



## Ear to Asia podcast

**Title:** Australia caught in the escalating US-China rivalry

**Description:** Australia is finding itself increasingly torn between its largest trading partner, China, and its long-time ally, the United States. So, what is the value vs the cost of Australia's alliance with the US? And what will it take to repair relations with China? International strategy expert Professor Michael Wesley examines this geopolitical triangle with presenter Ali Moore. An Asia Institute podcast.

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Voiceover:

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Ali Moore:

Hello, I'm Ali Moore. This is Ear to Asia.

Michael Wesley:

The most we can hope for in the Australia-China relationship will be a stabilization at a level of pragmatic coldness that will allow each side to deal with each other but not to trust each other. It's about making sure you draw limits around around where the mistrust is allowed to affect relations. And I think we have to rediscover how to do that with China.

Ali Moore:

In this episode, Australia caught in the escalating rivalry between China and the United States.

Ear to Asia is the podcast from Asia Institute, the Asia research specialists at the University of Melbourne.

Australia's relationship with China appeared to fall off a cliff in 2020 after Canberra pushed for a global inquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, and China's handling of the initial outbreak in Wuhan. While the bilateral relationship had already been floundering for some time, Australia now finds itself torn more than ever before between its longtime ally, the United States, and its largest trading partner, China. Concern about China's meteoric, economic and military ascendancy has been growing in the US since the Obama administration, and has led to pressure on allies like Australia to join US efforts to contain the Asian juggernaut.

Ali Moore:

Meanwhile, a self-assured and impatient China has been assertively seeking to protect its strategic and economic interests, and has been quick to punish those it perceives as questioning its ambitions with trade sanctions against Australia, only a recent example. So what is the value versus the cost of Australia's decades old alliance with the United States? What will it take to repair relations with China. And how can Australia reduce its economic dependence on the reawakened dragon? Joining



me in the studio to examine the state of affairs and the Australia, US, China triangle is Professor Michael Wesley, an international strategy expert, and Deputy Vice-Chancellor International at the University of Melbourne. Welcome to Ear to Asia, Michael.

Michael Wesley:

Great to be here Ali.

Ali Moore:

Let's start first, not with the Australia, China relationship, but China and the US. In the post-Trump world, to what extent do you think there's a new paradigm in what's arguably one of the world's most important relationships?

Michael Wesley:

Is it a new paradigm or is it a revisited paradigm I wonder? I look at a lot of the way that the United States is not only viewing China, but dealing with China these days. And I think there are some very strong parallels with the Cold War in how the United States viewed the Soviet Union and treated the Soviet Union, and the way that the Soviet Union responded in many ways. Particularly when you see the displacement of a lot of their rivalry into their relationships with other countries, particularly in this part of the world. I just think that we are seeing a return to something that is very similar to what we saw in, let's say, the decades after 1947.

Ali Moore:

That can't be a good thing.

Michael Wesley:

It's a dangerous phase for us to be going into because it means that number one, I think that there is now a dynamic of economic disengagement going on between the United States and China. One of the things that had been a stabilising factor in their bilateral relations was the substantial economic stakes they had in each other's economy. While there is still substantial economic engagement between the two, this is decreasing all the time. And I think it will be something that continues. We're seeing particularly the technological disengagement between the two. The US government in particular putting much greater scrutiny on any US companies manufacturing or doing business in China in the high-tech fields. And the very heavy investment in very different platforms by both China and the United States and the blocking of those platforms by each other as well. So that technological disengagement I think, is going to lead to other forms of disengagement. And we saw during the Trump years and continuing in the Biden years, a willingness to disrupt other forms of commodities trade as well. That is going to take one of the stabilising features of the relationship out of the picture.

Ali Moore:

Against that background, as you describe it, what happens to the pivot to Asia? It was President Obama who talked about the pivot, but it never happened. Do you think, particularly against the background of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, that it's going to be President Biden, who in this Cold War scenario will deliver the pivot?



Michael Wesley:

Inevitably, I think. I think that you will see US foreign policy concentrate on Asia probably to a greater extent than ever before. Certainly, I think probably surpassing the period between the start of the Korean War and the end of the Vietnam War, where there was a substantial focus on Asia. The United States still was at that stage, very focused on Europe as well and the threat from the Soviet Union there. There is no balancing threat in Europe anymore. And the United States, I think, has taken a decision to downgrade the importance of the Middle East as well. So I think the rhetoric that Joe Biden has been really foregrounding in terms of an alliance of democracies, working with allies and partners and a shifting of US strategic weight that really started with Obama was continued with Trump and will be accelerated under Biden. I think it's almost inevitable.

