen,
Und am Hügel pflanzt mir Blumen,
Schöne Blumen, edle Frauen! [...]

Aus der Heimat kommen Kukuks
Und mit ihnen Nachtigallen:
Und die Kukuks werden weinen,
Und die Nachtigallen singen,
Jene werden von der Schwester,
Die vom Liebchen Kunde bringen.³⁸

³⁸ Fed'kovych's German poems appear as a separate section in Ivan Franko's 1902 edition of Fed'kovych's poetry: 'Nimets'ki poezyi', *Pysania Osypa Iurii Fed'kovycha*, vol. 1, 710-83. Bracketed page numbers for Fed'kovych's German-language poems refer to the text of this edition.

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And over my grave make a burial mound, / Make it tall, / And on the
mound plant flowers – / Beautiful flowers, [like] noble women! [...] //
From the homeland cuckoos will come / And with them nightingales, //
And the cuckoos will weep, / And the nightingales sing, / The ones will
bring tidings from my sister, / The others from my beloved.

But in a majority of his German-language poems published in 1862 and 1865 Fed'kovych reproduced clichés of German Romanticism. The poems contain more than a reasonable quota of hunters (716, 736), bards (713-14, 727), warriors (715, 718, 721), horsemen (721, 722, 723), maidens (712-13, 722, 727), roses (716, 731) and falcons (718, 723). The poems identified as translations of Ukrainian folksongs are no less marked by such features than Fed'kovych's original compositions.³⁹ The same is true of the poems' metrical structures, whose emphatically musical, indeed singable prototypes are to be found in the verse of such poets as Uhland, Eduard Mörike, Friedrich Rückert, Joseph von Eichendorff and – in particular – Heinrich Heine.⁴⁰ Dependence on Heine is transparent in 'Die Tscheremusmaid' (The Maid of the Cheremosh), a poem that remained in manuscript during Fed'kovych's lifetime. In it Fed'kovych follows the text of Heine's 'Die Lore-Ley' closely, repeating some lines exactly and altering others only to accommodate local colour: for example, 'Und ruhig fließt der Rhein' (And gently flows the Rhine)⁴¹ becomes 'Es braust der Tscher-

³⁹ Mykhailo Paziak, *Iurii Fed'kovych i narodna tvorchist'* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1979), 49-50.

⁴⁰ For a detailed analysis of the metrical forms of Fed'kovych's poetry in German, see Volodymyr Pivtorak, 'Pro formu nimets'komovnykh poetychnykh tvoriv Iurii Fed'kovycha', *Naukovyi visnyk Chernivets'koho universytetu: Slovians'ka filolohiia* 274-75 (2005): 109-13. Huts' notes Fed'kovych's frequent imitation of the rhythmical structure of Heine's poems (34-35).

⁴¹ Heinrich Heine, *Sämtliche Schriften in zwölf Bänden* (München: Carl Hanser, 1976), 107. Similar domesticating substitutions may be observed in Fed'kovych's Ukrainian-language translations or adaptations of German poetry,

emuschestrom' (The Cheremosh River roars) (740). Distanced a little from Heine, the motif of the accidental death in a natural setting of a man distracted by the seductive music of a supernatural figure appears in the poem 'Biskof', where a wanderer, driven by an irresistible melody played by a demonic fiddler, recklessly climbs a treacherous rock and falls to his death (730-31).⁴² Only occasionally do these German-language poems constitute more than epigonal inscriptions of Bukovynian material into German Romantic templates. One such instance occurs in the poem 'Dobusch', where the motif of the serpent is given a startling new life when the protagonist, the folk hero Dovbush, admits a black adder into his own body through an open wound so that the 'horrorworm' (*Scheusswurm* or, in another version, *Giftwurm* – 'poisonworm') can bite into his heart (728).

We know nothing of the contemporary reception of these German poems of Fed'kovych's.⁴³ But what anticipated audience response was inscribed into them? Fed'kovych clearly had no intention of destabilising or challenging the German literary canon. His objective appears to have been to use it as a source for his own German-language poetry and as a set of templates into which he could insert Ukrainian content. His overall goal, as articulated in 'National Poetry of the Rus'' and embodied in his German poems themselves, was to make something of the 'spirit' and culture of his compatriots intelligible to German readers. This project of familiarisation he undertook in concert with an embrace of German Romantic models so epigonal and formulaic as to be practically parodic, trivialising the originals and posing the ques-

as Ol'ha Ivasiuk observes. 'Rozvytok ukraïns'koho khudozhn'oho perekladu vid chasiv Iuriiia Fed'kovycha do nashykh dniv (zahal'nyi ohliad problemy)', *Naukovyi visnyk Chernivets'koho universytetu* 274-75 (2005): 169-72.

⁴² Huts', 33-34.

⁴³ Indeed, even concerning the reported popularity of his Ukrainian works we have only the indirect evidence of letters and memoirs, rather than contemporary reviews. See Kovalets', 221-22. Makovei lists the first articles about Fed'kovych as appearing no earlier than 1873 (Makovei, *Zhytiepys'*, 25).

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tion of whether the creative model that was susceptible to such imitations was not itself inherently flawed.

By contrast, Fed'kovych's Ukrainian-language poems, which were not overwhelmed by Romantic clichés, to this day seem to deserve Ivan Franko's restrained accolade of 1886: 'Osyp-Iurii Fed'kovych is, unquestionably, one of the most original literary physiognomies in our literature. It seems that the Hutsul tribe and the landscape of the Hutsul lands conferred upon him whatever they possessed that was the most tender and most heartfelt: an enchanting simplicity and melodiousness of language, [and] a warmth of feeling'.⁴⁴

Unlike Ukraine in the Russian Empire, where efforts to establish a modern Ukrainian literature were accompanied by a clear understanding on the part of such authors as Kvitka-Osnovianenko and, most importantly, Shevchenko, that these endeavours were oppositional vis-à-vis the dominant imperial culture, in the Habsburg crown province of Bukovyna no surface conflict appeared to exist between German culture and the emerging Ukrainian literature. Indeed, German literature had a great admirer in Iurii Fed'kovych.

And yet, the texts produced by Fed'kovych attest the opposite: that the emergent literature could not help resisting its dominant counterpart. Fed'kovych appropriated the traditions and conventions of German literary culture – and harnessed them to the writing of Ukrainian verse whose Romanticism was aesthetically distinct from German prototypes and ideologically opposed to the political hegemony with which German culture was in collusion. Fed'kovych translated classics of German literature – and put them to work developing literature in Ukrainian. In his work in the German language his reverence toward German culture came close to devastating parody.

⁴⁴ Ivan Franko, 'Osyp-Iurii Fed'kovych (Kil'ka sliv po povodu 25-litn'oho iuvileiu ioho literaturnoi diial'nosti', *Zibrannia tvoriv u p'atdesiaty tomakh*, vol. 27 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1980), 37-39, here 37.

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Most of his writing addressed in some way the political challenges that flowed from the very fact of the existence, within a sphere hegemonised by a dominant culture, of a literature in the language of a nation-coming-to-consciousness: the challenge of state borders that disrupted the unity of a culturally defined ethnos, and the challenge that the exercise of the functions of an imperial state (notably, warfare) placed in the way of the personal, familial and erotic desires of ordinary people of the non-state nation.

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AN ANARCHIST'S FAREWELL: ALEXANDER ZUZENKO'S CORRESPONDENCE ON HIS
DEPORTATION FROM AUSTRALIA IN 1919¹

In the aftermath of the dramatic events of March 1919, when mayhem erupted in the streets and Brisbane's provincial calm was shattered by the 'Red Flag Riots', the Russian activists identified as prime movers in the disturbances were quickly taken into police or military custody.² The Russian community had attracted much police attention over the preceding four years as a focus of sedition, subversion and 'disloyalty' to the crown. The Union of Russian Workers (URW) had opposed the war effort, campaigned against the proposed introduction of conscription, worked closely with the banned Industrial Workers of the World to foment industrial unrest, and organised anti-government demonstrations such as that of 23 March 1919, in which the URW took a leading role. Special efforts were made by the authorities to neutralise and remove the ringleader, Alexander Mikhailovich Zuzenko (1884-1938), the secretary of the Union of Russian Workers and editor of its newspaper *Knowledge and Unity*. Arrested on 26 March 1919, he was held for a few days by the army in Victoria Barracks in Brisbane, then sent under military escort by train to Sydney for deportation. There he was held in Darlinghurst Detention Barracks with six other Russians detained fol-

¹ The author is grateful to Dr Elena Govor for her assistance and advice on many points of detail.

² Evans, Raymond, *The Red Flag Riots: A Study of Intolerance*, St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1988. See also idem, 'Agitation, Ceaseless Agitation: Russian Radicals in Australia and the Red Flag Riots', in McNair, John and Thomas Poole (eds), *Russia and the Fifth Continent: Aspects of Russian Australian Relations*, Brisbane, University of Queensland Press, 1992, pp. 125-71; and Windle, Kevin, *Undesirable: Captain Zuzenko and the Workers of Australia and the World*, Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2012, 50-86.

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lowing the riots, until his deportation could be arranged. (Most of the others were kept in detention for six months and deported in September.)

Much is now known about Zuzenko's career as a sailor, revolutionary and journalist, his years working and agitating in Queensland (1911-1919), his travels in the service of the Communist International (1920-1923), then as a sea captain, and his premature death in Stalin's purges.³ That career will not be rehearsed here, save where it is essential in order to provide contextual reference points for the material offered below.

Letters to and from Zuzenko at this period, held in the National Archives of Australia, tell us much about his standing in the Russian community, the Australian government's view of him and his political position at the time, and help to round out the existing portraits. They also set forth his own view of himself and his situation as he was parted from his young wife and dispatched to an uncertain fate in the port of Odessa, which for most of the year 1919 was firmly in the hands of Denikin's White forces. Under the provisions of the War Precautions Act, from 1916 to September 1919, the correspondence of all citizens deemed potentially 'disloyal', and particularly aliens, was subject to censorship, and surveillance was carried out by the Intelligence Section of the Army's General Staff in the various military districts. Few letters sent through the mail and few telegrams escaped close scrutiny as the military and civil authorities sought to build up a comprehensive picture of the disaffected individuals and organisations which increasingly disturbed the peace of the home front, especially in Queensland. As Louise Curtis has shown, all intercepted correspondence was perused, full translations or summary translations were made of material in foreign languages and background notes appended by the censor's staff, and the records scru-

³ See Windle, *Undesirable*.

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pulously maintained and cross-referenced.⁴ A small selection of epistolary material which has recently come to light, mostly bearing on Zuzenko's deportation in April 1919, is reviewed below, with commentary aimed at situating this material in the context of what was previously known about the URW and the career of Zuzenko himself. In addition to the mail intercepts, some use is made of relevant material from other sources, notably the press of the period, and documents from the files of the Communist International (Comintern).

Some prior comment is needed on the linguistic problems presented by some of the documents under review: the great majority of the censor's records of Russian correspondence consists of translations or summaries in English. Only in rare cases were the Russian originals retained. The translations were made by Russians hostile to the URW who collaborated with the Australian authorities by providing information, background on some of the personalities involved and, since few of the military analysts or police officers could boast a command of Russian, some linguistic assistance. The informants' command of English was in most cases somewhat limited, and the intelligence officers were not always able to make complete sense of their attempts. This will be apparent in some of the passages cited below, in which some obscurity is caused by ill-advised choices, occasional *faux amis*, and the literal transfer of Russian idioms; the intended meaning can sometimes – not always – be deduced by reimagining the original wording.

Where the original is available for comparison, it can be seen that the translators were given to omitting difficult words or phrases, sometimes misreading or misconstruing the original, and mishandling or omitting points of importance, including names, though the writers' handwriting frequently compounded the difficulty of their

⁴ Louise Curtis, 'Red Criminals: Censorship, surveillance and suppression of the radical Russian community during World War I', unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Queensland, 2010.

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task. The original Russian is cited below wherever possible. In most cases, however, only the translations have been preserved. The censor inserts occasional notes in round brackets. This writer's brief explanatory notes are interpolated in square brackets, in italics, with more substantial commentary following the quoted material.

Of interest on a personal level are two letters from Zuzenko to his wife Tsetsiliia, née Rosenberg, known as Tsiva, which she spelled in English 'Civa', whom he had married less than two months earlier, on 8 February 1919. The letters, dated 1 April and 7 April 1919, were both smuggled out of Darlinghurst Detention Barracks, evading the scrutiny of the guards, but intercepted by surveillance of mail addressed to Civa. The two letters, filed as a single document,⁵ recount the author's recent tribulations and provide eloquent evidence of his state of mind, his priorities, and his determination to proceed along his chosen revolutionary path come what may. While showing scant evidence of tender feeling, he is at least apologetic, in view of Civa's predicament, for which he is solely and fully responsible. Elsewhere the tone is by turns querulous (because of requests not fulfilled), truculent with regard to the Australian authorities, sanguine in the face of an uncertain future, and less than fully valedictory, because he has reason to hope that Civa will be able to follow wherever he may be sent. The text below is slightly abridged, as is that of other letters cited:

Just arrived. We left Brisbane (Roma St Station) on Monday under a convoy of 6 mugs [*The Russian was presumably 'mordy', a derogatory reference to his guards. For 'convoy' read 'escort' (Russ. konvoi).*] (5 privates and 1 officer) and until reaching Warwick I was in irons. At Warwick the officer and 1 private left us, leaving only four soldiers for

⁵ National Archives of Australia (NAA): A6286, 1/120, First Military District, Censor's Office, A. Zuzenko to Miss Z. Rosenberg, QF3679, 1/4/19 and 7/4/19.

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the convoy. At Wallangarra I saw 2 Russians D & K (they are Diskouskin and Kostia – Int.) but I never recognised them, nor let on that I knew them. [*Int.* denotes information supplied by the interpreter. No closer identification of the named Russians is possible. Wallangarra, near the New South Wales border, was the site of a quarantine camp where people entering Queensland were kept for seven days at the time of the great influenza epidemic of 1918-1919.] In Sydney I was travelling again in irons. I am waiting now in the deportation gaol and don't turn my moustache [*In the original possibly 'usom ne vedu', = 'v us ne duuu': I am quite calm/unperturbed*].

In Brisbane I was lonely, you never visited me. Nothing to smoke and for a long time I could not get out of my head the song that Marusia sang 'the time will come'. [*Marusia: probably Maria Stepanoff (Stepanova), a member of the Brisbane Russian community whose home Zuzenko and others used for the printing of illegal newspapers.*⁶ *On the song 'Dubinushka', see below*]. I was cursing myself for bringing you to such conditions. Words of Necrasoff were in my head 'It was not for joy that you meet me' [*sic; on Nekrasov, see below*]. Forgive me for all I have brought on you, for all you have to bear on my account.

What will be the future – decide for yourself. I am giving you absolute freedom in your actions. You may do everything what you find necessary. If I am not mistaken, they are going to deport me out of Australia. [*He was not mistaken. His deportation notice was drawn up on 25*

⁶ On 'Marusia' and her family, see NAA: A402, W302. Stepanoff, Mary – Queensland Russian communist.

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*March and served on him on 9 April.*⁷] You have a possible chance to apply for a permit to accompany me. [*See below*]

Ziva why did you not fulfil my last request and send me the English 'self-learner' [*i.e. 'samouchitel'*], a textbook of English self-taught, a few shillings in cash and books. If it is possible to do it, send all to Boris, and he will deliver to me personally. [*Boris: Civa's younger brother Boris Rosenberg, then living in Pymont and active in radical circles. The detainees included his and Civa's father Michael Rosenberg, who would be deported in September 1919 and spend the rest of his life in the USSR. Boris himself returned to the USSR in 1924.*]

Deliver my greetings, and my determination to continue my work to the end. To continue my work exactly as it was here. [...]

The food in the gaol is such that probably there is going to be a hunger strike in Russian style. [*Boris Rosenberg wrote of this in a letter to the Industrial Council in Brisbane on 29 April 1919: 'The food is very bad and there is very little of it.' Some of the detainees did in fact declare a hunger strike on 24 April; this was after Zuzenko's deportation.*⁸]

What I gave you before leaving pay debts with it. Ask my comrades in what possible way I could square all my debts. I think they are going to deport me from here.

⁷ NAA: SP 43/2 N59/21/962 Alexander M. Zuzenko. 'Order for Deportation'.

⁸ NAA: A6286, 1/128, First Military District, Censor's Office, QF3980, 29/4/1919. See also unsigned, 'Izdevatel'stvo nad tovarishchami', *Nabat* No. 2, 5, and NAA: A6286, 3/103, Charlesworth to Cameron; Russian protest, MF2740, 24/4/19.

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I am not worrying about you too much. I know very well that comrades will look after Zuzenko's wife. [*See below*] If we can't meet here again try to make your way to Russia. At any anarchial [*sic*] group you will find my whereabouts. In Russia very likely I will work in 'Voice of Labour' or edit my own 'Ninth Wave'. [*In Brisbane from December 1918 to February 1919, Zuzenko had been editing an illegal Russian newspaper with the title Deviaty val (Ninth Wave), taken from a Russian saying according to which the ninth wave has the greatest destructive power. On his later journalism, see below.*]

Search for Zuzenko or Matulichenko. [*Zuzenko used several aliases, including Matulichenko and Sania Mamin. Here the censor comments that this line is an 'admission ... that Zuzenko and Matulichenko are one and the same', which was previously suspected but unconfirmed.*] Write to my comrades and assure them that I will be true to my ideals for which I was working and suffering till the present time. Nobody will change my opinions. I have heard that Bikoff was arrested.

This letter is of interest for a number of matters raised in it, and must be read with the circumstances of the key participants in mind. Of particular note here is the fact that Zuzenko, far from insisting that his wife join him, grants her 'absolute freedom in your actions' and invites her to 'decide for yourself', allowing that she may well elect to remain. This was no easy choice for Civa, who was then in the early stages of pregnancy, a fact which Zuzenko mentions in a letter to Peter Simonoff on 3

April.⁹ It is curious that in writing to Civa he makes no mention of it, instead rebuking her for failing to visit him in Brisbane and not delivering the books and cash he had requested!

At that point Zuzenko could not have known that Civa had very quickly made up her mind to leave Australia with him if she could, or that she was making almost daily applications to see him and travel with him.¹⁰ Her correspondence with the authorities shows that she had lost no time in moving to Sydney in order to be close to him and visit him as soon as possible.

In view of the persistent legend, encouraged by Zuzenko himself and elaborated by novelists such as Konstantin Paustovsky, that the British or Australian government had sentenced him to death, or confidently expected Denikin to execute him on arrival in Odessa,¹¹ it is worth pointing out that no such dire punishment is contemplated here, and he clearly expects to survive and prosper in Soviet Russia. Indeed, he would hardly have advised his wife to follow him had there been a worse outcome in prospect.

As to what his future in Soviet Russia might hold, he fully expects to be a journalist and ‘work on his own *Ninth Wave*’. With the benefit of hindsight, the idea that he would be able to edit ‘his own’ newspaper seems fanciful and reflects a false idea of the realities of life in areas under Bolshevik control, but at the time neither Zuzenko nor anybody else living in Australia could have had an accurate picture of

⁹ NAA: SP43/2 N59/21/962, A. Zuzenko to ‘Druzhe angel’, 3/4/19. *Druzhe* is the Ukrainian vocative of *drug*. In their correspondence, Zuzenko, Simonov and others frequently addressed one another as *angely*.

¹⁰ NAA: SP43/2 N59/21/962, Telegram to Intelligence Office, Victoria Barracks, Sydney, 1/4/19 et seq.

¹¹ See Windle, *Undesirable*, esp. 78; idem, ‘Aleksandr Zuzenko i avstraliiskaia tema v sovetskoii literature’, *Studia Rossica Posnaniensia*, XXXII (2005), 11-20; idem, ‘Konstantin Paustovskii, the “Communard Captain”, and William Morris Hughes. An Australian motif in an early work of Soviet Literature’, *Slavonica*, 14/2, 2008, 108-118.

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the form the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' would soon take. On his return Zuzenko did, in fact, serve for a brief period in early 1920 as editor of *Izvestiia tiraspol'skogo revkoma*, and even more briefly on the short-lived *Odesskii nabat* and *Burevestnik*.¹² In 1923-24, following his return from his Comintern mission to Australia, he had an important role in the production and editing of *Na vakhte*, a newspaper for Soviet seamen.

Twice in a single paragraph Zuzenko conveys something of his mood and morale by reference to lines of song and poetry. He was known to be fond of music and poetry, especially when the motifs accorded with his political beliefs. The song which Marusia sang, containing the words 'the time will come', is almost certainly 'Dubinushka', which enjoyed wide popularity at the time in a version sung by Fedor Shaliapin, containing the stanza:

Но ведь время придет, и проснется народ,
Разогнет он избитую спину,
И в родимых лесах на врагов подберет
Здоровее и крепче дубину.

As for the words of Nikolai Nekrasov, cited as 'It was not for joy that you meet me', the original ran 'Да не на радость сошлась и со мной', from the poem of 1847, 'Еду ли ночью по улице темной'.

С детства судьба невзлюбила тебя:
Беден и зол был отец твой угрюмый,

¹² A. Matulichenko, 'Kak ia, anarkhist, stal lenintsem', *Novoe russkoe slovo*, 16/2/1921, 6.

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Замуж пошла ты - другого любя.
Муж тебе выпал недобрый на долю:
С бешеным нравом, с тяжелой рукой;
Не покорилась - ушла ты на волю,
Да не на радость сошлась и со мной.

The plight of the woman to whom the poem is addressed only partially coincides with that of Civa Zuzenko.

Zuzenko may give an impression of blithe unconcern when he informs Civa that he is 'not worrying too much' about her because the 'comrades will look after Zuzenko's wife', but here, in some respects at least, it seems that his confidence was well placed. An unsigned letter to him, postmarked Kuridala in Queensland, bears this out, promising material assistance to cover Civa's passage to Russia. Since the letter arrived after his deportation and was not forwarded, the Russian original has survived:

Если мое слово будет иметь отзвук в сердцах той публики среди которой живу теперь – тогда вряд ли Вам имеет смысл беспокоиться о средствах для выезда Вашей жены в Россию. С миру по нитке – голому рубаха. Надеюсь, что достаточно найдется тех, которые изыщут средства для выезда отсюда и для Вашей жены во всяком случае.¹³

After denouncing those in the Russian community who opposed Zuzenko and sought to divide the URW, the letter closes with warm words of farewell, showing

¹³ NAA: SP 43/2, N59/21/962, unsigned to Zuzenko, 26/4/19. The original is accompanied by an incomplete and unreliable English translation.

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that, in certain quarters at least, the respect which Zuzenko claimed was no figment of his imagination:

Свет правды и живые сознательные элементы природы благодарят и благоговеют пред Вами и подобными Вам, как пред достойными борцами за народное право! Многие Вам лета и столько же здоровья!!! Прощайте!

In the event Civa, who could not have afforded the fare without help, did not need to pay: she was able to take ship to Egypt, following her husband's route, at the Australian government's expense.¹⁴ She sailed on the SS *Ulimaroa* one month after her husband, apparently in a comfortable berth. Their further adventures, their meeting in the Middle East, their onward voyages to Constantinople and Odessa, and the birth of their daughter, would later provide rich material for Russian novelists and television feature writers, with notable departures from the facts.¹⁵

Of Zuzenko's letter to Civa, the censor observes that 'the covering envelope bears no mark indicating that it had passed through the hands of any officer at the Detention Barracks'. This, with the mention of Boris Rosenberg, clearly suggests that Boris was serving as a messenger and evading censorship of the prisoners' mail. A similar service was sometimes provided by Paul Mirkin, a brother-in-law of Boris and Civa.

Zuzenko concludes this letter with a brief mention of the arrest of Herman Bykoff (German Bykov), also known as A. Rezanoff. Zuzenko and Bykoff were often

¹⁴ Correspondence between the government and Cunard concerning the fare may be found at NAA: SP 43/2, N59/21/962; 26 May, 17 July and other dates.

¹⁵ See Windle, *Undesirable*, esp. 199-217; idem, 'Televising the Red Captain' (forthcoming).

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at odds, and some of Bykoff's writings about 'His Anarchic Majesty', 'the Great Destroyer', are far from complimentary, but the two had nevertheless joined forces to lead the red flag procession on 23 March 1919.¹⁶ Of Bykoff the censor wrote in April 1919, 'Every Russian in Queensland knows Rezanoff's extreme views [...] It was also generally known that Rezanoff was leader of the Bolshevik section and Zuzenko of the Anarchial group.'¹⁷ An energetic propagandist, Bykoff would go on to publish the illegal newspaper *Nabat* (see below), and place in it one of the fullest known accounts of the procession and riots.¹⁸ He was arrested very soon after Zuzenko, held in Boggo Road Jail in Brisbane, and deported in September, with other Russians mentioned in Zuzenko's letters. He would later serve in the Communist Party apparatus in Chita, whence he sent authoritative advice to former comrades in Brisbane and Ipswich.

* * * * *

Two letters of farewell from Zuzenko, with the same date (20 April 1919) and much overlapping content, written while he was briefly imprisoned in Hobart en route from Sydney to Colombo, provide further evidence of his outlook at the time and echo the determination voiced in his letter to Civa to remain true to his ideals and 'continue

¹⁶ *O tom, kak my uchimsia samoupravleniiu i kontroliu*. NAA: BP4/1 BOX 4 66/4/2165. See Windle, "'Unmajestic Bombast': The Brisbane Union of Russian Workers as Shown in a 1919 Play", *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies*, 19/2005, 29-51; idem, 'Nabat and its editors: the 1919 Swansong of the Brisbane Russian Socialist Press', *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies*, 21/2007, 143-63.

¹⁷ NAA: A6286, 1/126, First Military District, Censor's Office, N. Illin to A. Rezanoff, QF3859, 24/4/19.

¹⁸ (Unsigned), 'Razgrom SRR. Krasnaia demonsratsiia i okhota za bol'shevikami', *Nabat* No. 1, 6/8/19, 2, continued in *Nabat* No. 2. An English translation, with commentary, may be found in Kevin Windle, "'A Crude Orgy of Drunken Violence": A Russian Account of the Brisbane Red Flag Riots of 1919', *Labour History* 99 (November 2010), 165-78.

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his work'. One of these letters, intercepted and translated by the censor, is addressed to his comrades in Cairns. The censor's notes confirm yet again that the deportee was perceived to be a serious threat to the stability of the realm:

The deported anarchist would like to have his comrades possessed of his final Australian message which is another avowal of the dangerous principles of which he was so clever a propagandist. Nothing but harm can result from circulating his evil counsel amongst an already disaffected section.¹⁹

The authorities felt able to celebrate a decisive victory over the undesirable elements who had caused such trouble, but as this letter shows, Zuzenko remained defiant in the face of adversity and as confident as ever of the ultimate victory of his cause:

My dear ones I am at sea on board a transport, Karachi [*He was actually on board the transport Bakara*], which is bound for Colombo, Bombay and Calcutta. Where they are taking me I have no idea [...]. Watt [*William Watt, Acting Prime Minister in the absence of William Morris Hughes*] informed my wife by telegram that she could accompany me. On Thursday 17th April when they were going to put me in the Black Maria to convey me to the boat, I made a protest, saying I am not going to leave without my wife. My wife at the time was in the office. When my wife was forcibly taken away from me I let go right and left. In about 15 minutes warders managed to slap the irons on me and transported me to the boat. What became of my wife I don't know. In the gaol were left Markin, Klushin, Rosenberg, Weinberg, Timms and

¹⁹ NAA: A6286, 1/128 First Military District, Censor's Office, Alexander to Comrades, QF3928, 20/4/19.

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Wishnevsky. They will be sent away by the next boat. [*These men, with Bykoff and Petr Kreslin, were in fact deported in September 1919.*] It seems to me that I am very lucky with the bracelets [*i.e. handcuffs*] on. From the time I left Brisbane I have been practically always with the bracelets on. Probably they know that it is the highest honors for an anarchist to wear bracelets.

Here the censor summarises some passages: ‘States that whatever happens he will be true to his principles, will bear his trials with honor and will use every endeavour to “burst” his way into Russia and there “with my blood” pay his debt to his mother Russia, and the Russian proletariat. [...] He urges his comrades to find their way home as “only at home your work will bear fruit”. [...]’ Quotation then resumes:

Don’t forget your duty. I am taken away to a place unknown but I am quite calm. My conscience is clear. As a man and as an anarchist I did my duty to spread the propaganda of the great Russian revolution. I am quite sure that the work which I began here will not die, but will be kept alive by the comrades that are left behind. On the wharf showing my chained hands I shouted in Russian and English ‘Long live Anarchy’. My looks must have been more terrible and dirty all knocked about after my struggle with warders with my eyes bloodshot I was not a being that would inspire sympathy. The crowd was silent. To you my comrades, my angels, is my forcibly muffled cry ‘Long live anarchy’. Will you be silent? Yours for Anarchy.

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The content of his missive of the same date (20 April) addressed to ‘*dorogie drugi-angely*’ and eventually published in *Nabat*, is substantially the same, but the following lines from *Nabat*, not all present in the letter to Cairns, are worth quoting:

Примите уверение, что при всяком положении в тюрьме в ссылке перед лицом смерти, я останусь тем же непоколебимым в своей вере революционером анархистом каким был до сих пор. [...] Обо мне не заботьтесь. Воля железная, характер крепкий, выносливый. Куда не забросят выплыть на поверхность.²⁰

Since the second issue of *Nabat* was not ready until late September 1919, some parts of this letter had lost their topicality by the time it reached its readers. *Nabat*'s editor makes clear that the writer could not have written or dispatched this letter unless his jailers in Hobart had helped by supplying writing implements and posting it.

Similar sentiments had issued from Zuzenko's pen to appear in the inaugural issue of *Nabat* (No. 1, August 1919), which Bykoff managed to publish in a brief period of freedom between his release from Brisbane's Boggo Road Jail and his rearrest for deportation. Internal evidence indicates that two editorial articles, one signed ‘Rossiisky rabochii’ under the title ‘Deviatyi val’ and one unsigned ‘K tovarishcham’ are both by Zuzenko. Both were most likely written before his arrest, very soon after the events of 23-26 March, when mobs of returned soldiers attacked the Russian protesters and attempted to sack the URW's South Brisbane premises. He acknowledges

²⁰ ‘Pis'mo T. Zuzenko’, *Nabat* No. 2. This issue is known only in a typescript copy held in the Central Museum of Modern Russian History, Moscow, catalogue no. 1913/БИО-12А, listed as ‘*Biulleten' Soiuza russkikh rabochikh v Avstralii*’. It has no clear page numbers and no date, but its contents indicate a date between the deportation of the Russians held in Darlinghurst (including Bykoff) on 20 September and the anniversary of the revolution (7 November). See also Windle, *Undesirable*, 78.

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that the URW has suffered a defeat, and, citing the stirring lyrics of the *Varshavianka*, a favourite in revolutionary circles, urges his readers not to be downhearted and to continue the struggle in spite of all difficulties. To be sure, the ‘English’ proletariat in Australia has proved slow to assimilate the message of revolution,²¹ but progress has been achieved. Russian workers have understood that

настало время когда быть просто Иваном, Степаном мало для человека, что надо быть также политическим участником этой борьбы. И опыты нам показывают, что рабочий не замедлил принять устав, устав братства, равенства, свободы, заменив научную нагноенность своей собственной идеологией: Живи в труде а умирать в борьбе ... презирай рабство.²²

‘Deviatyi val’ concludes:

нас разбили в неровном бою, но не убили, мы – живы, товарищи, и вместе с нами жива и революция! Очередь за вами, товарищи. Помогайте нам материально и нравственно, скрепляйте наши ряды вашей солидарностью [...]

К делу, товарищи. Да здравствует Социальная революция!²³

²¹ Frustration, indeed exasperation, with the perceived passivity, dull-wittedness and want of fighting spirit of Australia’s Anglo-Saxon workers is a frequent refrain in the writings of both Zuzenko and Bykoff. See Windle *Undesirable*, 52, 140; idem, ‘*Nabat* and its Editors’.

²² ‘К tovarishcham’, *Nabat* No. 1, 6/8/19, p. 1; see also Windle, ‘*Nabat* and its Editors’, 151-152.

²³ ‘Deviatyi val’, *Nabat* No. 1, 6/8/19, p. 1; see also Windle, ‘*Nabat* and its Editors’, 152-155.

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While it is notable that 'social revolution' here takes the place of 'anarchy', in other respects this rousing call to arms is in a very similar vein to his letters sent from Hobart Prison.

* * * * *

Two other intercepted letters from the same period are of particular interest; in this case Zuzenko is not the writer but the addressee. The censor's records show little evidence of communication between Zuzenko and his family in Latvia and Soviet Russia, with the exception of these letters from his elder half-brother Ivan, which arrived after his deportation. The brothers had seen little of each other since their youth in Riga, but some contact had been maintained. It is clear from one of Ivan's letters that Alexander had sent him a letter, evidently from Brisbane, of 'fourteen pages and numerous cuttings', which has not been located in the archives. Ivan's letters, written in March and April 1919,²⁴ indicate that Zuzenko, like many others in the Russian community at the time, may have been considering a return to Russia (or anticipating deportation) before the riots and his arrest.

Ivan, who early in life had established himself in business, writes from the SS *Tomsk* as it sails from Vladivostok via Kobe, Colombo, Singapore, Suez to Odessa, then in White hands and – many believed – safe from the depredations of the Bolshe-

²⁴ NAA: A6286, 1/123, First Military District, Censor's Office, Vania to A. Zuzenko, QF3767, 14/4/19. (That date should read '14/3/19'. It is clear that the date has been incorrectly recorded in the censor's files: the letter from the Suez Canal is allocated a date before that from the voyage from Vladivostok to Japan. A letter posted in Japan on 14 April could not have reached Sydney until well after 17 April, the date of Zuzenko's departure, yet the censor's note reads 'The addressee has been interned.');

The letter from the Suez Canal is at NAA: A6286, 1/133, Vania Zuzenko to A. Zuzenko, QF4147, 4/4/19. (The censor's note reads 'The addressee has been interned and deported', showing that it was received after 17 April.)

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viks. Ivan's letters point to a close relationship between the brothers, in spite of their very different political views. Ivan makes plain his antagonism to the revolution and all its proponents: 'In Vladivostok I was not faring too well. Thanks to our "comrades" I have lost everything. In fact I had to tighten my belt on many occasions.' In Russia as a whole,

[the] situation is bad. For the scoundrels who are now in Moscow won't allow Russia to heal her wounds which she received in the war. Siberia is placed in better position, but still there is the echo from the disturbed centre. Our proletariat is very near naked – work for them is out of the question.

He gives only the briefest indication of his intentions and his entrepreneurial purpose in making for Odessa: 'My journey to Odessa is with intention to liquidate some goods on a large sum. With God's will I think I'll make something good.' He hopes that his brother can return to Russia, adding the unlikely proposition: 'If we could meet again I am sure we could float a limited company about which we were dreaming in Riga, in the days gone by.' He expresses much concern over the fate of their mother, who is mentioned twice:

From Matulecko [*Matulechka?*] never heard a word over a 12 months.²⁵ Probably she is dead, poor thing. [...] Will do my best, if I am in Riga, to find out Matuschecku [*sic; the brothers had not learned*

²⁵ The mother of Alexander and Ivan Zuzenko was a native of Belarus (Belorussia), where the forms *matulia* and *matulechka* are widely used.

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that their mother, Kseniia Prokhorovna Zuzenko, had died in 1918, in Kashin, near Tver'.²⁶].

Knowing nothing of recent events in Brisbane, Ivan writes in a following letter from the Suez Canal:²⁷

[...] Is there any possible way for us to meet somewhere? If I am coming back from Odessa [by] the same route could you make a trip to Singapore and meet me there? I am not against a visit to Australia if necessity will arise. All will depend how my business will be in Odessa. If it will pan out successfully, then everything will be well. From Odessa I will inform you by cable. [...] Particularly write to me, if you have intention to return to Russia or not. Perhaps you have sunk so deep in Anarchistical swamps that you cannot get out of it. In my opinion there is plenty of work in Russia. I think they destroyed enough, and probably will come to their senses to commence to create again. Or is it not in your line? It is enough. I am not going to start silly political argument with you. Don't feel inclined. Am in a hurry to reach Odessa, and learn something about the Riga, and our poor Matulichenko [*In the original this may have read 'Matulechka'. The censor's awareness of Zuzenko's pseudonym Matulichenko (see above) appears to have caused confusion*]. If everything will turn out as I am anticipating you would be a very useful companion for me, as an Englishman and as a correspondent. Of course, all will depend on what kind of view you will take to my proposition.

²⁶ Kseniia Aleksandrovna Zuzenko, personal communication.

²⁷ NAA: A6286, 1/133, Vania Zuzenko to A. Zuzenko, QF4147, 4/4/19.

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5.4.19. We are leaving Port Said today. Received reliable and cheery information that the Bolsheviks in Russia are getting ‘Kopot’ [*sic*] [...] When I arrive in Odessa I will do my best to give them a final push into the grave they made for themselves. From information received here, I believe in Petrograd left only 460,000 population. They are still exterminating each other, but the end is drawing near, as they have made up their mind to get free from the blessing of the Soviet authority. I will conclude now. Write me soon. Enough of this silence. Sending you brother’s greeting.

Ivan’s proposed business ventures in Russia, involving his half-brother, seem improbable in the light of all that is known about Alexander Zuzenko, and at odds with all the latter’s principles. Though fully aware of his political commitment, Ivan plainly underestimated his dedication and his aspirations, at a time when few others did. Ivan’s hopes of thriving in commerce in a Russia free of Bolshevism also appear tragically misplaced. At the time, however, many were of the view that Lenin’s regime could not survive its war with the Whites and dominate almost all of the former Tsarist Empire. As for their earlier ‘dreams’ of founding a limited liability company in Riga, it is difficult to imagine that Alexander shared them, as he had been deeply involved in revolutionary activity even before the upheavals of 1905. Unable to realise his plans, Ivan Zuzenko eventually found refuge in the USA.²⁸

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²⁸ Kseniia Aleksandrovna Zuzenko, personal communication.

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As it turned out, Zuzenko's farewell to Australia in April 1919 would not be his last. He had no sooner reached Moscow than he contacted the Third International, attended its congress in 1920, and arranged to be dispatched back to Australia as its emissary. After an epic journey lasting some twenty months, via Britain, Canada, the USA and New Zealand, which he would describe in a long memorandum to the Comintern's Executive Committee, he duly arrived in Sydney in July 1922.²⁹ He would soon be identified, despite a new *nom de guerre* and false passport, arrested, and sentenced to deportation a second time. His primary mission, naturally, was to work with the infant Communist Party of Australia to advance the cause of revolution, but in addition he now had a further objective: he aimed to urge Russians abroad to form societies, or *artels*, and farming collectives and return home to assist in the building of socialism and restoration of industry and agriculture. These societies were something of a speciality of Zuzenko's, a task he viewed as one of central importance, vital to the reconstruction of a country devastated by war, revolution and internecine strife. While travelling to Australia through the USA and Canada in 1921-1922, he had devoted much effort to organising societies of technical aid, especially among Russian emigrants, and making arrangements for them to return to Russia. In Australia he planned to do the same, as may be seen from a document found on him in London in October 1922. It is unsigned, but even in this unpolished translation its rhetorical figures and didactic tenor mark it unmistakably as Zuzenko's prose, as seen in his Brisbane news-

²⁹ See Windle, *Undesirable*, 106-145; idem, 'Round the World for the Revolution: A Bolshevik agent's mission to Australia 1920-22 and his interrogation by Scotland Yard', *Revolutionary Russia* 17/2, December 2004, 90-118. Zuzenko's original memorandum is in the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI): f. 495, op. 94, d.18, Ispolnitel'nomu komitetu 3-go kommunisticheskogo internatsionala, 16/3/23; in English in Kevin Windle, "'The Achilles Heel of British Imperialism': A Comintern agent reports on his mission to Australia 1920-1922. An annotated translation', *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies*, 18/2004, 143-76.

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papers and other writings. The tone of the excerpt below is less one of valediction than of laying down a challenge, as he had so often done in *Knowledge and Unity* three years earlier:

If you Russian workmen of Australia call yourselves proletarians, then remember that your duty is to be in that place where in the throes of the revolution or organisation for the future is being created [*sic*]; your brothers and sisters of your class are fighting with the army at home and abroad; they are fighting with the elementary [*stikhiinymi?*] forces of nature, that is, with the economic destruction. Be organised, says Soviet Russia (the fatherland of the workmen of the whole world) as the successes of the revolution are not due to all the peasant workmen but to the organised parts of these, only to the revolutionary part who acknowledge themselves as one class. Be conscientious and try and understand the teachings of the Revolution. Soviet Russia promises that she will not be like the mother-in-law she was in the days of the bloody Czar, but she will be a tender loving mother, caring for her children, if they will be true to the great ideals of Socialist Reconstruction. Do not imagine that a life of pleasure awaits you at home, and a smooth life. Work, work, work is waiting for you [...]. It is not a case of regulations only, but of the readiness with which you respond to the call of your brethren from Soviet Russia, and if, in answer to a call you reply in silence, then Soviet Russia will not miss anything by your not being there. Everything will offend you, both the singing of the International and the Red Flag of the Revolution. You do not hear the call. Even in the Czar's time they did not have two Church services said for the deaf (evidently a saying) [*The saying is: Глухому non две обеду не служат, said by someone refusing, when asked, to repeat an utter-*

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ance]. You, comrades, some of whom want knowledge, some of you wish to share your knowledge with others. Those to whom that which is enacted in the first Proletariat [*sic*] Republic of the World, this cry from across the ocean is only for you. Comrades, come to our aid. We are exhausted; we are worn out with illnesses, hunger, the intense cold of several winters – and now for a change.³⁰

The writer goes on to mention specific details of communes formed in California and of a group which sailed for Russia on 9 July 1922, with all the necessary agricultural machinery. No-one was better placed to have this information than the organiser, Zuzenko, who now urges Australians and Russians in Australia to do the same.

Zuzenko's second and last departure from Australia, following his arrest in August 1922, was less dramatic than his first. Although sentenced to deportation he was able to sail as a free man, having paid his own fare, on the SS *Hobson's Bay* from Melbourne, bound for London. Nevertheless the occasion was marked by some modest fanfare: a farewell rendition of the International by his comrades on the quayside, and on his part some vigorous waving of a red flag from the taffrail.³¹ A blurred photograph survives to testify to the ceremonial nature of the event.

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As may be apparent from Zuzenko's appeal to the 'Russian workmen of Australia' (see above), his devotion to anarchism did not prove enduring. His farewell to

³⁰ NAA: A6122, 111, 'Society of Technical Aid to Soviet Russia', Summary of Communism (1922), 264-66. See also Windle, *Undesirable*, 139.

³¹ NAA: A6122, 111, Summary of Communism (1922), 165-166.

that political creed came soon after his first deportation to Soviet Russia, as he recounted in 1921 in an article over the by-line 'A. Matulichenko' in the New York *Novoe russkoe slovo*, 'Kak ia, anarkhist, stal lenintsem', in which he dates his apostasy from the Moscow congress of trade unions in late March 1920.³² He describes the powerful impact of Lenin's and Trotsky's speeches, which convinced him of the need for 'iron discipline' and the rightness of the dictatorship of the proletariat. After that the protests of anarchists seemed to him *zhalkim, glupym, bessviaznym detskim lepetom*. In the same newspaper a few weeks later, in an article entitled 'Amerikanskaia makhnovshchina', 'Sania Mamin' declared his wholehearted agreement with 'Matulichenko', that is, with himself, claiming that 'all honest anarchists'

вошли в партию коммунистов-большевиков, как застрельщики революции, как смелые, стойкие борцы. Партия гордится ими так же как они гордятся своей пролетарской партией. В анархистских группах остались только тупицы, да примкнувшие к ним монархисты.³³

Anarchists, in concert with others, 'Mamin' claimed in another piece in *Novoe russkoe slovo*, were to blame for the rebellion at Kronstadt, adding that when the revolution was in greatest danger,

мы видели грязную, кровавую, бандитскую лапу провокаторского анархизма, наносящую удар в спину борющемуся за великие

³² A. Matulichenko, 'Kak ia, anarkhist, stal lenintsem', *Novoe russkoe slovo*, 17/2/21, 2. See Windle, *Undesirable*, 91-92.

³³ Sania Mamin, 'Amerikanskaia makhnovshchina', *Novoe russkoe slovo*, 8/4/21, 2.

ZUZENKO'S DEPORTATION CORRESPONDENCE OF 1919

идеалы социализма великому пролетариату России. [...] [Анархисты] сделали все от них зависящее, чтобы как можно больше напаскудить трудящимся Советской России.³⁴

During his North American travels he would denounce prominent anarchists fiercely and preach his new-found Bolshevik faith with ardour, although his understanding of Bolshevism remained coloured by his earlier convictions. At this point it is legitimate to ask whether he did in fact remain 'true to his ideals' (see his letters to Civa and comrades left behind). In response it may be argued that to a large extent he did, but his ideals and the path towards them had undergone some evolution. He had now become a radical of a different stripe, convinced that the dictatorship of the proletariat, which was incompatible with anarchist views, was a practical necessity in achieving the long-term goal. In his mind, the change was less one of strategy than of tactics. The goal itself, the betterment of the working class and the ideal society of the future, had changed little. Zuzenko's ultimate downfall, however, bore no relation to niceties of ideology. Caught up in the Great Purge of 1937-1938, he was charged with being a 'British spy' and executed in August 1938. His widow would live for a further fifty-two years, until the last days of Soviet rule, and do much to preserve his memory for posterity. That memory was of the 'true Leninist Stalinist' he claimed to be in 1938.³⁵ His children never knew of his professing any other political faith, and in the USSR Civa had every reason to suppress the memory of his defiant cry 'Long live anarchy!'

³⁴ Sania Mamin, 'Uglublenie revoliutsii', *Novoe russkoe slovo*, 24/3/21, 2-5.