Ali Moore:

And to what extent is the US reliant on Australia in that picture?

Michael Wesley:

Increasingly so. We occupy a very valuable piece of real estate for the United States in its efforts to confront China. The United States finds its forces at risk of really quite sophisticated Chinese anti-access and area denial, missile, submarines, sensors, all of those sorts of things. Australia is situated far back enough, it has got enough strategic depth to allow the United States to base some of its presence here on Australian territory. We're already seeing Marines training in Darwin. I think you can probably expect to see a request from the United States for further basing facilities in Australia. That's a big step for us. We are one of the very, very few close US allies that was not asked to base US forces during the Cold War.

Ali Moore:

Is it a step you think Australia would take?

Michael Wesley:

Yes, I do, but we should take it with eyes very much open because think of the other places that the us has had bases during the Cold War: Japan, Korea, Western Europe. All have seen the US alliance become a significant dividing point in domestic politics. So we need to be very aware of that, but I think it would be almost inevitable for an Australian government to say yes.

Ali Moore:

So how would you describe the state of the Australia China relationship at the most?

Michael Wesley:

It's at its most attenuated and cold point at any time since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972. This is a situation that in my view is not retrievable. I don't think we will see a return to the sort of Australia China relationship we saw during that period, stretching from Whitlam to Howard again in my lifetime, unless there is a substantial change in either China or Australia. By that, I mean that what each side demands of the other to return the relationship to cordiality is politically unacceptable for each side to take. And so the most we can hope for in the Australia China relationship will be a stabilisation at a level of pragmatic coldness that will allow each side to deal



with each other, but not to trust each other, or to develop any sort of warmth of relationship that we've seen in the past.

Ali Moore:

When you talk about that inability for either side to do something that is going to be mutually agreeable, do you think there's a risk that China's going to become a permanent antagonist? And I look here at that extraordinary list of 14 disputes that the Chinese embassy in Canberra made public, including everything from what China called spearheading a crusade in multilateral forums on China's affairs in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, banning Huawei from 5G, blocking 10 Chinese foreign investment deals. Those 14 disputes are very specific and not things that Australia can walk away from.

Michael Wesley:

Exactly. I mean, there would not be a side of politics in Australia that could accede to any of those demands and win an election. It's politically unfeasible in my view. Is there a threat that China could be a permanent antagonist? Absolutely. And it's something that I think we need to take very seriously. For those who think that that can be something that we deal with lightly, think about how China has dealt with Taiwan for a period of well over half a century, of processes of diplomatic isolation, processes of closing down trade relations at a whim, processes of harassing citizens. If we think that the threat of foreign interference is serious and high in Australia, which of course it is, talk to the Taiwanese about what they deal with every single day from the People's Republic of China.

Ali Moore:

You've written about the shallowness of Australia's attempts to understand what's gone wrong. And before we look at how we might get to this next phase of the relationship, historical perspective and context is important, isn't it? You talk about three phases of the relationship.

Michael Wesley:

That's right. I think the first phase of the relationship was a phase of optimism. I think it began with Whitlam and stretched all the way through probably to the Tiananmen Square massacre. It was underpinned by strong complementarity of economic interests, but also a belief that as you engaged with China, China would change politically and become more like us. And I think there were periods where, for example, Bob Hawke in his close engagement with Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang really did believe that Australia could be almost the midwife of a liberalisation of China. Then there was a period of pragmatism that I think kicked in, in the early 1990s and went all the way through probably to the end of the Howard government.

Ali Moore:

Indeed, I was living in China in the early 1990s and Australia was relatively quick to return post Tiananmen Square.

Michael Wesley:

Indeed. I think that Australia saw two important interests in a good relationship with China. One was it could see the economic benefits starting to develop and China's economy really starting to roar along, and needing all of the sorts of things that we produce in abundance and quality.



Michael Wesley:

And secondly, I think Australia did look ahead and see that China would become a significant player in the region. And that for Australia to engage with Asia, we needed to have a good relationship with the major players in Asia, one of which had to be China. So there was this ... John Howard put it the best. He said, "You set aside your differences and you maximise your complementarities." And then I think beginning with Kevin Rudd, you've an increasing pessimism in Australia about China, a growing realisation, particularly with some of China's assertive activities in places like the South China Sea that you talked about before, that maybe this optimism that China would change, that China's increasing integration into the regional and global economy would cause it to really become socialised to regional norms and global norms, had been misplaced. That suddenly we were dealing with a fast growing economy with aggressive intent. And I think the pessimism about China and the fear about China has really escalated since that period.

Ali Moore:

And Australia has started belling the dragon.

Michael Wesley:

That's right. I think that as our concerns about China grew, our insecurities caused us to cleave ever more tightly to the United States. There was a period where we thought we could play both sides of the fence. John Howard was very famous and regular of saying, "We don't have to choose between our prosperity and our security." I think we realised that suddenly we needed the United States and the United States wasn't terribly happy with us developing a close relationship with Beijing. And we began to think that, well, maybe a way of shoring up our relationship with the United States might be putting some boundaries around our relationship with China. And I think that started to happen around the early 2010s when we started to make decisions around Huawei, around Chinese investment, when there was an uproar about Land Bridge's leasing of the port of Darwin. These are all points in time where we decided we needed to signal to the United States, that it wasn't all the way with China, that there was a limit to how much we were prepared to compromise in order to benefit economically from China.

Ali Moore:

So does that mean when you look at this triangular relationship between Washington, and Beijing, and Canberra, that Washington has won?

Michael Wesley:

I think Washington is much more comfortable with Australia's relationship with China now than it was, let's say in the 1990s and maybe the early 2000s.

Ali Moore:

Is that because Washington is very comfortable or that Australia has America first?

Michael Wesley:

Absolutely. And I think Washington now has seen evidence that Australia is willing to sacrifice some of its economic benefits and its economic complementarities in order to keep its relationship with China at an attenuated level. I think there are a lot of people in Washington who were very pleased



with that outcome because it shows that Australia has been willing to give something up in order to show where its loyalties lie.

Ali Moore:

How much do you think from China's perspective, the angst in the Australia, China relationship is connected to China, sending a bigger message, a message beyond Australia and message to other nations. Don't mess with us.

Michael Wesley:

Look, I think there's a very big element of that in there. There is a sense that if China tolerates the sort of behaviour that Australia is exhibiting, that it will embolden others in the region and beyond to do similar things. So I think there's a very big element of Australia being made an example of to send a message particularly into Southeast Asia.

Ali Moore:

Quite successfully so you'd have to say, wouldn't you?

Michael Wesley:

I think there wouldn't be many countries in the region that haven't noticed what China has been willing to subject Australia to. I'm not sure there would be many Southeast Asian countries, if any, that would be willing to respond to China in the way that Australia has. But certainly I think Beijing's behaviour towards Australia has reinforced the feelings of many countries in Southeast Asia that they don't want to follow down the track that Australia has ploughed.

Ali Moore:

You're listening to Ear to Asia from Asia Institute at the University of Melbourne. And just a reminder to listeners about Asia Institute's online publication on Asia and its societies, politics and cultures. It's called the Melbourne Asia Review. It's free to read and it's open access at [melbourneasiareview.edu.au](http://melbourneasiareview.edu.au). You'll find articles by some of our regular Ear to Asia guests and by many others. Plus you can catch recent episodes of Ear to Asia at the Melbourne Asia Review website, which again, you can find at [melbourneasiareview.edu.au](http://melbourneasiareview.edu.au). I'm Ali Moore. And my guest is international strategy expert, Professor Michael Wesley. We're discussing Australia's relationship with China and the United States.

Ali Moore:

So Michael, the very big question, how does Australia stabilise this relationship? And if as you write, Australia has decided that responding to the threat China poses outweighs the benefits of a pragmatic relationship with Beijing, might Australia have to rethink that equation before it does anything?

Michael Wesley:

It will. I think that there needs to be what I would call a pragmatic reset. What worries me about the way that our policy is developing on China is that it is becoming increasingly ideologically driven. There is increasing reference to treating China in the way that we treat China, because it is a one party authoritarian state. And to that, I would say two things.