³⁵ A. M. Zuzenko, 'S"ezd prokhodil v kolonnom zale', (no date, but contents indicate the year 1938). Manuscript in Zuzenko family archive; see Kevin Windle, "'A Bolshevik Agent of Some Importance": Aleksandr Zuzenko's autobiographical notes and British government records', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 92/2, 2014, 284-204; also Windle, *Undesirable* 189.

STEFAN AUER AND NICOLE SCICLUNA

FRAMING A NEW WORLD ORDER?
THE SINO-RUSSIAN CHALLENGE TO THE WEST¹

Introduction

In late August 2015, the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, in an article published in the Russian newspaper *Rossiiskaia Gazeta* and China's *People's Daily*, reflected on the legacy of the Second World War for both countries on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of its end. Lavrov claimed that the Sino-Russian relationship had been forged in war's epic struggle. During that period the Soviet Union 'became the only state to provide real assistance to China', and that 'spirit of cooperation' imbues their 'strategic partnership' up until the present day.²

Lavrov's paean to Sino-Russian friendship is remarkable in many ways; not least for its extensive discussion of the Second World War without any reference to the Western allies, and for glossing over the complexity of Soviet relations with both the Republic and People's Republic of China.³ It is also indicative of the recent

¹ We would like to thank Walter Lee, Honggao Ma and Thomas Stiegler for their kind assistance with the article, in particular for researching the Chinese language sources.

² Sergey Lavrov (2015) '70th anniversary of the end of World War II: Lessons from history and new vistas', published in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* and *Renmin Ribao* 24 August, available on the website of the Russian Embassy to the U.S. at <http://www.russianembassy.org/article/sergey-lavrov> (accessed on 22 February 2016).

³ Whereas today both Russia and China fear Western encroachment upon their respective spheres of influence, it was not always thus. In a meeting with then-US President George HW Bush in February 1989, Deng Xiaoping described Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union "as the countries that had done the most harm to China." M.E. Sarotte, 'China's fear of contagion: Tiananmen Square and the power of the European example', *International Security*, 37:2, 2012, p. 165.

solidification of the relationship between the two states.⁴ What Vladimir Shlapentokh identified as a distinct possibility some time ago is emerging: ‘most Russian élites are inclined today to sacrifice the long-term national interests of the country and regard China as an ally against the United States, which is perceived as the main antagonist and irritant’.⁵ Indeed, over the last several years, China and Russia have been drawn together by two separate but interlinked factors: internally, a fear of so-called ‘colour revolutions’⁶ and externally, a desire to resist Western (particularly US) geopolitical and normative hegemony.

Both factors have played out in Russia’s actions in Ukraine since 2014, and in China’s response to the Ukraine crisis itself as well as the Russian intervention. Thus, what started as a non-violent rebellion against the autocratic regime of Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine in 2013-14 resulted in a major military confrontation in Europe that has the potential to reshape the post-Second World War international order. The West and its norms are being challenged by a revisionist power, Russia, whose actions are condoned (and, perhaps, implicitly supported) by a rising power, China. Both are paradigmatic examples of illiberal states, whose commonalities include an authoritarian leadership style marked by a preference for order and suspicion of Western-style democracy (with the accidental unravelling of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, and the chaotic liberalisation of Yeltsin-era Russia that followed, serving as cautionary tales for both regimes). Moreover, these commonalities translate into shared policy

⁴ However, we do not wish to overstate the *warmth* of the relationship, which continues to be characterised by mutual mistrust.

⁵ Vladimir Shlapentokh, ‘China in the Russian mind today: Ambivalence and defeatism’, *Europe-Asia Studies* 59: 1, 2007, p. 19.

⁶ Though this fear is not new, there can be little doubt that it intensified after Yanukovich’s defeat in Ukraine. See Titus C. Chen, ‘China’s reaction to the color revolutions: Adaptive authoritarianism in full swing’, *Asian Perspectives* 34: 2, 2010, pp. 5-51; Jeanne Wilson, ‘Coloured Revolutions: The View from Moscow and Beijing’, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25: 2-3, 2009, pp. 369-395.

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objectives, namely the prevention of domestic unrest and popular mobilisation, and the protection of core national interests at home and (in the near) abroad. Thus, the partnership has produced sustained cooperation, despite its inequality (with China's economic rise tipping the bilateral power balance decisively in its favour), the differing diplomatic approaches of the two states, and the existence of potential irritants such as border disputes.⁷

To be sure, Chinese and Russian responses to the threat of large-scale internal opposition diverge. Whereas Russia has gone on the offensive with what may be termed a 'preventive counter revolution' (exported abroad with the annexation of Crimea), the Chinese response, witnessed, for example, in relation to Hong Kong's 2014 umbrella movement, has been more defensive in nature. Chinese authoritarian adaptation followed the premise that 'prevention is even more important than repression – in fact, violent suppression of protests is seen as a sign of failure'.⁸

Interestingly, law has played a significant role in both strategies. In the case of China and Hong Kong, pro-Beijing authorities used a particular understanding of the 'rule of law' to pre-empt and delegitimise protests, while in the case of Crimea, the Russian government has wilfully misinterpreted international law to justify its annexation. It is the latter development, and the Chinese response to it, on which this article focuses. Ruling over a vast, multi-ethnic state with several restive and potentially secessionist provinces, the Chinese authorities have a strong interest in maintaining respect for the norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which should

⁷ China and Russia share a 4,300 km.-long border. Decades of fractious negotiations over the Eastern part of the border were brought to an official conclusion with an agreement signed in 2008 (a resolution driven in part by the desire to cement closer ties). However, tensions persist, with nationalists on both sides denouncing the deal. In particular, nationalist sentiment in China continues to focus on vast swaths of Manchuria, which were lost to Tsarist Russia in the 19th century.

⁸ Youwei, 'The End of Reform in China', *Foreign Affairs* 94: 3, 2015, p. 3.

preclude wholehearted endorsement of Russia's actions. And yet, Beijing has embarked on an ambiguous strategy, which calls for a nuanced analysis. By abstaining from the draft UN Security Council resolution of 15 March 2014, which condemned Crimea's Russian-staged referendum as invalid, Beijing did not explicitly endorse Russia's move. Yet, at the same time, the refusal to follow the US and EU in imposing sanctions on Russia signalled non-acceptance of the Western narrative of Russian aggression, as well as unwillingness to interfere with Moscow's definition and pursuit of its foreign policy agenda in Ukraine.

The struggle to find the right response is reflected in Chinese state-run media. An English-language commentary from *Xinhua News Agency* argued in March 2014 that, '[b]ased on the fact that Russia and Ukraine have deep cultural, historical and economic connections, it is time for Western powers to abandon their Cold War thinking, stop trying to exclude Russia from the political crisis they failed to mediate, and respect Russia's unique role in mapping out the future of Ukraine'.⁹ By contrast, the usually more polemical party mouthpiece *Global Times* struck a more nuanced chord, arguing that 'China needs to secure a balance between not supporting the independence of Ukraine's eastern region and avoiding isolating Moscow with the West'.¹⁰

Officially, Chinese authorities adopted what they characterised as a neutral stance in relation to the Ukraine crisis. In outlining the Chinese position, Fu Ying, a senior Chinese diplomat and Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress, wrote:

⁹ Lu Yu, 'Commentary: West should work with, not against, Russia in handling Ukraine crisis', *Xinhua English News*, 3 March 2014, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-03/03/c_133154966.htm.

¹⁰ *Global Times*, 'China neutrality valuable for Ukraine crisis', 15 April 2014, available at <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/854593.shtml> (accessed 22 February 2016).

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China emphasized that all the parties involved in the Ukrainian conflict should resolve their differences through dialogue, establish co-ordinating mechanisms, refrain from activities that could worsen the situation, and assist Ukraine in maintaining its economic and financial stability. China did not take any side: fairness and objectivity serve as guiding principles for Beijing when addressing international affairs.¹¹

However, Fu went on to claim that the crisis was caused, at least in part, by “the series of Western-supported ‘color revolutions’ in post-Soviet states and the pressure on Russia that resulted from NATO’s eastward expansion.”¹² This uncritical acceptance of the Russian narrative of events in Ukraine calls into question Fu’s description of her government’s stance as neutral. It also underscores the mutual distrust of Western foreign policy in and towards Russia and China (and their border regions) that informs the contemporary Sino-Russian partnership.¹³ Thus, taking Crimea’s annexation as a point of reference, in the rest of this article we shall shed light on the nature, purposes and implications of this partnership – above all, whether and to what

¹¹ Fu Ying, ‘How China Sees Russia’, *Foreign Affairs*, 95: 1, 2016, p. 100.

¹² Fu, ‘How China Sees Russia’, p. 100.

¹³ Interestingly, the takeover of Crimea appears to have bolstered President Putin’s standing in China. Whilst Russian involvement in Crimea met with disapproval by public opinion in the West, a 2014 Pew survey of global attitudes showed that an overwhelming majority of Chinese people had a favourable view of Russia and its president after the invasion. 66% of Chinese rated Russia favourably, 23% unfavourably, in April/May 2014 as compared to 49% versus 39% in 2013. 62% of Chinese people expressed confidence in ‘Russian President Putin to do the right thing in world affairs’. See, Pew Research Centre, ‘Russia’s Global Image Negative amid Crisis in Ukraine’, 09 July 2014, available at: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/09/russias-global-image-negative-amid-crisis-in-ukraine> (accessed 22 February 2016).

extent it is indicative of a shift in the postwar liberal international order away from the normative predominance of the US and its Western allies.¹⁴

Us and them: geopolitics and contemporary great power relations

The protracted crisis in Ukraine has exposed major differences between the West and Russia. To understand these differences, Carl Schmitt's reflections on the nature and meaning of politics are a useful point of departure. To be sure, a full elucidation of Schmitt's ideas in all their complexity is beyond the scope of this article, as are the controversies attached to his role as the leading Nazi philosopher of law. Following Hans Sluga's lead, we take the liberty to 'ignore the overheated debate about the man' and 'bypass aspects of his thought not relevant'¹⁵ to our endeavour. Schmitt, at any rate, can be read profitably as 'an antidote to an overdose of liberal optimistic internationalism'.¹⁶ His interpretation of Hobbes' *Leviathan*, for example, draws our attention to the iconic image published on the title page of its first English edition in 1651:

a gigantic man, composed of innumerable midgets, holding in his right hand a sword and in the left hand a crosier, guarding a peaceful city. Under each arm, the secular as well as the spiritual, there is a column of five drawings: under the sword a castle, a crown, a cannon; then

¹⁴ To be clear, we do not claim that China and Russia challenge US hard power nor do we engage in debates about a postulated shift from a unipolar to a multipolar international system (see, e.g. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, 'The rise and fall of the great powers in the twenty-first century: China's rise and the fate of America's global position', *International Security* 40:3, 2015/16). Nevertheless, the shift taking place in the realm of global normative leadership and followership does have significant implications for international order.

¹⁵ Hans Sluga, *Politics and the Search for the Common Good* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 122.

¹⁶ Bardo Fassbender, 'Carl Schmitt', in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 1178.

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rifles, lances, and banners, and finally a battle; to these correspond, under the spiritual arm: a church, a mitre, thunderbolts; symbols for sharpened distinctions, syllogisms, and dilemmas; and finally a council.¹⁷

What this picture demonstrates even more clearly than Hobbes' actual text, Schmitt believed, is that political battles embrace 'every sphere of human activity, bring[ing] to the fore on both sides specific weapons'. Just as important as 'fortresses and cannons' are 'contrivances and intellectual methods'. To use the modern parlance of international relations, hard power needs to be complemented by soft power if it is to prevail in the ongoing contest of ideas. But equally, soft power has a limited reach if it is not backed up by the ability and willingness to engage the enemy by military means, if necessary.

Indeed, Schmitt's thinking itself can be deployed as an effective tool for 'contrivances and intellectual methods'. This might help to explain Schmitt's growing popularity in China and Russia, in contrast to Europe, where he remains something of a taboo (partly because his insistence that conflict is at the heart of the political is profoundly at odds with prevailing post-geopolitical analyses of interstate relations).¹⁸ Alexander Dugin, to name but one influential thinker, building on Schmitt, defines

¹⁷ Carl Schmitt, *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol*, transl. by George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. 18.

¹⁸ Mark Lilla, 'Reading Strauss in Beijing: China's strange taste in Western philosophers', *The New Republic*, 30 December, 2010, pp. 14-16; Zheng Qi, 'Carl Schmitt in China', *Telos* 160, 2012, pp. 29-52; Zheng Qi, 'Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, and the Issue of Political Legitimacy in China', *American Foreign Policy Interest* 35: 5, 2013, pp. 254-264.

geopolitics ‘as a science about power and *for* power’,¹⁹ and perceives the struggle over Ukraine as a harbinger of a ‘Russian spring’.²⁰ Echoing Schmitt’s ideas about Germany’s need to defy British and American imperialism, Dugin casts Russia into the role of a saviour of humanity, which ought to challenge the West.

Their rhetorical flourishes about the importance of multilateralism and international cooperation notwithstanding, the political élites in both China and Russia are more comfortable than their Western counterparts with the basic Schmittian approach to politics that emphasises the distinction between friends and enemies, and seeks to (re-)order the world following the precepts of geopolitics.²¹ Schmitt’s polemical writings defending continental European culture and civilisation against the onslaught of the hostile forces of liberalism represented by the Anglo-sphere²² resonate strongly with Dugin’s ideology of Eurasianism.

Eurasianism is one of the potential heirs to Marxism-Leninism in 21st-century Russia. This ideology is based on a revival of imperialist aspirations, which, above all ‘seems to be about Russia living up to an idea of itself distinct from what it perceives the West to be.’ The ideology ‘readily expresses the extremism of a country tending to lawlessness, but bolstered and even steadied by self-glorification.’²³ The takeover of

¹⁹ Our emphasis: Alexander Dugin, *Osnovy geopolitiki: geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii* (Moscow: Arctogaia, 1999); Alan Ingram, ‘Alexander Dugin: geopolitics and neo-fascism in post-Soviet Russia’, *Political Geography*, 20:8, 2001, pp. 1029-1051.

²⁰ Sergei Skvortsov, ‘Russkaia vesna na iugo-vostoke Ukrainy [‘Russian Spring’ in the south-east of Ukraine]’, *RIA Novosti*, 3 March 2014.

²¹ This argument is further developed in relation to Russia in Stefan Auer, ‘Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin: the Ukraine crisis and the return of geopolitics’, *International Affairs*, 91: 5, 2015, pp. 953–968.

²² For example, Carl Schmitt, ‘Forms of modern imperialism in international law’, in Stephen Legg, ed., *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt*, translated by Matthew Hannah (London: Routledge, 2011[1933]), pp. 29-45.

²³ Lesley Chamberlain, ‘New Eurasians - How Russians have long reacted to revolution’, *Times Literary Supplement*, 15 May 2015, pp. 14-15.

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Crimea has served the purpose of national ‘self-glorification’ well, enhancing Putin’s popularity at home and seemingly vindicating his project of ‘sovereign’ or ‘managed’ democracy, according to which order and national unity are prioritised over chaotic liberty.

As already noted, a shared risk perception regarding US encroachment on perceived ideological or territorial spheres goes some way in explaining analogous Sino-Russian response patterns regarding the crisis in Ukraine. Both Russia and China are frustrated that they have to live in an international order not of their making.²⁴ Citizens in both countries tend to think of themselves as being a part of distinct civilisations, not just nations like any other.²⁵ As a leading American sinologist, Lucian W. Pye, observed some time ago,

²⁴ In the case of China, this frustration is often described in terms of the ‘century of humiliation’ (from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century) it suffered at the hands of Western and Japanese colonisers. In terms of its attitude towards the US-sponsored global order, Lee Kwan Yew, the late founder of Singapore, put it thus: ‘China wants to be China and accepted as such - not as an honorary member of the West’ (quoted in Graham Allison, ‘The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?’ *The Atlantic*, 24 September 2015).

²⁵ The Russian sense of a civilising mission was invoked in a remarkably successful propaganda YouTube video, ‘Я Русский Оккупант [I’m a Russian Occupant]’, which celebrates the military exploits of Russian fighters from 13th century Prince Alexander Nevsky via the last generalissimo of the 18th century Russian empire, Alexander Suvorov, to the legendary Soviet military commander, Marshal Georgy Zhukov. The openly chauvinistic video also went viral on Chinese social media, even making its way onto the official website of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. See Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ‘Èluósī tiáokǎn xīfāng xuānchuán piàn “wǒ shì éguó qīnlüè zhě”’, 07 May 2015, available at: http://www.cssn.cn/jsx/jsfsy_jsx/201505/t20150507_1732447.-shtml (accessed 22 February 2016). Responding to this unexpected demand, the Russian producers also added Chinese subtitles <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T65SwzHAbes>. In a similar vein, a more extensive and serious – if not less propagandistic – account of ‘Crimea Returning Home to Russia’ released on 15 March 2015 (the first anniversary of the annexation) has been translated into Chinese and made widely available to netizens in China, including by a pro-government media website, www.guancha.cn.

China is a civilization pretending to be a state. The story of modern China could be described as the effort by both Chinese and foreigners to squeeze a civilization into the arbitrary, constraining framework of the modern state, an institutional invention that came out of the fragmentation of the West's own civilization.²⁶

Nevertheless, the practical response to a shared sense of frustration and perception of a US threat to cultural and territorial identity differs. Rather than underlying ideology, this difference is best located in the two countries' respective approaches to diplomacy, particularly in the readiness to take risks. While Chinese diplomacy puts a premium on 'sticking to principles, being practical and flexible, taking an all-round and long-term perspective, being stable and persistent',²⁷ with an emphasis on 'holism, coordinationism and common sense',²⁸ the Ukraine crisis pointed to a Russian inclination to sacrifice economic interests in order to assert what it regards as its legitimate sphere of influence.²⁹ As Fu put it, whereas Chinese diplomacy is cautious and reactive, Russia favours 'strong, active and often surprising diplomatic maneuvers'.³⁰

²⁶ Lucian W Pye, 'China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society', *Foreign Affairs*, 69:4, 1990, p. 58.

²⁷ Yang Jiemian, 'The Self-Consciousness of Chinese-Characteristic Diplomatic Practice and Theory', in Zhao Jinjun and Chen Zhirui, eds, *China and the International Society: Adaptation and Self-Consciousness* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2014), pp. 3-4.

²⁸ Zhu Liqun, 'China and International System: Two-Way Socialization under the Logic of Practice', in Zhao Jinjun and Chen Zhirui eds, *China and the International Society: Adaptation and Self-Consciousness*, (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2014), pp. 42-50.

²⁹ Gudrun Wacker, 'The Irreversible Rise. A New Foreign Policy for a Stronger China', in Alessia Amighini and Axel Berkofsky eds, *Xi's Policy Gambles: The Bumpy Road Ahead* (Milan: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), 2015), p. 69.

³⁰ Fu, 'How China Sees Russia', p. 99.

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Counteracting perceived US encroachment — whether embodied by the Obama administration’s ‘pivot to Asia’ or the post-1989 eastern expansion of NATO membership — is seen as necessary in both Beijing and Moscow. But while Russia reacted to Yanukovich’s ouster by openly (and militarily) asserting its interests in Crimea, China’s interventions in regional and global politics have been more nuanced. On the one hand, Beijing’s construction activities in the South China Sea point to the regime’s resolve when it comes to defining and defending core interests. On the other hand, its ‘March westwards’ seeks to ease tensions by developing opportunities for cooperation with the US along its ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative.³¹ The new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is an intriguing example of how Beijing desires not merely to exert power within the international system, but to exert it in such a way as to reshape the system itself. Rather than use bilateral agreements to fund regional development projects, the regime has created a multilateral institution — a new world bank — in which China has a significant, but not majority, stake of 26 percent.³² Despite persistent Chinese overtures, Washington has so far declined to participate. However, several of its closest allies are among the states that have signed up, including Britain, Germany, France, Australia and South Korea.

Such differences of approach between Russia and China hint at one of the factors militating against the evolution of their partnership into a more permanent alliance — the absence of a shared positive normative agenda. Again, this point may be further explicated by reference to the annexation of Crimea.

³¹ Wang Jisi, ‘Marching Westwards: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy’, *Global Times*, 17 October 2012, cited in Michael Clarke ‘Beijing’s March West: Opportunities and Challenges for China’s Eurasian Pivot.’ *Orbis*, 2016, pp. 2-3.

³² Jane Perlez, ‘China Creates a World Bank of Its Own, and the U.S. Balks’, *The New York Times*, 4 December 2015.

The normative implications of the annexation of Crimea

Determining how Russian and Chinese responses to the annexation of Crimea fit with the prevailing interpretation of international norms is not straightforward. International law is often fuzzy and ambiguous — to a large extent, states make law by their words and deeds. This means that any evaluation of the legality of Crimea’s annexation cannot be based purely on objective criteria (e.g. reference to existing treaties and custom). Whether Russia’s action is a violation of international law depends significantly on whether other states *treat* it as such. Thus, in Ukraine as elsewhere, law and politics are inextricably linked, and battles over territory and resources are fought in the realm of ideas as well as on the ground.

In relation to Crimea, Russian authorities sought to push an official narrative that combined the rightful return of the Crimean peninsula ‘to the motherland’ with a responsibility to protect (R2P) type claim of humanitarian protection. This narrative emphasised the national and cultural identity of Russian speakers in Crimea — privileging the unity of co-nationals and the need to protect them from a hostile new regime in Kiev over respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Despite its potential to encourage secession, this interpretation has been met sympathetically in China. A former military attaché to Russia and former People’s Liberation Army general, Wang Hai Yun, for example, blamed the West for the conflict, because it had instigated a ‘colour revolution’ that resulted in Ukraine being ruled by an illegitimate, pro-Western government.³³ Wang, choosing the perspective of pro-establishment Russian historians, argued that Crimea ‘is being returned back to Mother [Russia]’s embracing arms’. In this account, Khrushchev’s earlier gesture of giving the peninsula as a ‘gift’

³³ Wang Hai Yun, ‘Zhōngguó bùbì jìyú chéngrèn wūkèlán xīn zhèngfǔ, opinion.huanqiu.com, 2014a, Available at http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2014-03/4869449.html (accessed 21 May 2015); See also Oliver Ait, ‘Ukraine from the Chinese perspective – from cautiousness to pragmatism’, *Eesti Foreign Policy Institute’s monthly paper*, 19 March 2015.

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to the Ukrainian people had ‘no legal validity’, because it merely constituted an alteration of the Soviet Union’s ‘internal administrative boundaries’.³⁴

Framing Crimea’s change of sovereignty in such a manner makes it more compatible with the strong, ongoing support evinced by both China and Russia for the underlying principles of the Westphalian state system, which was entrenched in the Charter of the United Nations and globalised after 1945.³⁵ Wang’s allusion to a Western-instigated colour revolution as the cause of Ukraine’s turmoil is instructive in this regard. It is one example of a broader effort by Chinese and Russian policy makers to redefine that term; taking it from a concept that had positive connotations – denoting the process of self-empowerment of peoples against corrupt and autocratic élites – to a label that stands for an illegitimate attempt by Western powers to subvert states that they seek to control.³⁶ Indeed, Russia’s response to the spread of colour revolutions in

³⁴ Wang Hai Yun, ‘Kè lǐ mǐ yà yǔ zhōngguó lìshǐ wèntí fēi yī huí shì’, Xinhua, 2014b, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2014-03/19/c_126286408.htm (accessed 21 May 2015). Such interpretative logic – which focuses on cultural and historical ties – could potentially support Chinese claims over Hong Kong, and even Taiwan.