Michael Wesley:

Firstly, China has always been a one party authoritarian state since 1949, and certainly since 1972. Nothing in that has changed. There hasn't been a revolution in Beijing.

Michael Wesley:

The second thing I would say is that looking at the region that Australia exists in, if we are going to respond ideologically to every bilateral relationship, we're not going to have very many good relationships in this region. Another way of saying that is if we start responding to other authoritarian states in our region in the same way that we respond to China, or that we act towards China, we're going to find ourselves very isolated in this part of the world. A great example is Vietnam. Vietnam and China share very similar political systems, and yet we have very different political relationships with both countries. So we need an element of taking the ideology out of the equation and putting some pragmatism back in. Yes, we have great policy differences with China. Yes we have, and we'll have ongoing disagreements with how China is choosing to assert itself internationally. But do we have to bell the dragon at every stage? Do we have to be the leading voice in holding Beijing to account?

Ali Moore:

But do you see any, I suppose, any catalyst for this, what would be an enormous shift in the current thinking under the current government, which has been the one that has introduced so many of the things, the measures that China has thought of as so offensive?

Michael Wesley:

I think the catalyst will probably be an economic one. We don't know how much harder China is going to choose to squeeze Australia. One point I would make is that most of the trade in commodities that we have with China comes from regional Australia. A lot of regional jobs depend on energy exports, depend on food exports, agribusiness exports. The economic hit to regional communities is going to come. It is hard to see how industries that China has targeted won't start to really feel the pressure and the pain from that. Now the coalition government has the National Party as part of the coalition. It's hard to see how rural communities will continue to be as comfortable with our quite combative approach to China if it's having real effects on regional Australia. I think that could be one catalyst for the current government recalibrating its thinking on China.

Ali Moore:

At the same time though, if you look at the punitive taxes that have been imposed on everything from coal to cotton to copper, the one thing that is not touched by either side is iron ore. Is that a potential point of leverage for Australia albeit Australia has shown no willingness to go there.

Michael Wesley:

I'm not sure Australia could afford to do that. I mean, China is so far and above our biggest customer for our biggest export. In a post COVID world in which we're trying to rebuild an economy in which we need export income, I'm not sure we're willing to go there.

Ali Moore:



But doesn't that go to the heart of Australia's position, whether we're ideological or we're pragmatic? If we're pragmatic, then we have to accept that for the benefit of our economy, there are things that we will do. Or if we're ideological, which is the path we appear to be on, it's an all or nothing. There shouldn't be some areas like iron ore carved up just because they're too important.

Michael Wesley:

Yeah. Well, I mean, there's also a point of principle here. Does Australia stand for free trade? The types of actions that China is taking against Australia are patently, patently against the principles of free trade that Australia has stood for, for a very long time. I think it would be an act of sheer folly for Australia to retaliate against China in a tit-for-tat way, because A, I don't think it would make one jot of difference to what China actually did. And B, I think it would compromise us in a really fundamental way.

Ali Moore:

There's also, of course China's Dual Circulation strategy. Can you tell us how that sort of fits into the aim or the intention of self-sufficiency and where that could leave Australia if it doesn't play nice?

Michael Wesley:

So this is China's big gamble as far as I can tell. The Dual Circulation strategy, which was announced by Xi Jinping last year basically says that China now has sufficient economic size and sufficient trusted partners internationally to be able to with stand an economic isolation on behalf of the United States and its allies. So it's a big gamble. It's a question of whether China has sufficient economic momentum, whether the Chinese economy has enough of what it needs to continue to grow and to continue to prosper. And whether over time it can replace Australian exports to China, with exports from other countries, places like Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Latin America.

Ali Moore:

Do you think it can, if you go on it's track record of achievements?

Michael Wesley:

Yet to be seen. Yet to be seen. Of course, Australia is not the only potential major producer of things like iron, or coal, gas.

Ali Moore:

No, indeed, you've got the Simandou Mine in Guinea for example, which will come online in the next few years.

Michael Wesley:

Indeed. And so the question is can China access enough of that material? Brazil will come back online. Vale will once again, surge back to be a major competitor for our iron ore producers. So I think the question for China is, is there going to be enough supply at the right cost and the right price to be able to continue to supply China's needs? I think that's a big question.

Ali Moore:





If we can just explore a pragmatic relationship between Australia and China in a bit more detail. I mean, you've written quite a lot about how it might work about the recognition it would require, intimate collaborations would not be possible, that while basic interests might be opposed, there'd be limits to that opposition. But fundamentally can relationships of distrust work?

Michael Wesley:

Yes they can. And I think there's plenty of examples of how that works. In Europe is a great example of a set of distrustful relationships that have been made work. The legacies of the Second World War and the Cold War is still very strong in Europe, where you have a great deal of distrust between countries, particularly in Eastern Europe. Germany is still looked upon askance I think by many countries in Europe. And yet they make those relationships work. So I think that the relationship between South Korea and Japan, even though it can become really quite acrimonious at times, it's a relationship of distrust, but it's been made to work in very pragmatic ways. So I think that Australia needs to learn from these examples. I think the relationship between Vietnam and China, as well is a relationship of deep distrust built over centuries, but it's a pragmatic relationship as well. It's about making sure that you draw limits around where the mistrust is allowed to affect relations, and it's about finding ways to build on mutual interests. And I think we have to rediscover how to do that with China.

Ali Moore:

If Australia can rediscover how to do that with China, where would that leave the relationship with America?

Michael Wesley:

Look, I think one of the things that we need to signal to the United States is that we have our own national interests, particularly in relation to countries in this particular part of the world. They will not always follow what America's preferences are, but we won't tolerate our relationships with any Asia Pacific country to be mortgaged to the benefit of our relationship with the United States. These are independent relationships. I think there is benefit to trying to decouple the relationship between Australia and China, from their relationship with the United States. That's a very difficult task.

Ali Moore:

In a practical sense, how does Australia do that?

Michael Wesley:

First of all, we need to be a little bit more self confident about our strategic value to the United States. I think that this kind of ongoing "fear of abandonment", the title of a wonderful book by Allan Gyngell, that we've had that when we come to blows in the region, particularly with a major competitor like China, the United States simply won't show up. I think we've got to start to get over that and realise that sure we do need the United States, but the United States needs us as well. But it's also about sitting down with the United States and saying, listen, we've got interest in a pragmatic relationship with China. You have interests in Australia having a pragmatic relationship with China. You need to let us get on with it. I think governments, particularly over the last decade, have been a little bit too anxious about what Washington has thought about our relationship with China.

Ali Moore:



I suppose the ultimate question and the one that seems to increasingly be on people's lips of late is Taiwan, if we're talking about whether America will show up. And in the weeks leading up to the recording of this podcast and the third week of April, there've been numerous stories about the mooted likelihood of China moving on Taiwan. What is your thinking? And do you think it is guaranteed that America would turn up?

Michael Wesley:

It depends on what Chinese pressure looks like. And this is the big dilemma for the United States and its allies. What China has shown as has Russia, is that they understand very clearly where America's red lines are. And they're very willing to apply pressure at just below those threshold, just below those red lines. So what the United States needs to do along with its allies is to rethink how it responds to pressure being put on its strategic settings that fall just below those red lines and what it wants to do. Because unless the United States does that, it will find itself increasingly unable to respond and not sure how to respond to these sorts of situations. What worries me is China's recent rhetoric about being able to isolate Taiwan, to cut off all access. And I would dearly hope that there is some very detailed planning being done in the Pentagon, but also in Russell Offices in Canberra, about scenarios and how we'd respond to those scenarios.

Ali Moore:

But it is the ultimate challenge, isn't it? I mean, as one commentator put it, "If Beijing conquered Taiwan, it would put the question and then put the question to the Americans. Will you risk nuclear annihilation to restore a small Pacific democracy?"

Michael Wesley:

Exactly.

Ali Moore:

Stark, harsh but real.

Michael Wesley:

Absolutely. I would put it slightly differently. I think that China realises that conquering Taiwan is not going to be an easy thing. The Taiwanese have been thinking about this and planning for this for a very, very, very long time. The question is what would the United States do to prevent China conquering Taiwan? And would it put itself at threat of nuclear exchange over that? That's a very, very big question. It's a big question for the Chinese as well.

Ali Moore:

It's also, I guess in part one of the issues that will consume the minds involved in the quad – the quadrilateral security dialogue between the US, Japan, India and Australia. How do you see a more pragmatic approach by Australia, towards China fitting in with the quad? What's the role of the quad?