³⁵ For China, this support is encapsulated by the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ (FPPC), originally promulgated by China and India in 1954 and re-stated by Xi Jinping on their sixtieth anniversary in 2014. The principles – mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in states’ internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence – mirror the guiding principles of the UN.

³⁶ In 2012, for example, China’s Communist Party newspaper, the People’s Daily, published a major editorial exhorting the Chinese people to beware of the West’s efforts to export democracy and human rights - including via so-called ‘colour revolutions’ (Zhang Chuanjia, Xu Yan, and Chang Peiyu, ‘See through the nature of Western push for human rights and democracy’, ‘Rèn qīng xī fāng ‘mínzhǔ rén rénquán shūchū de shízhì’, *People’s Daily*, 25 May 2012). What Russia has done with the term colour revolution is in fact similar to what China has done to the language of rights – a re-framing of concepts deliberately to detract from, obscure or confuse its original meaning – a process Pils refers to as ‘conceptual dilution’ (Eva Pils, ‘The Dislocation of the Chinese Human Rights Movement A sword and a Shield: China’s human rights lawyers’ in Mosher and Patrick Poon, (eds), China

its immediate neighbourhood echoes the Chinese response to the 1989 non-violent revolutions that brought down communism in Central and Eastern Europe (brutally executed in the Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989). As M.E. Sarrotte astutely noted, in relation to the student protests in Beijing, “[t]he evidence now available from 1989 captures Chinese decisionmakers citing concern about the democratic changes in Eastern Europe as one of their main motivations in deciding how to respond.”³⁷

Hong Kong’s 2014 ‘umbrella movement’ also occurred in the shadow of 1989. This was China’s brush with a potential colour revolution. Despite the efforts of the movement’s leaders explicitly to distance themselves from that revolutionary paradigm, the protests were dismissed by pro-Beijing forces as a Western-backed attempt to destabilise the city state and with it China’s territorial integrity. Widespread acceptance of this narrative, in China and beyond, indicates that this redefinition of ‘colour revolution’ has been at least partially successful.³⁸

In fact, Russian and Chinese intellectuals, opinion-makers and political leaders could see their anti-colour revolution arguments echoed by (and/or were themselves echoing) the many critics of ‘the New World Disorder’ created by the US’s preponderant power.³⁹ Those sympathetic to Russia’s defiant stance were able to draw on

Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, 2009, pp. 141-159; See also Katrin Kinzelbach, ‘Will China’s Rise Lead To a New Normative Order?’ *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights*, 30:3, 2012, pp. 299-332.

³⁷ Sarotte, ‘China’s fear of contagion’, p. 166. More recently this process of mutual learning has been once again reversed. David Shambaugh cites reliable Chinese sources reporting that Putin ‘was instrumental in getting former President Hu Jintao to crack down on civil society, physically grabbing Hu by the lapel at a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit and telling him, ‘If you do not get a grip on these NGOs in China, as we are doing in Russia, you too will have a color revolution!’’, David Shambaugh, *China’s Future?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2016), p. 70.

³⁸ Indeed, Russian television made overt comparison between the Umbrella Movement and the Maidan protests, linking both the US meddling. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point.

³⁹ Tariq Ali, ‘The New World Disorder.’ *London Review of Books* 37:7, 2015, pp. 19-22; Noam Chomsky, ‘After Dangerous Proxy War, Keeping Ukraine Neutral Offers Path to Peace with Russia’, *Democracy Now!*, 2 March

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sophisticated critiques of globalisation (from both the left and the right), as well as deriving support from a number of realist scholars of International Relations.⁴⁰ Chantal Mouffe's influential re-statement of 'Carl Schmitt's warning on the dangers of a unipolar world'⁴¹ appeared timely in this regard, as did John Mearsheimer's musings about Russia's legitimate sphere of interest.⁴²

The unsettled state of international relations is reflected in the unsettled state of international law. With the passing of the United States' post-Cold War hegemonic moment, gone too is its ability to have its interpretation of international law generally accepted, or at least acquiesced in. William W. Burke-White uses the image of a 'multi-hub system' to describe the contemporary landscape in which a variety of established and emerging powers sometimes compete and sometimes cooperate in their ef-

2015, at: http://www.democracynow.org/2015/3/2/noam_chomsky_after_dangerous_proxy_war (accessed 15 June 2015); Richard Sakwa, 'Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands' (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015).

⁴⁰ Putin's defenders often combine scepticism towards colour revolutions with a realist, great power-centred worldview in which the agency of minor players is minimised. Again, this view is echoed in scholarship. Writing in the *Chinese Journal of International Law*, Rein Müllerson cites with approval a former US Ambassador to Russia's claim that Putin had adopted a pro-Western orientation early in his presidency, but that 'in return' he got "colour revolutions" supported by or instigated from Washington'. There is little space in this assessment for the agency of Ukrainians themselves. (See, Rein Müllerson, 'Ukraine: Victim of Geopolitics' *Chinese Journal of International Law* 13:1, 2014, p. 144.)

⁴¹ Chantal Mouffe, C, 'Carl Schmitt's warning on the dangers of a unipolar world', in Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito, eds, *The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global Order* (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 147-153; Cf. also Alberto Toscano, 'Carl Schmitt in Beijing: partisanship, geopolitics and the demolition of the Eurocentric world', *Postcolonial Studies*, 11:4, 2008, pp. 417-433.

⁴² John Mearsheimer, 'Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault', *Foreign Affairs* 93:5, 2014, pp. 77-89. Mearsheimer's article was well received in Beijing. At the 1-2 December 2014 Sino-European Dialogue organised by the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), one of the largest Chinese think-tanks on foreign and security policy, which is closely affiliated with the government, a senior official from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to Mearsheimer to rebut one of the present author's criticisms of Russian and Chinese fears of colour revolution.

forts to shape international legal norms.⁴³ Putin's seizure of Crimea may be a naked exercise of power in the service of geopolitics and 'preventive counterrevolution',⁴⁴ but his attempted justification of it hints at an additional ambition. His defence – which adopts and then subverts well established legal doctrines – is also a direct challenge to the post-war normative order built by the West (which itself appears to have lost the self-confidence necessary to defend it).

This post-war order is underpinned by two conflicting legal norms. On the one hand, respect for the territorial integrity of sovereign states.⁴⁵ On the other hand, the right to self-determination of peoples – popularised as a political concept by US President Woodrow Wilson after the First World War and incorporated into Article 1(2) of the UN Charter – is now generally accepted as a principle of international law, having been 'confirmed, developed, and given more tangible form by consistent State prac-

⁴³ William W Burke-White 'Crimea and the International Legal Order', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 56:4, 2014, pp. 65-80.

⁴⁴ Robert Horvath, *Putin's Preventive Counter-Revolution: Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet Revolution* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).

⁴⁵ In addition to the entrenchment of the principle of territorial integrity in general international law, Ukraine's post-Cold War borders were specifically guaranteed by Russia (along with the US and the UK) in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum (in return for the new regime in Ukraine acceding to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and giving up Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its territory). As a fellow nuclear power, China issued its own unilateral declaration in December 1994, according to which it 'recognizes and respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and stands ready to further develop friendly and cooperative Sino-Ukraine relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' (United Nations General Assembly, 'Letter dated 12 December 1994 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General', A/49/783, 14 December 1994, Forty-ninth session, Agenda item 60, available at: [https://disarmamentlibrary.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/939721e5b418c27085257631004e4fbf/4bd51a4bdd15e65285257687005bbc1f/\\$FILE/A-49-783_China-effective%20intl%20arrangements.pdf](https://disarmamentlibrary.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/939721e5b418c27085257631004e4fbf/4bd51a4bdd15e65285257687005bbc1f/$FILE/A-49-783_China-effective%20intl%20arrangements.pdf) (accessed on 22 February 2016)).

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tice'.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the content and scope of both doctrines are contested and subject to change over time. Territorial integrity and the norm of non-intervention in states' internal affairs have been considerably reshaped in the twenty-first century by increasing acceptance of humanitarian intervention as legitimate in some circumstances, and the concomitant rise of the Responsibility to Protect (a doctrine towards which Russia and China have expressed suspicion and even hostility).⁴⁷

For its part, self-determination was described as a 'right' of all peoples in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). It received a more detailed elaboration in the Friendly Relations Declaration of the UN General Assembly (1970), which also specified that the right could be implemented through the creation of an independent state, integration with an independent state, or 'the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people'. Notably, however, the Friendly Relations Declaration was at pains to qualify the scope of self-determination, emphasising that it must be interpreted in conjunction with the principle of territorial integrity. Thus, self-determination exists as a narrowly circumscribed right, largely elaborated in the context of decolonisation, which overlaps only partially with a 'right' to succession. Nevertheless, it formed an important plank of Putin's normative defence of events in Crimea.

⁴⁶ Daniel Thürer, and Thomas Burri, 'Self-determination', in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., *Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 113-128.

⁴⁷ Non-intervention remains a core norm of international law, but is tempered by a definition of sovereignty that increasingly emphasises state *responsibilities* (including in terms of the treatment of a state's own population) as well as rights. See: Kalevi Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 159.

Russia's (doctrinal) expansionism

Putin could have let his actions in Crimea speak for themselves. The hastily arranged referendum, held under the watchful eyes of Russian troops on March 16, 2014, produced an overwhelming vote in favour of union with Russia, and a law to formalise the incorporation of the new territories was deposited with the Russian Duma two days later. Instead, the Russian President used his March 18 speech to the Duma as an opportunity to justify those actions, passionately and at length.⁴⁸ Central to his exposition was a greatly expanded notion of self-determination, according to which Crimea's annexation by Russia was the logical and legally-sound fulfilment of the Crimean people's wishes.

In making this case, Putin drew extensively on the precedent set by Kosovo's unilateral secession from Serbia in 2008 – arguing for the equivalence of the two cases and taking the opportunity to chide the West for its hypocrisy.⁴⁹ Important differences, including the absence of serious and systematic human rights violations, such as existed in the lead up to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, were brushed over.⁵⁰ Instead, Yanukovich's ouster was described as a 'coup' executed by 'Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites', which threatened the rights of Crimea's Russian-speakers, forcing them to turn to Russia for help. According to Putin, the new Kiev government's ill-considered – and quickly abandoned – attempt to revise Ukraine's language law was proof of this unacceptable threat.⁵¹ To be sure, the post-

⁴⁸ Vladimir Putin, 'Address by President of the Russian Federation', The Kremlin, 18 March 2014, available at: <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889> (accessed 14 May 2015).

⁴⁹ The Kosovo intervention is also a sore point for China. NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 led to massive protests, and is routinely contextualised in terms of China's 'century of humiliation' at the hands of Western powers.

⁵⁰ Putin cleverly turned this argument around by claiming that Russian intervention in Crimea prevented large-scale violence of the kind seen in Kosovo. See Putin, 'Address', 2014.

⁵¹ Putin, 'Address', 2014.

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Yanukovich government did face the challenge of establishing its authority and legitimacy in all parts of the country, but it was given barely a month to do so before losing Crimea. Moreover, even accepting that the Crimean people may have had legitimate grievances against Kiev, secession is not an automatic or natural outcome either legally or politically.

The Chinese response: confronting a strategic and normative dilemma

As already noted, China has refrained from overt criticism of Russian actions in Ukraine and, in fact, has offered measured support. However, Beijing cannot be entirely happy with Moscow's broad redefinition of the 'right' to self-determination and its excessive conflation with a 'right' to secession. Indeed, Security Council deliberations on the Arab Spring and its aftermath have shown that China often adheres more strictly to Westphalian norms than the Western creators and heirs of the Westphalian state system themselves.

How then to explain China's muted reaction to such a flagrant violation of Ukraine's sovereignty? Part of the answer lies in the fact that the principle of self-determination and, accompanying it, Putin's expansive notion of a state's right to protect co-nationals abroad, was only part of his normative defence of Russia's position. In fact, Putin's March 18 speech sets out a three-pronged justification of the annexation of Crimea: (1) that it merely fulfilled the wishes of the Crimean people in line with their right to self-determination; (2) that justice, on the basis of deep historical and cultural ties, demanded the reunification of Crimea and Russia; and (3) that Russian security interests (particularly in preventing further eastward expansion of NATO

and the EU) made the annexation imperative.⁵² It was the latter two points, rather than the first, that most resonated with the regime in Beijing.

Moreover, China's strategic interests are served by the emergence of alternative norm-producing 'hubs', which challenge the dominance of Western values in international law. Indeed, Russia has the same interest in China's rise.⁵³ As already noted, Beijing under President Xi has become more forthright in engaging in norm entrepreneurship in its own region, including the November 2013 unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, which includes airspace above disputed islands. The government has recently reiterated that it reserves the right to establish a similar ADIZ in the South China Sea.⁵⁴

The South China Sea (in which Russia does not have any territorial claims) may well emerge as another site for the public performance of the Sino-Russian partnership. The sea and its islands are subject to a myriad of overlapping and conflicting claims by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. On 12 July 2016, a tribunal constituted under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled against China's claims to sovereignty over almost the entirety of the sea and its islands, on the basis of the so-called 'nine dash line', in a case brought by the

⁵² In relation to the third prong, Putin stated (perhaps betraying the cynicism of the self-determination argument) that '[F]or all the internal processes within the organisation, NATO remains a military alliance, and we are against having a military alliance making itself at home right in our backyard or in our historic territory. I simply cannot imagine that we would travel to Sevastopol to visit NATO sailors.' (Putin, 'Address', 2014.)

⁵³ James D. J. Brown, 'Towards an Anti-Japanese Territorial Front? Russia and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 67:6, 2015, p. 900.

⁵⁴ For a detailed discussion of the Chinese justification of ADIZs, and their position under international law, see Michael D. Swaine, 'Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone', *China Leadership Monitor* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 03 February 2014, available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/03/chinese-views-and-commentary-on-east-china-sea-air-defense-identification-zone> (accessed 22 February 2016).

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Philippines. The decision was rejected by Beijing, which has consistently refused to recognise the tribunal's jurisdiction, preferring instead to deal with its neighbours bilaterally, thus giving it a considerable advantage in terms of size and strength. During the proceedings, China called on Russia to support its stance and Moscow obliged, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov joining his Chinese counterpart in opposing the 'internationalisation' of the territorial dispute.⁵⁵ This was followed, in September 2016, by the holding of Sino-Russian naval exercises in the South China Sea.⁵⁶

Nevertheless, there are limits to the Sino-Russian partnership. There is little evidence for a coherent worldview or unified alternative vision underlying their actions (i.e. there is little evidence of *joint* norm entrepreneurship). This point may be explicated by considering Chinese approaches to world order. One such 'big idea',⁵⁷ which has attracted considerable academic interest, is captured in the concept of *tianxia* (天下- 'all under heaven'). According to *tianxia*, the ideal (utopia) of Universal Great Harmony (*Dàtóng*) 大同 is built on a holistic understanding of a relationship between 'father and sons in the Confucian family, unequal but benign.'⁵⁸ Where Western world views of realism or geopolitics assume dichotomy and opposition between self and others (state and other states; civil society and the state; individuals

⁵⁵ Zhen Liu, 'China seeks Russian help over sea row', *The South China Morning Post*, 20 April 2016, p. 1.

⁵⁶ Gabriel Wildau, 'China and Russia launch joint naval drills in South China Sea', *The Financial Times*, 12 September 2016, <https://www.ft.com/content/918e30ec-78ad-11e6-97ae-647294649b28>.

⁵⁷ Callahan uses this classification to classify *tianxia*'s utopian quality as of similar proportions as the idealised Western concepts of 'International society' (for the English School), or 'Democratic Peace' (for US International Relations theory). See William A. Callahan, 'Nationalizing International Theory: The Emergence of the English School and IR Theory with Chinese Characteristics', paper presented at IR Theory in the 21st Century: British and Chinese Perspectives, Renmin University of China (Renmin University: Beijing, 2002).

⁵⁸ Qin Yaqing, 'Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?', in Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, eds, *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia*, (Abingdon / New York: Taylor & Francis, 2010), p. 42.

and the state), *tianxia* dissolves all opposition into a one-ness of order. Indeed, promotion of a harmonious world order continues to be a major theme in the rhetoric of high-ranking Chinese officials,⁵⁹ although, as Shih and Yin argue, the difficulty of reconciling such aspirations with the requirements of a national interest-driven foreign policy create something of a ‘self-role conflict’ for Chinese policy makers.⁶⁰

Tianxia appears to defy the Schmittian conception of the political in that it absorbs any potentially hostile ‘other’ through ‘化 (*Huà*)’ (transformation) from the outside into the inside, turning the inevitability of enemies into the natural state of friendship or, at least, non-confrontation.⁶¹ The concept’s rejection of antagonism and confrontation also sits comfortably with China’s antipathy towards alliances.⁶² This, in turn, casts doubt over the long-term durability of the China-Russian ‘strategic partnership’, as does China’s greater susceptibility to reputational pressures.⁶³

Yet, there is opposing evidence suggesting that ‘in terms of ideology and core national interests’ China and Russia do have similar views.⁶⁴ Indeed, the two countries’ stances grow more aligned when it comes to the domestic ‘price’ to be paid for

⁵⁹ Qin Yaqing, ‘Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and China’s International Strategy’, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 7:3, 2014.

⁶⁰ Shih Chih-yu and Yin Jiwu, ‘Between Core National Interest and a Harmonious World: Reconciling Self-role Conceptions in Chinese Foreign Policy’, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 6:1, 2013, pp. 59-84.

⁶¹ The defiance is only ‘apparent’ in the sense that Schmitt would argue that *tianxia* merely masks, rather than resolves, political conflicts.

⁶² Fu’s restatement of China’s official line (Fu, ‘How China Sees Russia’ 2016, pp. 97;104-105) here reflects China’s foreign policy rationale since the end of the Second World War. As Foot puts it: ‘China is neither part of, nor determinedly seeking to build, anti-hegemonic coalitions.’ Rosemary Foot, ‘Chinese Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging.’ *International Affairs*, 82:1, 2006, p. 94.

⁶³ Zeng Jinghan, Xiao Yuefan, and Shaun Breslin, ‘Securing China’s core interests: the state of the debate in China’, *International Affairs*, 91:2, 2015, p. 265.

⁶⁴ Wacker, ‘The Irreversible Rise’, 2015, p. 69.

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the *tianxia* utopia: a new form of hierarchy⁶⁵ in which democracy is substituted by a ‘careful observation of social trends’ by a ‘Confucian-Leninist elite’ with the value of order superseding that of freedom.⁶⁶ As it applies to intrastate relations, *tianxia* is not unlike Putin’s concept of managed democracy. Thus, while Russian and Chinese foreign policy principles are certainly not identical, a common threat perception is complemented by a commitment to respect – and internationally support – each other’s self-defined ‘core national interest’ (whether it be in Crimea or the South China Sea) and to work together to oppose external meddling.⁶⁷ The apparent inconsistencies of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership may thus be dissolved by conceptualising it as an ‘axis of convenience’.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Callahan argues that the concept of *tianxia* will reify hegemonic order through ‘China’s hierarchical governance’, and critiques the concept by claiming that ‘*tianxia* is a hierarchical system that values order over freedom, ethics over law, and elite governance over democracy and human rights.’ See William A. Callahan, ‘Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-Hegemonic or a New Hegemony?’ *International Studies Review*, 10:4, 2008, p. 753). He goes on to argue that the hierarchy it propagates also implicitly endorses “racism” (by classifying cultural qualities) and “imperialism” (through conversion rather than conquest) (p. 756).

⁶⁶ Callahan, ‘Chinese Visions of World Order’, 2008, p. 752., cited in Zhao Tingyang, ‘Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun [The Tianxia system: A Philosophy for the World Institution]’, (Nanjing Jiangsu: Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2005).

⁶⁷ For example, we could expect China to claim Russian support in the case of a crisis in cross-strait relations prompted by a Taiwanese independence movement. An expectation for Russia to limit its economic ties with Taiwan, conduct joint military exercises and provide diplomatic support would hail from a joint commitment to ‘strongly oppose [...] separatist movements’ (See, Shelley Rigger, ‘The Taiwan Issue and the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership’, in James Bellacqua, ed., *The Future of China-Russia Relations: The View from Beijing* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010). The apparent contradiction with both Russian and Chinese rhetoric over Crimea could be resolved by focusing on the themes of history, national and cultural identity, and core national interests, rather than any putative right to self-determination (via full independence) on the part of the Taiwanese people.

⁶⁸ Bobo Lo, *Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics* (London: Chatham House, 2008), cited in Tim Summer, ‘Russia–China relations in the post-crisis international order. By Marcin Kaczmarek’, *International Affairs*, 91:6, 2015, p. 1441.

The new world order – an emerging anti-Western alliance or genuine multilateralism?

Two years after Russia's seizure of the Crimean Peninsula, the crisis which that event prompted has undoubtedly pushed Russia and China closer together. In the economic realm, the impact of international sanctions is forcing Russia to search for new partners, of which China has emerged as the most important. Thus, for example, the two countries signed two major energy deals in 2014, involving China's purchase of Russian natural gas.⁶⁹

Political and diplomatic cooperation between Russia and China is evident in major international forums, such as the United Nations Security Council. A shared opposition to the dilution of Westphalian sovereignty principles has led the two states to veto four resolutions on Syria since 2011. Vitaly Churkin, the Russian ambassador to the UN, justified this course of action as necessary to prevent the Security Council from engaging in 'regime change operations'.⁷⁰ This suspicion that the West is cynically manipulating international legal and humanitarian norms to remove unfriendly governments captures the shared fear that animates the contemporary Sino-Russian strategic partnership - colour revolutions within, and geopolitical marginalisation without. According to this narrative, Russia's intervention in Ukraine was a corrective to Western interference in that country (culminating in the removal of the Yanokovich regime), rather than a hypocritical replication of the very policies that Russian and Chinese leaders have denounced in the Middle East and elsewhere.

⁶⁹ Jane Perlez and Neil MacFarquhar, 'Friendship Between Putin and Xi Becomes Strained as Economies Falter', *The New York Times*, 3 September 2015. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/asia/friendship-between-putin-and-xi-becomes-strained-as-economies-falter.html?_r=0 (accessed 5 September 2015).

⁷⁰ Julian Borger and Bastien Inzaurrealde, 'Russian vetoes are putting UN security council's legitimacy at risk, says US', *The Guardian*, 23 September 2015. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/23/russian-vetoes-putting-un-security-council-legitimacy-at-risk-says-us> (accessed 23 September 2015).

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When it comes to Syria, Russia has gone much further, launching a massive bombing campaign in September 2015, which has helped to turn the five-year old civil war in the regime's favour, largely at the expense of 'moderate' rebels, some of whom are backed by the West.⁷¹ Indeed, the contrast between Russian decisiveness and Western equivocation is perhaps even starker in Syria than it is in Crimea and Ukraine. A total disregard for international humanitarian law combined with a lack of squeamishness in its choice of allies, allows Russia to create new 'facts on the ground' with a brutal effectiveness unmatched by any liberal democratic state.

The reconstruction of historical memory is also playing a role in nurturing a sense of shared purpose between the Chinese and Russian nations. President Xi Jinping was guest of honour at Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 9, 2015, which marked the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany. Western European and US leaders were conspicuously absent from the commemorations, which featured the Putin-era's now customary display of military hardware and nationalistic sentiment. Indeed, Xi even honoured his hosts with a long article in *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*,⁷² in which he celebrated China and Russia's heroic historical stance against the evils of 'fascism and militarism' and extolled their continued commitment to peace, development and international cooperation.

The sincerity of China's commitment to peaceful development and to multilateralism may be questioned — not least by its rejection of multilateral solutions to ter-

⁷¹ Liz Sly and Zakaria Zakaria, 'Why the Syrian cease-fire probably won't work', *The Washington Post*, 12 February 2016.

⁷² Xi Jinping, 'Remember History, Open Up the Future', Chinese Foreign Ministry, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, 6 May 2015, available at <http://www.rg.ru/2015/05/06/knr-site.html> (accessed on 22 February 2016).

ritorial disputes in the South China Sea.⁷³ Furthermore, Beijing hosted a large-scale military parade of its own later in the year, when it commemorated the 70th anniversary of Japan's defeat in the Second World War. Appropriately, Putin was guest of honour at that event, which saw Xi presiding over a parade involving 12,000 soldiers and 500 pieces of military hardware, including nuclear-capable missiles.⁷⁴ This was a show of strength designed to impress both domestic and international audiences. Like the Moscow parade, China's commemoration was notable for the absence of high-level western leaders, most having decided to avoid the event so as not to be seen to be endorsing Xi's chauvinistic and stridently anti-Japanese rhetoric.

Their absence created a curious effect. Xi and Putin were able to mark their decades-old victory over global fascism with little reference to the role played by the Western allies (or, indeed, the Chinese Nationalists) and none at all to their own countries' troubled diplomatic history.⁷⁵ Despite the Western snub, around 30 leaders were in Beijing for the commemoration, and troops from 17 states marched in the parade. There is no doubt that China's diplomatic clout is rising. Under Xi, the regime appears to have both the ambition and capacity to cement its status as a global norm-entrepreneur and an alternative hub around which states may group.⁷⁶

⁷³ Where China was recently accused of installing missile launchers on a disputed island ('South China Sea dispute: US attacks China 'militarisation'). *BBC*, 17 February 2016, available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35600599> (accessed 19 February 2016).

⁷⁴ 'China's military parade was a 'peaceful' show of force'. *Washington Post*, 4 September 2015, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-peaceful-show-of-force/2015/09/04/bb48e12e-531b-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html (accessed 19 September 2015).

⁷⁵ Xi's tribute to the Sino-Russian bond in *Rossiiskaia Gazeta* was also notable for its omission of any reference – positive, or negative – to the role of the Western allies in the Second World War. This seems to be a recurring theme of both Chinese and Russian commemorations of the conflict.

⁷⁶ The current regime's greater willingness to assert itself and to exercise political leadership has been described in the context of a shift from a foreign policy of 'keeping a low profile' (instigated by Deng Xiaoping) to one of

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Nevertheless, the Sino-Russian axis faces a number of practical challenges. As Andreas Umland notes, Russia's international isolation, declining economy and erratic politics make it an increasingly risky business partner for China.⁷⁷ Unfavourable economic conditions, including falling commodity prices, are also having a negative effect on collaborative projects, including the two energy deals mentioned above, which are progressing much more slowly than expected.⁷⁸ At the same time, as Wacker highlights, 'the U.S. and the EU are still China's biggest markets and remain indispensable for its modernisation goals.'⁷⁹

In the political realm, the image suggested by Aglaya Snetkov and Marc Lanteigne of China as 'cautious partner' to Russia's 'loud dissenter' is apt — whilst the former has become more assertive under Xi, it does not seek the sort of spoiler role embraced by Putin's Russia.⁸⁰ This seems to be corroborated by China's Security Council veto record — all six Chinese vetoes of the past decade have coincided with Russian vetoes. China has not vetoed any measure on its own since 1999. Finally, a lack of a positive normative agenda (comparable to that which underlies European

'striving for achievement', advocated by Xi. See Yan Xuetong, 'From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 7:2, 2014.

⁷⁷ Andreas Umland, 'Towards a "Greater Asia"? The Prospects of a Sino-Russian Entente', *Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) Blogs*, 2015, available at http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/digest/?id_4=1857 (accessed 21 May 2015).

⁷⁸ The *New York Times* reports that '[t]he bilateral trade that was predicted to amount to more than \$100 billion this year [2015] instead reached only about \$30 billion in the first six months, largely because of a reduced Chinese demand for Russian oil.' See Jane Perlez, and Neil MacFarquhar, 'Friendship Between Putin and Xi Becomes Strained as Economies Falter', *The New York Times*, 3 September 2015, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/asia/friendship-between-putin-and-xi-becomes-strained-as-economies-falter.html?_r=0 (accessed 5 September 2015).

⁷⁹ Wacker, 'The Irreversible Rise', 2015, p. 69.

⁸⁰ Marc Lanteigne, and Aglaya Snetkov, 'The Loud Dissenter and its Cautious Partner' — Russia, China, global governance and humanitarian intervention,' *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 15: 1, 2015 pp. 113–146.

integration, for example), also points to the partnership remaining *ad hoc* and contingent on a mutually beneficial definition of core interests.⁸¹

There are, then, opportunities for the West to use normative and foreign policy differences between Russia and China to drive a wedge between them. Contemporary China's investment in global stability makes it a potential partner against destabilising forces. However, as Burke-White notes, such cooperative opportunities will not emerge by accident, rather they must be cultivated by the United States and its European partners.⁸² Rising powers, China foremost amongst them, have or will become norm-producers in their own right; an important question is whether they can be co-opted into the existing post-war legal order, or whether they will re-make it through their norm entrepreneurship.

Conclusion

Given the often obstructionist way in which the Sino-Russian partnership has operated, particularly in the UN, we may doubt Lavrov's description of it as 'a co-operation model for the 21st century'. Against the backdrop of Russia's intervention in Ukraine and China's tacit support for it, his insistence that both countries 'consistently advocate the creation of a new polycentric world order resting on international law, respect for unique national identities, [and] the right of nations to independently

⁸¹ See Andreas Umland, 'Towards a "Greater Asia"?' 2015. Thus Umland concludes that 'Neither in cultural, nor in economic terms, can China constitute an adequate replacement of the West as Russia's prime partner. Instead, the risks stemming from conflicting interests and the geographical proximity of the two large countries outweigh the opportunities for a close alliance.' This echoes Shlapentokh's earlier assessment of Russia's ambivalence towards China. While Russian élites have attempted to see in China 'an ally against the United States', they have found it difficult to overcome their fear of their neighbour as 'a potentially dangerous adversary with an eye on the vast territory of Siberia and the Far East' (Shlapentokh, 'China in the Russian mind today', p. 3).

⁸² William W Burke-White, 'Crimea and the International Legal Order', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 56: 4, 2014, pp. 75-77.

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choose their own development models' is inaccurate. So too is his claim that both states 'resolutely oppose efforts to impose one's will on sovereign states, including by force, unilateral sanctions and the use of double standards.'⁸³

A deeper appraisal of contemporary Sino-Russian relations also behoves us not to mistake mutual respect for core national interests for a complementary world view, or a Western-style alliance based on common values, a positive normative agenda and enduring loyalty. A considerable gap remains between China and Russia both on the strategic substance (China's rejection of alliances) and the conduct of foreign policy (Russian assertiveness vs. Chinese prudence). While 'alliance' may be a misnomer, a common Sino-Russian threat perception and mutual respect for core national interests is not inconsequential. It has prompted concerted behaviour which is capable of reframing the Western order. Both China and Russia use the same vocabulary as the West, yet their meaning is often different. Their talk about multilateralism, self-determination, sovereignty and the need for mutual respect, 'satirises' those concepts.⁸⁴ To be sure, the West has not always lived up to its own ideals, its frequent failures exploited by Russia and China for their own purposes. Whether and how they succeed in doing so depends not just on their creativity as norm entrepreneurs (rather than mere norm dilutors), but also on the willingness and determination of key Western partners to call their bluff.

⁸³ Sergei Lavrov, '70th anniversary of the end of World War II: Lessons from history and new vistas', published in Rossiiskaia Gazeta and Renmin Ribao 24 August 2015, available on the website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://de.mid.ru/de/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1679408?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB, (accessed 22 February 2016).

⁸⁴ Elizabeth Cullen Dunn and Michael S. Bobick, 'The empire strikes back: war without war and occupation without occupation in the Russian sphere of influence', *American Ethnologist*, 41:3, 2014, pp. 405-413.

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KEY AREAS OF VARIATION IN RUSSIAN VERBAL WORD STRESS

1. Introduction

This paper is part of a wider corpus-based approach to variation in Russian word stress currently being carried out by the author. On the basis of variant stress forms (amounting to some 5200 in total) collected from a comprehensive contemporary source (Gorbačevič 2000), key areas, i.e. those types of variation which occur most frequently in the said source, of stress variation in Russian are identified and analysed. As Bybee (2007, 7) writes, ‘Corpus studies often reveal quantitative patterns that are not available to introspection but that are likely to be important to the understanding of how speakers store and access units of language.’ In particular, factors motivating types of variation are delineated, and conclusions regarding the dynamics and possible future directions of change are given. By their very nature, stress variants represent some degree of ambivalence, which, presumably, in the future will be resolved in one way or another. In addition, stress variation generally operates at the ‘fault lines’ of the phonological system, in those areas (typically known to learners as the difficult areas of Russian stress) where there is tension between two or more competing motivations for a particular stress position or type, and an appropriate corpus of such forms can offer an overview of such areas based on a categorisation of forms. The aim of this paper is to analyse and outline the dynamics of some of the most common areas stress variation in Russian verbs.

Words with variation in stress allow the possibility of two, or occasionally more, syllables on which the stress may fall in a given word form without any difference in meaning (though stylistic differentiation can be and, indeed, generally is a fac-

tor). Thus, for example, the future tense of the verb *разгородить* ‘to partition’ is given in standard lexicographical sources (e.g. *ORD* 1993) as either *разгорожy*, *разгорóдишь* (i.e. as either having fixed ending stress or mobile stress) without any finer distinction between the two forms, while the verb *позвонить* ‘to call (telephone)’ has variation in the future tense which is, however, marked by the stylistic distinction *позвоню́, позвони́шь* (*позвонишь* ‘not recommended’) (Gorbačevič 2000). Stylistic distinctions, of course, vary between different scholars, each having his or her ‘subjective pick’. In Es’kova’s dictionary (Es’kova 1994), for example, five categories of variation are included on a scale ranging from, at the most tolerant level, a) absolutely equivalent variants (e.g. *искристый* vs. *искри́стый* ‘sparkling’), b) two normative forms of which one is basic and the other allowed or allowed/obsolescent, to the non-normative c) not recommended or not recommended/obsolescent, then d) incorrect, and, finally, e) the rather colourfully named ‘грубо неправильно’, e.g. *мага́зин* vs. correct *магазин* ‘shop’. Gorbačevič (2000), the main source of the current project, arranges such distinctions from (in descending order of correctness) ‘acceptable’, ‘not recommended’, ‘sub-standard’ to ‘incorrect’, as well as the specific category of ‘professional speech’ which is evaluated differently and more objectively than the previous four types. More will follow on this below.

There are two main, distinct areas of stress variation in Russian. Firstly, variation may occur in one or more inflected forms of a word, as in the example above of *разгородить* (cf. the infinitive and four past tense forms without variation (unlike the variant future-tense forms): *разгородить*; *разгородил*, *разгородила*, *разгородило*, *разгородили*). Secondly, in contrast, a word can be characterised by stress variation in all its forms: essentially this results from variation occurring in the base form (i.e. nom. sg. of nouns, nom. sg. masc. of adjectives, the infinitive of verbs). Thus, if we take the verb *премировать* ‘to award a bonus’, which in Gorbačevič (2000) is given

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as either *преми́ровать* (though ‘not recommended’) or *премирова́ть*, one finds that one is dealing with two different accentual paradigms: in the case of *преми́ровать* it is a paradigm with fixed stress on the initial suffixal syllable (e.g. present tense *преми́рую, преми́руешь*), and in the case of *премирова́ть* it is a paradigm with fixed stress on the final suffixal syllable (e.g. *премиру́ю, премиру́ешь*). This type of stress variation plays a prominent role in Russian derivational stress: words containing the same suffix may either form uniform categories in terms of stress (so called ‘dominant’ suffixes such as *-изи́ровать* with stress always, that is, without *any* exception, on the same stem syllable, e.g. *идеализи́ровать* ‘to idealise’), or a more complex ‘pattern’ may occur with stress occurring in two or more different syllabic positions in different words or even in the same word. An example of the latter pattern is provided by the verbal suffix *-ировать* which can be stressed on the final or pre-penultimate syllable in different verbs: thus *маскирова́ть* ‘to mask’ versus *телефони́ровать* ‘to telephone’. There are also individual verbs with both stress positions permitted in standard sources (without any distinction in meaning, but with possible different stylistic evaluation), e.g. *татуирова́ть/татуи́ровать* ‘to tattoo’ (Zaliznjak 2010).

Other types of stress variation which are less common and play a minor role in the current paper are the following:

a) free variation occurs in a relatively small number of cases of stress variation where a non-derived word, or, at least, word whose morphology is perceived to be non-derived, has two free, legitimate stress positions in its initial form (and, therefore, two different stress paradigms) with no difference in meaning and, therefore, no apparent motivation other than etymological, e.g. *творо́г* ‘curd cheese’;

b) semantic cases of stress variation are those when a different stress is connected to a different meaning, i.e. these are homographs, e.g. *на́рпуть* ‘to steam’ and *нари́уть* ‘to soar’.

c) dialectal differences of stress have limited effect on the standard language, since they are essentially restricted by geography, education, the standardising role of the spoken media and social class. In particular, southern Russian dialects differ from standard Russian in some areas of stress (e.g. acc. sg. non-retracted stress for fem. nouns with retracted stress in the standard language: *водѹ́, ногѹ́* vs. standard *водѹ, ногѹ*) (see Cubberley 2002, 326). However, the mobile stress pattern for second-conjugation verbs (see 2.1 below) is originally the result of the influence of southern Russian dialects, though the forms themselves are not generally classified as such.

2. Areas of variation

In the following sections, the most frequently occurring types of verbal stress variation in Russian are analysed and presented, based on data collated from a contemporary comprehensive source (Gorbačevič 2000) by a noted expert in the area (see, for example, discussions of word stress in Russian by Gorbačevič (1978a, 1978b)). The relevant words (taken from Gorbačevič (2000)) in each section (with the exception of the suffix *-ировать*) are listed, but not presented in tables owing to limitations of space. The four most commonly occurring areas of stress variation identified in this source are, in descending order, the present and future tense forms of second-conjugation verbs (929 forms), past passive participles in *-енный/-ённый* (though, of course, adjectival in form, but are included here as verbal derivations) (660), variation in the past tense forms of verbs (divided further into reflexive and non-reflexive) (422 in total, 146 and 276 of each type respectively), and verbs with the suffix *-ировать* (84). The first three of these types, therefore, collectively comprise approximately 40 percent of all variant forms in Russian (approximately 2000 out of 5200 lexemes), a significant proportion.

In her study of the effects of frequency on language (Bybee 2007, 9-15) distinguishes between tokens and types: token frequency counts ‘the number of times a unit appears in running text [...]’, but ‘[o]nly patterns of language have type frequency, because this refers to how many distinct items are represented by the pattern.’ While token frequency has been included in a previous study of Russian stress (Lagerberg 2011), the present article is both restricted by space and more concerned in the first instance with type frequency (albeit with some discussion of token frequency within this) in an attempt to document the main areas of Russian word stress in which variation occurs. Certainly the broader project in progress will take more account of token frequency within each type, which, in agreement with Bybee’s work, clearly plays a role in Russian stress assignment (see Lagerberg 2011, 128-130).

2.1 Present/future tense forms of second-conjugation verbs

There has been a general tendency in second-conjugation verbs in *-ить* with ending stress in the (imperfective) present / (perfective) future forms (characterised in the modern language by *говори́ть* ‘to speak’, *говору́ю*, *говори́шь*, *говори́т* etc.) towards a mobile stress type, i.e. ending stress in the first person singular and stem stress in all the remaining forms (characterised by *кури́ть* ‘to smoke’, *куру́ю*, *кури́шь*, *кури́т* etc.) (see, for example, Voroncova 1979, 204-236, for a detailed account). Variation between the two types of stress, however, is extensive and is exemplified in a well known example - the present tense of the verb *звони́ть* ‘to call, telephone’, whose stem-stressed variants are generally deprecated in dictionaries and grammars of Russian: 1st p. sg. *звону́ю*, but 2nd p. sg. *звони́шь*, 3rd p. sg. *звони́т* etc. Verbs of a higher style (and lower frequency, especially in everyday speech), which include Church Slavonicisms (e.g. *благослови́ть* ‘to bless’), tend to have fixed ending stress.

As a result, this ongoing stress shift has resulted in a large number of variants in the language, in which the newer stress pattern (i.e. mobile) has failed to oust com-

pletely the more traditional forms with ending stress. In one well known case, that of *звонить* quoted above, the choice of stress is a type of shibboleth, indicative of the educational and/or provincial status of the speaker, the newer form in this case (*звонишь, звонит* etc.) representing the ‘lower’ end of the scale. More recently, however, this situation has changed to some extent, so that Gorbačevič (2000, 72-73) admits the opinion of one linguist on the ‘artificial character’ of the case against mobile stress in this word, though he also includes (which is unusual for a dictionary) humorous anecdotal evidence against this non-standard stress pattern and classifies it as ‘not recommended’.

As Comrie (1996, 87) points out, the situation is complicated further by the fact that reflexive verbs formed from transitive verbs in *-ить* may have a different stress from the verb from the related non-reflexive verb, e.g. *садить* (mobile stress) ‘to plant, put down’ vs. *садиться* ‘to sit down’ (ending stress). Stankiewicz (1993, 212), however, classifies this efficiently by a general rule according to which such transitive verbs tend to have mobile stress (*сажу́, садишь*), whereas intransitive (including, of course, reflexive) ones have ending stress (*сажусь, садишься*).

Comrie (1996, 88-89) also points out that the tendency towards mobile stress in verbs in *-ить* (which he views as a particularly clear case of southern dialect influence) is unusual in that it actually increases the amount of stress variability in the verbal forms rather than reducing it, i.e. it is a reverse kind of analogy. As he states (*ibid.*, 89), ‘learned, less frequent words tend to retain fixed stress, while everyday words acquire mobile stress.’ This may even become lexicalised as in the case of *просветить* (‘to shine through’ - mobile stress) vs. *просветить* (‘to enlighten’ - fixed ending stress). Nevertheless, though it is perhaps unusual for an ‘anomalous’ type of stress (in the sense that the mobile stress pattern actually increases the amount of syllabic stress positions) to become the dominant model and, therefore, attract more

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words towards itself (rather than merely retain those words which already exist within the given pattern), in fact the pattern of higher frequency correlated to anomalous stress type, which can be viewed as the general type for Russian stress variation, is repeated here with the added factor of the type actually acquiring numerous new members. This should not be surprising in such a large and important class of verbs.

One can also view this tendency as analogous to singular/plural stress opposition in nouns, so that present/future stress on the stem is opposed to ending stress in the infinitive/past tense. The differentiation of the 2nd p. pl. and plural imperative, viz *кúрите/курíte* respectively, may also play a role in this. Of course, the first person singular is at odds with this, since it always has ending stress in verbs with infinitive stress *-ítъ*, but that much must be put down to historical factors which are irreversible given the high frequency of this form. Certainly, though, where variation exists between mobile and ending stress in individual verbs, even where the former is deprecated, the direction of change would appear to be overall in the direction of mobile stress (i.e. towards the mobile stress type of *куритъ*). This is certainly borne out by the data in the corpus.

Of the some 900 variant forms of second-conjugation verbs in *-итъ* (or occasionally *-еть*) listed by Gorbačevič (2000) (the verbs are listed below), the majority display a clear shift towards mobile stress from desinential stress. Forms with the stylistically censorious labels ‘incorrect’, ‘not recommended’ and ‘acceptable’ show overwhelming evidence towards the (pattern *c*, mobile) type of stress of *курítъ* in the present/perfective future tense in the modern language, i.e. *курjó, кúришь, кúрит* etc. To take just a few examples from the many available in the corpus, we find *графитъ* ‘to rule (lines)’ (*графлю́, графíт* (‘неправ.’ *гра́фит*)); *кривítъ* ‘to bend’ (*кривлю́, кривíт* (‘не рек.’ *крíвит*)); *уместítъ* ‘find room for’ (perf. fut. tense *умеи́т, умести́т* (‘допуст.’ *уме́стит*)). In some rarer cases there is no stylistic vari-

ation, e.g. *городить* ‘to enclose’ (*горожѹ, городѹт/горѹдит*). In conjunction with this, forms deprecated temporally (i.e. as archaic and obsolescent) confirm the general trend from pattern *b* to pattern *c*, e.g. *наточить* ‘to sharpen’ (*наточѹ, натѹчит* (‘устарелое’ *натѹчит*)); *разгрузить* ‘to unload’ (*разгружѹ, разгружѹт* (‘устаревающее’ *разгружѹт*). The overall picture that emerges from the corpus data, therefore, is of current pressure towards pattern-*c* stress (realised in these cases as stylistically deprecated mobile variants) and an ongoing move away from pattern-*b* stress (realised in these cases as temporally deprecated variants with ending stress). Counter examples are few and far between, indicating a wholesale movement, but the following verbs are noted with ‘incorrect’ pattern-*b* variants: *заблудиться, заложить, застрелить(ся), наклонить, явиться*. No difference in the patterns of related reflexive and non-reflexive verbs was noted. In some cases the distinction between transitive and intransitive meanings are preserved as stress variants. Thus, the verb *валить* displays pattern *c* in its transitive sense ‘to knock over’, while pattern *b* is preserved in the intransitive meaning ‘to fall, flock’.