Michael Wesley:

I think the quad will probably play a relatively minor role in our strategic rethinking about how we respond to a much more conflictual region. I think the much more meaningful relationship there is



the trilateral security dialogue with the United States and Japan. That's been a much longer standing set of relationships. There is much greater strategic intimacy between those three countries while relations are building with India, that leg of the quadrilateral will be a much more attenuated leg. I think that Australia and Japan are absolutely crucial strategic partners for the United States. They need to be right at the table, helping the United States think through real scenarios, such as what we would do if China did start to blockade Taiwan. India is a much more peripheral discussant in those situations. It has its own very significant relationship with China, but I would urge us to be really doubling down on that relationship with Japan and the United States.

Ali Moore:

So just stepping back a bit, I mean, Australia has always been in a position where it's sought to balance its security and its economic interests. Do you think that while on the one hand, it is now perhaps a much harder balancing act than it has ever been before? Are you confident that Australia will be able to move beyond what appears to be a state of paralysis in its relationship with China?

Michael Wesley:

I think that there's a real possibility that the region will split. It's been a bit of a nightmare scenario that a lot of people have been thinking about for some time. And that is that what has been a very economically integrated region will split between a China centred region and a US economy centred region as well. If that occurs, I think that Australia will probably see its economic relationship on all fronts with China shrivel quite significantly. And we will become invested in a US centred sort of economic sub region if you like.

Ali Moore:

And would that be a conscious decision, a conscious decision not to follow this more pragmatic approach that you've been outlining?

Michael Wesley:

It may be conscious, or it may just be what happens to us as China begins to demand less of what we produce. And we begin to demand much less of what China produces. I think that future is a much poorer future for Australia. I fail to see how the countries that would probably become part of the US centred block would generate that sort of economic dynamism to generate the sort of demand for Australia's commodities that we've traditionally seen.

Ali Moore:

How likely is that though?

Michael Wesley:

I think there's a reasonable likelihood that that would occur. It all depends on how far advanced the economic decoupling between the United States and China would develop, and how much China decides to redirect its demand away from US allies in that process. Australia, I think is a key player in that process, but Japan is another. So whether China decides to reorient its economy away from Japan, and Japan away from China is another really, really, really big question. Southeast Asia is a big player in all of these sorts of questions as well.



Michael Wesley:

So it's something that I think that I hope won't happen. I hope that we can salvage in an age of rivalry, an element of economic integration in the region. That in itself requires an element of pragmatism, an element of countries deciding that they will continue to trade with countries that they don't distrust and maybe even some institution building. I think that institutions like APEC in these sorts of situations really do need to step up and make sure they put in place structures that make sure that despite increasing strategic rivalry, economic trade and investment does continue across these lines of rivalry.

Ali Moore:

And so from Australia's point of view, is time of the essence? There needs to be a more proactive approach?

Michael Wesley:

Absolutely. We're a founding member of many of these institutions. We need to rethink what they're about and what we want to try and achieve through them, and to bring on board other like-minded countries as well that may be as worried as we are about what the economic consequences for the region might be.

Ali Moore:

Just a last question because I can't tell from your answers so far, are you optimistic?

Michael Wesley:

My optimism scale about Australia in the region is not particularly buoyant at the moment, but I haven't yet slipped over the line into pessimism. I still think that farsighted, creative Australian diplomacy can still work. We just need to give it a little bit more of a chance than we have been. A lot of people have made this point, but when you're putting all of your investment in your foreign affairs, into your defence force and starving your diplomacy and development assistance of resources and initiative, you're not giving yourself much of a chance. So I would hope there would be a rethink and a reset of the way in which we conceive of our foreign policy, and a little bit more initiative and imagination in what we seek to achieve in the region.

Ali Moore:

Michael Wesley, thank you so much for talking to Ear to Asia.

Michael Wesley:

My pleasure, Ali.

Ali Moore:

Our guest has been international relations expert Professor Michael Wesley from the University of Melbourne. Ear to Asia is brought to you by Asia Institute of the University of Melbourne. You can find more information about this and all our other episodes at the Asia Institute website. Be sure to keep up with every episode of Ear to Asia by following us on the Apple Podcast app, Stitcher, Spotify or SoundCloud. And if you like the show, please rate and review it on Apple Podcasts. Every positive review helps new listeners find the show and please help us by spreading the word on social media.



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