There follows a list of second-conjugation verbs with variant stress in the present/future tense found in Gorbačevič (2000):

белить, блудить, божиться, бороться, бурить, валить, валиться, варить, вариться, вертеть, ввинтить, долбить, вертеть, вертеться, взбесить, взбеситься, взбодрить, взбодриться, взборонить, взбугрить, взвалить, взвинтить, взвинтиться, взмолиться, взмутить, винтить, включить, включиться, вкroить, вкусить, вменить, водрузить, возбудить, возвестить, возложить, волочить, волочиться, воротить, воротиться, ворошить, восхвалить, вперить, вручить, всадить, вселить, вселиться, вскормить, вскружить, вспоить, всучить, вьюжить, гатить, глушить, глушить, голосить, городить, графить, громоздить, грузить, грузиться, губить, дарить, делить,

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делить, дивиться, добелить, добурить, доварить, довинтить, доволочить, доволочиться, догрузить, догрузиться, доделить, дозвониться, доить, доиться, докатить, докатиться, докроить, докрошить, докружиться, докурить, долбить, домолотить, допилить, допойть, досадить, досверлить, доскоблить, досолить, дострочить, дразнить, дружить, дружиться, дубить, забелить, заблудиться, заборонить, забурить, завалить, завалиться, заварить, завариться, завертеть, завертеться, завинтить, завинтиться, заворотить, завьюжить, загатить, заглушить, заглушиться, загородить, загородиться, загрузить, загрузиться, загубить, задарить, задолбить, зазвонить, зазрить, закатить, закатиться, заколоситься, закосить, закрепить, закрепиться, закружить, закружиться, закрутить, закрутиться, закурить, закуриться, залениться, заложить, залучить, заманить, заменить, замирить, замириться, замолить, заморить, замутить, замутиться, запалить, запилить, запорошить, запорошиться, запрудить, зародиться, заронить, заручиться, зарядить, заселить, заселиться, засиненный, заскоблить, заслонить, заслониться, засмолить, засолить, засолиться, засорить, засориться, застрелить, застрелиться, застрочить, застудить, засучить, засушить, затворить, затвориться, заточить, затрубить, затужить, затупить, захоронить, зашевелить, зашевелиться, защемить, звонить, золить, изволочить, издолбить, иззубрить, излениваться, излучить, изменить, измолотить, изморить, изморить, изрешетить, изъявить, изъязвить, искривить, искривиться, искрошить, искрошиться, искупить, иссверлить, исстрочить, иссушить, источить, иступить, катить, катиться, колоситься, копить, коптить, кормить, косить, коситься, кренить, крениться, крепить, крепиться, крестить, креститься, кривить, кривиться, кровоточить, кроить, крошить, крошиться, кружить, кружиться, крутить, крутиться, крушить, курить, куриться, кутить,

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лени́ться, ломить, ломиться, лосни́ться, ло́щить, лудить, лу́щить, мани́ть, месить, ми́рить, ми́риться, мо́лить, мо́литься, мо́лодиться, мо́лотить, мо́рить, мо́стить, му́тить, му́титься, набе́лить, набе́литься, набо́ронить, набу́рить, навалить, навалиться, наварить, навертеть, навинтить, наворожить, наворотить, наглушить, нагородь, нагромоздить, нагрузить, нагрузиться, надарить, наделить, надоить, надолбить, надпилить, надсверлить, наклонить, накопить, накоптить, накосить, накренить, накрениться, накроить, накружиться, накрутить, накрутиться, накурить, накуриться, налу́щить, нама́стить, намолотить, наморить, намостить, намутить, напилить, напоить, напорошить, народить, народиться, нарубить, нарядить, нарядиться, насадить, населить, насинить, наскоблить, наслоить, насмолить, насолить, насолиться, насорить, настрочить, настудить, насучить, засушить, нато́чить, натру́дить, натру́диться, на́цедить, начертить, начинить, начудить, недovarить, недovarиться, недогрузить, недогрузиться, недозвониться, недокатить, недокроить, недопилить, недосо́лить, обвалить, обвалиться, обварить, обвариться, обделить, обелить, обзвонить, облокотить, облокотиться, облучить, облучиться, облущить, обмолотить, обогатить, оборотить, оборотиться, обрешетить, обронить, обручить, обручиться, обрядить, обрядиться, обстрочить, обсудить, оглушить, огородить, огородиться, огранить, огрубить, одарить, оделить, одолжить, одолжиться, оженить, ожеребиться, озолотить, окатить, окатиться, окрестить, окреститься, окружить, окрутить, окурить, омолодить, омолодиться, опериться, опоить, опорожнить, опорожниться, опороситься, опохмелиться, определить, определиться, опростить, опроститься, осадить, осветить, осветиться, оскоблить, осмолить, остолбить, остудить, осудить, осушить, отбелить, отвалить, отвалиться, отварить, отвариться, отвертеть,

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отвинтить, отвинтиться, отворить, отвориться, отвратить, отговорить, отгородить, отгородиться, отгрузить, отделить, отделиться, отдоить, отелиться, отеплить, отзвонить, отклеить, отклеиться, отклонить, отклониться, отключить, отключиться, открепить, открепиться, откреститься, откроить, открутить, отлучить, отманить, отменить, отмолить, отмолотить, оторочить, отпилить, отпоить, отпустить, отравить, отравиться, отрастить, отрядить, отселить, отселиться, отсинить, отскоблить, отслоить, отсрочить, отцепить, оценить, оцепить, очинить, очутиться, оцнить, оцнить, оцнить, оцнить, оцнить, оцнить, оцнить, перебелить, перебеситься, переварить, переволочить, переворошить, перегородить, перегородиться, перегрузить, перегрузиться, переделить, передоить, перезарядить, перезвонить, переключить, перекрестить, перекроить, перекрутить, перекрутиться, переманить, переменить, перемолотить, переморить, переоценить, перепилить, перепоить, переполошить, переполошиться, перераспределить, переселить, переселиться, пересинить, пересластить, переслоить, пересолить, пересолиться, пересушить, перетрудиться, перехвалить, перехоронить, переценить, перечертить, пилить, плодоносить, побелить, побожиться, побудить, повалить, повалиться, поварить, повариться, поволочить, поворотить, поворотиться, поворошить, повторить, повториться, поглотить, поглотиться, поглушить, погрузить, погрузиться, подарить, подбодрить, подбодриться, подвинтить, подгрузить, поделить, поделиться, подзарядить, подзубрить, подивиться, подклеить, подключить, подключиться, подкопнуть, подкосить, подкрепить, подкрепиться, подманить, подменить, подоить, подпоить, подружиться, подрядить, подрядиться, подсветить, подселить, подселиться, подсинить, подскоблить, подсолить, подсолиться, подточить, подтрунить, подцветить, позвонить,

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позвониться, позолотить, поить, покатить, покатиться, покосить, покоситься, покривить, покривиться, покроить, крошить, крошиться, покружить, покружиться, покрутить, покрутиться, прокрушить, прокрутить, покутить, полениться, положить, положить, полудить, полуцить, поманить, помесить, поместить, помирить, помириться, помолиться, помолотить, поморить, помутиться, понудить, породить, породнить, породниться, порошить, поручить, поручиться, поселить, поселиться, посинить, поскоблить, посмолить, посолить, посторониться, построчить, посулить, посушить, посушиться, потопить, поточить, потрубить, потрудиться, потрусить, потужить, потупить, потупиться, похвалить, похвалиться, похоронить, починить, почудиться, пошевелить, пошевелиться, предвосхитить, предложить, предопределить, предположить, предуведомить, преклонить, преломить, преломиться, препоручить, претворить, претить, преуменьшить, прибедниться, привалить, приварить, привинтить, привить, привиться, приволочить, приворожить, приглушить, пригубить, прикатить, прикатиться, приклонить, приключить, прикопнуть, прикрепить, прикрепиться, приложить, приманить, применить, примирить, примириться, принарядить, принудить, приободрить, приободриться, приотворить, приотвориться, приперчить, приплатить, припорошить, припорошиться, приручить, прислонить, прислониться, присовокупить, пристрочить, приструнить, пристыдить, притворить, притвориться, приторочить, притупить, приуменьшить, прищемить, прищепить, пробелить, проблудить, проборонить, пробудить, пробурить, провалить, провалиться, проварить, провариться, провозвестить, проволочить, продолбить, прозвонить, прозвониться, прокатить, прокатиться, прокопнуть, прокружить, прокружиться, прокрутить, прокрутиться, прокрутить, прокрутиться, промолотить, проморить,

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пропилить, проредить, проронить, прорыхлить, просверлить, проскоблить, прослоить, просмолить, просмолиться, просолить, просолиться, прострочить, просушить, просушиться, проторить, протрубить, проясниться, прудить, разбурить, развалить, развалиться, разварить, развариться, развинтить, развинтиться, разворошить, разгородить, разгородиться, разгрузить, разгрузиться, раздарить, разделить, раздоить, раздолбить, раздражить, раздробить, раздружиться, раззвонить, раззолотить, разлучить, разлучиться, разместить, разместиться, размолотить, разморить, размориться, разредить, разрядить, раскрепить, раскрепиться, раскроить, раскрошить, раскрошить, раскрошиться, раскружить, раскружиться, раскрутить, раскрутиться, распилить, распорядиться, распределить, распределиться, рассверлить, расселить, расселиться, расслоить, растеребить, растравить, растравиться, раструбить, расценить, расчеретить, расшевелить, расщемить, расщепить, родить, родиться, руководить, рукоположить, рулить, рябить, рядиться, сбеситься, свалить, свалиться, сварить, свариться, сверлить, своротить, святить, сгрузить, сгрузиться, сгубить, сдоить, сдружить, сдружиться, селить, селиться, синить, скатить, скатиться, склонить, склониться, скоблить, скопить, скормить, скосить, скрепить, скрепиться, скрестить, скреститься, скривить, скривиться, скроить, скрутить, скрутиться, сластить, слезоточить, слепить, случить, сманить, сменить, смениться, смолить, смолотить, сморить, смочить, снарядить, снежить, совокупить, созвониться, солить, сорить, соскоблить, сотворить, спилить, сплотить, сплотиться, споить, спрамить, срастить, сроднить, ссудить, сторониться, строчить, студить, студиться, сулить, сучить, сушить, схоронить, схорониться, сцепить, счертить, тащить, тащиться, телиться, топить, торопить, торопиться, точить, точиться, травить,

травиться, трубить, трудиться, трунить, тужить, тужить, тупить, тупиться, тушить, убелить, убелиться, уварить, увариться, уволочить, уговорить, угостить, уделить, удружить, узреть, укатить, укатиться, уклониться, укоротить, укрепить, укрепиться, улучшить, уместить, уместиться, умолить, уморить, умориться, упоить, уронить, усадить, усластить, усмирить, усолиться, устыдить, утеплить, утончить, утрудить, утяжелить, уценить, ущемить, ущемить, ущемиться, уясниться, хвалить, хвалиться, хоронить, хорониться, цедить, цедиться, ценить, цениться, чертить, чинить, чиниться, члениваться, чудить, чудиться, шевелить, шевелиться, щемить, щемиться, явить, явиться, ягниться.

2.2 Past passive participles in *-енный/-ённый*

Zaliznjak's analysis of this suffix (Zaliznjak 1985, 75-76) states that the stress of past passive participles of this type is based on the third person singular of second-conjugation verbs with vowel stems or the feminine past tense form of verbs with consonant stems. Ending stress (pattern *b*) in these respective forms gives *-ённый* (e.g. *простѣт* > *прощённый* 'forgiven', *сплелá* > *сплетённый* 'braided'), while stem stress in this form (which can result from verbs with fixed stem stress or verbs with mobile stress, pattern *c*) gives pre-suffixal stress (e.g. *изно́сит* > *изно́шенный* 'worn out', *укра́ла* > *укра́денный* 'stolen'). There is, however, quite a large number of exceptions, in particular in verbs with pattern-*b* or pattern-*c* stress, or, indeed, with variation, often between these two types. Thus, some verbs (and all their derivatives with prefixes) with pattern *c* have *-ённый*, e.g. *делѣть* (e.g. *разделѣть, разделѣт, but разделённый* 'divided'), *-менѣть, ценѣть, клонѣть, крестѣть*, though Zaliznjak notes the often bookish character of such forms, which is sometimes confirmed by the Church Slavonic consonant alternations *т/щ, д/жд*, e.g. *поглощённый* 'absorbed'

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from *погло́тить*. In addition, all the verbs quoted here by Zaliznjak previously (i.e. even in the 18th and 19th centuries) belonged to pattern *b*, as can be shown from their entries in *SAR* (1789-1794) and *SAR* (1806-1822), so that their participles in *-ённый* represent a conservative stress type which has ceased to be dependent on the stress of the present/future tense. Particularly noteworthy exceptions are participles with suffixal stress derived from pattern-*a* verbs, e.g. *осведомлённый/осведомленный* ‘informed’ (cf. *осведомить*). The reverse type of exception is also fairly common, i.e. verbs with pattern-*b* stress giving pre-suffixal stress in the participle, e.g. *скро́ить* > *скро́енный* ‘cut out’. This latter group, according to Zaliznjak, has a large amount of verbs used in everyday colloquial speech, as well as verbs of a technical character.

In addition to participles in *-енный/-ённый*, Russian also has the related class of past passive participles in *-еный/-ёный* which is used in place of the above suffix in (mostly) unprefixed second-conjugation verbs (e.g. *плетёный* ‘wicker’, *жарёный* ‘fried, grilled’). Zaliznjak (*ibid.*, 76) notes that while the rules for generating their stress position are the same as for participles in *-енный/-ённый* (given directly above), exceptions from the two types of participles do not coincide. Thus, participles with suffixal stress formed from verbs with pattern *c* are, for example, *цежёнйый* ‘strained, filtered’, *варёнйый* ‘boiled’ etc., though, as *SAR* (1789-1794) shows, these verbs were also previously of pattern *b*, thus explaining the stress of these forms. There are a few examples of suffixal stress from pattern-*a* verbs, e.g. *клеёнйый* ‘glued’ < *кле́ить* (though variation between *кле́ить* and *кле́йтъ* (and their derivative verbs) is well documented (e.g. in Gorbačevič (2000)). However, there are no clearcut examples of verbs with pattern *b* (or ending stress in the fem. past tense) producing participles with pre-suffixal stress (only verbs with variant stress, e.g. *пря́ля* > *пря́деный* ‘spun’), while some ‘apparent’ participles have no direct link with any verb, e.g. *рифлённый* ‘corrugated’, *мудрённый* ‘strange, abstruse’.

The dominant pattern which emerges from the corpus is a tendency towards pre-suffixal stress, accompanied by the stylistic deprecations ‘incorrect’ (299), ‘not recommended’ (68) and ‘acceptable’ (30) (i.e. some 60% of all 660 such participle forms found in the corpus), clearly, therefore, a movement away from *-ённый*. The predominance of ‘incorrect’ above ‘not recommended’ and ‘acceptable’ suggests that this tendency is relatively new, insofar as the majority of such examples are severely deprecated (rather than viewed as ‘not recommended’ or accepted as ‘acceptable’). Examples include *произнёсенный* ‘pronounced’ (‘неправ.’), *прикре́пленный* ‘fastened’ (‘не рек.’), *отво́ренный* ‘opened’ (‘допуст.’). The corpus also includes the following five ‘incorrect’ variants in *-енный*, e.g. *ва́ренный*, *водру́женный*, *крéщенный*, *па́ленный*, *то́ренный*, confirming the same process in the unprefixated participles of this type.

In addition to the comments above, the temporally censorious deprecations ‘устарелое’ and ‘устаревающее’ (‘archaic’ and ‘obsolescent’ respectively) are accompanied by suffixal (*-ённый*) stress in some 135 cases (e.g. *потуплённый* ‘downcast (eyes)’ (‘устарелое’), *перегружённый* ‘overloaded’ (‘устаревающее’), representing a word stress previously associated with pattern-*b* stress, but which now is shifting its stress to the pre-suffixal position. With these additional 135 cases, some 80 % of the forms found in the corpus can be said to be tending towards pre-suffixal stress. Of interest is the fact that only four of these forms register at all in the *RFL* (*заслуженный* ‘deserved’, *заснеженный* ‘snow-bound’, *раздробленный* ‘broken up’, *униженный* ‘humbled, humiliated’), suggesting that low frequency has also contributed to the gradual move away from the more anomalous *-ённый*.

The general shift towards pre-suffixal stress is also connected with two other areas of verb stress discussed in this paper, the present/future tense of second-conjugation verbs and the past tense of consonant-stem verbs. In particular, the former

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groups of verbs has had and continues to have a significant effect on the stress of past passive participles, since the move towards pattern-*c* stress in the present/future tense has clearly resulted in more participle forms with pre-suffixal stress. For example, the ‘incorrect’ stress of *изме́ненный* ‘changed’ (normative *изме́ненный*) can clearly be linked both to the general shift towards pre-suffixal stress, as well as to its current normative pattern-*c* stress in the future tense (*изменю́, изменишь* etc.), as compared to its previous (18th and early 19th century (see *SAR* (1789-1794)) pattern *b*. Far less numerous in the corpus is any evidence of the influence of the move away from final stress in feminine past tense forms (see 2.3 below), which one would expect to lead to pre-suffixal stress in the participle. The only such forms found are prefixed derivatives of *плету́* and *прясть*, e.g. *впрясть*, ‘to spin in’, feminine past tense *впряла́* (‘допуст.’ *впряла*), and the concomitant variant participle forms *впряде́нный* and ‘допуст.’ *впряденный*.

Within this complex scheme of stress, it is not surprising to come across a number of anomalous forms. Thus, there are 12 cases of participles with pre-suffixal stress deprecated as either ‘устарелое’ or ‘устаревающее’, viz *всполо́шенный, залосне́нный, иссе́ченный, обáгрненный, осве́домленный, переполо́шенный, просе́ченный, разору́женный, разры́хленный, рассу́ченный, рукополо́женный, увлажне́нный*, and 18 forms with suffixal stress deprecated as either ‘incorrect’, viz *надоё́нный, наложе́нный, недоё́нный, нижеизложе́нный, обнаруже́нный, обособле́нный, образумле́нный, одобрё́нный, оженё́нный, ознакомле́нный, опошле́нный, приложе́нный*, ‘not recommended’, viz *озлобле́нный, предвосхище́нный, расклеше́нный* or ‘acceptable’, viz *окровавле́нный, переперче́нный, пригубле́нный*. These variants appear to be a type of hypercorrection, perhaps, as Zaliznjak mentions (see above), as a result of the fact that the participles in question are perceived as bookish in character. There are also some 80 cases of free

variation (i.e. without any stylistic information) which offer few clues regarding the general shift of stress, but, nevertheless, are indicators of the general ambivalence with regard to the stress of these past passive participles. For the most part these forms result either from verbs with pattern *b/c* variation in the present/future tense (e.g. *скрѐнный* vs. *скроѐнный* from *скро́ить* ‘to cut out’, fut. tense *скро́ю*, *скро́ишь* vs. ‘допуст.’ *скрѐишь*), variation in the feminine past tense form of consonant-stem verbs (e.g. *сѐченный* vs. *сечѐнный* from *сечь* ‘to cut’ (past tense fem. *секла́* vs. ‘устарелое’ *сѐкла*)), or variation in the infinitive resulting in two separate stress paradigms for the verb as a whole (e.g. *вкра́пленный* vs. *вкраплѐнный* ‘sprinkled’ from *вкра́пить* vs. ‘устаревающее’ *вкрапѐть*).

There follows a list of past passive participles in *-енный/-ѐнный* (*-ѐный/-енный*) with variant stress found in Gorbačevič (2000):

варенный, восстановленный, введенный, везенный, долбленный, взбешенный, взбодренный, взбороненный, взбугренный, взведенный, взвыхленный, взнесенный, видоизмененный, вклиненный, включенный, вкрапленный, вмененный, внедренный, внесенный, водруженный, возведенный, вознесенный, воспроизведенный, восхваленный, вперенный, вpletенный, впряденный, впряженный, врожденный, врученный, вселенный, вскормленный, вспененный, вспоенный, всполошенный, всученный, всхолмленный, выдворенный, вышеизложенный, вышеприведенный, груженный, даренный, деленный, добеленный, доведенный, довезенный, догруженный, доделенный, донесенный, доплетенный, допряденный, забеленный, заваленный, заваренный, заведенный, завезенный, заволоченный, замороженный, заглушенный, загноенный, заговоренный, загороженный, загруженный, задаренный, задымленный, закаленный, закисленный, заклиненный, заключенный, законнорожденный, закопченный, закормленный, закрепленный, закупоренный, залеченный,

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заложенный, залосненный, замедленный, замененный, заметенный, замоленный, заморенный, занесенный, заостренный, запаленный, запененный, запечатленный, запеченный, заплетенный, запорошенный, запруженный, запряженный, запыленный, зарожденный, зароненный, заряженный, заселенный, засеченный, засиненный, заслоненный, заслуженный, засмоленный, заснеженный, засоленный, засоренный, застуженный, засученный, засушенный, затверженный, затворенный, затопленный, заторможенный, заточенный, затупленный, захваленный, захламленный, захороненный, защемленный, изведенный, издолбленный, измененный, изморенный, изобретенный, изреженный, изрешеченный, изъявленный, изъязвленный, искривленный, искривавленный, искрошенный, искупленный, испеченный, испряденный, иссверленный, иссеченный, иссушенный, источенный, иступленный, ищербленный, крещеный, малозаселенный, набеленный, наваренный, наведенный, навезенный, навороженный, нагроможденный, нагруженный, надгрызенный, наделенный, надоенный, надолбленный, надпиленный, надсверленный, надсеченный, надушенный, найденный, накаленный, наклеенный, наклоненный, накопленный, накопченный, накошенный, накрененный, накрученный, наложенный, намащенный, наметенный, намолоченный, наморенный, намощенный, нанесенный, наостренный, наперченный, напеченный, напиленный, наплетенный, напоенный, напряденный, нарожденный, наряженный, насаженный, населенный, насеченный, насиненный, наслоенный, насмоленный, насоленный, настроченный, насушенный, наточенный, натруженный, нахваленный, недоваренный, недогруженный, недоенный, недокормленный, недопиленный, недосоленный, незаконнорожденный, незаряженный, неосведомленный, непревзойденный, несенный, нижеприведенный, низведенный, нижеизложенный, нововведенный,

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нововозведенный, новоизобретенный, новоиспеченный, новонаселенный, новоприобретенный, новорожденный, обагренный, обваренный, обведенный, обвороженный, обделенный, облегченный, облеченный, облученный, облущенный, обмененный, обметенный, обмолоченный, обнаруженный, обнесенный, обобщенный, ободренный, обожествленный, обойденный, обособленный, обостренный, образумленный, обрамленный, обретенный, обреченный, обрешеченный, оброненный, обрученный, обряженный, обстроченный, обсужденный, оговоренный, огороженный, ограненный, огрубленный, оделенный, одобренный, ожененный, оздоровленный, озлобленный, ознакомленный, озолоченный, окаченный, окисленный, оклеенный, окрещенный, окровавленный, окруженный, омоложенный, оплетенный, оповещенный, опоенный, опошленный, осведомленный, оскобленный, осмоленный, оснеженный, остуженный, осужденный, осушенный, отбеленный, отварренный, отведенный, отвезенный, отвинченный, отволоченный, отворенный, отговоренный, отгруженный, отделенный, отопленный, отклоненный, отключенный, открепленный, откупоренный, отлученный, отмененный, отметенный, отмоленный, отнесенный, отороченный, отпиленный, отпряженный, отравленный, отращенный, отселенный, отсеченный, отсиненный, отскобленный, отслоенный, отцепленный, оцененный, оцепленный, очиненный, паленый, перворожденный, перебеленный, переваренный, переведенный, перевезенный, переволоченный, переворошенный, перегороженный, перегруженный, переделенный, перезапряженный, перезаряженный, перейденный, переклеенный, переключенный, перекопченный, перекормленный, перекрещенный, перекроенный, перекрученный, переманенный, перемененный, перемолоченный, переморенный, перенаселенный, перенесенный, переоцененный, переперченный, перепеченный, перепиленный, переплетенный, переполошенный,

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перерожденный, переселенный, пересеченный, переслащенный, переслоенный, переснаряженный, пересоленный, пересушенный, перетопленный, перетруженный, перехваленный, перехороненный, перецененный, перечерченный, пиленный, побеленный, поведенный, повезенный, повторенный, поглощенный, погруженный, подаренный, подбодренный, подведенный, подвезенный, подгруженный, поделенный, подзаряженный, подклеенный, подключенный, подкрепленный, подманенный, подмененный, подметенный, поднесенный, подпаленный, подпеченный, подпоенный, подпряженный, подряженный, подсвеченный, подселенный, подсеченный, подсиненный, подсоленный, подцветенный, позолоченный, покривленный, окруженный, полуженный, полуотворенный, поманенный, пометенный, помещенный, поморенный, понесенный, понужденный, поперченный, попоенный, поселенный, посеребренный, посеченный, посиненный, поскобленный, посмоленный, посоленный, посушенный, потопленный, поточенный, потупленный, похваленный, похороненный, починенный, превзойденный, превознесенный, предвосхищенный, предуведомленный, преклоненный, преломленный, преподнесенный, пресеченный, пресыщенный, претворенный, преуменьшенный, приведенный, привезенный, привинченный, привнесенный, приволоченный, привороженный, приглушенный, приговоренный, пригубленный, приклоненный, прикрепленный, приложенный, приманенный, примененный, примиренный, принаряженный, принесенный, принужденный, приободренный, приобретенный, приотворенный, припеченный, приплетенный, припорошенный, прирожденный, прирученный, прислоненный, присовокупленный, пристыженный, притворенный, приторможенный, притороченный, притупленный, приуменьшенный, приученный, прищемленный, прищепленный, пробеленный, пробужденный, пробуренный, проваленный, проваренный,

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проведенный, провезенный, провозвещенный, проволоченный, продолбленный, продымленный, пройденный, произведенный, произнесенный, прокопченный, прокуренный, прокученный, проморенный, пронесенный, пропеченный, пропиленный, пропыленный, прореженный, пророненный, просверленный, просеченный, проскобленный, прослоенный, просмоленный, просоленный, простроченный, просушенный, проторенный, разбомбленный, разбуренный, разваленный, разваренный, разведенный, развезенный, развинченный, разворошенный, разгороженный, разгромленный, разгруженный, раздаренный, раздвоенный, разделенный, раздолбленный, раздраженный, раздробленный, раздушенный, разжиженный, раззолоченный, разлученный, размещенный, размолоченный, разморенный, разнесенный, разобщенный, разоруженный, разреженный, разрыхленный, разряженный, расклешенный, расклиненный, раскрепленный, раскроенный, раскрошенный, раскрученный, раскупоренный, распиленный, расплетенный, расположенный, распределенный, распряженный, распрямленный, распыленный, рассверленный, расселенный, рассеченный, расслоенный, растворенный, расточенный, растравленный, расхваленный, расцветченный, расцененный, расчерченный, расщемленный, расщепленный, рожденный, рукоположенный, сваленный, сваренный, сведенный, свежеиспеченный, свежепобеленный, свезенный, свободнорожденный, сволоченный, сгруженный, сгубленный, сдвоенный, сеченный, скаченный, клеенный, склоненный, скобленный, скопленный, скормленный, скрепленный, скрещенный, скривленный, скроенный, скрученный, слепорожденный, сложенный, слученный, сманенный, смененный, сметенный, смоленный, смолоченный, сморенный, смоченный, снаряженный, снесенный, соблюденный, совмещенный, совокупленный, соотнесенный, сопровожденный, сопряженный, соскобленный, сотворенный, спеченный, спиленный, сплетенный, сплоченный,

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спряденный, спрямленный, сравненный, сращенный, сродненный, строенный, схороненный, сцепленный, счерченный, терпеть, тореный, травленный, убеленный, убиенный, убыстренный, уваренный, уведенный, увезенный, увлажненный, уволоченный, углубленный, уговоренный, угощенный, уделенный, укороченный, укрепленный, укупоренный, умащенный, уменьшенный, умещенный, умилитивленный, умоленный, уморенный, умягченный, унесенный, униженный, упеченный, уподобленный, упоенный, упрощенный, уравненный, урожденный, уроненный, усаженный, усеченный, услащенный, усмиренный, устыженный, усугубленный, утепленный, утонченный, утруженный, утяжеленный, уцененный, ущемленный, ущербленный, хваленный, холеный, холощенный, цеженный.

2.3 Past tense forms of verbs

Ukiah (2000) gives a full account of the current status and dynamics of stress variation in the past tense of Russian verbs, which he divides into non-reflexive and reflexive. In this article he gives the results of a survey of native speakers, the aim of which was to ascertain preferences for different stress types among mobile-stress verbs (as well as short-form adjectives and participles, which are not discussed here).

The past tense of non-reflexive verbs in Russian is characterised by three stress types, i) stem stress (e.g. *делал* 'did, made', *делала*, *делало*, *делали*); ii) ending stress (with conditional stem stress in the masculine form owing to the zero ending) (e.g. *нёс* 'carried', *несла́*, *несло́*, *несли́*) and iii) mobile stress (e.g. *брал* 'took', *брала́*, *бра́ло*, *бра́ли*). It is the last of these types which is of particular interest here, as the majority of variation occurs in verbs associated with mobile stress. Its salient feature is the ending stress of the feminine form which contrasts with stem stress in the other three forms, and this pattern is considered normative for about 25-30 non-prefixed

verbs (according to Ukiah 2000, 119; 33 such verb forms occur in the corpus (see below)). Prefixed derivatives of these verbs behave in a similar fashion to their un-prefixed counterparts: if the (syllabic or disyllabic) prefix attracts the stress (e.g. *про́клял* ‘cursed’), then this stress position is the same in the neuter and the plural, while the marked feminine has ending stress (*про́кляло*, *про́кляли*, but *прокля́ла*). If the prefix does not attract the stress, then stress is on the root in the masculine, neuter and plural, but, again, on the ending in the feminine form (e.g. *убра́л* ‘took away, tidied’, *убра́ла*, *убра́ло*, *убра́ли*).

Taking the non-reflexive verbs first, the corpus represented here by Gorbačevič (2000) contains 276 non-reflexive verbs with some kind of variation in the past tense. In it the following 31 non-prefixed verbs consistently display variation in the past tense: *брать*, *быть*, *дать*, *жить*, *бить*, *вить*, *лить*, *рвать*, *знать*, *звать*, *ткать*, *пить*, *плыть*, *прясть*, *врать*, *гнуть*, *драть*, *ждать*, *жрать*, *переть*, *клясть*, *лгать*, *плести*, *слать*, *стлать*, *спать*, *стричь*, *вести*, *красть*, *сечь*, *родить*, as well as the two roots *-(н)ять*, *-мереть* which only occur with a prefix, e.g. *принять*, *обмереть*.

The patterns and incidences of stress variation in the past tense are complex. Ukiah (2000, 119-121) identifies the following, often conflicting, tendencies among non-reflexive verbs in the past tense:

1. A strong tendency (especially among younger speakers) towards ending stress in the neuter form, creating the following kind of mobile pattern: *рвал* ‘tore’, *рвалá* (however, see point 2 below), *рвалó*, *рва́ли*. Ukiah finds this pattern both in non-prefixed verbs, as well as prefixed verbs (*назва́л* ‘named’, *назвалá*, *назвалó*, *назва́ли*). The data in Gorbačevič (2000) confirm these findings, but to a lesser extent than Ukiah (2000). Thus, while Ukiah (*ibid.*, 120) finds this stress pattern ‘in almost all verbs which

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show mobile stress in this paradigm', the corpus has far fewer examples, e.g. *быть* (*был, была́* ('неправ.' *бы́ла*), *бы́ло* ('неправ.' *было́*), *бы́ли*), also for *взять, лить*, but not for *лгать, драть, ждать, клясть, жить, пить*. Ending stress in the neuter form of such verbs is also deprecated in almost all cases in the corpus as 'incorrect', indicating that this tendency is at an early stage and yet to be treated as normative, though the tendency is undoubtedly present as can be seen by the large number of occurrences.

2. A weaker tendency towards stem stress in the feminine form of such verbs, something which appears to be at odds with what has been said directly above concerning the neuter past tense. Ukiah (ibid., 120) finds that this tendency occurs only in a few non-prefixed verbs *ткать, прясть, вить, гнить, родить* (impf), *слыть*, but in a large number of prefixed verbs. Gorbačevič (2000), in fact, reveals a very high level of occurrence of this feature in all such verb forms; indeed, this is the most common feature of variation in past tense forms in the corpus, occurring in some 90% of cases. Thus, for example, the verb *изгнать* 'to banish, drive out' has the forms *изгнáл, изгналá* ('not recommended' *изгнáла*), *изгнáло, изгнáли*. Clearly, as Ukiah (ibid.) states, this is a form of levelling of stress in the past tense, which creates a single stress position in all four forms of the past tense, i.e. a move towards uniformity which probably occurs more readily in lower frequency verbs. Verbs with higher frequencies are, one presumes, more able to retain a complex stress type. What remains unclear is to what extent ending stress in the neuter form is becoming the new norm, and, thus, whether the basic mobile paradigm in the past tense is changing from one whose key marker is the feminine form to one whose key marker is be-

coming the neuter form. As Ukiah argues (*ibid.*, 138), a possible motivation for the rise of the neuter ending-stressed form would be a need to disambiguate it phonetically from the new feminine stem-stressed form (thus, fem. *назв́ала*, neut. *назв́ало* > *назв́ала*, *назвалó*). However, this is a complex area of verbal stress in Russian currently undergoing significant change and one which will need considerable further research.

3. A tendency in certain prefixed verbs towards stress on the root (rather than on the prefix) in the masculine, neuter and plural forms. As Ukiah notes (*ibid.*, 120), this is already normative in some verbs (e.g. *добы́ть* ‘to procure’, *добы́л*, *добы́ла*, *добы́ло*, *добы́ли* – *до́был*, *до́было* and *до́были* are marked as ‘archaic’) and, in fact, represents a levelling of stress based on the stress of the infinitive. Thus, for example, *зада́ть* ‘to set’ has in the past tense the forms *за́дал* (‘допуст.’ *зада́л*), *задала́* (‘неправ.’ *задала*, *зада́ла*), *задало́* (‘допуст.’ *зада́ло*), *задали́* (‘допуст.’ *зада́ли*) (Gorbačevič (2000)). Indeed, the vast majority of past tense forms with ‘traditional’ stress on the prefix allow root stress with varying degrees of deprecation (i.e. ranging from ‘incorrect’ to ‘acceptable’) in Gorbačevič (2000). Again, however, points 1 and 2 above appear to conflict with this point, since feminine forms with root stress (e.g. *зада́ла*) appear to suggest a wholesale move towards uniform infinitive/root stress, while the tendency towards ending stress (in point 1 above) suggests a new type of mobility which undermines this uniformity. This is clearly another complex area of word stress in Russian which is in flux and which will require further investigation.

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In addition to the non-reflexive verbs with variant mobile stress in the past tense, the corpus contains 146 reflexive verbs with this feature. As Ukiah (ibid., 123) explains, there are two main patterns of stress for reflexive verbs in the past tense, stem stress (e.g. *читáлся, читáлась, читáлось, читáлись*) and mobile stress with all forms except the masculine having ending stress (though see point 1 below) (e.g. *нёсся, несла́сь, несло́сь, несли́сь*). There is some variation, however, particularly in the 33 unprefixated verb roots mentioned above, the main cause of which is represented by a further mobile pattern based on the unprefixated mobile pattern (see above) (e.g. *ли́лся, лила́сь, ли́лось, ли́лись*). A key distinction between reflexive and non-reflexive verbs is that the tendency towards ending stress in the neuter past tense observed for non-reflexive verbs plays no such role in corresponding reflexive verbs.

Ukiah (ibid., 125) identifies the following major tendencies in the past tense of reflexive verbs:

1. There has been and continues to be a loss of stress on the particle *-ся* in the masculine form. Thus, *взя́лся* ‘undertook’ has replaced the older form *взялсѧ́*. In turn, this has led to the dominance of the mobile pattern mentioned above and is exemplified by the past tense of *нестись* ‘to rush’, *нёсся* (< *нессѧ́*), *несла́сь, несло́сь, несли́сь*). The corpus is able to confirm this development with close to 100 forms which give a variant in *-ся́* marked as archaic or obsolescent, e.g. *сбы́лся* ‘came true’ (‘устарелое’ *сбылсѧ́*), *сбыла́сь* (‘неправ.’ *сбыласѧ́*), *сбыло́сь* (‘не рек.’ *сбылосѧ́*), *сбыли́сь* (‘не рек.’ *сбылисѧ́*).
2. As Ukiah (ibid., 125) finds and as can be ascertained from the example directly above, there is also a tendency towards levelling of stress in the past tense based on the position of stress in the infinitive. This, of course, is analogous to the same tendency for non-reflexive verbs (see point 3 above).

An excellent example of this phenomenon which characterises the vast majority of prefixed reflexive verbs with mobility in Gorbačevič (2000) is provided by the entry for *допиться* ‘to drink oneself to a state of’: *допи́лся* (‘устарелое’ *долилсѧ*), *допи́лась* (‘не рек.’ *допи́лась*), *допи́лось* (‘допуст.’ *допи́лось*), *допи́лись* (‘допуст.’ *допи́лись*). The normative pattern is stem stress in the masculine (resulting from loss of stress on *-ся*) and ending stress in the other three forms (i.e. a mobile stress pattern), but this is being undermined by a shift towards stem stress in these same three forms. However, the neuter and plural forms (labelled ‘acceptable’) are more acceptable than the feminine, which remains more severely deprecated (as ‘not recommended’). This certainly corresponds to Ukiah’s (ibid.) finding that root stress in the feminine past tense form of reflexive verbs is less frequent than it is in the neuter and plural forms.

In consequence, therefore, it can be said that the corpus generally supports Ukiah’s (ibid., 139) theory that mobile word stress in the past tense of verbs is changing in accord with ‘the underlying principle of the elimination of mobile stress in favour of fixed stress, or a general levelling of stress within the paradigm.’ However, the data from Gorbačevič (2000) suggests that there is much more pressure towards a levelling of stress on the root syllable in all forms, including the feminine, than Ukiah’s survey finds. Indeed, the vast majority of the 146 reflexive verbs with variant stress in the corpus show evidence of some kind to indicate this ongoing development.

There follows a list of verbs with variant stress in the past tense found in Gorbačevič (2000):

братъ, браться, быть, вдатся, вжиться, взвить, взвиться, взобратся, взорвать, взорваться, взять, взяться, вить, виться, влить, влиться, вложить,

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внять, вобрать, вогнать, воздать, воззвать, ворваться, воспринять, воссоздать, воткать, впитаться, всплыть, впрясть, врать, всплыть, гнать, гнаться, гнить, дать, дань, добрать, добратся, добыть, довить, довраться, догнать, догнить, додать, додрать, дожидаться, дожить, дозваться, долить, долиться, донять, допить, допиться, допрясть, дорвать, дорваться, доткать, драть, драться, ждать, жить, житься, забрать, забратся, завить, завиться, завратиться, загнать, загнить, задать, задаться, задрать, задраться, заждать, зажить, зажиться, зажраться, зазвать, зажаться, залгаться, залить, залиться, замереть, занять, заняться, запить, заплестись, заплыть, запродать, зарваться, заслать, заспать, заспаться, заткать, звать, зваться, избрать, известись, извить, извиться, изгнать, изгнуть, издать, изжить, излить, излиться, изодрать, изодраться, изолгаться, изорвать, изорваться, изорваться, изоткать, испить, испрясть, клясть, клясться, красть, красться, лгать, лить, литься, набрать, набратся, навить, навиться, наврать, нагнуть, надгнуть, надорвать, надорваться, надрать, надраться, нажить, нажиться, нажраться, назваться, налгать, налить, налиться, наложить, нанять, наняться, напиться, наплыть, наподдать, напрясть, нарвать, нарваться, насечь, наслать, настлать, настричь, наткать, начать, начаться, недобрать, недодать, недождать, недожить, недозваться, недолить, недопить, недопонять, недослать, недоспать, обвить, обвиться, обдать, обдаться, обжить, обжиться, облить, облиться, обмереть, обнять, обняться, обобрать, обогнать, ободрать, ободраться, обождать, обожраться, обозвать, оболгать, оборвать, оборваться, объять, ожить, опиться, опыть, отбыть, отдать, отдаться, отжить, отлить, отмереть, отнять, отняться, отобрать, отогнать, отодрать, отодраться, отозвать, отозваться, оторвать, оторваться, отослать, отоспаться, отпереться, отпить, отплыть, отсечь,

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перебрать, перебраться, перевернуть, перегнуть, перегнуть, передать, передаться, передрасть, передрасться, переждать, пережить, переизбрать, переиздать, перелить, перелиться, переложить, перемереть, перепить, перепиться, переплыть, перепродать, перервать, перерваться, пересдать, переслать, пить, плестись, плыть, побыть, повестись, погнать, погнаться, погнуть, подать, податься, поддать, поддаться, подкраситься, подлить, поднабраться, поднять, подняться, подобрать, подобраться, подождать, подозвать, подорвать, подорваться, подослать, подостлать, подпереть, подпереться, подплыть, подрасть, подсечь, пождать, пожить, пожрать, позвать, поклясться, покрасть, полить, политься, помереть, понять, попить, поплестись, поплыть, попрать, порвать, порваться, посесть, послать, поспать, постлать, поткать, предать, предложить, предпринять, преподать, прервать, прерваться, пресечь, пресечься, прибраться, прибыть, привить, привиться, приврать, пригнать, придать, придрасться, прижить, прижиться, призвать, призваться, приложить, принять, приняться, приплыть, приподнять, приподняться, пробить, пробраться, пробить, прогнать, прогнуть, продать, продаться, прождать, прожить, прожиться, прозвать, прозваться, проклясть, покрасться, пролить, пролиться, пронять, пропить, пропитаться, проплыть, прорвать, прорваться, прослыть, проспавать, проспаваться, пряхать, развить, развиться, раздать, раздаться, разжиться, разлить, разлиться, разнять, разобрать, разобрать, разогнать, разогнаться, разодрать, разодраться, разорвать, разорваться, разорваться, разослать, разостлать, разостлаться, разоткать, распить, расплыться, распродать, рассечь, рвать, рваться, родить, родиться, сбыть, сбыться, свить, свиться, сгнуть, сдать, сдать, сжить, сжиться, слить, слиться, сложить, слыть, снять, сняться, собрать, собраться, соврать, согнать, содрать, содраться, созвать, создать,

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солгать, сорвать, сорваться, соткать, спать, спаться, спиться, сплестись, стлать, стлаться, стричь, стричься, убрать, убраться, убыть, увить, угнать, угнаться, удаться, удрать, ужиться, унять, уняться, упереть, упереться, упиться, уплыть, урвать, усечь

2.4 Verbal suffix *-ировать*

Cognate with German *-ieren* and first appearing in Russian lexicographical sources during the late eighteenth century, *-ировать* now occurs as a productive and relatively frequent formant to generate loanwords and quasi-loanwords of, for the most part, English origin. Its stress in the infinitive (and, therefore, in all inflected forms, including the past passive participle) in the modern language is complex, or, at least, non-uniform, as it occurs with both pre-penultimate stress (i.e. *-ировать*, e.g. *аплоди́ровать* ‘to applaud’), and, less commonly, final stress in the infinitive form (i.e. *-ировать*, e.g. *группи́ровать* ‘to group’).¹ Thus, this suffix is characterised by categorial variation (two possible forms, in theory, in all derivations, viz *-ировать* or *-ировать*), as well as significant specific variation, with several verbs allowing both forms (with, as ever, varying stylistic evaluation and also possible semantic differentiation), e.g. *татуи́ровать* vs. *татуировать* (the latter given as ‘устаревающее’ in Gorbačevič (2000)) ‘to tattoo’, and *брони́ровать* ‘to reserve’ vs. *бронировать* ‘to armour’.

There exist a number of analyses of the accentual behaviour of this suffix, the most important of which now follow. The most detailed synchronic account is by Zaliznjak (1985, 105-106), who assigns to it the mark ↓D (a dominant suffix which places stress on to itself), but with two possible variants: *-ировать* or *-ировать*.

¹ Verbs in *-ировать* with pre-penultimate stress generate past passive participles with the stress *-ированный*, while verbs with final stress generate past passive participles with stress of the type *-ированный* (cf. *мотиви́ровать* – *мотивированный* ‘motivated’ and *газиро́вать* – *газированный* ‘aerated’).

Although no absolute set of rules is given by Zaliznjak to establish when each of these variants occurs, the following tendencies can be observed:

The variant *-ировать* occurs:

1) with monosyllabic stems which have the meanings:

a) to cover or fill with a certain substance, e.g. *лакировать* 'to varnish';

b) to cover one object with another, e.g. *маскировать* 'to mask';

c) to organise, exercise or improve: *группировать* 'to group', *тренировать* 'to train', *юстировать* (variant stress) 'to adjust (instruments)';

2) in some verbs with a polysyllabic stem with the meanings of 1a and 1b given above: *эмалировать* 'to enamel', *костюмировать* 'to dress (in theatre)';

3) in isolated cases which cannot be accounted for: *маршировать* 'to march', *сервировать* 'to serve (meal)', *крокировать* 'to rocket'.

In all other cases the more common variant *-ировать* occurs: *позировать* 'to pose', *шокировать* 'to shock', *форсировать* 'to force' etc. In addition, there are a certain number of verbs which meet the semantic conditions of 1a/1b/1c above, but which, nevertheless, have the stress *-ировать*, e.g. *хлорировать* 'to chlorinate', *вирировать* 'to intensify (photographic)', *газировать* 'to aerate' (but *газированный* 'aerated' indicating (original ?) final stress in the infinitive), *хромировать* 'to plate with chromium' (but usually *хромированный* 'chromium-plated' also indicating (original ?) final stress in the infinitive), *гуммировать* 'to (stick with) gum'.

A diachronic analysis of this suffix is given by Kiparsky (1962, 295-298). Using a list of data taken from dictionaries, Kiparsky concludes that the original stress of these verbs was *-ировать*, since they came from German words in *-ieren* and therefore had the same stress as their respective German counterparts (which are always stressed on the initial suffixal syllable). Kiparsky, however, provides no direct evidence of this, rather evidence of the opposite, since all the earliest records of words in

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–*ировать* which he provides have final stress in the infinitive without exception. According to him, many of these verbs had subsequently shifted their stress on to the final syllable of the infinitive on the model of the Russian word *пировать* ‘to feast’, presumably, already by the time of the first records. Given the lack of evidence supporting an original stress position –*ировать*, the possibility of an original –*ировать* stress can hardly be ruled out entirely.

On the basis of the evidence from dictionaries, Kiparsky (ibid., 295) finds that after the early shift –*ировать* > –*ировать* which he postulates, a number of verbs shifted their stress back on to the initial suffixal syllable. Kiparsky surmises that this is connected with the frequency of the word, a word with higher frequency having the stress type –*ировать* and a word with lower frequency retracting its stress from the latter type to –*ировать*. This, according to Kiparsky, is the explanation of the stress of the low frequency verbs *вальсировать* ‘to waltz’, *баллотировать* ‘to vote’, and *копировать* ‘to copy’ (though one would presume that the latter two have become significantly more frequent in the course of the last several decades), and the frequently used verbs *пломбировать* ‘to seal’, *тренировать* ‘to train’. Exceptions to this are the high frequency verbs *гарантировать* ‘to guarantee’ and *датировать* ‘to date’, and the low frequency verbs *гофрировать* ‘to corrugate’ and *маркировать* ‘to mark’. No evidence is given to decide the relative frequency, and the question of changing frequency and its role in the stress of these verbs is ignored, so that a word like *вальсировать* ‘to waltz’ clearly must have had a higher usage in Russia in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth century.

Another diachronic analysis is given by Voroncova (1979, 237-248). Unlike Kiparsky, Voroncova assumes that the original stress of verbs in –*ировать* in Russian was –*ировать*, and that this stress model was largely influenced by the stress of an-

other verbal suffix used to form loan words, namely *-овать* (mainly from Polish words in *-ować*), e.g. *арестовать* ‘to arrest’.²

According to Voroncova (ibid., 242), as verbs in *-ировать* were assimilated by speakers of Russian, so their stress was retracted from the final syllable of the infinitive on to the initial suffixal syllable (*-ировать* > *-ировать*). This theory is, in fact, directly opposed to that of Kiparsky, since, according to Voroncova, it is in fact the more frequent verbs which should retract the stress giving *-ировать*, as it is precisely these verbs which would have been assimilated most quickly.

Another diachronic analysis of this suffix (Lagerberg 2011, 69-82), using data gathered from lexicographical sources from the eighteenth century to the twentieth century, gives unequivocal evidence of a stress shift from the final syllable to the initial suffixal syllable (*-ировать* > *-ировать*). Variation remains, however, in modern Russian where this process has not been finalised, in many cases as a result of frequency effects: verbs with higher relative frequency are more likely to resist the general trend towards pre-penultimate stress and retain final stress, while verbs with a lower relative frequency are more likely to conform to the general analogy of pre-penultimate stress (see Lagerberg 2011, 99-100).

It would be logical to assume, therefore, that data from a corpus with variation would confirm the more archaic character of stress on the final syllable, and the data from Gorbačevič (2000) (see Table 1 below) indeed confirms that where variation exists within verb forms with the suffix *-ировать* (there are 84 forms in total), it points to a general, ongoing shift away from final stress towards pre-penultimate stress. As already seen in previous sections, the more stylistically censorious deprecations (i.e.

² It should be noted that for many verbs in *-ировать* there existed previously an alternate form in *-овать*, e.g. *пробовать* and *пробировать* ‘to approve’, *акцентовать* and *акцентировать* ‘to accent’. In general it is the forms in *-ировать* which have survived into modern Russian at the expense of those in *-овать*.

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неправильно, не рекомендуется, допустимо found in 28 forms) indicate the ‘target’ stress position, and in this case are, for the most part, utilised for variant forms with stress on the pre-penultimate syllable, e.g. *трениро́вать* vs. (‘неправ.’) *трени́ровать* ‘to train’, *костюмиро́вать* vs. (‘допуст.’) *костюми́ровать*, *премиро́вать* vs. (‘не рек.’) *преми́ровать* ‘to award a bonus’. In contrast, the two more temporally censorious deprecations (viz *устарелое* and *устаревающее*), which are found in 41 forms, point to the same shift of stress, but in this case away from the previously favoured position of stress, e.g. *лави́ровать* vs. (‘устарелое’) *лави́ровать*, *татуи́ровать* vs. (‘устаревающее’) *татуи́ровать*. In this way, a general move towards pre-penultimate stress can be observed in the former group through variants which have still to achieve normative status, and in the latter group through variants with final stress which are yet to fall into disuse entirely. The issue of frequency is not analysed here, but it is possible that all these variant forms are characterised by mid-to-lower rates of usage, since forms with high frequency would be more likely to maintain anomalous stress, and forms with very low frequency would be more likely to shift to the general pattern. Variant forms are essentially characterised by middle frequency and it is this which largely contributes to their status as ambivalent forms.

There remain some anomalies, not all of which can be accounted for, but which make up a very small minority compared to the majority of forms with such deprecations, for example, the stress of the verb *коти́ровать(ся)* (‘to quote (be quoted)’ (financial)) marked in the data source as ‘incorrect’. Among forms marked as archaic or obsolescent is the form *бомбарди́ровать* ‘to bombard’ (normative *бомбардировать*), which goes against the general trend towards pre-penultimate stress, possibly as a result of semantic factors listed by Zaliznjak above (polysyllabic stem with basic meaning ‘to cover with’) which give rise to final stress. Among vari-

ants marked as ‘incorrect’ are also *квотировать* ‘set quotas’ and *мотивировать* ‘to motivate’. An interesting sub-group is that of variants marked as ‘professional speech’: all variants with this label have pre-penultimate stress, viz *гравировать* ‘engrave’ and its perfective derivatives *награвировать*, *отгравировать*; *гримировать* ‘to make up (e.g. in theatre)’ and the perfective *загримировать*. These forms differentiate themselves from the normal stress type (as mentioned above, verbs in *-ировать* denoting ‘to concur with another substance, to improve etc.’ have final stress) and also correspond to Zaliznjak’s (1985, 79-80) observation that assimilated derived words affected by the pragmatic factor or derived words in professional speech have stress on the suffixal syllable.

Finally, verbs whose meaning is differentiated by the stress position generally conform to Zaliznjak’s semantic classification (see above): thus, for example, the verb *бронировать* (and its prefixed derivatives) has final stress (*бронировать*) in connection with the sense ‘to cover in armour’ and pre-penultimate stress (*бронировать*) in connection with ‘reserving, booking’. In a similar way, *планировать* and its prefixed derivatives have final stress (*планировать*) in connection with the sense of ‘laying out’, but pre-penultimate stress (*планировать*) with the more abstract notion of ‘planning’.

Word	Variation
абонировать	(устарелое) абонировать
аккомпанировать	(устарелое) аккомпанировать
ангажировать	(устарелое) ангажировать
асфальтировать	(устарелое) асфальтировать
балансировать	(устарелое) балансировать
бальзамировать	(устарелое) бальзамировать
блокировать	(устарелое) блокировать

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Word	Variation
бомбардировать	(устарелое) бомбардировать
бронировать	бронировать = «официально закреплять что-л. за кем-л.»; бронировать = «покрывать броней»
буксировать	(устарелое) буксировать
вальсировать	(устаревающее) вальсировать
варьировать	(устарелое) варьировать
варьироваться	(устарелое) варьироваться
газировать	(не рек.) газировать
галопировать	(устарелое) галопировать
глазировать	(допуст.) глазировать
гофрировать	(допуст.) гофрировать
гравировать	гравировать and (проф.) гравировать
гримировать	гримировать and (проф.) гримировать
демаскировать	(устаревающее) демаскировать
дистиллировать	(устаревающее) дистиллировать
дисциплинировать	(устарелое) дисциплинировать
дозировать	(устарелое) дозировать
заасфальтировать	(устарелое) заасфальтировать
забаллотировать	(устарелое) забаллотировать
заблокировать	(устарелое) заблокировать
забронировать	забронировать = «официально закрепить что-л. за кем-л.»; забронировать = «покрыть броней»
загримировать	(проф.) загримировать
замаскировать	(неправ.) замаскировать
замаскироваться	(неправ.) замаскироваться
запланировать	«составить план работы» - запланировать; «расположить в соответствии с планом» - запланировать
инсценировать	(устарелое) инсценировать
квотировать	(неправ.) квотировать

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Word	Variation
копíровать	(устаревающее) копи́ровать
костюми́ровать	(допуст.) костюми́ровать
котíровать	(неправ.) котировать
котíроваться	(неправ.) котироваться
крейси́ровать	(устаревающее) крейсирова́ть
кристаллизи́ровать	(устарелое) кристаллизирова́ть
лави́ровать	(устарелое) лавирова́ть
литографи́ровать	(устарелое) литографирова́ть
манки́ровать	(устарелое) манкирова́ть
марки́ровать	(устаревающее) маркирова́ть
маски́ровать	(неправ.) маски́ровать
маски́роваться	(неправ.) маски́роваться
мебли́ровать	(неправ.) мебли́ровать
монти́ровать	(устарелое) монтирова́ть
мотиви́ровать	(неправ.) мотивирова́ть
нагофри́ровать	(допуст.) нагофри́ровать
награвирова́ть	(проф.) награвирова́ть
нивели́ровать	(устарелое) нивелирова́ть
нормирова́ть	(допуст.) норми́ровать
опломбировать	(неправ.) опломби́ровать
отбукси́ровать	(устарелое) отбуксирова́ть
отгравирова́ть	(проф.) отгравирова́ть
перебаллотировать	(устарелое) перебаллотирова́ть
перепланировать	переплани́ровать = «изменить план развития»; перепланирова́ть = «заново разметить»
пики́ровать	пики́ровать = «снижаться под большим углом»; пикирова́ть = «пересаживать всходы»
плани́ровать	плани́ровать = «составлять план действий; плавно лететь, снижаясь» планирова́ть = «располагать, размещать в соответствии с планом»

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Word	Variation
пломбировать	(неправ.) пломбировать
премировать	(не рек.) премировать
прибуксировать	(устарелое) прибуксировать
разблокировать	(устарелое) разблокировать
разбронировать	разбронировать = «освободить от брони»; разбронировать = «снять броню»)
распланировать	«составить план действий» - распланировать; «расположить» - распланировать
расформировать	(неправ.) расформировать
ретироваться	(неправ.) ретироваться
сбалансировать	(устарелое) сбалансировать
сблокироваться	(устарелое) заблокироваться
сгруппировать	(неправ.) сгруппировать
сгруппироваться	(неправ.) сгруппироваться
сервировать	(неправ.) сервировать
скопировать	(устаревающее) скопировать
славировать	(устарелое) славировать
спланировать	«составлять план действий; плавно снизиться» = спланировать; «расположить в соответствии с планом» = спланировать
стажироваться	(допуст.) стажироваться
татуировать	(устаревающее) татуировать
тренировать	(неправ.) тренировать
тренироваться	(неправ.) тренироваться
формировать	формировать and (неправ.) формировать
форсировать	(устарелое) форсировать
экзальтировать	(устаревающее) экзальтировать
экипировать	(допуст.) экипировать
экипироваться	(допуст.) экипироваться

Table 1. Verbs in *-ировать* in the corpus (Gorbačević, 2000)

3. Conclusion

Variation in Russian word stress is an area rich in complexity, with over 5000 lexemes displaying this characteristic. A corpus-based analysis of variant stress forms in Russian is able to give a snapshot of the current situation and, by categorising the different types, highlight and analyse those areas of word stress which have the highest degrees of variation. Variation in word stress is, in fact, central to an understanding of word stress in general, as it identifies precisely those areas of Russian stress which are more complex as a result of tension between competing factors in the language.

The present article has presented four key areas of verbal stress variation (based on number of occurrences) in Russian in an attempt to analyse their dynamics, arranging them by types in descending order of quantity as found in Gorbačevič (2000): these are the present and future tense forms of second-conjugation verbs, past passive participles in *-енный/-ённый*, variation in the past tense forms of verbs (divided further into reflexive and non-reflexive) and verbs with the suffix *-ировать*.

In the case of the present and future tense forms of second-conjugation verbs, the corpus is able to demonstrate both their scale (some 900 verbs), as well as analyse their underlying dynamics. The three stylistic deprecations ('incorrect', 'not recommended' and 'acceptable'), which indicate the underlying direction of change, give overwhelming evidence of a shift towards the mobile stress paradigm (pattern *c*), while the two deprecations, 'archaic' and 'obsolescent', confirm this state of affairs, with the overwhelming majority of such cases indicating 'conservative' pattern-*b* stress. Indeed, in general these five deprecations, though subjective, taken as a whole portray a spectrum, with the latter two indicating an older stress type, and the three former ones indicating the direction in which the stress change is occurring.

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The stress shift from pattern *b* to pattern *c* in these verbs also has an effect on past passive participles, since pattern *c* is connected with pre-suffixal stress in the case of participles in *-енный/-ённый*. In some 60% of the 660 cases found in Gorbačevič (2000), there is clear evidence of a movement away from *-ённый* to pre-suffixal stress, as seen in some non-standard variants such as *прикрéпленный* (normative *прикреплённый*). In addition to this, the deprecations ‘устарелое’ and ‘устаревающее’ are accompanied by suffixal (*-ённый*) stress in some 135 cases, clearly demonstrating a conservative attempt to maintain pattern-*b* stress in the face of the general shift towards pattern *c*. With these additional 135 cases, some 80% of the forms found in the corpus can be said to be tending towards pre-suffixal stress. The major factor leading to the shift of stress and, thereby, high level of variants, must be viewed as the shift in stress of second-conjugation verbs from pattern *b* to pattern *c*.

Ukiah’s (2000) findings on the past tense forms of verbs with mobile stress are generally reflected well in the corpus, though there are certain differences also. In non-reflexive verbs, the tendency for the neuter form to have ending stress is not as strong as in Ukiah’s research, though, nevertheless, present. It does not appear in several of the unprefixated verbs mentioned by Ukiah, and is unfailingly deprecated stylistically when it is found. By contrast, the corpus contains far more occurrences of feminine past tense forms with stem stress than are found by Ukiah. Evidence of a shift towards a uniform position of stress in both reflexive and non-reflexive verbs which coincides with the infinitive is also found, though it is unclear how the shift towards ending stress in the neuter form of non-reflexive verbs can be reconciled with this shift. A loss of stress on the reflexive particle *-ся* is clearly indicated by a large amount of entries showing the generally more archaic character of final stress in the masculine past tense form of reflexive verbs. Mobile stress in the past tense of verbs represents one of the more complex and volatile areas of modern Russian word stress

and warrants further analysis and enquiry through the use of surveys and corpus methods.

The most significant area of stress variation in verbal derivation is represented by verbs formed with the suffix *-ировать*. Of the 84 forms found in the corpus, a clear movement of stress from final stress towards pre-penultimate stress is evident. As already seen above, the more stylistically censorious deprecations (viz *неправильно, не рекомендуется, допустимо*) are found in 28 forms and indicate the 'target' stress position, which, in this case, is the pre-penultimate syllable, e.g. ('неправ.') *трени́ровать*. The two temporally censorious deprecations (viz *устарелое* and *устаревающее*), found in 41 forms, point to the same shift of stress, but in this case away from the previously favoured position of stress, e.g. ('устарелое') *лавирова́ть*. In this way, a general move towards pre-penultimate stress can be observed in the former group as variants which have still to achieve normative status, and in the latter group as variants whose older variant forms with final stress are yet to fall into disuse entirely. A future task is to analyse such variants using frequency amounts, since the expectation would be that such forms are essentially characterised by low-middle frequency and it is this which largely contributes to their status as ambivalent forms.

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Arnold McMillin, *Spring Shoots: Young Belarusian Poets in the Early Twenty-First Century* (Publications of the Modern Humanities Research Association, vol. 19), Cambridge: MHRA, 2015, 191 pp.

Arnold McMillin has been writing on Belarusian literature for over forty years and brings a huge amount of knowledge and expertise to his subject. Since his ground-breaking *A History of Byelorussian Literature from its Origins to the Present Day* (Giessen: Wilhelm Schmitz, 1977), subsequent volumes have dealt with progressively more recent periods. *Spring Shoots* looks to the twenty-first century, focussing on the work of forty poets (nineteen men and twenty-one women) born in or after 1980. These are necessarily writers at the beginning of their careers, though most of them have published at least one book of verse.

Providing an analytical framework for the discussion of so many diverse writers whose creative paths are not yet settled, and in the absence of any significant body of criticism dealing with their work, cannot have been an easy task. McMillin has chosen a fairly loose structure, assigning each poet to one of eight themes, each with its own chapter: the historical heritage, religion, protest at alienation and repression, use and defence of language, the lyrical impulse, humour, performance poetry, and writing and poetic inspiration. Within this structure the individual poets are treated largely separately. In sections of varying length McMillin provides brief biographical information, publishing history, and an outline of the poet's work. These descriptions are generously illustrated by quotations from the poetry both in the original and with practical English translations provided at the foot of the page.

The poets, of course, frequently work outside the theme with which McMillin associates them (as, indeed, he acknowledges), but the thematic approach at least

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serves as a starting point for further exploration, and at the same time identifies the primary subject matter, which is exercising the minds of this generation of poets. Not surprisingly, many of the themes are about identity, whether this is in relation to the status of Belarus in the post-Soviet world order, the integrity of the Belarusian language, the limited opportunity in present-day Belarus for political or sexual self-expression, or to more personal feelings connecte to religion, love, or a lyrical response to the natural world. The actual approach of the different poets, not only in subject matter but also in style, shows considerable variety, from the richly allusive and metrically sophisticated work of Anton Bryl', to the freer forms of Viktor Siamaška, the explicit sexuality of Nasta Mancevič, the humour of Volia Čajkoŭskaja and the performance poetry of Adam Šostak. McMillin has been careful to include not only poets from Miensk, but also writers from other parts of Belarus, most notably from Homiel and the surrounding area. One or two indeed live and work outside Belarus, suggesting at least a limited international aspect to the Belarusian poetic project.

McMillin notes in his brief introduction to the volume that some older Belarusian writers have commented less than enthusiastically on the poets of the new generation (pp. 1-2). Nevertheless, *Spring Shoots* conveys a strong sense that poetry in Belarus is alive and well, dealing with contemporary and traditional themes in productive and interesting ways. How the careers of the young poets represented here will progress is uncertain, but *Spring Shoots* is an invaluable guide to the present state of their craft.

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Henrietta Mondry, *Political Animals: Representing Dogs in Modern Russian Culture*. (Studies in Slavic Literature and Poetics), Brill - Rodopi, 2015, 432 pp.

Dogs occupy a curiously important place in Russian and Slavic cultural history. Their role is evident in their use for military purposes during the reign of Ivan Grozny and later periods. I recall a remarkable episode which involves dogs in the anecdotal political history of the Bolshevik party. It relates to a story from 1914 when Stalin and Yakov Sverdlov shared a tiny apartment while in exile in a remote village on the Yenisei river. According to Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin called his dog "Yashka" after the first name of Sverdlov, and he did it in order to humiliate Sverdlov. Stalin had a habit of offering his soup-plates to Yashka for licking as an alternative to washing dishes. Sverdlov disliked this offensive association with a stray dog. He also, most likely, perceived it as a joke with anti-Jewish connotations. This dog matter was never peacefully resolved between the two and they remained enemies for the rest of their lives.

This unique syncretism between an image of a dog and that of a human is observable in Russian culture and art. It is to this unusual mutually dependent relationship that Mondry's fascinating and ground-breaking book is dedicated. In this pioneering study the author provides a comprehensive overview of Russian cultural constructions of Cynology, a study of all the tricky matters associated with domestic, feral and wild canines.

The book opens with a valuable overview of a set of cultural patterns concerning the reception of dogs. It uses a comparative and historical perspective which goes beyond Russia and offers an elaborate methodological framework. In a chronological and thematic mix, the book studies dog narratives from the beginning of the 19th century, focusing on the different attitudes to dogs by various classes: peasants and gentry in Alexander Pushkin's *Dubrovsky*, Fedor Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov* and *Notes from the House of the Dead*. Dogs as class enemies of peasants are drama-

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tised by the Decembrist Bestuzhev and the modernist Khlebnikov in the motif of forced breastfeeding of puppies by peasant serf women. Dogs as gendered animals feature in Mondry's reading of Anton Chekhov's *Kashtanka* and Turgenev's *Mumu*, while dogs as working animals are the subject of Ivan Kuprin's classic of children's literature, *The White Poodle*. Dogs representing visions of post-revolutionary utopian communes feature in Boris Pilnyak's short masterpiece *A Dog's Life: the Vicissitudes of Destiny*.

Mondry discusses the role of animal trainer Vladimir Durov and scientist Ivan Pavlov in the construction and perception of dogs as working animals. This allows Mondry to investigate the issues of animal exploitation in scientific experiments. Durov was known for his humane treatment of animals, while Pavlov invented the discourse of dogs' willing self-sacrifice in cooperation with the scientist carrying out the experiments. The discussion of the use of dogs for scientific experiments is at the centre of Mondry's analysis of Mikhail Bulgakov's *The Heart of the Dog*. Scientific experiments, according to Mondry, did not exclude the popular cultural beliefs in dogs' supernatural powers and their roles as psychopomps. This quasi-eschatological layer is often present in the stories of transformation involving dogs, such as Vladimir Mayakovsky's *How I became a dog*, Fedor Sologub's *White Dog*, and Evgeny Zamyatin's early piece *Howl*. Similarly, Aleksei Remizov's early stories are underpinned by his knowledge of folk beliefs related to the dogs' special status as mystical animals. In examining these transformation and transmutation narratives, Mondry ingeniously demonstrates the influence of the ideas of Nikolai Fedorov and Vasily Rozanov who had different attitudes to Cartesian dualisms.

Mondry also examines selected films which explore canine themes, such as dogs at war in *Dzhulbars* (1935), *Zastava v gorakh* (1953) and *Pes alyi* (1979). She also discusses the ideological nuances in the film adaptation of Gavriil Troepolsky's

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iconic novella *Belyi Bim Chernoe ukho*, a film which was viewed by millions of Soviet cinema goers and which fostered new humane sensibilities in the 1970s.

There are a few points that would be worth considering for a second augmented edition of the book. The fascinating topic of dog-human syncretism in Slavic cultures may be broadened and enlarged by providing more historical examples and contextual details. In particular, the extraordinary topic of the dog-headed Saint Christopher and his canine imagery occupies an interesting place in Russian “dvoeverie” and deserves more attention than is accorded in the book. (The author mainly relies on Viacheslav Ivanov’s short study.) The theological and folkloric background of the unusual Orthodox icons with “pesieglavtsy” could reveal a rich cultural stratum that will reinforce the existing arguments that Mondry already brilliantly incorporates in her analysis. Another issue is the illustrations, which could have been more numerous and perhaps of better quality. One may also wonder whether Mondry might consider devoting her next study to a scholarly exploration of cats, thereby conceptually extending the duality of the dog fascination in Russian culture with its logical counterpart. Cats in Russian culture offer a no less rich ground for a learned study and, theoretically, may complement their eternal rivals for human benevolent attention.

The book is lucidly written and will become a classic in this area of Russian cultural history. It is highly recommended to all connoisseurs of Russian culture of the modern period.

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